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In this thesis I present a philosophical argument that defends a particular approach to 
the legitimation of substantive principles of justice in the context of a modem society. 
Philosophy must seek to justify a procedure of legitimation that gives us a conception 
o f an impartial point of view. This procedure could then act as a critical test of 
substantive claims about justice. However philosophy must not actually carry this 
legitimacy test out itself. This task must be left to all those who are to be affected by 
the principles in question. The first of three chapters is a critical analysis of the 
procedure of impartiality that is outlined by John Rawls. I will argue that a 
consideration of the views of Rawls's communitarian, post-structuralist and feminist 
critics reveals that his procedure is flawed in a number of important respects. The 
most important flaw is the fact that Rawls's procedure represents a monological point 
of view where all differences between represented parties are eliminated prior to a 
consideration of substantive principles of justice. In the second chapter, Michael 
Walzer's attempt to theorise justice without recourse to a philosophical conception of 
an impartial procedure will be examined. While Walzer's approach has certain 
advantages over Rawls's, his failure to justify an impartial point of view means that 
his interpretive account of justice is dangerously partial. In the third chapter I will 
present a theory of justice that overcomes the weaknesses of both Rawls's 
monological proceduralism and Walzer's contextualist anti-proceduralism. Jurgen 
Habermas presents us with a dialogical conception of impartiality that can retain 
Walzer's context sensitivity without losing the critical edge that a philosophical 
conception o f an impartial point o f view brings to a legitimacy test for substantive 
principles of justice. Furthermore, Habermas clearly separates the philosophical task 
of clarifying an impartial point of view from the democratic task of legitimating 
principles of justice. I will focus my attention on the dialogical conception of 
impartiality that is at the core of Habermas's discourse ethics so as to show that his 
work is the best available theoretical guide for the necessarily procedural task we 
face, that of legitimating substantive principles of justice in a modem context.
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1INTRODUCTION
To demand justice or to claim that an injustice has been suffered is to 
engage in the practice of social criticism. In this thesis I wish to explore 
one aspect of justice as a tool of social criticism in the context of a 
modem society. Social criticism in any society depends on a descriptive 
understanding of how the institutions and practices of that society came 
to be as they are. This involves an analysis of the struggles of the 
society’s history, its achievements and its failures. It is to the work of 
historians, social scientists and legal scholars that we should look for the 
resources necessary to inform this descriptive understanding.
But criticism also depends on a normative understanding of the 
society. This normative understanding can be thought of as a substantive 
account of justice. Such an account provides a test for historical 
achievements. It articulates the standards or principles by which the 
institutions and practices of that society are called to account. A social 
critic will argue that some aspect of society fails this test of justice. The 
critic is expressing a tension between the descriptive and the normative 
understandings of the people to whom the criticism is addressed. This 
tension should be a matter of public concern, the subject of an informed 
and inclusive discussion.
My chief concern is to inquire as to how a substantive account of 
justice is to be grounded and justified. One of the most significant 
characteristics of a modem society is that people do not share one 
comprehensive conception of what constitutes a good life for human 
beings. In a modem society there is not one religious or general 
philosophical worldview that is shared universally but rather there is a 
wide ranging plurality of worldviews. Furthermore, people can have very
2good reasons for not coming to an agreement about certain 
comprehensive questions as to what constitutes a good human life. It 
would appear therefore that no one worldview can ground, by itself, an 
account of justice which all people in a modem society would have good 
reason to affirm.
Given the many divergent beliefs about how a human life should be 
led, and the corresponding variety of lifestyles that are represented in 
modem societies, it is no easy task to say what it is to give an account of 
justice. It does seem to be the case however that the notion of 
impartiality, the idea that no one person or group is arbitrarily favoured 
by any account of justice that could claim to be legitimate, must be 
central to our concerns here. Under modem conditions justice must be 
grounded, not in one comprehensive worldview, but within some 
framework that treats people who do not share worldviews in an 
impartial manner. The justification of some such framework has been 
one of the great questions with which political philosophy, since the 
Reformation at least, has had to grapple. I will address myself to two 
questions that are related to this problem.
First, who is qualified to give an account of justice? I will argue that 
no one philosopher, political theorist or indeed anybody else, is qualified 
to provide an account of the substance of justice in a modem society. To 
claim to do so is to overestimate the extent to which any one citizen 
could adopt an objective and impartial standpoint where the various 
perspectives of all citizens are equally represented. Philosophers are no 
more or less qualified than other citizens in this regard. Any citizen, who 
claims to be able to overcome the difficulties involved here, fails to take 
sufficiently seriously the very real possibility of disagreements, 
differences and tensions surfacing between the plurality of worldviews 
and the social groups they represent in modem societies. A substantive
3account of justice can only be produced in an on-going manner, as the 
outcome of democratic deliberation where this plurality of perspectives is 
more adequately represented. This could only happen if each social 
group were to speak and act on its own behalf.
For this reason the attempt to derive philosophically a definitive, 
substantive account of justice for a living political community would 
appear to be an unproductive one. To pursue that task would be to deny 
the historical nature of a community's normative self-understanding by 
closing off any future discussion or revision. This would involve the 
assumption that the community’s history had reached its end, that public 
debate about justice could with good reason be closed off since things 
were not going to change in any significant way in the future. This 
assumption, that history has no future, has a particularly poor track 
record.
Second, under what conditions could a substantive account of justice 
that is legitimate be produced? Even though philosophers are not 
themselves qualified to give a substantive account of justice, I want to 
argue that they can attempt to provide a philosophical justification for a 
procedure that would serve as a legitimacy test for substantive principles 
of justice. The point of advocating such a procedure is to clarify the 
criteria according to which a political community could judge legitimately 
between competing claims about justice under particular circumstances. 
In making this argument I will draw on the work of Jurgen Habermas.1 
According to Habermas, philosophers can, and should, refrain from 
claiming any special qualification to give a substantive account of justice.
1 See especially Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 1990 and Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse 
Ethics, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1993.
4They can however, simultaneously, defend a discursive procedure of 
legitimation that places certain normatively justified constraints on the 
on-going democratic deliberation that yields principles of justice for 
particular political communities.
The discussion is divided into three chapters. Each of these will 
examine an influential and important theoretical contribution to recent 
debates about justice. John Rawls has defended what is perhaps the most 
celebrated theory of justice of this century.2 Rawls presents a procedure 
of legitimation that claims to specify the conditions of an impartial point 
of view. He also derives from that procedure two substantive principles 
of justice that are to regulate the basic structure of a modem democratic 
society.3 In the first chapter I will assess the procedure he presents as a 
philosophical articulation of conditions of fairness for the choice of 
substantive principles of justice. The discussion offers a critique of 
Rawls's procedure by reconstructing arguments that could be made from 
the theoretical perspectives of communitarianism, post-structuralism and 
feminism. After anticipating this critique, in the first section, with 
reference to Marxian objections to contractarian approaches to justice in 
general, I will develop arguments from each of these three perspectives in 
the remaining three sections of the chapter.
My suggestion in this chapter is that Rawls’s procedure is excessively 
theorist-centred. By this I mean that it depends too much on the
2 His most important work is A Theory o f Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1972 but for recent developments in his defence of the argument made there 
Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
3 Although it is not the case in A Theory o f Justice, it is clear in Political Liberalism
that Rawls's procedure is justified with reference to the particular traditions of 
Western democratic societies. The significant difference between this type of 
justification and the strictly universalist one that Habermas offers for his theory 
of justice is one of the central themes of this thesis.
5unwarranted assumption that a constructivist philosopher, such as 
himself, can know what all other citizens will agree on to be matters of 
justice. I will focus on Rawls’s attempt to isolate political aspects of 
citizens' morality from all other aspects of their moral views because I 
believe that this attempt highlights this theorist-centred assumption.
Rawls is forced to make this assumption because of the fact that he 
theorises impartiality in, what I will call, a monological way. It is a 
monological in that all citizens of a democratic community are presumed 
to reason, in isolation from each other, in exactly the same way from an 
impartial point of view. On this account no real differences between 
citizens are articulated within the framework of an impartial procedure.
The monological nature of this procedure leads Rawls to argue, 
mistakenly in my view, that he can derive, as an integral part of the 
theory, certain definitive and substantive principles of justice for a 
modem democratic society. Rawls’s procedure does not reflect 
adequately the full variety of perspectives among social groups that one 
can expect under conditions of modem pluralism. A philosopher must 
never assume, prior to public deliberation, that some certain aspects of 
the moral views of citizens are political, and therefore of public concern 
in relation to the demands of justice, while other aspects of the citizens’ 
moral views are not. The relation between the political and the non­
political must itself be treated as a subject of on-going debate among all 
the citizens of a democratic community.
In the second chapter I will consider the work of one political theorist 
who rejects entirely the claim that philosophy can defend a procedure of 
legitimation for substantive accounts of justice. Michael Walzer rejects 
proceduralism for the sake of democratic pluralism.4 He believes that no
6philosophically articulated procedure of impartiality can reflect 
adequately the real differences among the citizens of modem 
democracies. He does not therefore seek an alternative procedure to that 
advocated by Rawls but rather he rejects the procedural project 
altogether. Walzer advocates instead a hermeneutic, or interpretive, 
approach to justice and social criticism where substantive principles of 
justice are thought to be embedded in the shared understandings of 
particular communities. He shifts the focus of a theory of justice away 
from impartial procedures of legitimation towards the articulation, 
through democratic dialogue, of the substance of justice in particular 
contexts.
I will introduce Walzer’s work, in the first section of the chapter, by 
considering the idea of complex equality. This notion gives shape to the 
substantive account of justice that Walzer advocates for a modem 
democratic society and I will discuss it in relation to the two substantive 
principles that Rawls proposes. Both accounts can be thought of as 
significant contributions to an on-going debate among all citizens as to 
what the substance of justice for any modem society might be. Both 
theorists offer serious and carefully worked out proposals that could act 
as highly stimulating catalysts for democratic deliberation. They are not 
the last word of course on the substance of justice for any one community 
since no one citizen can have the last word on that.
My purpose in discussing these two substantive accounts is initially 
to add some weight to Walzer’s claim, that any theory of justice that 
stresses procedures of impartiality is necessarily insensitive to particular 
contexts. I will suggest that Walzer's account of complex equality does
4 See especially Spheres o f Justice: A Defence o f Pluralism and Equality, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1983 and Interpretation and Social Criticism, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987.
7have important advantages over Rawls’s two principles because it 
facilitates a detailed elaboration of the substantive demands of justice in a 
way that is highly sensitive to cultural particularity. Of course the fact 
that Walzer's indeterminate notion of complex equality has significant 
advantages over Rawls’s principles as an account of the substance of 
justice does not in itself justify his rejection of proceduralism. In fact it 
merely underlines the fact that a substantive account of justice that 
proposes particular, determinate principles should not be presented as an 
integral part of a philosophical theory of justice. The democratic task of 
articulating a substantive account of justice must be thought of as being 
strictly separate from the philosophical task of clarifying an impartial 
point of view.
In the remaining two sections of the second chapter I will explore at 
greater depth the implications of Walzer's hermeneutic approach to 
justice. The discussion in the second section will suggest that, despite 
the views of many critics, an interpretive approach to justice need not 
defend tradition in a conservative way. However, while this implies that 
it can facilitate an important form of social criticism, I will suggest in the 
third section, that in failing to treat the justification of procedures of 
impartiality as the core of a theory of justice, Walzer's hermeneutic 
approach remains one-sided and dangerously inadequate.
In the third chapter I introduce Habermas's alternative approach to 
justice as outlined in his universalist moral theory or discourse ethics. In 
my view discourse ethics presents us with the best theoretical guide 
available to us in addressing questions as to how we can test the 
legitimacy of substantive principles of justice in the public life of a 
modem society. The discursive procedure that Habermas defends is 
grounded in certain pragmatic presuppositions of everyday 
communication that are both necessary and unavoidable. I will first of all
8explain, in the first section, the nature of the philosophical argument that 
Habermas claims to make in justifying this procedure. The way in which 
his moral theory is, like his critical social theory, built on the notion of 
communicative action will be explained. By presenting a moral theory in 
terms of a theory of communication, Habermas can conceive of an 
impartial point of view in a way that is necessarily dialogical rather than 
monological. This is because communicative action always takes place 
within the context of an intersubjective encounter that can never be 
reduced to the reflections of one isolated individual.
After giving a detailed reconstruction of Habermas's justification of 
discourse ethics I will argue, in the second section, that the dialogical 
view of impartiality that this represents is sufficiently sensitive to 
differences between social groups to avoid successfully the weaknesses 
exposed in the earlier critique of Rawls's procedure. From this 
perspective any substantive account of justice must be necessarily the 
outcome of an on-going public debate and so it can never be presented as 
an integral part of a philosophical theory. To this extent Habermas 
agrees with Walzer. At the same time however, he avoids the dangers of 
hermeneutics by retaining the notion of impartiality as the core of justice 
in the context of a modem society. Furthermore, by justifying his 
impartial procedure of legitimation in terms of the pragmatic 
presuppositions of communicative action, Habermas gives his moral 
theory a strong universalist grounding. This universalist thrust 
establishes a critical foothold that is more adequate to the task of 
challenging the effects of power in contemporary societies than anything 
that is available to a hermeneutic conception of justice and social 
criticism.
Habermas's account of discursive legitimation can be thought of as a 
synthesis of the approaches of Rawls and Walzer. While Rawls's
9project, of attempting to give a philosophical justification of an impartial 
procedure that tests the legitimacy of substantive principles of justice, is 
the right one, he remains vulnerable to the better criticisms of a variety of 
contextualists. On the other hand, while Walzer's stress on the dialogical 
nature of any substantive account of justice is not misplaced, his rejection 
of Rawls’s procedural project leads him into serious difficulties in 
clarifying theoretically the demands of justice in a modem society. The 
conception of dialogical impartiality, that discourse ethics makes 
available, manages to take the best from these two alternative approaches 
to theorising justice. It also avoids their most serious limitations. Much 
of this is achieved by the separation of the philosophical task of justifying 
a procedure of legitimation from the democratic task of actually testing 
the legitimacy of substantive accounts of justice in particular contexts.
In the third section of this chapter I hope to make it clear that 
discourse ethics can be defended from the contextualist criticisms of 
those who are sceptical of its universalist grounding. Finally, in the 
fourth section I will assess the implications of my argument for one 
particular dispute about justice where the problems of pluralism are 
particularly acute. This will be an analysis of the case of Northern 
Ireland and there I will try to give concrete evidence in support of the 
claim that discourse ethics succeeds much better than Walzer's 
contextualist approach in clarifying the demands of justice in that 
particular context.
My argument overall suggests that, in a modem, pluralist society, 
political philosophy can at best provide a procedural test of the 
legitimacy of substantive claims about justice. Disputed claims can only 
be addressed in the actual context of particular political communities.
The discussion can be thought of as a contribution to our understanding 
of what is at stake when we argue about justice in any modem pluralist
10
society. My hope is to clarify how we might best support the aspiration 
to a more just social reality as it is articulated in the on-going public 
disputes that sustain us as living democratic communities.
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1 JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS AND THE ISOLATION 
OF THE POLITICAL
The separation of a political domain from other aspects of social life is 
fundamental to liberal accounts of justice. The isolation of a political 
domain sets a limit to the aspects of social life that are of public concern 
and anything that falls outside this domain is thought to be beyond the 
scope of justice. It is certainly nothing new to be critical of naive 
attempts to isolate the political domain by limiting it to matters of formal 
civil and legal rights of individuals while ignoring the effects of social 
and economic structures on the effective exercise of those rights. In this 
chapter I want to argue that even though this naivete is not characteristic 
of the most highly sophisticated theory of justice yet presented within the 
liberal tradition, that of John Rawls, his approach to questions of justice 
remains crucially flawed in this regard. Rawls's defence of his account of 
justice as fairness depends on an attempt to isolate the political domain in 
a way that places an excessive emphasis on the role of the theorist in 
testing principles of justice appropriate to a modern society. I will 
suggest that the attempt to isolate the political involves a monological 
view of impartiality that is insufficiently sensitive to the differing 
perspectives among the diverse social groups that are characteristic of a 
modem society.
The chapter presents a critique of the procedural test of the 
legitimacy of substantive principles of justice that Rawls defends in his 
theory. The critique will focus on the consequences of Rawls's attempt to 
isolate the political. I argue that the boundary between the political and 
the non-political, that sets a limit to the scope of justice, can never be 
assumed in any theory constructed by a lone philosopher but rather it
12
must be treated as an on-going matter of public debate. Rawls presents 
us with an inadequate account of conditions of fairness, or an impartial 
point of view. By ruling out the explicit articulation of different 
perspectives in the choice of substantive principles of justice, Rawls runs 
the serious risk of giving insufficient attention to the particular concerns 
of marginal social groups.
In the first section I will place Rawls's work within the liberal 
tradition in relation to the isolation of the political domain. This 
discussion will allow us to anticipate the criticisms that are to follow in 
the remainder of the chapter by introducing certain Marxian objections to 
liberal assumptions about justice. Marxism can be thought of as, in a 
sense, the precursor of the three critical perspectives considered in the 
remaining sections. This is because Marxism highlights the dangers 
involved for any one theorist who claims to be able to construct 
theoretically an account of justice that is assumed to be acceptable to all. 
Marxism concerns itself with the potential danger of a class bias being 
built into such a construction. This bias may be rooted in certain 
assumptions that the theorist brings unwittingly to the task. Such a bias 
would render the account of justice an ideological account, in spite of the 
theorist's best attempts to remain impartial.
The three perspectives that I draw on in the remaining sections 
concern themselves in different ways with potential biases in Rawls's 
account of justice. Each of these perspectives, communitarianism, post- 
structuralism and feminism, claim to represent distinctive, and often 
marginal, voices in public debates about justice in the context of a 
modem society. I will consider the possible objections that could be 
raised from these three perspectives in relation to three particular aspects 
of Rawls's theory. The second section deals with communitarian 
objections to the way that Rawls defends the claim that the right is prior
13
to the good. The third section presents post-structuralist objections to 
Rawls's construction of an impartial point of view, what he calls the 
original position. The fourth section is concerned with feminist 
objections to Rawls’s neglect of issues of justice within the family and 
also with the relation between justice and solidarity.
My strategy in each section will be to assess the extent to which the 
criticisms that I reconstruct can be sustained against Rawls. While I do 
not question the importance of the procedural task that Rawls has set for 
himself, that of offering a philosophical justification of an impartial point 
of view that can test the legitimacy of principles of justice, I reject the 
procedure that he himself proposes. The most damaging criticisms of 
Rawls's procedure that can be reconstructed from the three perspectives I 
discuss, converge in highlighting the theoretical difficulties involved in 
the attempt to isolate the political. I will argue that this is related to his 
monological view of impartiality. Since all parties to the original position 
are assumed to reason in the same way, the procedure of choice that is 
presented is static rather than dynamic. Differences in perspective must 
be overcome prior to the choice of principles of justice. Furthermore, the 
basic theoretical assumptions that Rawls builds into his construction are 
not open to question within the framework of the procedure of choice 
itself. I hope to show that a procedure of legitimation that is to be 
adequate to the critical task required of it in a modem society must 
incorporate, more successfully than Rawls does, the concerns of the 
critics whose work I examine in this chapter.
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1.1 RAWLS. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF MARXISM
Rawls's work has revived the tradition of social contract theory.1 Rawls 
is to be thought of as a contract theorist in the liberal tradition. Liberal 
contract theory has its origins in the work of Locke but its most 
significant formulation, at least in relation to our concerns here, was 
achieved in the work of Kant. First of all, I will make some introductory 
comments so as to place Rawls in the contractarian tradition of 
liberalism. In the later part of the section I will outline certain Marxist 
objections to Rawls’s liberal account of justice. This discussion will 
anticipate the critique to follow, of Rawls's attempt to isolate the 
political.
Liberalism and Contract Theory
A clearly defined separation of the political, that is the domain of life that 
is legitimately of public concern, from the non-political is the distinctive 
feature of the more liberal versions of the social contract, notably those of 
Locke2 and Kant.3 For Locke the protection of our natural rights to life, 
liberty and private property set limits to the legitimate role of civil
1 Rawls's A Theory o f Justice is considered in the context of social contract theory in
Michael Lessnoff Social Contract, London: Macmillan, 1986. For general 
introductions to that tradition see J.W. Gough The Social Contract, Second 
edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957 and Patrick Riley Will and Political 
Legitimacy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.
2 The Second Treatise o f Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration, Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1966.
3 See especially the second section of "On the Common Saying: This may be true in
theory, but it does not apply in practice'" in Kant: Political Writings, Second 
edition, Hans Reiss (ed.), Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 
73-87.
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government. For Kant the "pure rational principles of external human 
right" establish the legitimate civil state.4 The personal welfare of each 
individual is a private matter once it is framed in accordance with the 
public principles of right. It may be worth stressing the liberalism of the 
versions of contractarianism in Locke and Kant by contrasting them very 
briefly with the less liberal versions to be found in Hobbes5 and 
Rousseau.6
According to Hobbes we defend our primary interests by accepting 
some limitation on our freedom. We do this by consenting to the power 
of the state so as to escape from our natural state of war. The sovereign 
might be one person or it could be an assembly. In either case it is 
rational for all of us to abandon to the sovereign our judgement as to 
what is needed to protect each individual’s right to self-preservation.7 We 
are equal before the sovereign since in the state of nature we are equally 
vulnerable to the dangers of potential conflict and loss of our life, 
"solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short" as it is.8 It is rational therefore, 
in order to protect our right to life and whatever sustains it, that we 
accept in a form of social contract the restrictions placed on our freedom 
by the laws enacted by the sovereign. In the public realm we are subject 
to the sovereign so that we can enjoy the necessary protection that 
enables us to sustain our lives and so to pursue our rational self-interest 
in satisfying our private desires and in living a commodious life.
4 Kant: Political Writings, 74.
5 Leviathan, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.
6 The Social Contract and Discourses, London: Dent, 1973.
7 Leviathan, 227.
8 Leviathan, 186.
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Hobbes's conclusion is authoritarian.9 So long as the sovereign 
protects us, enabling our self-preservation, it is rational for us to submit 
to political authority and to obey. While we retain a right of self-defence 
there are no other particular rights that protect any clearly defined private 
sphere for the individual. For Locke, in contrast, civil government is 
legitimately established by contract to protect the individual's natural 
rights to life, liberty and private property from the interference of any 
potential threat. It is rational for us to consent to and to trust the power 
of the state and to take upon ourselves the obligations involved as 
citizens so that we can enjoy the benefits of these natural rights in our 
private lives. Our public obligations are legitimate if they protect our 
private interests.
This division of society into realms of the public, or the political, and 
that which is excluded from the political domain, is at the very foundation 
of the liberal tradition. For Locke, the public realm comes into existence 
in the first place, out of the state of nature, because of our need to come 
to some agreement as to what could protect our natural rights as 
individuals. So long as we keep our part of the contract, nobody, not 
even the state itself, can legitimately interfere in the non-political, or 
private, realm that is protected by individual rights. If however the 
government loses the trust of the people by failing to respect their natural 
rights, then the people are justified in resisting its authority. In this case 
the government has forfeited its legitimacy.10
While Locke sees a separation of powers as an essential check on 
government for the protection of the individual, Rousseau's contract is of
9 See especially the chapter "Of the Rights of Soveraignes by Institution" Leviathan, 
228-239.
10 Second Treatise, 105-122.
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a rather different character.11 It results in the sovereignty of the general 
will. Despite the vast differences between Rousseau and Hobbes, the 
general will resembles the Leviathan, in so far as neither of them 
guarantee the natural rights of the individual.12 The general will requires 
the "total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the 
whole community."13 Rousseau assumes however that the general will 
cannot do any harm to individual members of the body politic as the 
purpose of the contract is to protect the associates, allowing each to 
remain as free as before. Locke's checks on government are therefore 
thought to be simply unnecessary.
Rousseau's concern for unity and commonality of purpose contrasts 
sharply with Locke’s emphasis on the natural rights of the individual. It is 
this stress on individual rights, and the implicit protection of a definitive 
private sphere that distinguishes Locke from Hobbes and Rousseau, 
marking him out as a liberal. In this respect Kant too is undoubtedly a 
liberal. For Kant however the non-political realm is not protected by 
specific natural rights but rather by a distinction between the right and the 
good. It is the Kantian claim that the right has priority over the good that 
is the key feature of Rawls's attempt to isolate the political. As we will 
see later, this is one of the key issues on which debates about 
contemporary liberalism have been focussed.
Kant's contract is "an idea of reason, which nonetheless has 
undoubted practical reality."14 The practical reality of the idea of an
11 Second Treatise, 73-75.
12 Gough The Social Contract, 173-174.
15 The Social Contract and Discourses, 191.
14 Kant: Political Writings, 79.
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original contract consists in its being a test for the rightness or legitimacy
of public law. Justice must be based on principles to which all citizens
could consent.15 This original contract could only come about through
the united will of the people, and that in turn requires that the parties to
the contract are free, equal and independent. The freedom of the parties
consists in the principle that
each may seek his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as 
he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to pursue a similar 
end which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else 
within a workable general law - i.e. he must accord to others the 
same right as he enjoys himself.16
A workable general law of justice must be willed by a plurality of free 
agents who do not share a view of their own happiness or a conception of 
the good. It is by virtue of their capacity to choose a conception of the 
good, and not its content, that human beings are capable of possessing 
rights.
The parties are equal as subjects before the law in that no one can 
coerce any other except through the law. This means that hereditary 
privilege, which from birth creates an inequality among subjects in terms 
of their legal position, could not be legitimate. All subjects are equally 
entitled to pursue their own ends, while none of them is to have any legal 
advantages over the others in that pursuit.17 Furthermore the unity of
15 Onora O’Neill argues that this idea, that we should only adopt principles that the
plurality of all possible voices in a shared world could affirm, is the fundamental 
principle of the entire Kantian enterprise of undertaking a critique of reason. See 
the first chapter of her Constructions o f Reason, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989, 3-27.
16 Kant: Political Writings, 74.
17 Kant: Political Writings, 74-77.
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wills that constitutes the original contract can only be achieved if those 
whose wills it unifies are independent of each other. What Kant means 
here is that citizens cannot be dependent on others to the extent that they 
are unable to support themselves economically. If this were the case they 
could not serve the commonwealth alone, as they would be vulnerable to 
be used in this respect by those on whom they are dependent.18
Since Kant's contract is to be thought of as a test for the legitimacy of 
a law, the political domain is restricted, and the non-political protected, in 
ways that would not be possible under the absolute rule of Hobbes's 
Leviathan. Similarly, while Kant shares with Rousseau the desire for a 
unity of wills that allows each to remain as free as before, he does not 
stress the common good to anything like the same extent. In fact it is 
reflected only in the principles of right that constrain, yet permit, a 
plurality of conceptions of the good.19 A law is legitimate if all free, 
equal and independent citizens could agree to it despite the fact that they 
do not share a conception of the good. In recognition of the significance 
of Kant’s formulation of the contract, we might refer to the philosophical 
attempt to justify a procedure that is to test the legitimacy of substantive 
principles of justice under modem conditions, as the Kantian project. We 
will be concerned throughout this thesis with debates that concern 
themselves with the issues that are raised by contemporary attempts to 
pursue this Kantian project.
It is within this liberal tradition of contract theory, with its clearly 
defined isolation of the political domain, that I would like to situate
18 Kant: Political Writings, 77-79.
19 Kenneth Baynes The Normative Grounds o f Social Criticism, Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1992, 42-44. Baynes also gives a clear account 
of some important differences between Kant's idea of the contract and Locke's.
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Rawls’s work. His emphasis is not on the limits of state power as such, 
nor on the legitimation of political obligation, but rather on the idea of a 
public conception of justice which serves to regulate a well-ordered 
society.20 In this way his theory is much closer to Kant's than to Locke's. 
He offers us an account of justice as fairness which assigns our rights and 
duties in society and which presents us with determinate principles of 
distribution that, according to the theory, can rationally be justified. In 
this chapter I will argue that the procedure of legitimation that Rawls 
defends is flawed. It is also one of the central arguments of this thesis 
that no determinate, substantive principles of justice can rationally be 
justified by the philosophical arguments of one theorist. The substance of 
justice can only be justified through public encounters in particular 
contexts.
I will discuss the isolation of the political rather than the separation of 
public and private that has been the focus of many important criticisms of 
liberalism.21 The reason for this is that Rawls's account of justice, unlike 
those of many of his liberal predecessors, does not appear to depend 
crucially on a naive and rigid dichotomy between public and private. 
Rawls takes the primary subject of justice to be the basic structure of 
society. Each of us is bom into a particular position in relation to the 
political system and economic and social arrangements of our culture.
Our starting position has profound effects on our life prospects and it is
20 A Theory o f Justice, 5.
21 Of course there are non-contractarian defences of the liberal separation of public
and private, notably John Stuart Mill's harm principle. See "On Liberty" in 
Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, 
H.B. Acton (ed.), London: Dent, 1972. For a critique of the public/private 
dichotomy in Mill's essay see the second and third chapters of Richard Norman 
Free and Equal, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
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clear that some people are privileged over others in this regard. Rawls 
wants to derive principles which test the legitimacy of such deep 
inequalities by allowing us to "regulate the choice of a political 
constitution and the main elements of the economic and social system."22 
These main elements of the basic structure of society certainly include 
aspects of life which would be taken by traditional liberals to be beyond 
the scope of the public realm. They incorporate economic institutions 
like the competitive market and private property in the means of 
production as well as social institutions such as the monogamous family.
Rawls’s theory does provide critical standards for a public evaluation 
of the basic structure of society which is understood more broadly than 
the idea of political justice that is implicit in earlier liberal theories of 
social contract and individual rights. I want to argue however that 
despite this broad conception of the subject of justice Rawls formulates 
some key elements of his theory by attempting to isolate the political 
domain in a way that is unsustainable. Before assessing the arguments of 
communitarianism, post-structuralism and feminism in this regard, I will 
mention briefly certain relevant criticisms that could be made of Rawls’s 
work from a Marxian perspective.
Rawls’s Liberalism as Ideology
Marxists have objected that liberal theory is ideological in the sense that 
it conceals from itself the class bias of its own assumptions. The formal 
equality of liberal rights masks the substantive inequalities between social 
classes and rationalises the oppression of the proletariat by the 
bourgeoisie under the conditions of a competitive economic market.
22 A Theory o f Justice, 7.
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Liberalism represents the ruling ideas of the capitalist age as an 
expression of the interests of its ruling class.23 Numerous commentators 
have argued that Rawls's liberalism is ideological in so far as it expresses 
bourgeois interests and rationalises class oppression.24
One of the issues involved here relates to the priority of liberty, or the 
fact that Rawls’s first principle of justice, which guarantees equal basic 
liberties, is given priority over the second, which is to regulate socio­
economic inequalities. Marxists maintain that this separation of the 
strictly political and the economic is an ideological defence of class 
oppression. I will discuss this criticism more extensively when I come to 
assess Rawls's two substantive principles in the next chapter. We can 
leave it aside for now however as the aim here is not to argue through the 
differences between Marxism and Rawls’s liberalism at any great depth, 
but rather to show how Marxism anticipates other criticisms that I will 
assess in the remainder of this chapter. This is related to the danger of 
allowing biases to undermine the claim to impartiality of a theorist- 
centred approach to the justification of a procedure of legitimation for 
substantive principles of justice. While Marxism alerts us to the dangers 
of class bias, the other three theoretical approaches that we will analyse
23 See Marx "On the Jewish Question" and with Engels "The German Ideology, part
1" and "The Communist Manifesto" all reprinted in Karl Marx: Selected 
Writings, David McLellan (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. The 
most celebrated critique of Locke from this point of view is undoubtedly that of 
C.B. Macpherson The Political Theory o f Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to 
Locke, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962, 245-247. On Kantianism as a 
market morality see Ross Poole Morality and Modernity, London: Routledge, 
1991, 17-21.
24 In the paragraphs that follow I draw on two very useful overviews of Marxian
critiques of Rawls, Allen E. Buchanan Marx and Justice, London: Methuen, 
1982, 103-161 and R.G. PefFer Marxism, Morality and Social Justice, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, 361-415.
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in greater depth are more concerned with the marginalisation of various 
other points of view.
It is worth pointing out at this stage that many critics fail to note that 
Rawls actually shares with Marx many serious objections to free market 
capitalism. This becomes clear if Rawls’s egalitarian liberalism is 
compared with the libertarianism of Robert Nozick.25 While Nozick 
simply disregards structural constraints on individual autonomy, Rawls is 
concerned that the cumulative effect over time of isolated, historical and 
supposedly free transactions between individuals, can lead to intolerable 
structural limitations on the possibility of autonomous living for some 
citizens. This indicates that for Rawls, as for Marx, formal freedom is of 
questionable worth if it is not supported by effective means for each 
individual to live a dignified, creative and autonomous life. Rawls is 
therefore keenly aware of the fact that the basic structure of society must 
be consciously controlled to the extent that nobody can be denied the 
chance to five autonomously because of bad fortune with regard to social 
circumstances or the distribution of natural talent. It is for this reason 
that the basic structure is the primary subject of justice.
Rawls is however no Marxist. He makes a number of assumptions 
that could be criticised as ideological. While Rawls may believe that 
certain of his claims are impartial, the convinced Marxist will argue that 
they are in fact biased in favour of the dominant economic class. For 
example, the convinced Marxist might argue that Rawls’s Kantian 
conception of the person, as a free and equal individual, contradicts the 
claim that his account of justice does not favour any one of a plurality of
25 Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974. For a clear and 
succinct case for egalitarian liberalism see Ronald Dworkin "Why Liberals 
Should Care about Equality" in A Matter o f Principle, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1985, 205-213.
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reasonable conceptions of the good. This conception of the person, it 
might be suggested, is too individualistic. It undermines the prospects for 
generating proletarian solidarity by invoking a bourgeois conception of 
freedom that is an historically specific reflection of a competitive 
capitalist economy. Rawls invites us to choose how we wish to live as 
individuals but he in insufficiently attentive to the ways in which we have 
to compete for the resources to make that choice effective. This 
conception of the person deflects our attention from the real issue which 
is the oppressive nature of the capitalist class structure.26
A second possible objection that a Marxist might raise against Rawls 
relates to his lack of a theory of transition. Under the conditions of 
advanced capitalism, Rawls is naive to assume that people will be 
motivated to support the socio-economic transformations that would be 
necessary even to bring our institutions into line with his own substantive 
principles of justice. It is characteristic of bourgeois ideology to assume 
that people are motivated by moral concerns while underplaying the 
extent to which we are in fact motivated by our material interests. If 
Rawls is to close the conceptual gap between a modem liberal capitalist 
society and his idea of a well-ordered society he would have to explain 
why people might be willing to risk a deterioration in their material 
conditions for the sake of justice. He is unable to do so, according to this 
type of criticism, because of his ideological emphasis on moral 
motivation.
Thirdly, a Marxist might point out that when we come to consider 
what institutional arrangements would satisfy Rawls’s two principles of
26 I will actually defend Rawls against the charge that his procedure reveals an 
individualistic bias when I discuss the communitarian challenge in the next 
section.
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justice it seems quite likely that under present conditions certain 
empirical assumptions will be made.27 These might reflect ideological 
beliefs in so far as they will mistakenly take characteristics of human 
behaviour that are particular to capitalist society, to be characteristics of 
humanity as such. In capitalist societies it may appear that material 
inequalities are necessary to provide incentives for people to work to the 
best of their ability. But this appears to be the case, or so the Marxist 
will claim, because of the existence of private property. It is not clear 
whether Rawls’s theory of justice is sufficiently critical towards such 
empirical assumptions in assessing the merits of a variety of institutional 
arrangements and in testing substantive claims about justice.
Finally, Rawls might be accused of assuming a single state structure 
for his theory. Again this reveals to the Marxist a naivete towards the 
workings of international capitalism. Any attempt to satisfy acceptable 
principles of justice in one state, especially if this involved a limitation on 
the movement of capital, would almost certainly be undermined by 
powerful states who would perceive this as a threat to the stability of 
class relations in their own territory.28 Justice could only come about on 
a global scale. That Rawls ignores this fact gives further evidence, on a 
Marxist account, that his theory is presented within a framework of 
bourgeois ideology.
27 Buchanan Marx and Justice, 126-128.
28 Of course this view is supported by many examples. Take the case of paranoia in
the US. administration which was caused by the threat of a socialist Nicaragua. 
The point here could be supported further by criticising Rawls for neglecting to 
deal adequately with the fact that the establishment of fair terms of co-operation, 
which is the key feature of his account of justice, will be resisted strongly by 
those who are in a privileged position at present. This of course relates back to 
the question of motivation mentioned above.
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As I have already pointed out, it is not my intention to assess the 
charge of bias that all these possible criticisms make against Rawls's 
account of justice. Some of the issues raised will be discussed in 
different contexts in later sections. What is important to note here is the 
form of criticism that is typical of Marxian objections to liberalism. The 
arguments above attempt to uncover aspects of Rawls's theory that 
reveal it to be biased in a way that satisfies the interests of the ruling 
class. It is not necessary to go along with everything that Marx argued 
about historical materialism or class interests to agree that certain 
theories that claim to be impartial are in fact incapable of identifying their 
own biases. While I leave aside the substance of Marxian claims with 
regard to the biases of Rawls's theory, it is this form of argument that will 
be used in the critique of Rawls's attempt to isolate the political in the 
following sections.
In his attempt to isolate the political, Rawls is insufficiently attentive 
to the danger of ideological assumptions being smuggled into his theory. 
As I hope to make clear, this is related to the elimination of all 
differences between the parties to Rawls's contract. In other words it is 
rooted in the monological view of impartiality that is built into his 
procedure. If the Kantian project is to be defended it will need an 
alternative way of conceiving of impartiality. The three sections that 
follow will support my critique of Rawls in different ways. I will begin 
by examining the set of objections that has received most attention in 
recent years. These objections have been raised from the perspective of 
communitarianism.
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1.2 THE PRIORITY OF RIGHT AND COMMUNITARIAN 
OBJECTIONS
The Kantian claim that the right is prior to the good is one of the striking 
characteristics of Rawls's theory of justice. Unlike in say utilitarianism, 
which is a teleological theory that asserts the priority of the good 
(happiness or the satisfaction of rational desire), injustice as fairness 
there is no reason to suppose that the right will maximise the good. The 
right, as represented by principles of justice, is not dependent on any one 
particular conception of the good. In fact it imposes "restrictions on what 
are reasonable conceptions of one's good."1 Justice defines the scope 
within which we can choose a reasonable plan of life and it limits us to a 
conception of the good which will not violate the principles of right.
It follows from this that while we must reach some agreement about 
justice, we do not have to agree about the good.2 It is actually to our 
advantage that we do not since, according to Rawls, we can benefit from 
the variety of talents that are developed by taking pleasure in one 
another’s activities.3 The constraints that unanimous agreement on the 
principles of justice impose prevent us from making unreasonable claims 
on one another and this in turn allows us to enjoy the values of
1 A Theory o f Justice, 31.
2 Rawls does assume that we will agree on a thin theory of the good which can
account for his list of primary goods. These are introduced so that the parties in 
the original position are motivated to reach some agreement on the principles of 
justice. They are taken to be aspects of the good for each party regardless of 
what their various full conceptions of the good turn out to be. See A Theory of  
Justice, 90-95, 295-299. My point here is that agreement on a full conception of 
the good is, according to Rawls, not possible, but neither is it necessary or even 
desirable.
3 A Theory of Justice,448.
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community.4 The right is prior to the good then in that it is the principles 
of justice and not some agreed conception of the good that form a basis 
of social unity.
The particular way that Rawls seeks to separate issues of justice, 
about which we must agree, from questions of the good, which are not 
susceptible to agreement, reflects his attempt to isolate the political in a 
relatively straightforward manner. Matters of justice are of public 
concern to the extent that we can make legitimate claims on each other, 
and on our public institutions, if we believe that some principle of justice 
has been violated. These matters fall within the domain of the political in 
Rawls's sense. On the other hand there are many questions about which 
we cannot in principle agree, due to the plurality of diverse conceptions 
of the good and the wide variety of comprehensive moral views. These 
must be left off the public agenda and so long as they do not violate the 
principles of justice they can be treated as matters for individuals to 
decide on for themselves. In other words these questions are personal 
matters that are beyond the scope of justice.
In this section I will criticise Rawls's strategy of defending the 
priority of right by attempting to treat matters of political morality in 
isolation from other aspects of citizens’ more comprehensive moral 
views. I will develop my criticism by assessing the communitarian 
critique of Rawls's work. Communitarians have questioned the priority 
of right in Rawls’s work by accusing him of supporting the claim on the 
basis of an untenable atomistic ontology.5 In this section I want to defend
4 A Theory of Justice, 565.
5 See especially Michael Sandel Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Other celebrated works of 
communitarian criticism include Roberto Mangabeira Unger Knowledge and
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Rawls from this charge by arguing that his work is best understood as a 
version of what I will call liberal holism. Nonetheless, the discussion 
leads us to the suggestion that Rawls's liberal holist defence of the 
priority of right is undermined by the attempt to isolate political aspects 
of morality in the public domain.
Kantian Constructivism and the Charge of Individualistic Bias
The initial communitarian challenge to Rawls’s work was based on the 
claim that the priority of right, as expressed through the original position, 
produces an account of justice that is biased towards certain conceptions 
of the good.6 Rawls excludes from the original position information 
about the particular conceptions of the good that each party is to have.7 
He argues that, given the fact that there is a plurality of reasonable 
conceptions of the good, such a restriction is necessary if unanimous 
agreement is to be secured. Rawls makes two further assumptions 
worthy of note here. Firstly, the parties are to be thought of as being 
mutually disinterested and secondly, they are not to be motivated by 
envy.8 These conditions of choice are said to favour liberal conceptions 
of the good that are content with the loose social bonds characteristic of
Politics, New York: The Free Press, 1975, Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue, 
London: Duckworth, 1981, Charles Taylor "Atomism", "What’s Wrong with 
Negative Liberty?", "The Diversity of Goods" and "The Nature and Scope of 
Distributive Justice" in Philosophical Papers, II: Philosophy and the Human 
Sciences, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
6 Thomas Nagel "Rawls on Justice" in Reading Rawls, Norman Daniels (ed.),
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975,1-15, Michael Teitelman "The Limits of 
Individualism" Journal of Philosophy, 69 (1972), 545-556, Adina Schwartz 
"Moral Neutrality and Primary Goods" Ethics, 83 (1973), 294-307.
7 A Theory o f Justice, 137.
8 A Theory o f Justice, 151.
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highly individualistic cultures over conceptions that depend on a stronger 
basis of social unity. Indeed the implication is that this restriction could 
only be justified with reference to some such liberal conception of the 
good.
Furthermore Rawls’s account of primary goods is also said to
constitute a bias towards individualistic conceptions as it is blind to the
significance of irreducibly common goods, such as solidarity. There are
obvious echoes here of the Marxian concerns that were outlined in the
last section. The primary goods can, it is argued, be thought of as being
of greater value to those individuals for whom such common goods do
not matter greatly. The construction of the original position presupposes
highly fragmented social conditions and the individualistic bias in the
account of the primary goods undermines whatever bonds of social
solidarity actually do exist.
Rawls has responded to these criticisms by stressing the central role
that the Kantian conception of moral personality plays in providing a
normative justification for both the construction of the original position
and the account of the primary goods.9 According to this conception we
view each person as
a moral person moved by two highest-order interests, namely, the 
interests to realise and to exercise the two powers of moral 
personality. These two powers are the capacity for a sense of right 
and justice (the capacity to honour fair terms of cooperation), and the
9 "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory" Journal of Philosophy, 77 (1980), 515- 
572, "Social Unity and Primary Goods" in Utilitarianism and Beyond, Amartya 
Sen and Bernard Williams (eds.), Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1982, 159-185. For Rawls's first response to these criticisms see "Fairness to 
Goodness" Philosophical Review, 84 (1975), 536-554.
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capacity to decide upon, to revise and rationally to pursue a
conception of the good.10
Rawls accepts that this is an historically specific conception of the 
person. It is a conception that he believes to be embedded in the 
institutions and practices of modem liberal democratic societies. One 
consequence of this is that justice as fairness is a conception that applies 
to a particular culture and so it is not set up as an account of justice that 
claims to transcend all historical or cultural circumstances. The 
constructivist method that Rawls adopts sets itself the practical task of 
securing agreement on the first principles of justice that are to regulate 
the basic structure of society.11 The role of the constructivist political 
philosopher is to draw out the shared moral beliefs of our public culture 
and to build them up into a workable conception of justice. This sets it 
apart from Kant’s own moral theory in that the social is primary. While 
Kant began with personal morality working his way towards principles of 
social justice, Rawls moves in the opposite direction making personal 
decisions conform to a prior agreement on the regulation of the basic 
structure of society.12
The elaboration of the Kantian constructivist approach allows Rawls 
to respond to the criticism that the original position is biased towards 
individualistic conceptions of the good. Since we are to assume the 
conditions of modem pluralist democracies, the exclusion of full 
conceptions of the good from a procedure designed to secure agreement 
on the first principles of justice is simply unavoidable. Agreement could
10 MSocial Unity and Primary Goods”, 164-165.
11 "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory", 516-519.
12 "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory", 552-554.
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he suggests not be based on the whole truth. By the whole truth he 
means to include the truths of religion, philosophy and comprehensive 
moral doctrine.
There is no alternative, then, to founding a conception of justice 
suitable for a well-ordered democratic society on but a part of the 
truth, and not the whole, or, more specifically, on our present 
commonly based and shared beliefs.13
These shared beliefs hinge on the Kantian conception of moral
personality. The justification of Rawls’s claim that justice as fairness is
an objective conception, and not a biased one, depends on
its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our 
aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the 
traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable 
doctrine for us.14
This most reasonable doctrine represents, for Rawls, the only acceptable 
basis of social unity. Full conceptions of the good that involve extensive 
claims to truth, perhaps even claims to the whole truth, are excluded from 
the original position. To base our principles of justice on any one 
conception of the good would lead to intolerable coercion by the state of 
those who hold reasonable yet radically different conceptions.
Rawls's presentation of his theory of justice in terms of Kantian 
constructivism brings him close, in some important respects, to the 
hermeneutic position of a communitarian thinker like Walzer.15 We will
13 "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory", 542. In Political Liberalism, xx,
Rawls goes further than this. There he does not claim that the political 
conception of justice he defends is true at all, even in a partial sense, but rather it 
is reasonable. This revision does not affect the argument that follows here.
14 "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory", 519.
15 Rawls's position is still to be clearly distinguished from that of Walzer with respect
to the central theme of this thesis. Rawls has turned towards hermeneutics so as
33
return to this aspect of Rawls’s account of justice briefly in the analysis of 
hermeneutics in the next chapter. It will suffice for now to note that in so 
far as Rawls wants to defend particular substantive principles of justice, 
and there is no reason to believe that he has given up on this, then it 
seems to me that he had no alternative but to present his two principles as 
an interpretation of the deeply held convictions of the culture of modem 
democratic societies. This is because of the fact that he does not separate 
adequately the philosophical task of justifying the procedural conditions 
that clarify an impartial point of view from the democratic task of 
legitimating particular substantive principles of justice. We will return to 
this point when we examine Habermas’s alternative account of an 
impartial point of view in the third chapter.
But what of the communitarian objection that Rawls's procedure is 
biased towards individualistic conceptions of the good? The assumptions 
in the account of the original position, of mutual disinterest and no envy, 
are to be thought of in the context of Rawls’s claim that in a pluralist 
society principles of justice cannot reasonably be based on one particular 
conception of the good. Two persons with opposing religious beliefs can 
be mutually disinterested once they can agree on a framework of justice 
based on a shared notion of moral personality. It does not follow that 
they are self-interested nor can we assume that they pursue individualistic 
ends.16 The propensity for envy can be taken as a contingency, 
something which is not essential to the conception of moral personality
to justify his abstract account of the procedural conditions of fairness that are 
represented in the original position as an impartial point o f view. As we will see 
Walzer does not theorise an impartial point of view at all and his stress on shared 
understandings leads him to reject the use of all abstract conceptions in political 
theory. See Political Liberalism, 43-46.
16 "Fairness to Goodness", 542-543.
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that informs the construction of the original position. We must assume 
that the parties are not motivated by envy if the basis for agreement is not 
to be undermined.17
Finally, it is clear that what motivates the parties in the original 
position to choose the primary goods are in fact the two highest-order 
interests. Here Rawls wants to rule out any interpretation of the parties 
as merely egoistic rational consumers of goods who are motivated to 
accept the principles of justice solely in response to external constraints.18 
The primary goods are to be understood as the necessary conditions for 
realising the powers of moral personality and as all-purpose means for a 
wide-range of final ends.19 This is the practical nature of the primary 
goods. They cohere with the conception of the person to provide a 
framework of social co-operation that is both workable and stable as a 
basis of social unity in spite of the wide range of reasonable conceptions 
of the good. This is, according to Rawls, the only reasonable manner of 
proceeding in the practical task of securing fair terms of co-operation and 
so it cannot be charged with being arbitrarily biased in favour of 
individualistic conceptions of the good.
Justice as Political and the Charge of Atomism
While this emphasis on the ideal of moral personality does seem to allow 
Rawls to deflect the charge of individualistic bias, some ambiguities 
remain. The Kantian constructivist approach has been interpreted as a 
shift towards a form of perfectionism where this ideal of moral
17 A Theory o f Justice, 530.
18 "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory", 530-532.
19 "Social Unity and Primary Goods", 166.
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personality is held up as a moral goal which is actively to be pursued.
The institutions of the basic structure are judged according to the extent 
to which they facilitate our highest-order interests in exercising our two 
moral powers. The basic structure is to express our nature as free and 
equal rational beings.20 Rawls does not want to accept such a 
perfectionist interpretation as it is based on a comprehensive moral view 
involving controversial personal ideals which are not widely shared. On 
the other hand Rawls insists that justice as fairness is not to be 
interpreted as a modus vivendi, a conception based merely on a 
convergence of interests. That approach would seem to presuppose some 
form of moral scepticism since such a basis for agreement is prudential 
rather than moral.21 Rawls wants to steer a course between perfectionism 
and scepticism.
In his recent work Rawls maintains that justice as fairness is to be 
thought of as a a political and not a metaphysical conception.22 It avoids 
both controversial claims to truth and comprehensive moral views by
20 See William Galston "Moral Personality and Liberal Theory" Political Theory, 10
(1982), 492-519.
21 For a critique of Kantian expressivism see Charles Larmore Patterns of Moral
Complexity, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Although 
Larmore proposes liberal justice as a modus vivendi in his book, he has argued in 
a subsequent article that it was not his intention to imply any form of moral 
scepticism. Any difference he has with Rawls on this point is therefore to be 
thought of as a merely terminological one. See "Political Liberalism" Political 
Theory, 18 (1990), 339-360, here at 358-359.
22 The essays that are incorporated in revised form into Political Liberalism include
"Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory", "Justice as Fairness: Political not 
Metaphysical" Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 223-251, "The Idea of 
an Overlapping Consensus" Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies, 7 (1987), 1-25, 
"The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good", Philosophy and Public Affairs,
17 (1988), 251-276, "The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus" 
New York University Law Review, 64 (1989), 233-255.
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limiting itself to the subject of political justice for the basic structure of 
society. It is practical in its aim of securing agreement on fair terms of 
social co-operation in a context where agreement on comprehensive 
moral views is not possible. In this respect its application is historically 
specific to the modem constitutional democracies in which this problem 
arises. Although Rawls claims that it is not dependent on any particular 
comprehensive moral view, he stresses the fact that it is a moral 
conception both in its aim and on the grounds that support it.23 A 
political conception of justice for the basic structure of society is itself a 
moral conception. Furthermore, justice as fairness is affirmed as an 
overlapping consensus in that all citizens who affirm it do so on the basis 
of their own reasonable comprehensive moral view. Their 
comprehensive moral views coincide in the moral conceptions of the 
citizen as free and equal citizen and the notion of a well-ordered society 
that is characterised by the principles of justice and political virtues such 
as tolerance, reasonableness and fairness.24 Justice as fairness is affirmed 
for its own sake and so it is more stable than a modus vivendi which is 
always vulnerable to a shift in the balance of power between different 
social groups.
In his writings since the publication oiA Theory o f Justice, Rawls 
has used an impressive range of arguments to defend the priority of right. 
This claim is still one of the essential elements of the account of justice as 
fairness that he now presents as a conception of political liberalism.25 At 
the same time he has, with some sophistication, managed to use a number
23 "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus", 9-12.
24 "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good", 263.
25 "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good", 251.
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of ideas of the good in the construction of his theory which serve to 
reveal that he understands the right and the good to be complementary.26 
However, his recent defence of the priority of right is deeply flawed in 
one crucial respect. It depends on the implausible attempt to treat 
questions of political morality in isolation from the rest our more 
comprehensive moral views.27 From Rawls’s point of view it would 
appear that for each of us morality has a political aspect that relates to 
questions regarding the regulation of the basic structure of society, and a 
non-political aspect that relates to other dimensions of our lives. This 
key element in Rawls’s recent strategy leaves him vulnerable to a number 
of arguments that can be supported by the work of his communitarian 
critics. These arguments undermine Rawls’s attempt to isolate the 
political in his efforts to ground the priority of right.
Perhaps the most celebrated critique of Rawls from a communitarian 
perspective was put forward by Michael Sandel.28 According to Sandel 
the Kantian conception of the person, on which Rawls's account of 
justice is constructed, presupposes an idea of an unencumbered self that 
is prior to and independent of its purposes and ends. The values and 
ends espoused by the individual are thought to be chosen voluntarily and 
are never constitutive of the identity of the self. It is the capacity for 
choice rather than the ends that are chosen that is of importance in 
Sandel's reconstruction of this Kantian conception of free and equal 
moral personality. Furthermore it is assumed that any attributes I have,
26 In "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good" Rawls discusses five ideas of the
good that play important roles injustice as fairness.
27 See for example "The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus", 249.
28 See Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice.
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my talents, my physical appearance or any of my idiosyncratic 
psychological dispositions are accidental and contingent to my identity. 
They are therefore arbitrary from a moral point of view, as represented in 
the original position. There only the moral powers of the unencumbered 
self inform our choice. For Sandel this conception of the person lacks 
any depth of moral character. Our character comes from our being 
situated historically within a particular network of social ties. Each of us 
interprets our individual identity in a context which we did not choose 
and under circumstances which we cannot frilly control. The issue here is 
an ontological one between atomistic and holistic conceptions of the 
self.29
It seems to me that an atomistic conception of the self, such as the 
unencumbered self Sandel describes, is indeed quite untenable. The 
holists are right in so far as it is impossible to imagine a recognisably 
human being whose identity could be said to be prior to and independent 
of all constitutive ends. I did not choose my parents nor any of the other 
members of my family, nor the nation of my birth, nor my sex, nor my 
race, nor the talents I have which have helped me to become friends with 
particular people, nor my limitations which have almost certainly ruined 
any possibility of friendship with some others. These attributes that I 
have, independently of my will, condition and shape, to a greater or 
lesser degree, my values and ends and therefore my identity. A human 
identity is never formed by a free floating individual, cut off and isolated 
from all moral ties with significant others, but rather through a dialogical
29 See Charles Taylor "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate" in 
Liberalism and the Moral Life, Nancy L. Rosenblum (ed.), Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989, 159-182. According to Taylor this is an 
ontological issue in that it structures the field of possibilities for what we might 
advocate as a political policy.
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encounter of recognition with others. Self understanding always depends 
to some degree on the recognition of parents, friends, lovers, a 
community of scholars or even perhaps, for believers, God.30
Our identities are formed in the encounter with those others who 
matter to us. This process will presumably involve some degree of 
acceptance of the recognition we receive as well as a certain degree of 
struggle. If we struggle against the recognition, of our parents for 
example, we will want to move away from them, to draw on encounters 
with new significant others who can help us to become human beings that 
we could not have been had we not engaged in that struggle. The point 
here is that we are not simply encumbered with whatever values and ends 
our communities of origin happen to espouse. However it does not 
follow that we are ever unencumbered. We never change our ends or 
alter our identity without some struggle with or acceptance of the 
recognition of significant others.
The citizens of a liberal democracy are, in most circumstances, 
members of a particular political community that few have chosen 
voluntarily. Many citizens will find that they come to identify with the 
other members of their political community of origin. They will accept 
the recognition of their compatriots as constitutive of their identity. The 
fact that they are British, Irish, French or Portuguese becomes for each of 
them a part of their answer to the question "Who am I?" The good of 
their political community is in part constitutive of their own conception of 
the good.
30 Of contemporary communitarian theorists, Charles Taylor has provided with the 
most illuminating account of this holistic conception of the self See his Sources 
of the Self: The Making o f the Modem Identity, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989 and also The Ethics of Authenticity, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1992.
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However even if we were to leave our nation of origin, because we 
could not come to identify with its ends, we would want to find some 
new significant others on whom we could draw in the formation of a new 
political aspect to our identity. This might involve immigration or 
naturalisation and this process is obviously more common in a 
predominantly immigrant society like the USA. Yet even in these cases, 
for those who come to identify with their new political community, the 
community’s good will in part constitute their own personal good. So it 
would seem reasonable to assume that the personal identity of each of 
these individual citizens depends, to a greater or lesser degree, on the 
common good of their political community. If, for example, that political 
community were to be invaded by an aggressive foreign power then the 
personal identity of the individual citizen, as well as the political identity 
of the community, would be under some threat.
Ruling out atomism does not rule out liberalism. It would rule 
Rawls's theory of justice out if Sandel were right, that it depends on a 
conception of an unencumbered self. In fact Rawls’s position would best 
be described as that of a liberal holist. Although his recent writings offer 
more explicit support for this interpretation, I do not think he could ever 
fairly have been accused of atomism.31 It seems to me that Rawls is a 
liberal holist for two main reasons. Firstly, he can allow for the fact that 
individual identities are in part constituted by moral ties, such as ties 
within the family and various associations, that are not voluntarily 
chosen. By locating such associations beyond the scope of justice, 
Rawls assumes that he can disregard them in developing a political 
conception of justice. This move is not without its problems as will
31 A Theory o f Justice, 520-529 and "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good", 
268-273.
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become clear when we come to consider post-structuralist and feminist 
criticisms of his work. Secondly and more importantly here, Rawls 
points out that the establishment and successful maintenance of just 
democratic institutions is itself a common good. That good is achieved 
and realised "through citizens’joint activity in mutual dependence on the 
appropriate actions being taken by others.”32 The extent to which we 
realise and exercise our two moral powers depends, at least in part, on 
the achievement of this common good.33 If this reading of Rawls is 
correct, we need pursue the charge of atomism no further. However, I 
think that a commitment to liberal holism has certain implications that 
undermine the attempt to isolate the political. I will conclude this section 
by considering two of these implications.
Some Implications of Liberal Holism
Firstly, communitarians have been critical of the liberal view that the 
state can, and should, be neutral regarding the plurality of competing 
conceptions of the good in a modem society. This is taken to be one
32 "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good", 271.
33 For a clear exposition of what I am calling liberal holism see Ronald Dworkin
"Liberal Community" in Communitarianism and Individualism, Shlomo Avineri 
and Avner de-Shalit (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, 205-223, 
and "Foundations of Liberal Equality" in The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values, XI, Grethe B. Peterson (ed.), Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 
1990, 1-119. Taylor identifies with a tradition of holist individualism, influenced 
by the work of Humboldt, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian 
Debate", 163. It is interesting to note that Rawls is also influenced by Humboldt 
and so can be seen, at least in this respect, as part of the same tradition as 
Taylor, A Theory o f Justice, 520-529. It might be added that while both are 
holist individualists, Taylor's stress is more on the holism, Rawls's more on the 
individualism. We might also include as liberal holist theorists moderate liberal 
perfectionists such as Joseph Raz The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1986 and William Galston Liberal Purposes, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991.
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implication of the priority of right and its implicit commitment to 
impartiality. Principles of justice are to be legitimated thorough an 
impartial procedure and not in terms of any one substantive conception of 
the good. It seems to me however, that within the context of any one 
particular state, the ideal of neutrality has its limits.
A particular liberal democratic state is not neutral, for example, 
between on the one hand, those patriotic citizens who count as a 
constitutive aspect of their own good the justness of that state’s 
institutions, as they have been shaped historically in a distinctive cultural 
context, and on the other hand, anti patriotic citizens who, for whatever 
reason, have come to despise those same institutions and who long for 
their destruction. These need not be actively involved in attacking the 
institutions of the state, whether by violent or other means. They may be 
relatively passive and simply resigned to the fact that they have been 
unfortunate to live in a political community for which they feel much 
resentment but no loyalty. For personal or historical reasons their 
identity precludes that loyalty. Every democratic state has a particular 
history and lays claim to a certain territory. It is not unusual to have 
some citizens within that territory who do not identify with the political 
community in which procedural justice for them is to be embodied 
historically. These anti patriots may not despise liberal democracy or 
procedural justice as such but only British democracy or Lithuanian 
democracy or Spanish democracy or whatever.34
Citizens typically, even constitutional liberals, are loyal not to an 
abstract form of procedural justice as such but to a distinct cultural and
34 In the final section of the third chapter I will consider the demands of justice in the 
case of Northern Ireland, which is a society that is divided in a sense that is 
relevant here.
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historical embodiment of that procedure. They identify with the historical 
reality of a particular democratic community and that identification is, at 
least in part, the source of their allegiance to the state and their 
acceptance of its claim to legitimacy. The state cannot but privilege 
patriotic citizens over its anti patriots. In any society divided in this way 
the state can never be neutral between the conceptions of the good of 
those who identify themselves with its historical constitution and those 
who do not.35
Neither can the liberal democratic state be neutral between those 
political liberals who affirm the overlapping consensus and those who do 
not accept the Kantian conception of moral personality on which that 
consensus is constructed. Rawls would have no difficulty in accepting 
this since he has always maintained that not all conceptions of the good 
are permissible within the framework of his account of justice as fairness. 
This is a crucial consequence of asserting the priority of right. It is 
enough, according to Rawls, that the overlapping consensus be supported 
by a substantial majority of its politically active citizens.36 We recall that 
to support the overlapping consensus one need not endorse liberalism as 
a comprehensive moral view, by affirming the comprehensive doctrines 
of say Kant or Mill, but only as a political morality. The question that 
this claim raises however is whether or not political liberalism could be 
compatible with comprehensive moral views that are not themselves 
liberal.
35 This is a challenge not only for the state but also for the particular political culture
within which the state institutions are embodied. We will return to this in the 
discussion of ethical patterning in the third section of the third chapter.
36 "The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus", 235.
44
Rawls admits that justice as fairness does affirm a particular set of 
virtues, the liberal political virtues of tolerance, reasonableness and 
fairness.37 He maintains that what is required of citizens who hold 
comprehensive moral views that are not themselves comprehensively 
liberal, is that they recognise the great significance of these liberal virtues 
to the extent, for example, that they accept that they will be promoted in 
the education of their children.38 While there may be other virtues, such 
as religious ones, that are encouraged at home, it is the political virtues 
that prepare the young for citizenship in a well-ordered society.
But surely this is so demanding that the variety of comprehensive 
moral views that could accept it is quite limited. There will arguably be 
many citizens of modem societies who would find this unreasonable in so 
far as it clashes too sharply with certain important aspects of their 
comprehensive moral views. Take for example anybody who adheres to 
a religious conception of the good of all humanity in a fundamentalists 
way. For them to accept that the promotion of the liberal virtues as a 
central aspect of the education of their children is to ask them to risk 
something that may matter to them a great deal, that the religious 
upbringing they give to their children will be undermined at school. The 
comprehensive moral views that could affirm an overlapping consensus 
begin to look pretty comprehensively liberal. Not only does this reflect 
quite dimly the diversity of moral views that are held in modem societies 
but, more importantly, it leaves a great number of people outside of the 
overlapping consensus. They will be expected to accept the political
37 "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good”, 263.
38 "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good", 268-269.
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morality of Rawls's constitutional state not as a matter of conviction but 
rather merely as a modus vivendi,39
The problem here can be illustrated somewhat differently with 
reference to divisive moral issues which are part of the political agenda in 
contemporary societies. These include abortion, euthanasia, animal 
rights and questions such as the criminalisation of sado-masochistic sex 
or the right to freedom of expression in the light of the Salman Rushdie 
affair. Take abortion for example. Every modem state has to take some 
political position on this question and it must reach some conclusion 
about what rights are involved. Could the state do this by avoiding 
controversial comprehensive moral claims? If the state were to reach its 
conclusion by affirming only the liberal virtues of tolerance, 
reasonableness and fairness, what are we to make of its expectation that 
these considerations should override the comprehensive moral views of 
dissenting citizens?
It seems clear to me that there is no way that convinced pro-life 
campaigners could accept that these particular liberal virtues, of 
tolerance, reasonableness and fairness, should override their conviction 
that a mother and her unborn foetus are of equal moral value from the 
moment of conception, without radically changing their most fundamental 
moral beliefs. In other words, if they were to be able to digest political 
liberalism to the extent that they could accept that it would be 
unreasonable for the state to ban abortion, then they would already have 
swallowed a fairly large dose of comprehensive liberalism.40 Accepting
39 For similar arguments see William Galston "Pluralism and Social Unity" Ethics, 99 
(1989), 711-726 and Patrick Neal "Justice as Fairness: Political or 
Metaphysical?" Political Theory, 18 (1990), 24-50.
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that legal abortion is reasonable is incompatible with the comprehensive 
moral view that abortion is murder.41 Political liberalism is only 
compatible with comprehensive moral views that are themselves 
thoroughly liberal.
Nor could Rawls dissolve this difficulty by claiming that the question 
of the liberal state failing to be neutral is not at issue in the dispute about 
abortion, since this is a matter of political right and not a question of 
morality in a more comprehensive sense. The problem with a moral issue 
such as abortion is that we do not agree on a conception of the right. 
There is dissensus on who has rights and also on the matter of which 
rights have priority. But this disagreement will always be premised on 
and informed by disagreements between competing comprehensive moral 
claims. For one party, perhaps the foetus has equal rights with the 
mother because it is loved equally in the eyes of God. For another party, 
the foetus may have a right to life in a qualified sense but this right can be 
trumped by the rights of the mother, depending on her circumstances.
For a third, the woman's right to choose always takes priority over other 
considerations. Even among those who hold this position there is a no 
agreement on the time scale involved. The reasons given in support of 
these various positions as to what is right with regard to abortion will 
depend on the range of moral resources that could be drawn from the 
comprehensive moral commitments of the participants. An appeal to a
40 Political Liberalism, 243-244, n.32, Rawls suggests that it would be 
unreasonable not to allow a woman the right to terminate a pregnancy, at least 
within the first trimester.
41 A comprehensive liberal can still believe that abortion is wrong but the liberal
belief that disagreement about this matter is reasonable will override their 
possible preference to have all abortion banned. It seems to me to be impossible 
to hold this liberal belief and at the same time to consider abortion morally to be 
on a par with the murder of an independently existing human being.
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conception of rights does nothing to avoid the moral controversy 
involved.
A state that permits abortion cannot but favour conceptions of the 
good that are comprehensively liberal. The attempt to avoid 
comprehensive moral commitments in public discussion runs the risk of 
imposing a particular comprehensive morality rather than engaging in 
critical discussion about the real issues involved. Such a critical 
discussion cannot mark out in advance the issues that must be avoided for 
the sake of affirming an overlapping consensus. It must allow the 
relationship between the political right and the comprehensively moral to 
be the subject of deliberation in an open public encounter. Controversial 
moral views, even those on which agreement seems to be most unlikely, 
must not be excluded from the public agenda, but rather they must be 
incorporated into that agenda.42
These divisive moral issues make it clear that it is not as easy as 
Rawls seems to think to isolate a political morality from other 
comprehensive moral views. It is never obvious which aspects of our 
morality are political and which are not. Only comprehensive liberals 
could accept that their moral views on abortion, for example, should be 
trumped by the claims of political liberalism. The limits of a state’s 
neutrality between conceptions of the good can once more be easily 
underestimated. Not only must the conception of a patriot be privileged 
over that of an anti patriot, and the conceptions of those who do affirm 
the overlapping consensus be privileged over those who do not, but a 
politically liberal state must, by promoting the virtues of tolerance,
42 For a trenchant account of the moral consequences of liberalism's strategy of 
avoiding public discussion of the good see MacIntyre After Virtue, especially 
chapter 17 and Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, London: Duckworth, 1988, 
342-348.
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reasonableness and fairness, also privilege comprehensively liberal moral 
views over comprehensive moralities that are less than liberal.
A second implication of liberal holism, which is related to the first, is 
the need for widespread active participation in democratic politics if the 
liberties guaranteed injustice as fairness are to be secured. I will discuss 
the role of the basic liberties in Rawls’s account of justice when we come 
to analyse his two substantive principles in the next chapter. Rawls's 
communitarian critics emphasise the bonds of solidarity among citizens 
that are essential if the common good of just institutions is to flourish. If 
the rights provided by those institutions are to be of fair value to all 
citizens there must be a vibrant and vigilant public sphere where open 
discussion can take place about questions of the common good.
The communitarian stress tends to be on the need for democratic 
structures of power that encourage citizens to participate actively in 
public spheres which inform and shape political decisions on matters of 
common concern. The participatory model of citizenship implied here 
and the complementary notion of a vibrant public sphere can be 
contrasted with the strong emphasis on individual rights within certain 
strands of the liberal tradition.43 The communitarian model of citizenship 
is based on the republican ideal of citizen self-rule. In contrast the 
individualistic, liberal model of citizenship is based on the power of the 
individual to retrieve rights through the judicial process.44
Now it seems to me that both of these aspects of citizenship are 
central to any theory of justice that is presented in liberal holist terms.
43 I have in mind the Lockean strand of liberalism.
44 See Taylor "Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate", 177-181 and
Sandel "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self1 Political Theory, 
12(1984), 81-96.
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Individual rights could never be secured fairly outside the context of a 
self-ruling democratic community. At the same time that community 
could not be genuinely democratic if it did not respect the dignity and the 
personal autonomy of the individual. If we present the holist commitment 
to active participation among citizens in democratic self-rule and the 
liberal commitment to individual rights as two sides of the one coin, we 
do not have to give an account of political justice either solely in terms of 
the rights of isolated individuals nor solely in terms of the will of a tightly 
knit community. While the former depends on an untenable atomistic 
ontology, the latter cannot adequately facilitate the views of dissenting 
individuals. A liberal holist theory of justice can instead be presented as 
a normatively justified procedure that is grounded in intersubjective 
terms. This is the great achievement of Habermas's discourse ethics and 
we will examine his defence of that approach in detail in the third 
chapter.45
Although I have suggested that Rawls is a liberal holist, he does tend 
to stress an individualistic model of citizenship, one that is given in terms 
of the judicial retrieval of rights, at the expense of the holist concern with 
democratic self-rule.46 Again the attempt to isolate political morality 
from other comprehensive moral views is crucial here. This sets a limit 
to the scope of open political discussion by excluding issues about which 
it is presumed that we will not agree. I have already suggested that this
45 In this paragraph I have anticipated some of the ideas that Habermas has outlined
in his most recent writings, especially Faktizitat und Geltung: Beitrage zur 
Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtstaats, Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992.
46 Rawls accepts that classical republicanism is not incompatible with justice as
fairness, "The Priority of Right and Ideas o f the Good", 272, but, as we will see, 
this is overshadowed by his failure the theorise adequately the role of a vibrant 
democratic public sphere.
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method of avoidance that Rawls has adopted, fails to isolate political 
morality as neatly as he seems to imply. Furthermore the method does 
not do justice to the diversity of conceptions of the good that could be 
represented in the public domain since, as we saw in the discussion about 
neutrality, it marginalises conceptions that are not comprehensively 
liberal.
Rawls’s emphasis on the liberal political morality that forms the basis 
of the overlapping consensus does not reflect very satisfactorily the kind 
of differences that characterise a vigilant public sphere in a modem 
society. The equal opportunity of all social groups to participate in 
public discourse must be incorporated into any procedural account of 
justice that is to be adequate as a test of the legitimacy of substantive 
principles which are to regulate the basic structure of a modem society. 
Rawls procedure does not give a sufficiently central role to the notion of 
a vigilant public sphere. For this reason the role of democratic 
deliberation is unclear since basic principles are agreed upon before real 
public discussion even begins to take place.47 This causes a further 
problem, as to how the procedure that Rawls defends is itself to be 
assessed critically and legitimated. This problem is central to the 
discussion of the next section.
The importance of the communitarian model of citizenship that 
stresses active self-rule should not be overlooked. Within the framework
47 The point is made at greater length by Chantal Moufife "Rawls: Political
Philosophy without Politics" in Universalism Vs. Communitarianism, David 
Rasmussen (ed.), Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990, 217-236. I think that 
Rawls’s problem here is rooted in the monological nature of his procedure. 
Since we have to agree on basic principles in advance o f any public encounter, 
moral reflection does not involve any flexibility on the part of participants who 
want to come to an agreement with one another. This criticism will be 
developed in the following two sections and will be addressed once again in the 
discussion of Habermas.
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of liberal holism, citizens are committed to the common good of their 
shared achievement of just institutions and the vigilant maintenance of 
those institutions over time. This will secure their individual rights and 
the effective value of the liberties they guarantee.48 From this perspective 
all of our moral claims must be open to question since there is no 
reasonable way to decide in advance which claims are matters of political 
morality and which are not. The boundary between the political and the 
non-political is constantly under negotiation in the ongoing democratic 
debates that are informed by our moralities. It seems to me that this is 
unavoidable as our comprehensive moralities, and therefore our 
conceptions of the good, always underpin our political moralities.
If we wish to question and to assess critically the presuppositions of 
those political moralities then we are inevitably drawn into democratic 
deliberation about particular conceptions of the good. This does not 
mean that we can agree about a full conception of the good or that a 
shared comprehensive morality should be the aim of our deliberation.
Nor does it mean that we should reject the priority of right. In fact Rawls 
is clearly right in so far as justice in modem societies must be defended in 
terms of the priority of right. What I have argued in this section is that 
Rawls himself has not provided us with a convincing defence of that 
priority. We will have to wait until the third chapter, when I discuss 
Habermas’s work, before we can consider what I take to me a more 
convincing alternative.
A rejection of the method of avoiding public discussion over 
comprehensive moral views is necessary if we want to ensure that our
48 Kenneth Baynes draws on the work of Habermas to give a convincing critique of 
Rawls’s neglect of the need for widespread participation and a vibrant public 
sphere in a democratic society that could claim to be just. See The Normative 
Grounds o f Social Criticism, 161-181.
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democratic practices can be engaged in a self-critical assessment of their 
most fundamental moral presuppositions.49 Rawls’s recent strategy of 
avoidance does give sufficient evidence to suggest that he has not yet 
abandoned the unhelpful isolation of the political domain that dominates 
liberal thinking about justice. The most persuasive communitarian 
criticisms of liberalism can be used to highlight the inadequacy of that 
aspect of his procedural account of justice. Further evidence of the 
potential biases in Rawls’s procedure can be constructed from a 
reconstruction of possible post-structuralist objections to his work.
49 Seyla Benhabib Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in 
Contemporary Ethics, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992, 7.
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1.3 THE ORIGINAL POSITION AND POST­
STRUCTURALIST OBJECTIONS
The notion of an original position is to be thought of as an impartial 
procedure that is to test the legitimacy of substantive principles of justice. 
Rawls introduces this particular procedure because he conceives of 
principles of justice as the fundamental terms of association that free and 
equal moral persons would agree to in an initial situation of fairness. 
These principles would then be accepted as the standards according to 
which all features of the basic structure of society are to be regulated.1 
He derives his two principles by arguing that they are the ones that would 
be agreed to in such an original contract.
The original position then is a hypothetical situation that represents 
conditions of fairness. These conditions specify the moral point of view. 
Rawls's strategy is to use the idea of the original position to provide a 
moral justification for his principles. If the conditions of agreement are 
fair, then the object of the agreement will also be fair and so the 
principles chosen provide us with a rational and stable basis for social 
unity. Obviously the construction of the original position is itself in need 
of some justification. Why should we think of it as specifying the 
conditions of a moral, or an impartial, point of view?
In this section I will analyse Rawls’s procedure by assessing possible 
post-structuralist objections to the notion of an original position. These 
objections will be reconstructed through a brief examination of Michel 
Foucault’s work on power. I will maintain, against the stronger claims of 
post-structuralists, that under modem conditions a theory of justice must 
be presented in terms of a procedural conception of an impartial point of
1 A Theory o f Justice, 11.
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view. However, Rawls’s procedure is flawed in that the attempt to isolate 
the political is built into the conditions of the original position. This 
approach is monological in that there can be no articulation of the 
differences between parties who are choosing substantive principles from 
an impartial point of view. To conceive of impartiality in this way is to 
run the risk of constructing an account of justice on a conception of 
citizenship that may not adequately take into account the perspectives of 
social groups at the margins of modem societies.
The Veil of Ignorance and Social Unity
The idea that is central to Rawls’s procedure is that all morally arbitrary
aspects of our personality should be excluded from our considerations
about justice. The feature of the original position that achieves this is the
veil of ignorance. According to this notion we must assume that in the
original position none of the parties know their place in society, their
class, their social status, their natural abilities such as intelligence, good
looks, strength, their particular psychological propensities such as a
tendency towards optimism, risk-taking or envy.2 We have already
discussed communitarian objections to the fact that we are also to assume
that in the original position none of the parties know their conception of
the good. The idea of the veil of ignorance is to ensure that
no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by 
the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social 
circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to
2 For a full account o f the original position see chapter 3 of A Theory o f Justice, 
especially 118-150, and for a more recent account of its role, Political 
Liberalism, 22-28.
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design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of 
justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.3
All of the personal attributes that are excluded are to be thought of as 
morally arbitrary, as the contingent results of our good or bad fortune. 
Such matters should be considered irrelevant to the concerns of justice. 
Rawls supports this by pointing out that it is one of our considered 
convictions that the fact that I have a particular natural asset (say physical 
strength) or that I occupy a certain social position (say I’m a lawyer) is 
not a good reason for me to accept a conception of justice that favours 
people like me. I clearly have no good reason to expect others to accept 
such a conception either.4 No person should be disadvantaged simply 
because they are not physically strong or because they are not lawyers.
If they were to be so disadvantaged, that would be unjust. The argument 
is that the conditions of the original position provide the best available 
match for our considered moral judgements in reflective equilibrium.5 
They are, in other words, according to Rawls the conditions of fairness 
that we do in fact accept.
Rawls wants the parties to the contract not to be prejudiced or biased 
by knowledge of their particular natural assets or social circumstances for 
at least two reasons.6 Firstly, allowing such knowledge of contingencies 
would in practice make any agreement unlikely as different parties would 
be biased in different ways depending on their own good fortune. It 
would be impossible for us to say anything definite about justice at all.
3 A Theory o f Justice, 12.
4 "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", 237.
5 A Theory o f Justice, 21-22, 48-51 and see Rawls's comments in "Justice as
Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", 236-238.
6 A Theory o f Justice, 140-142.
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Secondly, the moral basis of the agreement would be undermined as the 
deliberations in the original position would be informed by factors which 
do not reflect the highest-order interests of the parties. If we were not to 
exclude such knowledge then any contract would almost certainly be 
partial towards those in a more powerful bargaining position. The less 
powerful would accept it for prudential, and not for moral, reasons.
Free and equal moral persons are to be motivated by their interests in 
choosing and revising a conception of the good and in exercising their 
sense of justice. This is why the conditions of the original position must 
be reasonable and fair, independent of chance and contingency, and 
grounded in the concern for rational autonomy that characterises our 
moral personality. In the original position our interests are to be 
reconciled in a reasonable and impartial way.7
Rawls's use of the veil of ignorance reflects the isolation of the 
political by excluding from the original position all aspects of our moral 
personality that are not relevant to our public life as citizens of a 
democratic community. Our public identity as citizens does not include 
certain convictions and attachments that may be constitutive of our 
personal "non-public" identity.8 Thus while I might be disoriented, or 
even thrown into a crisis of personal identity, were I to think of myself as 
no longer committed to certain religious or moral convictions, these same 
convictions are not a part of my identity as a citizen.
7 On the moral justification for the conditions of the original position see "Kantian
Constructivism in Moral Theory", section IV of "Justice as Fairness: Political not 
Metaphysical" and "A Kantian Conception of Equality" in Post-Analytic 
Philosophy, John Rajchman and Cornel West (eds.), New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1985, 201-214.
8 "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", 239-244.
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Thus for example Rawls would maintain that if it is my firm belief 
that Jesus is my Lord and Saviour then that is undeniably fundamental to 
my self-understanding, but it is irrelevant to my public identity. For that, 
it is enough that I view myself as having the moral power to have and to 
revise some conception of the good, as a self-originating source of valid 
claims and as a being capable of taking responsibility for my own ends.
In this way we each of us is a politically free citizen. Since we all share 
this public identity, we are not only free but also equal as citizens. This 
concentration on our public identity as citizens is part of the method of 
avoidance that Rawls has espoused in his later writings. He wants to stay 
"on the surface, philosophically speaking" and to construct a workable 
conception of justice while avoiding controversies about religious, moral 
and philosophical doctrine related to metaphysical questions of the truth 
or the nature of the self.9
We have already discovered, in assessing the import of some 
communitarian criticisms of Rawls's work, that the attempt to isolate the 
political domain leads him firstly, to overestimate the extent to which the 
state can be neutral between conceptions of the good and secondly, to 
underestimate the extent to which a procedural account of justice must 
reflect active participation by citizens in defence of the shared good of 
just institutions. What communitarians are concerned with is to give 
justice and social unity a more adequate moral foundation than Rawls has 
provided due to his stress on individual plans of life. In contrast post- 
structuralists do not object to Rawls's project, and specifically to the idea 
of an original position, on the grounds that it lacks an adequate moral 
foundation.10 They would rather reject all attempts to secure a
9 "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", 230-231.
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distinctively moral foundation for social unity and justice. Their 
objection could therefore be applied even more forcefully to the 
communitarians than to Rawls.
For post-structuralists the self is constituted not so much by shared 
moral ends as by power.11 Rawls's work can be thought of as a moral 
discourse about justice that seeks to establish an impartial basis for social 
unity. What he does not seem to realise, according to the post­
structuralist, is that power is built into all discourses and that any claim to 
impartiality is another hidden form of power.12 It rests on the binary
10 The term post-structuralist is usually applied to the work of theorists such as
Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Jean-Fransois Lyotard. In 
constructing this objection to Rawls I will be relying on the work of Foucault 
because I take his work on power to represent the most important post- 
structuralist challenge to liberal political theory. See for example 
Power/Knowledge, Colin Gordon (ed.), New York: Pantheon Books, 1980, 
especially chapters 5 and 6. For a rare essay that confronts Rawls directly from 
a post-structuralist perspective, but drawing primarily on Lyotard rather than 
Foucault, see Anne Barron "Lyotard and the Problem of Justice" in Judging 
Lyotard, Andrew Benjamin (ed.), London: Routledge, 1992, 26-42. Two books 
that seek to incorporate post-structuralist concerns into recent debates about 
justice are Stephen K. White Political Theory and Postmodernism, Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991 and Iris Marion Young Justice and the 
Politics of Difference, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. For a 
contribution to democratic theory that shares much with the neo-Nietzscheanism 
of Foucault, William E. Connolly Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations 
of Political Paradox, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.
11 Foucault "The Subject and Power", afterword to Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul
Rabinow Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982.
12 Power/Knowledge, 83-85, 115-117. While Foucault usually speaks of scientific
and social scientific discourse I think that a post-structuralist would argue that 
Rawls's account of justice is a power-laden discourse that conceals its power in 
its aspiration, through the construction of the original position, to be neutral and 
impartial. Derrida adopts a similar critical position towards what he takes to be 
supposedly neutral discourses or impartial procedures. See the interview with 
him "Deconstruction and the Other" in Richard Kearney Dialogues with 
Contemporary Thinkers, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984, 107- 
126. More generally for an account of Derrida's own ethics see Simon Critchley 
The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
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opposition of reason/power assuming that impartial agreement is driven 
by reason alone and that the effects of power can be eliminated by some 
such device as a veil of ignorance. To claim impartiality for justice as 
fairness is of course crucial to Rawls’s project of providing a basis for 
social unity. According to this post-structuralist objection however that 
project must be, at least in part, driven by power. The discourse 
involved, in this case the construction of the original position, will always 
exclude some marginalised "other” from its terms of reference.13 It will 
repress difference for the sake of unity.
There are a number of candidates to be considered as possible 
excluded others from Rawls’s theory. Firstly, the excluded other could be 
non-human entities (animals, plants, external nature). Secondly, the 
excluded other could be other human actors (women, non-whites, non- 
Christians, lesbians and gays, children, past or future generations, the 
unborn, the insane, the comatose). Thirdly, the excluded other could be 
other aspects of a human life (feelings, fantasies, sexual desire, as well as 
our full conception of the good including religious and comprehensively 
moral convictions).
The post-structuralist claim is that the original position is a discourse 
of power that claims to legitimate a conception of justice by excluding 
the other, devaluing it, marginalising it. This conception of justice will 
inevitably reflect the hierarchical assumptions that are built into the 
discourse that produced it. Justice as fairness is simply another form of
1992 and for two relevant critiques of Derrida, Thomas McCarthy "The Politics 
of the Ineffable: Derrida's Deconstructionism" in Ideals and Illusions, 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991, 97-119 and Richard J. Bernstein 
"Serious Play: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Derrida" in The New 
Constellation, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991, 172-198.
13 White Political Theory and Postmodernism, 17-19.
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power and the original position is a form of power/knowledge which 
subjugates the other that cannot be identified within its framework. Post­
structuralism represents a deep scepticism about the possibility of a 
reasonable and impartial conception of justice.
Foucault on Power and Resistance
Before assessing whether or not Rawls can be accused of arbitrarily 
excluding some other from his discourse on justice, we can clarify what 
is at stake here by contrasting this post-structuralist perspective with 
Marxism. As I mentioned in the first section of this chapter, a Marxist 
might criticise the notion of the original position, or indeed of the priority 
of right, by claiming that these are ideological notions that reflect a 
bourgeois conception of morality. This conception is an historical 
product of the capitalist mode of production that serves to uphold the 
power of the ruling class.
For a post-structuralist, or at least for Michel Foucault, there are 
serious problems with the notions of ideology and power which would 
have to be elaborated in order to ground this criticism. Firstly, ideology 
is to be opposed to truth, but for Foucault there is no truth outside of 
power. Secondly, ideology serves class power in that it represents the 
interests of the ruling class, but for Foucault power cannot be derived 
from interests nor does any one class have power. Thirdly, power for the 
Marxist is primarily a function of economic relations and so must be 
resisted by a liberating revolutionary class struggle, but for Foucault all 
resistance to power must be local, immediate and anarchistic with no 
illusion of ever being liberated from all the effects of power.14
“  Power/Knowledge, 89, 118-119, 131-133, 142, 145, 187-188, "The Subject and 
Power", 211-212.
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I cannot discuss in great detail the theory of power implicit in 
Foucault’s rejection of Marxism. It will suffice to give a brief sketch that 
should illuminate the objection to any theory that claims to be impartial. 
According to Foucault, every society has a "regime of truth". What 
counts as true is always a reflection of the operation of power, so power 
produces truth and truth in turn induces the effects of power. It is illusory 
to imagine a society where truth is not bound up with power in this way 
and so critical theory is best directed towards advocating a new regime of 
truth rather than liberating truth from all power as such.15
The reason that many people are under this illusion is that, according 
to Foucault, they fail to understand the nature of power, specifically 
power in modem societies. No one class, or one person, has power 
which can be used with negative effects on the powerless. This 
sovereign notion of power is misleading in that it fails to account for the 
complexity of specific mechanisms at work in the exercise of power 
throughout the social body.16 Power is not located in the state, nor is it 
confined to the basic structure of society which is, for Rawls, the subject 
of justice. It does not leave a private sphere of autonomous individuals 
untouched but rather it pervades all institutional domains of modem 
society. Any discourse that locates power outside of our private lives, 
which we supposedly protect with rights, is itself a form of domination 
concealing the nature of modem power. Liberalism typically concerns 
itself with rights and legislative practices while ignoring power in the 
form of "invisible societal constraints that defy such practices while 
continuing to influence them."17
15 Power/Knowledge, 131-133.
16 Power/Knowledge, 98, 142, 187-188.
62
Modern power is a capillary network of micropractices from the 
penal to the educational, from the medical to the familial and even the 
sexual. These micropractices are productive as well as prohibitive of 
action. They are integrated into a modem macrostrategy of "bio-power" 
that concerns itself with the production and reproduction of life in 
modem societies. We have become the objects of social scientific 
research, a form of power/knowledge that acts as an instrument of 
surveillance, discipline and control. Whatever is deviant is "normalised" 
through practices of therapeutic correction. Power is productive of action 
by constraining, directing and normalising our behaviour.18
Most importantly, Foucault claims that we internalise the disciplinary 
"gaze” of these strategies of surveillance by thinking of ourselves as 
subjects. Modem subjectivity is constituted by the effects of "pastoral 
power" that ties us to an identity informed and controlled by a conscience 
we learn from priests, therapists, the police, doctors, teachers, social 
workers, personnel officers and any organisation that concerns itself with 
our personal well-being.19 We can recognise here how the institutions of 
the welfare-state are implicated in the macrostrategy of bio-power. The 
welfare-state, even if it aims at a redistribution of goods to benefit the 
worst-off, is itself part of the problem. This is because it functions to 
administer and control the lives of those who depend on it.20
17 Seyla Benhabib and Durcilla Cornell "Introduction” to their edited collection
Feminism as Critique, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1987, 11.
18 In general see chapters 3, 5, 6, 9 and 10 of Power/Knowledge and also "Right of
Death and Power over Life" in The Foucault Reader, Paul Rabinow (ed.), 
London: Penguin, 1984, 258-272. Foucault's most important book on power is 
Discipline and Punish, New York: Pantheon Books, 1977.
19 "The Subject and Power", 214-216.
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The notion of confession is central for Foucault here. This idea of
course has its origins in early Christianity but it has been secularised in
modem social life. In the Christian tradition confession involves the
verbalisation, to a spiritual director, of one’s most intimate thoughts (and
actions). The subject excavates, interprets, analyses and evaluates these
thoughts by bringing them into the open. The spiritual director is the
listener who represents the image of God. By unburdening oneself of all
secrets, one is seeking to be at rights with God. This process was to
reflect an on-going permanent activity directed towards personal
conversion, turning away from Satan and so renouncing oneself, and
turning towards the love of God.
The renunciation of self expresses a wish not to be subject to one’s
own will but rather to be obedient to the will of God as manifested
through the guidance of the spiritual director. Foucault maintains that in
these confessional practices of Christianity, we can see most clearly a
link between the search for the truth about oneself and self-sacrifice.
The revelation of the truth about oneself cannot be dissociated from 
the obligation to renounce oneself. We have to sacrifice the self in 
order to discover the truth about ourself, and we have to discover the 
truth about ourself in order to sacrifice ourself.21
For Foucault one of the great problems for Western culture has been to 
break the link between a technology of interpretation of the self and self- 
sacrifice. Much of Western thought has been a quest for a positive 
foundation for the interrogation into subjective truth.
20 For discussions of the welfare state in this context see Young Justice and the
Politics o f Difference, 76-81 and Habermas The Theory of Communicative 
Action, Volume 2, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1987, 361-373.
21 Foucault "About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self* Political Theory,
21 (1993), 198-227, here at 221.
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What has been produced however are various discourses that amount 
to technologies of normalisation that set a certain image of the human self 
to be paradigmatic. This image then is the standard towards which we 
seek to be converted as we seek to know and to control ourselves. Such 
a quest for self-knowledge does not break with the self-sacrifice involved 
in Christian confessional practices. We still subjugate our own will to the 
modem practices of pastoral power. The discourses of therapists, social 
workers and so on have replaced theological discourse in our regime of 
truth. These discourses are crucial elements to the distinctively modem 
macrostrategy of bio-power.22
Resistance to bio-power cannot be reduced to a class struggle that 
identifies the roots of power to be embedded in the economic base of 
society. There is an irreducible plurality of struggles that can be thought 
of as resistance to particular effects of power, for example the medical 
profession which "is not criticised primarily because it is a profit-making 
concern, but because it exercises an uncontrolled power over people's 
bodies, their health and their life and death."23 Other such struggles 
include the feminist challenge to the power of men, the lesbian and gay 
challenge to the power of heterosexual normalisation, the challenge of 
ethnic, racial or religious minorities to the power of majorities.
These struggles are against forms of power that make individuals 
subject to control, or subject to their own identity through the internalised 
gaze of pastoral power. They are struggles for new forms of subjectivity. 
These groups cannot be identified as members of the proletariat
22 On the importance of confessional practices in sexual discourses of modem power 
see Foucault The History o f Sexuality, Volume I : An Introduction, London: 
Penguin, 1990, 53-73 and Power/Knowledge, 93-94.
28 "The Subject and Power", 211.
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struggling to overcome the effects of capitalist power. Class identity can 
repress the actual differences they are expressing in their struggle against 
a more immediate enemy, be it sexism, homophobia, racism or 
sectarianism. It is other aspects of their lives that can provide the source 
for resistance to the identity that has been forced on them through the 
effects of pastoral power and the modem forms of confessional practice. 
Refusing the overarching identity of a revolutionary proletariat may well 
also be a strategy for such resistance.24
This digression on Foucault’s notion of power has been necessary in 
order to reconstruct clearly a direct post-structuralist challenge to Rawls. 
We can see how, like Marxism, post-structuralism detects elements of 
power in Rawls's theory of justice. Unlike the case of Marxism however, 
the possibility of an alternative theory that might guide our liberation 
from unjust power is rejected as illusory. Like communitarianism, post­
structuralism is critical of the notion of a separate public identity of the 
self as citizen that can be affirmed independently of non-political 
concerns. Unlike the communitarian, who stresses the moral ties that are 
partly constitutive of the self, the post-structuralist stresses the effects of 
power beyond the public arena that constitute the self as a subject.
What post-structuralism alerts us to is the danger of assuming unity in 
the face of real differences. I believe that historical research, including 
that of Foucault himself, has produced enough evidence for us not to treat
24 Foucault discusses the relationship between power, resistance and freedom in 
"The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom" Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, 12(1987), 112-130. We practice freedom by transgressing the limits 
that have been imposed on us historically and by trying to go beyond the 
particular dangers involved. This is a process of self-invention. It is this attitude 
that characterises critique under modem conditions. For a clear statement on 
this and related issues see "What is Enlightenment?" in The Foucault Reader, 
32-50.
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this danger lightly and not to be complacent about the inclusiveness of 
any theory.25 Marxism, which has undoubtedly been a rich source for the 
theoretical clarification of the effects of power on human lives, fails 
dismally in this regard. It has tended to repress otherness for the sake of 
the revolutionary struggle against capitalism. I now want to turn to the 
assessment of the challenge to Rawls and his veil of ignorance. Is Rawls 
sufficiently aware of the dangers of excluding others in his attempt to 
provide a theoretical basis for social unity and justice?
An Excluded Other?
First of all does the original position exclude non-human entities? Yes, it 
does, but I do not think that this is a problem for Rawls since he 
explicitly limits himself to a theory of justice between persons. The 
scope of the theory extends only to moral relationships among people and 
even then only to the institutions of the basic structure of society.26 The 
parties to the contract have specifically human characteristics, notably the 
two moral powers to have a conception of the good and a sense of 
justice. Rawls does not discuss in any detail the relationship a human 
being might have with animals, plants or external nature, although he 
assumes these to be questions of great importance. He notes that while it 
is clearly wrong to treat animals with cruelty, it is not clear that they 
should receive strict justice in the same way that human beings, with 
these two moral powers, are entitled to justice from each other.27 Moral
25 The most important extracts from Foucault's histories of madness, discipline and
punishment, and sexuality, are included in The Foucault Reader.
26 A Theory of Justice, 17.
27 A Theory o f Justice, 512.
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issues that are raised with respect to the status of animals, plants and 
external nature can be treated as separate matters and there is no need to 
give a full account of them in a theory that deals explicitly with questions 
of justice between human beings.
So non-human entities are, with reasonable justification, excluded 
from Rawls's discourse. Much more important from his own point of 
view is the second possible exclusion that was mentioned earlier. Does 
the original position also in some way exclude, or at least marginalise, 
other human actors? The parties to the original position are 
representative persons who hold the various social positions that are 
established by the basic structure of society.28 Since all persons are to be 
represented, then at first glance it seems unlikely that Rawls can be 
accused of excluding some group of persons or other. All features of 
people's lives that are the result of natural fortune or social circumstance 
are hidden behind the veil of ignorance so as not to disadvantage anyone 
for such arbitrary reasons in the choice of principles of justice. Although 
Rawls may not be fully explicit about all of these features the parties 
would have to be deprived of knowledge of their sex, their race, their 
social status, the generation to which they belong as well their conception 
of the good which presumably would include their religion, their ethnicity 
and their sexual orientation and preference.
The strategy Rawls adopts in trying to ensure that no human actors 
are excluded in the original position, is to think of the parties in such a 
way that they are all identical to each other. All aspects of their lives that 
make them different from each other are shrouded in the veil of 
ignorance. The veil excludes all human features other than those features
28 A Theory o f Justice, 64.
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of our public identity as free and equal citizens. This of course is the 
third possibility of an excluded other. For Rawls this exclusion is 
necessary in order to avoid the only exclusion that we should worry about 
in terms of a theory of justice between persons, that of other human 
actors. Only by eliminating from the moral point of view whatever 
differentiates us from one another can we have any guarantee of 
impartiality, social unity and justice for all citizens.
There are problems here however in that the conception of the citizen 
may obliterate differences that are important in terms of the way that 
power operates. The use of the veil of ignorance amounts to an 
assumption that what is relevant for our public identity and what is not is 
uncontroversial and already fixed before we even come to assess possible 
principles of justice. Since the contract is hypothetical Rawls must 
presume that every reasonable person would and should agree to the 
conditions of the original position. In this respect Foucault’s post­
structuralism alerts us to the dangers of such a presumption.
Rawls has no adequate way of testing whether or not marginalised 
groups within his own society have good reasons to accept the particular 
characterisation of the political domain that the veil represents. He runs 
the risk of building his own biases into the outline of a supposedly 
impartial procedure from which a substantive account of justice is to be 
constructed. Rawls’s conception of citizenship may draw on a particular 
view that reflects the self-image of the dominant social group. The only 
adequate test for this would be to conceive of an impartial point of view 
not as a hypothetical contract but rather as an open public debate where 
the participants could raise any matter as a potential subject of justice and
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where the constraints on the debate are not fixed once and for all before 
substantive issues can be considered.29
The general knowledge about social life that Rawls relies on in his 
outline of the original position, and in deciding where the veil of 
ignorance should fall, is, from a Foucauldian perspective, 
power/knowledge. All such knowledge, that is the general 
presuppositions of any one theorist in a modem society, must be thought 
of as having been produced not only by reason but also by power. If this 
is right, then the potentially biased assumptions that are built into the 
discourse must be submitted to a test where all those affected by its 
outcome could make a contribution in deciding what is and what is not 
politically relevant and what the most appropriate conditions of moral 
justification would be. Rawls’s own potential biases are not effectively 
tested since the parties in the original position are identical and so the 
discourse represents not a dialogue but a monologue. The only real 
participant is Rawls himself as the constructivist theorist who provides us 
with a "philosophical soliloquy".30
If, in contrast, the choice of substantive principles is thought of as the 
outcome of an open public debate with real participants then we can be 
somewhat more confident that all human actors will be represented
29 Seyla Benhabib "The Generalized and the Concrete Other" in Feminism as
Critique, Benhabib and Durcilla Cornell (eds.) here at 93-94. Kenneth Baynes 
makes some telling points along similar lines in "The Liberal/Communitarian 
Controversy and Communicative Ethics" in Universalism Vs. 
Communitarianism, David Rasmussen (ed.), 61-81.
30 Michael Walzer "A Critique of Philosophical Conversation" in Hermeneutics and
Critical Theory in Ethics and Politics, Michael Kelly (ed.), Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 1990, here at 189. For evidence that the original position is a 
monological moral point of view see A Theory of Justice, 19, 119, 139, 564 and 
"Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory", 550.
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adequately. An impartial point of view must reflect a real discourse that 
gives every marginalised social group the opportunity to publicise the 
effects of power that had formerly operated on them in the private realm. 
Real public dialogue has definite advantages over monological 
philosophical construction in identifying and confronting the more subtle 
effects of power in modem societies when it comes to choosing 
substantive principles of justice. These marginalised social groups can 
represent themselves in public and so they do not have to rely on the 
sensitivity of one political theorist to design the choice of substantive 
principles in a way that will adequately take into account their particular 
point of view.
We can think of a number of social groups that have in the past 
suffered discrimination or arbitrary exclusion from the public arena and 
have asserted their rights as citizens to be included fully in public 
deliberations. But they have also demanded that the boundary of the 
political be renegotiated so as to accommodate this change.31 Whatever 
was previously considered to be a contingent matter of merely private 
relevance is then placed in the public realm as an effect of power and a 
subject of justice. Historical examples might include the struggle for 
legislation to improve working conditions that followed the inclusion of 
working people in the public realm, the struggle against cultural 
stereotyping that followed the inclusion of ethnic and racial minorities, 
the struggle to include domestic violence as a matter of public concern 
that followed the inclusion of women, and the struggle against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation that followed the open 
inclusion of lesbians and gays in the public arena.
31 Benhabib "Liberal Dialogue Versus a Critical Theory of Discursive Legitimation" 
in Liberalism and the Moral Life, Nancy Rosenblum (ed.), here at 154-155.
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These groups have resisted the power that had previously constituted 
them as citizens, they have refused that identity and have struggled for 
new forms of subjectivity that demand a renegotiation of the boundary of 
the political domain. It has been through public reflection on the 
differences between various groups of citizens, and not what they have in 
common, that has made possible this form of resistance to power. An 
adequate conception of citizenship then can only be produced 
dialogically in an on-going public struggle rather than in the reflections of 
one philosopher. The choice of substantive principles will be all the 
more inclusive, with less potential for bias, if every social group 
represents itself and is allowed to, and encouraged to, articulate its own 
particular needs and concerns.32
The main point here is that it does not matter how open Rawls is to 
the particular needs of marginalised social groups, he is not in a position 
to construct a conception of citizenship on which we can all be expected 
to agree. We should be suspicious of any one theorist who can claim to 
represent adequately all perspectives in the derivation of substantive 
principles of justice. Rawls's procedure is not well equipped to identify 
or to represent groups that are marginalised now but who have not yet 
found their voice. His conception of citizenship, dependent as it is on the 
attempt to isolate the political domain, is as likely to be as distorted as 
earlier conceptions of citizenship, including those that excluded women 
for example, were in their own context.
32 Of course such a public dialogue would have to be subject to some constraints 
that would constitute an impartial point of view or else no agreement on 
principles of justice would be possible at all. We will have to wait until the third 
chapter to assess Habermas's alternative conception of impartiality. Since this 
conception is based on public dialogue it has clear advantages over Rawls's 
monological procedure.
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A procedural test for principles of justice must reflect differences and 
not a taken for granted conception of the identity of citizens. Otherwise 
it will not be sufficiently critical to allow the perspective of the 
marginalised to be heard adequately. Particular aspects of social life 
cannot be newly incorporated within the political domain without 
changing our understanding of the identity of citizens. If the more subtle 
forms of social control and domination are to be confronted then we 
cannot have a final definitive conception of citizenship. To choose 
principles of justice on the basis of such a conception is to run the risk of 
imposing norms that might marginalise some social groups. This would 
simply reinforce particular effects of power that act as subtle forms of 
social control.
Reason, Power and the Moral Point of View 
I have been advocating a moral point of view that involves the direct 
representation of all concerned. While I believe that this overcomes 
many of the problems that Rawls creates for himself in his outline of the 
original position, there are however limits to this directness. Human 
actors that were inadequately represented in the original position can 
represent themselves in the public realm and challenge the privatisation 
of certain features of their lives that suffer the effects of power. This 
makes the separation of political and non-political a matter of public 
concern and not a once and for all constraint on our deliberations about 
justice.33 But this still does not cater for some human actors who may not 
have the capacity to represent themselves effectively (children, past or 
future generations, the unborn, the insane, the comatose). Some potential
33 Rawls places a condition of finality on the decisions that would emerge in the 
original position. See ^ 4 Theory of Justice, 135.
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voices are not given an adequate hearing even in the most open public 
dialogue imaginable.34
An awareness of this problem should make a theorist all the more 
cautious about presuming that everyone could agree to the constraints 
that he finds reasonable. Even in open public dialogue we must try as 
best we can to represent these persons indirectly, acknowledging the fact 
that this indirect representation is not altogether adequate. Such an 
acknowledgement reminds us of the fact that all moral theories have their 
limits and their openness to all potential voices must be finite. We must 
be careful to remind ourselves of those limits by conceiving of the moral 
point of view in such a way that makes it as open as possible to diversity 
and difference and as sensitive as possible to the danger of allowing 
power driven assumptions to enter the discourse. This is clearly not best 
achieved behind a veil of ignorance.
However it is important to stress that the criticisms I have made of 
Rawls do not in any way endorse the strong post-structuralist claim that 
the distinction between reason and power is somehow arbitrary. In fact 
everything I have argued depends crucially on maintaining that distinction 
and asserting the privileges of reason over power. This is where I believe 
Rawls’s perspective has some very important advantages over that of 
Foucault. Rawls seeks to articulate the moral point of view so that we 
can distinguish between claims based on reason and claims based on 
power. While I have suggested that his approach does not achieve this 
effectively, I believe this task to be indispensable to any theory of justice 
that is to facilitate a critical assessment of social institutions and 
practices.
84 White Political Theory and Postmodernism, 22, n. 18.
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Foucault himself is simply not articulate enough on this question.
This is partly because his important work on the capillary nature of 
power tends to blind him to the possibility of some normatively grounded 
criteria that are more sensitive to difference than for example, the strong 
claims of Marxism could allow for. Such criteria can still enable us to 
distinguish between more and less rigid forms of power, more and less 
adequate ways of evaluating what is and what is not morally arbitrary, 
and more and less reasonable principles of justice.
Actually since it seems that Foucault does seek to minimise 
domination then I believe he must presuppose some such normative 
framework.33 If not, then it is difficult to make sense of any motivation 
for struggle or resistance to particular effects of power or even our 
attempts to avoid the danger of excluding others from our discourses. 
Foucault does, perhaps despite himself, provide good reasons as to why 
we should be suspicious of any theory that presumes unity or identity in 
the face of difference. If he were to deny that we can have more or less 
reasonable views on this question then it would seem difficult for him to 
avoid some form of contradiction.36 He would be denying the very
35 "The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom", 124-130. There have
been a number of excellent critiques of Foucault based on the charge that his 
work is normatively inarticulate. Among the best are Nancy Fraser "Foucault on 
Modem Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions" in Unruly 
Practices, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1989, 17-34, Michael Walzer "The 
Politics of Michel Foucault" and Charles Taylor "Foucault on Freedom and 
Truth" both in Foucault: A Critical Reader, David Couzens Hoy (ed.), Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1986, 51-68 and 69-102, Jurgen Habermas The Philosophical 
Discourse o f Modernity, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1987, 266-293, Thomas 
McCarthy "The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School" 
in Ideals and Illusions, 43-75 and Richard J. Bernstein "Foucault: Critique as a 
Philosophic Ethos" in The New Constellation, 142-171.
36 I think that Foucault is vulnerable to Habermas's claim that his normative
inarticulacy enmeshes him in a performative contradiction. This notion will be
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grounds that could make his arguments normatively justifiable. If all 
human actors are to enjoy as little domination as possible in their lives 
then it seems reasonable to suppose that Foucault should have been 
asking the same type of question that Rawls, and Habermas, try so 
carefully to answer. This involves the articulation of a moral, or an 
impartial, point of view that enables us to assess the reasonableness of 
competing principles of justice.37
I believe that Habermas’s answer to this question has certain 
important advantages over Rawls's, including the fact I take it to be less 
vulnerable to post-structuralist criticism. While Rawls’s articulation of 
the moral point of view is seriously flawed, his emphasis on impartiality 
is not misplaced. If we think of impartiality on the model of public 
dialogue then we can see historically how this affords discourse a self- 
correcting mechanism. If a certain social group has not been represented 
adequately in some discourse that claims to be impartial then they can 
use that claim to criticise the conditions of the discourse internally. 
Similarly any theory that bases its claim to be impartial on the model of a 
public dialogue provides the resources needed for a self-critical test of its 
own biases. The problem with Foucault is that he does not take seriously 
enough our need for an impartial procedure that could legitimate 
substantive principles of justice. This is tantamount to surrendering an 
important tool of social criticism. To justify an impartial point of view 
need not involve the imposition of unity over difference. In fact it may
explained in the discussion of Habermas's justification of discourse ethics in the 
third chapter.
37 Foucault's later work on ethics and the care o f the self does not deal seriously with 
the need for normatively justified limits to the process of self-invention.
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well involve the articulation of difference as well as the attempt to seek 
common ground.38
In this section I have argued that the original position with its veil of 
ignorance is built on a conception of the citizen that Rawls assumes in his 
theory without any adequate way of testing whether or not those affected 
by the principles that are chosen in the original position share that 
assumption. I have suggested that post-structuralism and specifically the 
work of Michel Foucault reveals the naivete of that approach.
Throughout modem history difference has been suppressed by subtle and 
informal normalising effects of power. These effects certainly cannot be 
confined strictly to the political or economic systems, or even to the basic 
structure of society as such. We should therefore be suspicious of any 
theory that hides difference for the sake of unity. In the next section I 
will look in more detail at the feminist charge that Rawls’s theory has a 
male bias because he fails to comprehend the effects of power, and the 
need for justice, within the family.
38 Iris Young believes that seeking to be impartial necessarily involves an abstraction 
from particular situations. See Young Justice and the Politics o f Difference, 96- 
121. I am arguing here that we can continue to seek to be impartial in public 
dialogue about justice even though that may well involve asserting the 
differences between particular social groups. This point will be developed in the 
discussion of discourse ethics.
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1.4 JUSTICE IN THE FAMILY AND FEMINIST 
OBJECTIONS
There is some ambiguity in A Theory o f Justice regarding the status of 
the family as a subject of justice. When Rawls gives examples of the 
major social institutions that are to be included as features of the basic 
structure of society, and therefore as parts of the primary subject of 
justice, he includes the "monogamous family." Since the basic structure 
is basic precisely because "its effects are so profound and present from 
the start" there was no option for Rawls but to include the family as one 
institution within that structure. The family is arguably the institution that 
most profoundly influences the life-prospects of individuals, "what they 
expect to be and how well they can hope to do."1 Some starting places in 
life are favoured over others due to the family circumstances into which 
an individual is bom and in which nurturance and growth of that 
individual occurs.
It is clear that from Rawls’s point of view the very deep inequalities 
involved here could not be said to be merited or deserved by those who 
have had the good fortune to benefit from them. Family circumstances 
determine to a very significant degree the expectations (the index of 
social primary goods; liberties and opportunities, income and wealth and 
most significantly the bases of self-respect) that any representative 
individual could reasonably look forward to.2 This is surely one of the 
most urgent problems that must be addressed if we are to try to regulate 
the major institutions of society according to the principles of justice that 
Rawls's constructs from the procedure of the original position. We would
1 A Theory o f Justice, 7.
2 A Theory o f Justice, 95.
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have to ensure that any unequal distribution of primary goods is to the 
advantage of the least favoured.3 The fleeting reference to the 
monogamous family as part of the basic structure does not make it at all 
clear how the principles of justice are to apply to that institution.
It seems plausible that what Rawls meant by including the family as 
part of the basic structure was to indicate that it is a matter of justice 
whether or not some such public commitment between consenting 
individuals is legally protected. Marriage, for example, is a social 
institution that provides an important publicly supported option as to how 
individuals exercise their capacity to choose a long term rational plan of 
life. If the existence of legal marriage, or any other legislation related to 
the family such as divorce or adoption law, could be shown to lead to 
inequalities that are not to the advantage of the least favoured, then that 
would be unjust.
According to this interpretation, the family is a matter of justice only 
in this external sense in that we can and should regulate the legal 
constitution of the family so that the relevant options available for 
individuals are consistent with the principles of justice. This is quite 
different from the claim that the family is a matter of justice in an internal 
sense, that what goes on within the family can be assessed publicly in 
terms of justice and injustice. What this implies is a distinction between 
what constitutes the family externally and the order of the family 
internally. It seems to me that Rawls must assume some such external- 
internal distinction and that furthermore, his inclusion of the family as a 
feature of the basic structure is only intended to allow for an assessment 
of the justness of the family in an external, but not in an internal, sense.
3 A Theory of Justice, 303. I will discuss the substantive principles that Rawls 
believes to be legitimated by his procedure in the next chapter.
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If this were not the case it would be difficult to make sense of what he 
says, and does not say, elsewhere about the family. I will return to that 
later but first we must consider why the family might be thought of as just 
or unjust internally as well as externally.
Feminism and the Internal Justice of the Family
It is important to assess Rawls’s comments on the family from a feminist 
perspective because many feminists believe that the internal structure of 
the traditional, monogamous, heterosexual family does raise questions of 
justice. The gender structure of modem societies, that is the social 
construction and institutionalisation of sexual difference, particularly with 
regard to the division of labour within the traditional family, has led to 
serious injustice against women in terms of political and economic 
powers, opportunities and responsibilities.4 To assume that the family is 
beyond the scope of a theory of justice is to deny that the traditional 
division of labour within the family is unjust. It is to deny that the public 
sphere of political and economic life is inextricably intertwined with the 
private domestic sphere of family life. As is clear from our examination 
of the claims of post-structuralism, it is implausible to maintain that there 
are any aspects of our private lives that are immune from the effects of 
power. This is what feminists mean by asserting that the personal is 
political. They mean that any attempt to exclude the general structure of
4 In the following paragraphs I will be relying on the work of Susan Moller Okin.
See her "Humanist Liberalism" in Liberalism and the Moral Life, Nancy 
Rosenblum (ed.), "Gender, the Public and the Private" in Political Theory 
Today, David Held (ed.), Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991, 67-90 and 
especially Justice, Gender and the Family, New York: Basic Books, 1989 where 
she gives numerous references to empirical evidence in support of her claims.
For a comprehensive analysis of contemporary issues related to women's 
struggle for equality and the law, Deborah L. Rhode Justice and Gender, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.
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personal, even intimate, relations from public reflection serves to conceal 
and protect the more subtle effects of power on the lives of women. 
Substantive political and economic equality between the sexes is now 
widely accepted, in public at least, to be a reasonable norm. Yet any 
genuine aspiration to make this substantive equality a reality demands a 
radical reconsideration of the way in which the public and private spheres 
of life are intertwined.
In the first place it is impossible for the state not to have some effect 
on the domestic sphere. Historically the effect has more often than not 
bolstered a patriarchal gender structure. The more obvious sex-based 
discrimination in family law and restrictions on the participation of 
women in the public sphere have relatively recently been removed.5 
However it has been argued that even from a legislative point of view, 
this has not yet gone far enough and that divorce laws, for example, 
continue to arbitrarily privilege men in Western societies.6 This is 
because generally speaking women (and children) stand to lose more than 
men in economic terms should a difficult marriage end in divorce. It is 
therefore more likely for wives to have less power in marriage, being 
vulnerable to the threat of its dissolution from the more economically 
independent husband.
These issues make it clear that there is a direct connection between 
the external legal constitution of marriage and the internal order of family 
life. In any society that is rigidly gender structured, the legal constitution 
of the family will affect women and men in different ways when they
5 Okin "Humanist Liberalism", 42.
6 Okin Justice, Gender and the Family, 160-169. Okin restricts herself to a
discussion of divorce law in the USA. but I think that the general point clearly 
has a wider relevance.
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contemplate the possibility of marriage, while they are married and when 
they contemplate ending a marriage. What goes on within the family, the 
internal, is always being shaped and determined in part by legislation on 
the family, the external. If the family is part of the basic structure of 
society externally, then it is difficult to see how it could be argued that it 
is beyond justice internally.
It is not only direct legislation on the family that causes the internal 
order of the family to be intertwined with the basic structure. We have to 
take seriously the fact that women continue to perform far more unpaid 
labour than men in the domestic sphere, most notably in the reproduction 
of life and the care of children. The decision of a woman to bear the 
greater part of this burden often makes good economic sense since men 
continue to dominate in jobs with higher-pay and better career prospects. 
This is not surprising if women are expected to compete in the market 
with their hands tied behind their backs because of the social expectation 
that they will take primary responsibility for domestic affairs. But so 
long as men dominate in the public workplace and women continue to do 
most domestic work there will be at least two important consequences 
that lead to the perpetuation of a patriarchal gender structure.
Firstly, women are underrepresented in public workplaces, 
particularly in the most powerful and prestigious positions. This 
translates into a lack of influence and a public sphere organised from an 
excessively male perspective with the result that important decisions are 
made without due regard for the interests of women, particularly those 
who work at home. If the perspective of those who care for children 
were not so marginalised it might well also be of great benefit to men 
who are driven to a competitive public life that often demands the 
suppression of their own personal needs. This suppression will continue
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to affect their behaviour, both at work and at home, often without their 
being aware of it.
It might be pointed out that men in powerful and influential positions 
do not take the interests of most other men into account any more than 
they consider the interests of women at home. It might also be suggested 
that the few women who are in powerful positions do not seem to take 
the interests of most people, be they men or women, into account either. 
This objection could be given a Marxist formulation if we suggest that it 
does not matter whether or not the powerful person is a man or a woman 
because in either case the interests of capital and the dominant class will 
be best served, and not those of most men and women, that is wage- 
labourers (or those who cannot even find a buyer for their labour-power).
Feminism is certainly not incompatible with this form of Marxian 
objection but, as the discussion of Foucault suggested, it does represent a 
distinctive aspect of resistance to power in capitalist society. The task 
for feminists is not simply to involve women to a greater degree in public 
life but rather to actually change the way that public life is conducted so 
that gendered stereotypes are challenged and overcome. Challenging the 
gender structure of society is one, but by no means the only, form of 
resistance to power that aspires to the transformation of our social world 
for the better. Marxian inspired class struggle and other forms of 
resistance that also cut across sex differences, such as anti-racist 
movements, all play important roles in challenging and overcoming the 
structures of power that dominate the lives of a variety of social groups.
Apart from their under-representation in powerful positions, the 
continuing marginalisation of women also has a detrimental effect on 
those women who do go out to work. Their struggle for respect and 
authority is compounded and they are often vulnerable to various forms 
of sexual harassment. Despite the achievements of feminism in the West,
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and these are not to be dismissed, such obstacles to women having 
greater influence and power remain entrenched in this culture. 
Comparisons with other cultures, where feminism has still greater 
obstacles to overcome, should not lead to complacency in this regard.
The point is that continuing stereotypes of cultural expectation make it 
less difficult to challenge effectively the gendered division of labour 
within the traditional family. They hinder the radical social measures that 
would be necessary to alter satisfactorily the balance of work in and out 
of the home for both women and men.7
Secondly, some feminists have drawn on psychoanalytic theory to 
argue that the predominance of female parenting has led to a tendency for 
girls to identify with the nurturing mother who is of the same sex and so 
they value closeness and intimacy to a high degree, while boys tend to 
identify with the working father and so to a much greater degree they 
value independence and public participation.8 Even without accepting 
any of the psychoanalytic assumptions that could be used to support this 
argument I think it is clear that the identity of a child is very profoundly 
shaped, in relation to gender, by the balance of parental involvement in 
the earliest years of nurturance. The division of labour within the 
traditional family can be internalised and hence perpetuated at this early 
stage of the child's life.
Recent feminist research undoubtedly offers a strong challenge to any 
straightforward dichotomy between public and private. In the remainder 
of this section I hope to show that it also supports significant objections
7 Okin Justice, Gender and the Family, 175-186.
8 Nancy Chodorow The Reproduction o f Mothering, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1974 and Dorothy Dinnerstein The Mermaid and the Minotaur, 
New York: Harper and Row, 1977.
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to Rawls’s attempt to isolate the political domain. I have already 
suggested here that Rawls does not see the family as a subject of justice 
internally. This is a flaw in his conception of the basic structure that 
reflects once again the problems associated with any attempt to isolate 
the political. We will see later how this flaw can be connected to the 
monological nature of Rawls's procedure, thus adding weight to the 
central argument of this chapter. Firstly we will assess Susan Moller 
Okin's careful analysis of Rawls’s work from a feminist perspective.9 
Okin argues that Rawls is blind to the injustice of gender as embodied in 
the internal structure of the traditional family.
Gender Blindness in Rawls's Theory
Given the sexism of the tradition in which Rawls writes, we might, with 
good reason, have expected that it would be made very explicit at every 
relevant point that the theory applies to women as well as to men.10 In 
his initial account of the original position he does not mention that the 
parties should be deprived of knowledge of their sex.11 Now perhaps 
Rawls implicitly considered our sex to be morally irrelevant but the fact 
that he neglects to mention it specifically may indicate an oversight on his 
part in failing to recognise the highly contentious issues surrounding the
9 In particular Justice, Gender and the Family, 90-97.
10 Okin Women in Western Political Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1979 and Jean Bekthe Elshtain Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social 
and Political Thought, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981. More specifically since 
Rawls is usually identified within the tradition of Kantian moral theory, see 
Okin's critique of Kant, "Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice" Ethics, 
99 (1989), 229-249, here at 231-235.
11 A Theory o f Justice, 12.
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past exclusion of women from the scope of theories of justice as well as 
the continuing injustices of the gender structure.12
Furthermore, since the parties are to know "the general facts about 
human society"13 they presumably know that most societies are and have 
been gender structured in ways that disadvantage women in political and 
economic terms. Rawls never mentions this. It cannot be discounted as 
a possibility that he was not sufficiently aware of this fact himself. If this 
were the case, then it would constitute evidence that could be used in 
support of the argument I made in the last section, that the conditions of 
an impartial point of view must themselves reflect a public discussion 
rather than merely allowing for the constructive work of a lone theorist. 
Rawls runs the risk of building his own biases into the construction of his 
substantive account of justice. All social groups must be able to speak 
from their own particular point of view in the critical assessment of 
principles of justice.
Earlier I suggested that we think of Rawls’s initial inclusion of the 
family as part of the basic structure to have been intended in an external 
sense only. This seems plausible because certain other features of his 
theory seem to require him to assume that the family is internally just. He 
never discusses the institutions of the family directly when he comes to 
assess how the principles of justice he derives from the original position 
apply to the institutions of the basic structure, such as the political 
constitution, property relations and economic arrangements. This might 
lead to some doubts as to whether or not he intended to include the
12 It must be noted however that Rawls does place knowledge of one's sex behind
the veil o f ignorance in "Fairness to Goodness", 537.
13 A Theory o f Justice, 137.
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family as a subject of justice even in an external sense.14 It is not clear 
why he ignores family law as an institution of the basic structure of a well 
ordered society except perhaps that he realised that it would be 
impossible to discuss the question of the external justice of the family’s 
legal constitution without also treating the internal order of the family as 
a matter of justice. There are reasons why he would want to avoid this.
Rawls suggests that we think of the parties in the original position as 
heads of families.15 This allows us to think of them as being motivated to 
care for some members of the next generation and so ensures that the 
interests of the latter are taken into account, something which is 
particularly important in relation to the question of justice between 
generations and the savings principle.16 Although Rawls adheres to 
traditional assumptions by using examples of fathers and sons in the 
discussion of this problem17 it could fairly readily be claimed that the 
head of the family need not be the father. However what cannot be 
denied is that by suggesting that we think of the parties to the original
14 In Justice, Gender and the Family Okin gives support to this suspicion by
pointing out that in one article Rawls does not even mention the family as part of 
the basic structure. See "The Basic Structure as Subject" American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 14 (1977), 159-165, here at 159. However this may be 
unfair to Rawls since in the longer, revised version of this paper, in Values and 
Morals, A. Goldman and J. Kim (eds.), Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978,47-71, here at 
47, "the nature of the family" does remarkably reappear as part of the basic 
structure. This longer version of the essay is reproduced unchanged in Political 
Liberalism, 257-288 with the family reference at 258. What can certainly be said 
is that this indecisiveness does little to encourage any feminist confidence in 
Rawls.
15 A Theory o f Justice, 128.
16 A Theory o f Justice, 284-295.
17 A Theory o f Justice, 289.
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position as representatives of families he does assume that the family
itself is internally just. As Okin puts it
he is thereby effectively trapped into the public/domestic dichotomy 
and, with it, the conventional mode of thinking that life within the 
family and relations between the sexes are not properly regarded as 
part of the subject matter of a theory of social justice.18
This of course means that the claims of less advantaged members of a 
family, usually women and children, are not adequately taken into 
account in the original position.
Even though Rawls challenges discrimination against women in the 
public sphere it is his inability to theorise adequately the relationship 
between the political and the non-political, the external constitution and 
the internal order of the family that leaves him vulnerable to this charge.19 
He simply does not dig deep enough into the gender structure to 
effectively identify the roots of discrimination based on sexual difference.
Further evidence that Rawls assumes an internally just family can be 
offered by considering his comments on how the family sets a limit to the 
operation of fair equality of opportunity.20 Families within one social 
sector may differ in the way in which the aspirations of the children are 
shaped. For this reason Rawls considers whether or not the family 
should be abolished. But he feels that the difference principle and the 
principles of "fraternity1 and redress, all of which are designed to ensure 
that any social inequalities are to the benefit of the worst off, make any 
disadvantages in this regard easier to bear. At no stage does Rawls
18 Okin Justice, Gender and the Family, 92.
19 Rawls mentions discrimination based on sex as a subject of justice mA Theory of
Justice, 99.
20 A Theory o f Justice, 301, 511.
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question whether the traditional division of labour within the family 
should be confronted and challenged as a matter of justice. This seems to 
indicate that he is blind to the importantly different ways in which the 
aspirations of girls and boys are shaped in the context of the traditional 
family. He is also blind to the fact that this difference contributes to the 
perpetuation of the present gender structure.
Finally, Rawls assumes that the family is internally just in his 
discussion of the central role it plays in the development of the 
individual's sense of justice.21 Children’s moral development depends 
crucially on the internal order of the family and the way in which the 
parents exemplify their own morality. Throughout his account Rawls 
fails to consider how the division of labour within the family might 
involve an injustice to one of the parents. This is a serious flaw in the 
theory since it depends so heavily on our moral capacity to have a sense 
of justice. If our sense of justice is distorted from the start because of the 
structure of the traditional family then it seems likely that the subsequent 
moral development of the individual will be shot through with 
assumptions about gender.22
It seems that Rawls never satisfactorily deals with the family as a 
subject of justice.23 He includes it in the list of institutions of the basic 
structure because it would be absurd not to do so given the profound
21 A Theory of Justice, 462-472.
22 Okin Justice, Gender and the Family, 97-101 and "Reason and Feeling in
Thinking about Justice", 235-238.
23 Even in Political Liberalism, xxix, Rawls defends his conception of justice by
stating baldly that he believes "the alleged difficulties in discussing problems of 
gender and the family can be overcome." He also, rather unconvincingly, notes 
that he does not try to show this in the lectures included in the book. Nor does 
he show it elsewhere.
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effects of family circumstances on the individual’s chances in life. Yet he 
omits to question whether or not the family is itself internally just. I have 
argued here that this omission was unavoidable for him since he needs to 
assume an internally just family for the sake of some other central 
features of the theory. This is why he only included the family as part of 
the basic structure in an external sense.24 The question of the justice of 
the family then points to further problems for Rawls in his attempt to 
isolate the political from other aspects of our moralities.
The evidence of recent research convincingly supports the claim that 
an external-internal distinction, such as I have interpreted in Rawls's 
work, is not tenable. This is because of the fact that the family is 
structured internally by its external legal constitution as well as by other 
economic and political aspects of the basic structure. It is also 
noteworthy that the question of external justice is never adequately dealt 
with in Rawls’s very detailed analysis of the institutions of a well ordered 
society. Surely marriage, divorce and adoption law, as well as questions 
related to claims of rights for gay and lesbian marriages, and issues such 
as polygamous or arranged marriages merited some discussion in this 
broad analysis of the basic structure.25 It would appear that Rawls is
24 For evidence that Rawls thinks of the family as a private association see "Justice
as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", 245, n. 27 and "The Priority of Right 
and Ideas of the Good", 263. If he were to view the internal order of the family 
as a political matter of justice then he would have to revise again the central 
feature of his recent work, the identification of a distinctively political morality 
that underpins the overlapping consensus.
25 Okin herself fails to deal with many of these issues regarding the legal constitution
of the family. She is therefore vulnerable to the charge that she takes far too 
many aspects of the traditional family for granted in her own work. The point is 
made by Will Kymlicka "Rethinking the Family" Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
20 (1991) and by Joshua Cohen "Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family" 
Canadian Journal o f  Philosophy, 22 (1992), 263-286.
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unwilling to enter into any serious consideration of the justice of the 
family in any sense.
Perhaps this is so because he wants to avoid the communitarian 
criticism, that he presupposes in his construction of the original position a 
metaphysical conception of an atomistic, unencumbered, disembodied 
human self. As we have already seen, in the discussion of the second 
section, Rawls has responded by arguing that the original position, as a 
device of representation, relies only on a political conception of the 
person as a free and equal citizen and not on any metaphysical view of 
the person. This political conception simply avoids any aspects of our 
comprehensive moral views that are not relevant politically. At the same 
time these views may reflect private ties of affection, devotion or loyalty 
in the personal life of the citizen.
Now it is often within the family that such ties of affection, that 
constitute in part the personal identity of the citizen, will be most 
intensely experienced. From Rawls's point of view it is necessary to 
abstract from these ties of affection, to leave them behind the veil of 
ignorance, in order to construct a workable conception of justice. This 
might help to explain why he is reluctant to consider the family as a 
subject of political justice. But as we saw in the last section the use of 
the veil of ignorance involves certain dangers because it tends to take for 
granted what is and what is not of relevance to a publicly affirmed 
political morality. It is simply not possible for a lone theorist to construct 
a substantive account of justice on the basis of a political morality and a 
conception of the citizen that are taken for granted in the outline of a 
procedure that is to represent an impartial point of view. The procedure 
Rawls advocates does not reflect adequately the diversity of possible 
worldviews in modem societies. I think that the consideration of feminist
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arguments related to injustices within the family strengthens that 
criticism.26
Justice, Care and Solidarity
There is another important issue, related to the procedure outlined in the 
original position, that has been put on the agenda by feminist theorists. 
This has to do with the charge that to consider the type of abstract 
reflection on justice that takes place in the original position to be 
representative of the highest stage of moral reasoning is to reveal a male 
bias. Justice emphasises separation and autonomy while care, which 
according to the empirical research of Carol Gilligan is of greater 
significance in the actual moral judgements of women, emphasises
26 The feminism I elaborate here is compatible with the type o f liberal holism I 
defended in the second section. A commitment to a holist view does not 
preclude the questioning of any particular aspect of a tradition. Contemporary 
feminists tend to be critical, rightly in my view, of versions o f communitarianism 
that stress the moral ties of tradition, as being insensitive to gender-based 
oppression. See for example Okin Justice, Gender and the Family, chapter 3, 
Marilyn Friedman "Feminism and Modem Friendship: Dislocating the 
Community" in Communitarianism and Individualism, Shlomo Avineri and 
Avner de-Shalit (eds.), 101-119, Iris Marion Young "The Ideal of Community 
and the Politics of Difference" in Feminism/Postmodernism, Linda Nicholson 
(ed.), London: Routledge, 1990, 300-323, Susan Heckman "The Embodiment of 
the Subject: Feminism and the Communitarian Critique o f Liberalism" The 
Journal o f Politics, 54 (1992), 1098-1119. Many feminist critics of  
communitarianism tend to embrace postmodern celebrations o f difference in 
ways which enmesh them in the type of normative contradiction that 
undermined, as I argued above, the cogency of Foucault's work. For a useful 
account of why feminism and postmodernism can readily be drawn into an 
alliance see Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson "Social Criticism without 
Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism" in 
Feminism/Postmodernism, Linda Nicholson (ed.), 19-38. For the best account 
of why feminists should avoid such an alliance, while still incorporating the better 
insights o f both communitarianism and post-structuralism in a way that broadly 
supports the arguments of the earlier sections of this chapter, see Benhabib 
Situating the Self especially her critique of postmodernism at 203-241.
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connectedness and interdependence.27 It has been argued that Rawls’s 
concentration on justice and his abstraction from the concrete context of 
care for others contributes to the continued repression of the voice of 
women in contemporary moral theory. This argument has been made 
most effectively by Seyla Benhabib.28
Benhabib builds on Gilligan’s claim that women’s moral judgement is 
typically more immersed in the details of relationships, in the awareness 
of the standpoint of particular others, in feelings of empathy and 
sympathy for the differing needs of others that we encounter in the 
context of concrete human interaction. If the findings of Gilligan's 
research are valid then it seems to imply that any vision of moral maturity 
that stresses separation and abstraction rather than connection and 
interaction arbitrarily undervalues care and our responsibility to concrete 
others. An ethic of care provides a necessary complement to an ethic of 
justice and a fully adequate account of morality cannot afford to divorce 
one from the other. They must both be placed together at the centre of a 
moral theory’s concern.29 The important implication from our point of 
view here is that an adequate theory of justice must take an ethic of care 
into account.
27 Gilligan In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982 and "Do the Social Sciences 
have an Adequate Theory of Moral Development" in Social Science as Moral 
Inquiry, Norma Haan et al. (eds.), New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, 
33-51.
28 "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy
and Feminist Theory" in Feminism as Critique, Seyla Benhabib and Durcilla 
Cornell (eds.), 75-95. See also, in the same volume, Iris Marion Young 
"Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of 
Moral and Political Theory", 57-74.
29 Gilligan "Do the Social Sciences have an Adequate Theory of Moral
Development", 35.
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It does not follow that care is essentially a matter for women or that 
justice is essentially a matter for men. On the contrary this has been one 
of the chief ideological weapons that has helped to institutionalise the 
present gender structure that deprives women of an adequate voice in 
public affairs. The point that Gilligan's work underlines is that if we 
stress justice at the expense of care in our moral theories, then we are 
reinforcing patriarchal assumptions that privilege the traditionally male 
public concern for justice over the traditionally female private concern for 
care and nurturance. Our efforts to overcome gender based oppression 
will be better supported by a shift in moral theory from an almost 
exclusive stress on justice, to a perspective that gives care equal 
significance in the characterisation of moral maturity.
Benhabib argues that Rawls eliminates from moral consideration any 
real differences between us and any connection we might have to other 
concrete individuals. He tries to theorise justice without taking any 
account of an ethic of care. He deals only with the need for public justice 
among autonomous individuals. Of course there is still a very important 
distinction between justice and care but Rawls makes too sharp a division 
between them and so fails to pay sufficient attention to the role that care 
for the concrete other has to play in theorising about justice.
In the original position the other is a generalised other, not a concrete 
other, since all features that distinguish one party from the other are 
hidden. This makes it impossible for one party to be moved in moral 
judgement by the experience of facing concrete others, by the needs, 
desires and different perspectives that we are called on to recognise in 
such an interactive encounter.30 The moral dignity of each party comes
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from whatever they have in common, their two formal moral powers, 
rather than whatever particularises them, their individuality, their 
distinctive needs and interests. This implies that our deliberations on 
justice are informed by abstract reasoning alone and not by moral 
considerations that emerge in the light of an experience of the needs of 
concrete others. Much of our moral experience is thereby ignored.
Benhabib's objection to Rawls's procedure indicates that in order to 
make any moral decisions about justice we need to draw on our 
knowledge of the particular needs of concrete others. Without this we 
run the risk of assuming that care for one another, and for the 
intersubjective bonds that bind each of us to some significant others, has 
no role to play in the justification of a public conception of justice. These 
moral concerns are relegated to the private sphere of the family and other 
intimate relationships. Benhabib's accusation is that Rawls's procedure 
marginalises these concerns in a way that distorts our thinking about 
justice.31
This does not mean that the generalised other, the stress on the formal
moral powers that we all share, has no role to play in characterising the
moral point of view. According to Benhabib
the recognition of the dignity and worthiness of the generalized other 
is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition to define the moral
30 Young Justice and the Politics o f Difference, 99-107. See A Theory of Justice,
139 where Rawls's comments on the possible role o f a referee in the original 
position make it clear that there would be no real dialogue between the parties.
31 Both Benhabib and Gilligan discuss the marginalisation o f moral feelings such as
care, sympathy and compassion from an overly rationalistic procedure. I do not 
consider rationality to be in tension with moral feeling and so I do not want to 
phrase the objection in terms of a rationalistic marginalisation of moral feelings.
It seems to me that a procedure that allows no place for our concern for 
concrete others is in fact insufficiently rational. This will be explained fully in the 
third chapter when the centrality of intersubjectivity in Habermas's rational 
procedure will be discussed.
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standpoint in modem societies. In this sense the concrete other is a 
critical concept that designates the ideological limits of universalistic 
discourse. It signifies the unthought, the unseen, and the unheard in 
such theories.32
What is important is that we come to recognise the dignity and the rights 
of the generalised other through an acknowledgement of real concrete 
others. This can only take place in a process of political engagement and 
dialogue and not through abstraction from everything that differentiates 
individuals, or social groups, from one another.
I have already suggested, in the last section, that the abstraction 
involved in the idea of a veil of ignorance runs a serious risk of leaving 
the prejudices and biases of the theorist unchallenged in constructing his 
moral discourse. The issue that is raised in the controversy about justice 
and care relates more directly to the type of moral reasoning that is 
required of each of us if we are to consider matters of justice from an 
impartial point of view. Once behind the veil of ignorance, the parties to 
the contract cannot be sensitive to the actual experience of the least 
advantaged group in society, the worst off concrete other. This is 
because none of the parties, who are of course identical with one another, 
can speak from that particular perspective. However if we are 
adequately to carry out the sort of universalizability test that is implied by 
our accepting that the original position does in fact represent conditions 
of fairness, then this sensitivity to the concrete reality of the least 
advantaged group would seem to be necessary. It is only in real 
encounters that citizens can genuinely develop the sensitivity to adopt the 
perspective of the least advantaged social group. Such a real encounter
82 Benhabib "The Generalized and the Concrete Other", 92.
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must therefore be built into the very procedure of legitimating principles 
of justice.
Now it may be argued that an ethic of care simply involves an 
inappropriately strong commitment among citizens who seek justice but 
not any ties of sentiment or affection. Certainly an intimate concern for 
the needs of each individual is not a realistic requirement for all 
participants seeking fair terms of co-operation in a political context. But 
the demand to incorporate the standpoint of the concrete other in moral 
discourse need not be interpreted as requiring such care for all concrete 
individual others. Rather we could shift the emphasis, as Nancy Fraser 
suggests, from the standpoint of an individualised concrete other to that 
of a collective concrete other.33
Adopting the standpoint of the collective concrete other still involves 
real interactive encounters that do not require us to hide particular needs, 
desires and feelings behind a veil of ignorance. We encounter the others, 
however, not so much as individuals for whom we have feelings of care 
but rather as members of social groups with distinctive identities, needs 
and forms of life. Such a shift leads us to think of the bonds of solidarity 
that are to sustain collective concrete others as a necessary component of 
our thinking on justice. We cannot concern ourselves with the rights of 
concrete others without also taking into account the bonds of solidarity 
on which the formation of their particular identity depends.34
83 "Toward a Discourse Ethic of Solidarity" Praxis International, 5 (1986), 425-
429.
84 This theme will also be developed in the chapter on Habermas. As we will see
there the claim is based, in part, on the holistic conception of the self that I 
defended in the second section of this chapter.
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If all participants reflecting on the demands of justice were to adopt 
the standpoint of the collective concrete other, then each of them would 
be enabled "to speak and be heard, to tell one’s own life-story, to press 
one’s claims and point of view in one's own voice."35 This would be an 
important feature of a procedure of impartiality that, in contrast to 
Rawls's original position, would reflect differences in an effective way. 
Each social group that is suffering some form of injustice at present could 
articulate publicly its own needs. This articulation generates solidarity 
among those who come to recognise the injustice they suffer for what it 
is.36 The necessity of bringing this generation of solidarity into the heart 
of a theory of justice owes much to recent feminist theory. But there is 
nothing essentially feminine about the recognition of collective concrete 
others. The insights involved correct a distortion in the thinking of men 
and women who seek to eliminate all particularity from impartial 
procedures that are to test principles of justice.
Rawls as Feminist?
The extent to which Rawls's approach could be revised in ways that 
would allow him to evade the sting of these criticisms has been a matter 
of some dispute among feminist theorists. Okin believes that Rawls's 
work represents a potentially rich source for a critique of the gender 
structure of contemporary societies.37 This would of course require
85 Fraser "Toward a Discourse Ethic of Solidarity", 428.
36 Fraser is somewhat ambiguous on this point. It might be noted that this solidarity 
is not incompatible with mutual disinterest between persons with 
incommensurable conceptions of the good. Mutual disinterest with regard to full 
conceptions of the good was, as we recall, premised on a shared commitment to 
a framework of justice. This disinterest is shattered and transformed into 
solidarity with the recognition of an injustice to some collective concrete other.
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certain modifications in order to overcome all aspects of gender blindness 
in the theory. First of all, Rawls must put greater emphasis on the fact 
that the parties to the original position are to be deprived of knowledge of 
their sex so that the basic structure should not arbitrarily favour one sex 
over the other in the distribution of the primary goods.
Secondly, the parties must no longer be thought of as heads of 
families but rather as individuals. This would transcend the 
public/domestic dichotomy to the extent that it would extend the scope of 
justice to include the internal order of the family. We could then argue 
from within Rawls’s overall framework that if the traditional division of 
labour in the family contradicts the principles of justice that are derived in 
the original position, as it surely does, then it is unjust.
Furthermore if the internal order of the family were to be considered 
a subject of justice then the question of fair equality of opportunity 
between the sexes and the tendency for gendered assumptions to infect 
the moral development of children at an early stage could more readily be 
confronted. We might also suggest that the parties be deprived of 
knowledge as to whether they are to be parents or not, thus providing 
some guarantee that the interests of the next generation are taken into 
account, without assuming a just family.
Despite the fact that a revision of Rawls’s work in this direction does 
indeed offer considerable support to the feminist critique of the gender 
structure, there remain more fundamental flaws in the theory that 
undermine its potential usefulness as a tool of feminist criticism. It must 
be noted that Rawls himself has not made all of the necessary revisions 
that a feminist reading of his work would demand. So long as he remains
37 Justice, Gender and the Family, 101-105 and "Reason and Feeling in Thinking 
about Justice", 238-249.
99
reluctant to allow the family to be considered as a subject of justice in an 
internal sense, his theory will, according to Okin, contain "an internal 
paradox."38 On the one hand, the theory depends on an understanding of 
moral development where our capacity to have a sense of justice must be 
nurtured in the context of a loving and just family. On the other hand 
however, Rawls does not himself apply the principles of justice to the 
realm of the family.
In our assessment of the communitarian critique we saw that Rawls 
attempts unsuccessfully to isolate the political domain by avoiding other 
comprehensive moral views in constructing an account of justice. In the 
last section I argued that the insights of post-structuralism highlight the 
possible danger of marginalising certain perspectives in the monological 
procedure of the original position. We can now see how Rawls's strategy 
of avoidance has made it more difficult for him to treat the family as a 
subject of justice internally since that would appear to leave very few 
aspects of our moral concern on the "non-political" side of the divide. 
Rawls’s most recent work has offered little in the way of concessions to 
the stronger arguments of his feminist critics.
Furthermore, Rawls is not sufficiently aware of the fact that within a 
gender structured society it seems likely that there will be a difference of 
emphasis in the ways in which men and women reason morally. As we 
will recall, it is for this reason that it is absolutely imperative, from a 
feminist perspective, that solidarity be considered to be a core concern of 
any adequate theory of justice. Under gendered conditions the structure 
of the society in general, and of the family in particular, leads to the fact 
that women are more likely to be involved in nurturing activities and
88 Justice, Gender and the Family, 108.
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hence they are more likely to stress solidarity in their moral reasoning, 
while men, for whom separation is more important, will stress justice in 
terms of abstract individual rights. In a society where gender-based 
oppression had been overcome one might expect all members of both 
sexes to have integrated successfully solidarity and justice in their 
capacity for moral reasoning.
Now this relates back to the problems of the monological nature of 
the original position. Under gendered conditions, such as those that 
continue to prevail, the possibility of all parties being adequately 
represented by Rawls in his construction of an account of justice from 
that perspective would be undermined. The conditions of choice that the 
original position represents may not be equally acceptable to all since 
those conditions abstract from the possibility of generating solidarity in 
our reflections on the demands of justice. Unanimity, if it is to be 
possible at all regarding principles of justice, can only be the result of 
open common deliberation where all participants reach the same 
conclusion having argued through their differences. It could not be 
reached by abstracting from those differences. Only in an open public 
encounter, and not in the original position, could the effects of the gender 
structure on the differing stresses in people's moral reasoning be 
identified and challenged. Ironically our conclusion must be that rather 
than enabling us to overcome gender structuring, the original position 
must presuppose that this has already been achieved if it is to be of real 
use itself as a tool of criticism.39
39 See Okin's comments in Justice, Gender and the Family, 107-108 on the revisions 
that might be made to Rawls's substantive account of justice were it to be 
reformulated under non-gendered conditions.
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While Okin is aware of the fact that contemporary gendered 
conditions place the coherence of the original position in doubt, she 
defends its usefulness against the criticisms of theorists who, like 
Benhabib and Fraser, maintain that the original position is fundamentally 
flawed in that it allows no role at all for a sense of solidarity with 
collective concrete others.40 For these critics, the original position 
abstracts from all particularity and represents a monological procedure 
that obscures, represses and denies difference. In response, Okin recalls 
the fact that the combination of mutual disinterest and the veil of 
ignorance in the original position "achieves the same purpose as 
benevolence"41 without requiring Rawls to make strong assumptions 
about the motivation of the parties. But rather than endorse a rational 
choice interpretation of the argument, Okin maintains that moral feelings 
are crucial to the derivation of the principles of justice.42 Since the 
parties do not know which position they are going to have in society they 
would have to consider the interests of people in all possible positions. 
They cannot think from the position of nobody, but rather they must think 
from the position of everybody.
It follows that for us to enter the original position, to adopt it as a 
moral point of view according to Okin’s interpretation of it, we would 
have to be motivated by empathy and strongly committed to benevolence. 
These are hardly weak assumptions. This is because we have to consider
40 "Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice" is an egalitarian, liberal, feminist
response to Gilligan, Benhabib, Young and other feminists who are highly 
sceptical about the use of the original position for feminist criticism.
41 A Theory o f Justice, 148.
42 "Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice", 243-249. Rawls himself has
clearly rejected a rational choice interpretation of the original position, see 
"Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", 237, n. 20.
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the goals and aims of all others, no matter how different they are from us, 
to be of equal concern in our deliberations in the original position.
Indeed this would involve our ’’caring about each and every other as 
much as about ourselves.”43 Far from abstracting from all particularity 
this implies that the original position indicates a deep concern for all 
human difference. An ethic of care is, on this reading, indistinguishable 
from an ethic of justice. We must be capable of recognising differences 
between ourselves and "concrete others," of being empathetic with them 
and of caring for them if we are to formulate principles of justice that 
could be acceptable to all.
Okin's stress on care here, again seems rather inappropriate. It is a 
feeling of solidarity with all social groups who suffer injustice, rather than 
a intimate feeling of care for all individual others that is relevant in our 
reflections about justice. Not only is such care too demanding in this 
context, it is also, unlike solidarity, a feeling that can easily allow for 
over-protective, patronising attitudes towards marginalised groups. 
Emphasising care also tends to obscure the important distinction between 
those significant others with whom our personal identity is inextricably 
entwined and our fellow citizens with whom we share little else but a 
commitment to just political institutions.
Solidarity better embodies the type of respect for collective concrete 
others that supports all who suffer injustice and drives each of us to 
choose principles and to design institutions so as to put that injustice 
right. As I already outlined, it is solidarity for the collective concrete 
other rather than care, that must be integrated with the generalised other's 
claim to justice. The integration of solidarity into the core of a theory of
43 "Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice", 246.
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justice does not involve the incorporation of inappropriate affective 
elements into the choice of principles of justice. It merely affirms that 
fact that one cannot respect the rights of individuals without also 
protecting the intersubjective bonds of solidarity on which the particular 
identities of those individuals depend.
Benhabib agrees with Okin to the extent that she recognises the need 
for a universalist moral theory that defines an impartial point of view, 
where the needs and interests of all concerned must be taken into 
consideration. The crucial question of this section is how we, as citizens, 
are best enabled to adopt this point of view, where we can acknowledge 
the rights of others through a recognition of their concrete otherness. The 
issue brings into opposition what Benhabib calls "substitutionalist" and 
"interactive” universalist moral theories.44 While Okin undoubtedly has 
provided an interpretation of Rawls where an ethic of justice and an ethic 
of care are no longer opposed, she still defends a version of 
"substitutionalist" universalism that is inadequate to the task of 
facilitating genuine mutual understanding of otherness.
It is the restrictions on moral reasoning set by the veil of ignorance 
that make any possible reading of the role of the original position 
necessarily "substitutionalist." All we can know about the others is that 
they have the same very general interests as ourselves. As we already 
considered in the last section this monological conception merely 
demands that we imagine ourselves as individuals in this hypothetical 
situation. We do not have to confront whatever it is that makes us 
different from the other imaginary participants, since none of the parties
44 Benhabib gives a critical response to Okin in a revised version of "The
Generalized and the Concrete Other” in Situating the Self.\ 148-177, here at 165- 
168.
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can speak from any particular perspective. The result is that no 
commonly generated insight into principles of justice is possible. In 
imagining oneself in the original position, one does not have to listen to 
the particular experiences of others. This is surely inadequate as a device 
that is to enable us to take up the perspective of all.
It would seem much more plausible that we would come to a mutual 
understanding of each other’s needs and interests if we were to discuss 
them and argue about them in the light of all the information that would 
open our eyes to the differences between us. Despite Okin’s optimism 
we cannot simply trust that empathy and benevolence will guarantee that 
the interests of all are adequately taken into account. We may simply be 
wrong about what it would be like to occupy a different position in 
society, to be a woman rather than a man, to be black rather than white, 
to be unemployed rather than a managing director of a large company. 
These misperceptions will not go away if we try to imagine ourselves in 
the original position.
In contrast, I am suggesting that in any procedural test for principles 
of justice, all citizens must be allowed to speak for themselves and the 
only way that we can hear them is if we reason without the veil of 
ignorance in a real dialogue where our prejudices and hostilities could be 
tested and worked through interactively. We cannot substitute ourselves 
for all others in the original position but rather we must confront each 
other interactively in collective moral and political deliberation.
The point is that if we were to have the capacity to take the interests 
of all into account we could not do it alone but only as participants in a 
collective venture. Once we had attempted to engage with each other in 
public dialogue by trying to work through our disagreements, then 
perhaps we might decide to test our collective views about justice in a 
monologically carried out thought experiment, such as that outlined in the
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original position. We may indeed all reach the same conclusions. If this 
were so then our collective deliberation would have done its work and 
the original position would not have been in any way necessary. If we 
reached different conclusions, then it would be a sign that we were still in 
need of more collective deliberation. Again in this case the original 
position would do nothing to resolve those disagreements except perhaps 
to confirm what should already have been obvious from the public 
discourse, that we were still some way short of reaching agreement on 
appropriate principles of justice.
In the original position all social groups are to be represented but the 
identity of each is to be concealed, as if their faces were blank. This 
does not seem nearly as effective a challenge to unreasonableness as the 
prospect of encountering other real participants and having to deliberate 
over principles of justice with them, with the full face of each in view. 
The prospect of reasoned agreement is best served by lifting the veil of 
ignorance and allowing all participants to express themselves fully, to be 
visible in their particularity to all the others, as they engage in the co­
operative venture of determining principles of justice to fashion their 
political institutions in a way that does justice to them all.
In such a real dialogue there is no a priori restriction laid down about 
what is a subject of justice and what is not, what is an aspect of political 
morality and what is not. That must be worked out by the participants 
themselves and the boundary between the political and the non-political 
is always under negotiation. In this way we can see that the 
communitarian, post-structuralist and feminist critiques of Rawls coincide 
on this point which I have returned to throughout this chapter, that 
Rawls's attempt to isolate the political prior to public discussion fails. If 
we wish to work out adequately what the scope of justice is then we will 
need a moral and political theory that can incorporate the stronger
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arguments of these critical perspectives. We will need a theory that does 
not assume a clearly defined political domain that can be dealt with in 
isolation from the rest of the moral domain but rather one that treats that 
the constitution of the political domain as a matter of on-going concern 
for all the citizens of a democratic community.
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1.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have assessed critically the procedure of impartiality 
outlined in John Rawls's theory of justice. In the first section of the next 
chapter the two substantive principles of justice that Rawls advocates 
will be examined in relation to the work of Michael Walzer. As we will 
see, Walzer claims to derive his substantive account of justice without 
recourse to any procedural clarification of an impartial point of view. 
Rawls, in contrast, maintains that his two principles are legitimate 
because they would be chosen under conditions of fairness, as 
represented in the original position. So far we have examined Rawls's 
procedure as a philosophical outline of an impartial point of view that 
could test the legitimacy of substantive principles of justice.
I have argued that there are serious defects in Rawls's procedure of 
legitimation. The most serious defect is the attempt to isolate political 
aspects of morality from other aspects of our comprehensive moralities 
prior to any reflection on substantive principles of justice. This strategy 
for the construction of an overlapping consensus is much less inclusive, 
and therefore a less stable basis for social unity, than Rawls must assume 
it to be. Rawls’s procedure is grounded in this attempted isolation of 
political morality. In outlining the original position, as representing the 
conditions of choice that would be accepted by all who could affirm the 
overlapping consensus, Rawls assumes that he can speak for all parties 
when it comes to choosing substantive principles of justice. The 
monological nature of the procedure requires that the choice be made by 
one voice behind a veil of ignorance, rather than by a plurality of 
different voices who have, though an open interactive encounter, 
achieved a common insight into the demands of justice.
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Rawls characterises the parties in the original position as being 
representative of our public identity as citizens. By taking for granted a 
certain conception of citizenship, Rawls believes that he can take on 
himself the task of constructing of an account of justice that will 
legitimately regulate the basic structure of society. Such a construction is 
neither sufficiently sensitive to the possibility of bias in the conception of 
citizenship that is at its foundation, nor does it reflect adequately the need 
for real political encounters between citizens with different perspectives 
if the solidarity which is a necessary condition of reasonable democratic 
deliberation is to be generated.
In the first section I placed Rawls in the tradition of liberal social 
contract theory. His most significant debt is to Kant, who presents the 
contract as a procedural test of the legitimacy of law. This conception of 
the contract is the precursor to Rawls's procedural test for principles of 
justice that are to regulate the basic structure of a democratic society.
The most serious challenge to liberal contract theory has traditionally 
come from Marxism. Having outlined the most plausible Marxian 
objections to Rawls's project I argued that the basic thrust of these 
objections anticipates the other objections that I go on to consider in the 
central three sections of the chapter. The thrust of the Marxian challenge 
is that despite its claim to impartiality Rawls's approach involves a 
certain bias, in this case a class bias.
Communitarians share with Marxists a concern about the possibility 
of an individualistic bias in Rawls's procedure and the atomistic ontology 
that it would appear to presuppose. Unlike Marxists, communitarians 
stress moral ties to particular communities that are constitutive of 
personal identity. Post-structuralists, like Marxists, maintain that the bias 
reflected in Rawls's procedure is driven by power. Unlike Marxists, they 
refuse to conceive of power relations as being necessarily rooted in the
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class structure of the capitalist mode of production, but rather they see 
power as a capillary network of micropractices. While post­
structuralists, like communitarians, reject atomism, they do not seek to 
correct it with a holist moral foundation for justice, but rather seek to 
uncover and to resist the power driven assumptions of all possible 
accounts of justice.
Most contemporary feminists, like Marxists, question the scope of 
justice as it is defined within a liberal framework. They do so however 
so as to argue that patriarchal, rather than bourgeois, assumptions have 
distorting effects that lead to ideological biases in liberal accounts of 
justice. Specifically, some feminists claim that Rawls's procedure fails to 
deal adequately with the inextricable links between the private, intimate 
sphere of family life and the public matter of the regulation of the basic 
structure of society. The personal, and not only the economic, is also 
political. Furthermore Rawls's procedure does not reflect the necessity 
that solidarity be integrated into any public reflection on justice that could 
generate a co-operatively achieved agreement on substantive principles. 
Feminists who stress this point about solidarity would have much in 
common with communitarians here, although they would certainly reject 
any holist ontology that enmeshes personal identity too tightly in 
communal ties of tradition. These ties are likely to be loaded with 
gendered assumptions. While the suspicion of pervasive gendered 
assumptions embedded in all traditions might make these feminists 
sympathetic to post-structuralist scepticism towards all accounts of 
justice, they would not reject the possibility of a more adequate 
procedure of impartiality that could avoid the dangers of bias to which 
Rawls's approach is most vulnerable.
In this assessment I have maintained that, despite certain 
communitarian claims, Rawls advocates a version of liberal holism.
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However his attempt to construct an overlapping consensus is flawed 
since the isolation of the political domain, on which it depends, is 
untenable. We simply cannot avoid moral controversy in our disputes 
about justice. If Rawls's method of avoidance is rejected the possibility 
of an alternative way of theorising an impartial point of view is opened 
up. This will have to reflect more adequately the differences between the 
wide variety of comprehensive moral views that characterise modem 
pluralist democracies.
I have also defended Rawls's Kantian project in general against the 
scepticism of post-structuralism. Despite their criticisms we still need 
some theoretical resources to enable us to distinguish between reason and 
power, between legitimate and illegitimate principles of justice. But the 
study of post-structuralism does reveal the need to move beyond Rawls's 
stress on citizenship identity that leads him to assume that he can speak 
for us all in the choice of principles. That is not the role of the political 
theorist.
Finally I have maintained that feminist criticisms of Rawls, while not 
undermining his overall project of theorising an impartial point of view, 
do add further weight to the conclusion that Rawls's strategy does not 
succeed all that well in this task. In the first place his avoidance of 
comprehensive moral views leads to his reluctance to question the 
justness of the family in an internal sense. Secondly, the veil of 
ignorance rules out the type of encounter with collective concrete others 
that generates the solidarity on which reasonableness in democratic 
deliberations about principles of justice depends.
Rawls’s procedure is monological in that all parties are in agreement 
as soon as they manage to adopt an impartial point of view. What all the 
criticisms of Rawls I have defended seem to point towards is a view of 
impartiality that can allow for real differences. The project then is to
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conceive of how we might look at things from an impartial point of view 
without ruling out of the discussion the articulation of any need or interest 
that is particular to some social group or other. The hope is that we can 
bring to the discussion our comprehensive morality, our conception of the 
good, our dissident conception of citizenship, our feelings of solidarity 
for specific collective others, our experience of family life, our criticisms 
of the procedure itself. Any issue related to any of these matters could be 
raised and discussed openly without giving up on the claim that 
impartiality represents the core of justice in a modem context.
In an attempt to fulfil this hope we will assess in detail a conception 
of an impartial point of view which presents itself as dialogical, rather 
than monological. This conception is defended in the work of Jurgen 
Habermas. Habermas shares with Rawls the Kantian project. This 
important shift however, conceiving of the test for the legitimacy of 
principles of justice as dialogical rather than monological, relieves the 
project of many of the burdens that it has had to carry in the theories of 
both Rawls and Kant. This is the argument of the third chapter but 
before we get there we should consider an influential theory of justice 
that is presented as an alternative to the Kantian proceduralism that we 
find in the work of both Rawls and Habermas. I will turn now to the 
hermeneutics of Michael Walzer.
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2 SPHERES OF JUSTICE AND INTERPRETIVE 
SOCIAL CRITICISM
So far I have considered one highly influential presentation of a 
procedural test for the legitimacy of substantive principles of justice. The 
aspiration of this Kantian project is to conceive of an impartial point of 
view that could ground a critical assessment of social institutions and 
practices. It hopes to do this by providing us with a standard according 
to which the reasonableness of competing claims about justice that might 
arise in a modem society could be evaluated critically. The actual 
procedure considered, that advocated by Rawls, dealt with the pluralism 
of modem societies by insisting that in order to adopt an impartial point 
of view, we must abstract from our comprehensive moral commitments, 
or our thick conception of the good life, and eliminate them from our 
reflections about the choice of legitimate principles of justice.
In my discussion of Rawls I highlighted the weaknesses of his 
approach without, however, endorsing a rejection of the Kantian project. 
In this chapter I will assess the views of a political theorist who urges us 
to do precisely that. For Michael Walzer the attempt to provide a 
philosophical justification for an impartial point of view that can test the 
legitimacy of substantive claims about justice should be abandoned. He 
maintains that justice is always embedded in the moral world of a 
particular form of life and that therefore such abstract proceduralism 
necessarily violates the self-understanding of particular communities.1
1 The main sources for Walzer’s views in this regard are Spheres o f Justice and 
Interpretation and Social Criticism but see also "Philosophy and Democracy" 
Political Theory, 9 (1981), 379-399, The Company o f Critics: Social Criticism 
and Political Commitment in the Twentieth Century, London: Peter Halban, 
1989 and "A Critique of Philosophical Conversation".
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For Walzer every account of justice is a local account.2 It must therefore 
be given, not with reference to an abstract procedure that claims to 
represent an impartial point of view, but rather from within the context of 
a particular commitment to a shared understanding of social goods. A 
substantive account of justice is an interpretation of the meaning of social 
goods, and more specifically the principles of distribution that are 
inherent in those meanings, for a particular community.
In relation to the central theme of this thesis, we can say that Walzer 
rejects the assertions of any lone theorist or philosopher who claims to be 
able to construct a substantive account of justice for a modem society out 
of an abstract procedure of legitimation. The meanings which are 
interpreted in any account of justice are necessarily common social 
meanings to which no one citizen has privileged access. The conditions 
under which such an account can be given must therefore be 
characterised by a public encounter where these meanings are co­
operatively interpreted. This is only possible if we respect the historical 
particularity of different political communities.
In the first section of the chapter I will consider the form that 
Walzer's own approach to substantive accounts of justice takes. He 
advocates a conception of justice which he calls complex equality. 
Complex equality is to be contrasted with simple equality. It insists that 
substantive principles of justice depend on the meanings that social goods 
have in particular societies. Principles of justice are implicit in the social 
meanings of particular goods and so each society will have its own 
distinctive account of justice depending on the meanings that goods have 
in that distinctive historical and cultural context. While no bald principle
2 Spheres o f Justice, 314.
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of simple equality can be sensitive to cultural particularity in this way, 
Walzer's claim is that complex equality can prevent injustice by allowing 
each citizen to have their due in each of the variety of spheres of justice 
that are constituted by the particular variety of social goods in any given 
society.
I will assess Walzer's defence of complex equality by comparing it 
with the argument that Rawls makes in advocating his two substantive 
principles of justice. I believe that Walzer's work has certain important 
advantages in this regard especially in relation to its greater context 
sensitivity. Complex equality indicates how justice may vary in its 
demands in different cultural contexts. By stressing this context 
sensitivity I hope to bring out some of the philosophical points which are 
at issue in Walzer's rejection of the Kantian project. Rawls’s abstract 
procedure could never legitimate principles of justice for Walzer because 
these are necessarily a cultural product. The substance of justice must be 
interpreted openly in the public deliberations where all the citizens of 
particular political communities participate.
In the second section we will move on to consider Walzer's anti- 
proceduralism in more detail. The main purpose of this section is to 
consider more generally what is involved in a hermeneutics of justice. It 
will be noted briefly that Rawls himself now understands his own 
procedure to be justified hermeneutically. The recent shift towards 
contextualist approaches to justice reflects a general trend away from 
universalism in moral theory.3 This is a trend which raises important 
philosophical questions, not least with regard to the inherent dangers of
5 We have already considered some of the manifestations of this trend in the first 
chapter. The arguments of communitarians, post-structuralists and feminists 
have all contributed to the undermining of moral theories that defend universalist 
principles.
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relativism. It might be suggested for example, that a hermeneutic 
approach to justice must necessarily involve a relativistic endorsement of 
institutions and practices that characterise a particular culture. It might 
then be thought to be irredeemably conservative and incapable of 
grounding any adequate form of social criticism. The implication of this 
type of objection is that hermeneutically grounded accounts of justice 
always legitimate the dominance of one particular account of justice in a 
way that is entirely inappropriate in a modem pluralist society.
I want to suggest here that hermeneutics can defend itself, at least to 
some extent, from these charges. In order to support this view I will turn, 
in the later part of the section, to the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans- 
Georg Gadamer.4 Hermeneutics can ground one important form of social 
criticism in modem societies. This is connected to a form of ethical 
reflection that involves a community in a process of critical self­
questioning. When faced with the question as to whether or not a 
particular community has lived up to its own ideals as to what it should 
be, a significant space is opened up for social criticism within that 
community. This can happen in a way that is importantly related to the 
interpretation of the demands of justice in particular contexts. The 
communal self-clarification that this type of ethical reflection involves is 
also related to the idea of a holist approach to justice in that the historical 
embodiment of just institutions in a particular context is, in part, 
constitutive of the identities of the individual members of that community.
A hermeneutic approach to justice does however have some serious 
limitations and so a convincing defence is impossible. In the third section
4 Truth and Method, Second Edition, London: Sheed and Ward, 1979 and also the 
collection of Gadamer’s essays Philosophical Hermeneutics, David Linge (ed.), 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
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I will expose the most significant of these limitations by offering a 
critique of Walzer’s approach to justice. I will argue that if Walzer is 
concerned to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate accounts of 
the substance of justice then he is ill-advised to reject the Kantian project 
of philosophically justifying the conditions of an impartial point of view. 
This does not mean however that he is wrong to stress the fact that a 
substantive account of justice could never legitimately be derived from a 
monological procedure like the original position. The substance of 
justice is always the product of an open public encounter. However we 
must have a firm theoretical grasp of the ways in which the distorting 
effects of power are to be eliminated, or at least minimised, in such 
public encounters. As we will see, Walzer fails to deliver on this score.
Walzer’s failure here will lead us to the conclusion that in a modem 
context substantive principles of justice must be legitimated from an 
impartial point of view and not in relation to the ideals of one particular 
form of life. For this reason the only defensible holist approach to justice 
must be a liberal holism that defends the priority of right. Liberal holism 
can acknowledge the fact that the self is constituted dialogically but at the 
same time it locates the autonomy of the individual at the core of a theory 
of justice. This can only be achieved in a modem context by grounding 
the substance of justice in a philosophically justified procedure that 
represents an impartial point of view. In this final section of the chapter I 
hope to show that it is the rejection of the Kantian project that makes it 
impossible for Walzer to defend himself from the charge that his 
hermeneutic approach to justice is deeply flawed as a theoretical 
grounding for social criticism.
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2.1 SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES AND COMPLEX 
EQUALITY
I have two main aims in this section. First, I will analyse critically the 
substantive principles of justice that Rawls believes to be legitimated by 
his procedural outline of an impartial point of view. Second, I want to 
introduce the notion of complex equality. This is the key idea in Walzer's 
approach to substantive accounts of justice in modem societies. The 
argument here will indicate certain advantages of thinking about 
substantive principles of justice in the open-ended way that is 
characteristic of Walzer's view, rather than in the restrictive way that 
leads Rawls to believe that he can derive substantive principles through a 
monological procedure. Complex equality is more sensitive to particular 
contexts and this in itself would seem to give significant theoretical 
support to Walzer's rejection of the Kantian project. The philosophical 
issues that are at stake in that rejection are introduced here but we will go 
on, in the remaining sections of this chapter, to consider at greater depth 
the implications of this anti-procedural approach to theorising justice.
I want to argue that we should think of Rawls's principles as a 
defence of a right to equal citizenship. From Walzer's point of view 
however, Rawls's idea of a primary good does not allow for adequate 
consideration of the complexity of the social meanings of goods in 
modem societies and so Rawls's principles do not tell us very much about 
the demands of justice in particular contexts. Complex equality allows 
for the fact that each political community will have its own distinctive 
account of justice. Differences of historical context and the cultural 
creativity of particular communities are both to be given expression in the 
details of each substantive account of justice. Before assessing the merits 
of complex equality, I will indicate why we should think of Rawls's
118
principles as a straightforward defence of a right to equal citizenship. In 
order to do this I will return to one of the Marxian objections to Rawls's 
theory that I outlined early in the first chapter. We will consider the 
charge that in giving priority to his first principle, guaranteeing equal 
basic liberties, over his second, regulating socio-economic inequalities, 
Rawls assumes an ideological separation of the political and the 
economic.
Rawls's Principles and the Priority of Liberty
In his introduction to the two principles of justice Rawls states that they 
"presuppose that the social structure can be divided into two more or less 
distinct parts, the first principle applying to the one, the second to the 
other."1 The first principle guarantees an equal right to each of the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar 
system for all. The second principle regulates acceptable social and 
economic inequalities according to the conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity and the difference principle, the idea that any inequality must 
be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. At this stage he does 
not mention any way in which we are to give one principle priority should 
they conflict in a particular case.
He later places the two principles in serial order in a way that 
"forbids exchange between basic liberties and economic and social 
benefits."2 This asserts the priority of liberty which means that "liberty 
can be restricted only for the sake of liberty itself."3 Rawls points out
1 A Theory o f Justice, 61.
2 A Theory o f Justice, 151.
8 A Theory o f Justice, 244.
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that this priority is dependent on the persons in the original position 
assuming that their basic liberties can be exercised effectively.4 He then 
proceeds to give a number of reasons in support of his view that this 
ranking would be rational from the perspective of the original position. 
All of these reasons tend to assume favourable conditions under which 
the effective establishment of the rights and liberties guaranteed by the 
first principle present no real problem.5 This amounts to a claim that 
under these circumstances the domain of the first principle is unaffected 
by the inequalities which are sanctioned within the domain of the second 
principle. Rawls’s argument for the priority of liberty maintains a 
separation between the narrowly-defined political sphere and the social 
and economic spheres. While he undoubtedly modifies this traditional 
liberal dichotomy, as I argued in the first section of the last chapter, he 
certainly does not transcend it completely.
The separation involved in the argument for the priority of liberty 
does not exclude social or economic arrangements from the test of 
justice. As we saw, this distinguishes Rawls from a traditional liberal 
like Locke, or a contemporary libertarian like Nozick, both of whom are 
more explicitly protective of property rights and competitive markets.6 
On the other hand, by prioritising civil and political rights within a 
framework of strict legal but not socio-economic egalitarianism Rawls 
does however remain vulnerable to the criticisms of Marxists and 
egalitarian socialists who argue that the effective equality of these rights
4 A Theory o f Justice, 151-152, 542.
5 A Theory o f Justice, 542-548.
6 Of course Nozick identifies himself with the Lockean tradition, Anarchy, State and
Utopia, 174-182.
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and the liberties they protect will inevitably be undermined by
inequalities in the social and economic spheres. Based on his assumption
of a two-part basic structure Rawls tries to side-step such criticism by
claiming to be able to reconcile liberty and equality within his conception
of justice. His attempt to do so depends on a distinction he makes
between liberty and the worth of liberty
liberty is represented by the complete system of the liberties of equal 
citizenship, while the worth of liberty to persons and groups is 
proportional to their capacity to advance their ends within the 
framework the system defines. Freedom as equal liberty is the same 
for all; the question of compensating for a lesser than equal liberty 
does not arise. But the worth of liberty is not the same for everyone. 
Some have greater authority and wealth, and therefore greater means 
to achieve their aims.7
From these remarks it is not very clear that Rawls can evade the sting of 
one of Marx's most scathing criticisms of liberal or bourgeois ideology, 
that it concerns itself with merely formal liberty.8
Marx points out that this liberty is rendered relatively ineffective for 
the exploited proletarian class because of their powerlessness which is 
rooted in the property relations of the capitalist mode of production.
Only a radical transformation of the mode of production itself by a 
revolutionary proletarian class could overcome this ineffectiveness. It is 
not necessary to endorse all aspects of Marx's views on historical 
materialism to accept that this central aspect of his critique of liberalism 
poses insurmountable problems for any account of justice that
7 A Theory o f Justice, 204.
8 See for example Marx and Engels "The German Ideology, part 1" and "The
Communist Manifesto" in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, David McLellan (ed.).
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presupposes a strict separation of politics and economics. But just how 
serious a problem does it pose for Rawls?
Norman Daniels, in an influential critical analysis of the distinction 
between liberty and its worth, argues that Rawls is guilty of the 
traditional liberal failure to recognise this point that Marx was so clear 
on, that inequalities of power and wealth are not consistent with an equal 
system of liberties.9 It is clear that certain rights which are assigned to 
each citizen equally, such as the right to vote, the right to a fair trial or 
the right to free speech, have historically been exercised with unequal 
effectiveness. Wealthy citizens have been able to exercise their rights 
with greater influence, authority and power than those who are less 
privileged. A number of relatively uncontroversial sociological claims 
support this.
First, political parties always try to satisfy powerful interest groups 
on whom they feel dependent for investment in the economy.
Furthermore, the interests of all politicians tend to be closer to those of 
the wealthy than to those of the poor. Second, money can buy a higher 
quality legal service and again those who most directly shape legislation 
and legal practice tend to share the class interests of the wealthy. Third, 
the media of mass communication throughout the capitalist world are 
under the control of a small wealthy elite. They not only enjoy greater 
effectiveness in exercising their right to free speech but they also exert an 
inordinate influence on the ideas and concerns of other citizens and hence 
also on the political agenda.
The equality of these rights and liberties has been, and continues to 
be in fact, merely formal. Of course a full explanation of the various
9 "Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty" in Reading Rawls, Norman Daniels 
(ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975, 253-281.
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causal mechanisms at work here would have to be highly complex and 
multi-faceted. The comprehensiveness of Marxism as a theoretical 
resource which can facilitate such a task is clearly its great strength. Our 
need for some such comprehensive social theory is to my mind beyond 
question but to pursue these issues would take us too far from the matter 
in hand.10
It is not necessary to argue pursue this general point anyway as it 
seems clear that Rawls accepts it. What is at issue is whether or not, 
given this historical reality, Rawls’s distinction between liberty and its 
worth leads to an inconsistency between his two principles of justice. 
While the first principle establishes equal basic liberties for all, the 
second principle regulates inequalities in the value of these liberties to 
various representative individuals. Of course the difference principle 
operates to maximise the worth of the liberties for the least advantaged. 
So while they are not to enjoy as much value from these equal liberties as 
those who are more advantaged, they are compensated by the fact that 
the inequality of worth renders their own liberties of greater value than 
they would otherwise be. In relative terms they are worse off since the 
equal liberties are worth less to them than to others, but in absolute terms 
the liberties are worth more to them than if there were a strict equality of 
worth.11 The crucial question here is whether it makes any sense to
10 As we will note in the third chapter, Habermas's theory of justice is integrated
impressively with his own comprehensive critical theory of late capitalist 
societies. This in itself is a good reason to favour Habermas's theory of justice 
over those of Rawls and Walzer. Neither Rawls nor Walzer effectively link their 
normative concerns with a well-worked out critical social theory and so they are, 
in some respects, vulnerable to the charge of utopian idealism. I will not argue 
this point here.
11 For a critique of Rawls on the question of absolute and relative advantage see
Lawrence Crocker "Equality, Solidarity and Rawls' Maximin" Philosophy and
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suggest that while those with greater wealth, power or authority have 
greater worth of liberty, we can all claim to be guaranteed equal basic 
liberties.
Daniels argues convincingly that Rawls arbitrarily excludes economic 
factors from the possible constraints on liberty.12 Being poorer than my 
fellow citizens may mean that, unlike them, I cannot afford a holiday 
abroad, or private medical insurance, or the financial strain of sending my 
children to a private school. I am not at liberty to do certain things that 
other citizens are at liberty to do. It makes little sense to say that while it 
is of less value to me, I still enjoy an equal liberty with my fellow citizens 
to do these things. In these cases there simply are no equal liberties.
It is important to note that what Rawls is primarily concerned with 
however is not liberty in general but the specific basic liberties that define 
the scope of the first principle.13 Of particular relevance for our purposes
Public Affairs, 6 (1977), 262-266. Though Crocker's argument is aimed at a 
slightly different aspect of Rawls's theory it is also of relevance for the point in 
hand. His main criticism however has more in common with communitarians 
who charge Rawls with a bias in favour of more individualistic conceptions of  
the good, as discussed in Section 1.2 above.
12 "Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty", 259-263.
13 Despite some ambiguity in his first statement of the principle, A Theory o f Justice,
60, Rawls is very explicit in his later statements that he is concerned with equal 
basic liberties, A Theory o f Justice, 250, 302. For criticisms of the notion of a 
right to liberty in general and for an illuminating analysis of Rawls's idea of 
liberty see H.L.A. Hart "Rawls on Liberty and its Priority" in Reading Rawls, 
Norman Daniels (ed.), 230-252. It is clear from a later lecture that Rawls is in 
general agreement with Hart, "The Basic Liberties and their Priority" in The 
Tanner Lectures on Human Values, III, Sterling M. McMurrin (ed.), Salt Lake 
City : University of Utah Press, 1982, 1-87, here at 4-6. This important lecture is 
reproduced unchanged in Political Liberalism, 289-371. Ronald Dworkin has 
argued that not only do we not have a general right to liberty but that liberalism 
is actually primarily concerned with equality. See "What Rights Do We Have?" 
in Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth, 1977, 266-278 and "Why 
Liberals Should Care about Equality" in A Matter o f Principle, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986, 205-213 as well as "Foundations of Liberal Equality."
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here are the political liberties or rights of equal citizenship, such as the 
right to vote and the right to participate in the political process. If it can 
be shown that economic inequalities that are sanctioned by the difference 
principle similarly undermine these rights of equal citizenship then it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that there is indeed an inconsistency 
involved in the operation of Rawls's two principles. A consideration of 
this issue will lead us to explore the way in which Walzer’s alternative 
conception of complex equality relates to equal citizenship.
Justice and the Rights of Equal Citizenship
Rawls's strategy is to show that the parties in the original position would 
choose equal basic liberties while accepting inequalities in their worth. 
Daniels provides an immanent critique of this claim by arguing that the 
parties in the original position would have the same reasons to choose 
equal worth of citizenship rights as they do to choose equal citizenship 
rights themselves.14 The equal worth of these rights is as much a social 
basis for self-respect as are the equal rights themselves. Those who are 
publicly recognised to be less effective as participants in the political 
process would be likely to suffer in terms of their self-respect as this 
would mark them with a ''subordinate ranking in the public forum.’’15 
This is precisely the main reason Rawls gives in support of the liberties 
of equal citizenship. If Rawls is not to undermine these equal political 
liberties then there must be some measures taken to protect their equal 
worth as well.
14 "Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty", 263-278.
15 A Theory o f Justice, 544.
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There are at least two lines of argument which could be adopted in 
defence of Rawls here. Firstly it might be said that strictly equal 
effectiveness in the exercise of our basic liberties is an impossible dream 
or even a dangerous nightmare. Rawls argues that the minimisation of 
inequality under the regulation of the difference principle is as far as we 
can legitimately go in this direction.16 It might well be accepted that 
strictly equal effectiveness is impossible as it would involve intolerable 
state regulation which could not but fail in its task. There almost 
certainly are some aspects of personality or matters of individual choice 
that could not be legitimately regulated but which would lead to an 
inequality of effectiveness in exercising basic liberties. The fact that the 
scope of justice does have some limit is not at issue.
It does not follow however that there are no socio-economic 
inequalities allowed by the difference principle which undermine the 
equal effectiveness of basic liberties and which might legitimately be 
ruled out in a more egalitarian regulation of that effectiveness. The 
question of course is how to decide which inequalities might be involved 
here. It can be argued with some cogency, that the framework adopted 
by Rawls does not yield the best solution to this problem. More 
specifically, the fact that Rawls allows inequalities of wealth, power and 
authority regardless of their inegalitarian effects on the worth of the basic 
liberties seems to indicate that the traditional liberal separation of civil- 
political and socio-economic spheres of society is central to his theory. 
This separation is unconvincingly established. If the assumption of a 
two-part basic structure were abandoned it is at least plausible that we 
could question the ways in which these spheres are related and how they
16 "The Basic Liberties and their Priority", 44-45.
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should be distinguished and separated without accepting the same degree 
of inequality overall.17
Secondly we might recall that the grounds for the priority of the first 
principle actually presuppose that the basic liberties can be effectively 
exercised.18 This is rather vague however and it is I think best 
understood as an indication that a certain level of material well-being 
must be enjoyed by all citizens before the idea of prioritising equal basic 
liberties could even be considered.19 This may well serve as a criticism 
of any society where homelessness or abject poverty are accepted since 
that might suggest to Rawls that the quality of that civilisation was not 
sufficiently enhanced for its citizens to enjoy equal liberties. However 
we can safely assume that this point is not intended to undermine the 
distinction between liberty and its worth under social conditions where 
this level is attained. We do not have any reason to suppose that Rawls 
believes contemporary Western democracies not to be at this level, or at 
least near to it. So this point does not answer the Marxian criticism we 
have been considering here.
There is however a more specific and stringent guarantee that Rawls 
mentions with regard to the political liberties. While they need not be of 
strictly equal worth they must be of fair value to all. This was a central 
theme in his discussion of equal political participation.20 He has placed 
even greater emphasis on it since;
17 As we will see this is precisely what Walzer’s idea of complex equality is designed
to achieve.
18 A Theory o f Justice, 151-2, 542.
19 The effective exercise o f basic liberties requires the satisfaction of basic needs for
all citizens. This means that the first principle does cover, to a minimal extent, 
the distribution o f material goods. See for example Political Liberalism, 7.
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the worth of the political liberties to all citizens, whatever their social 
or economic position, must be approximately equal, or at least 
sufficiently equal, in the sense that everyone has a fair opportunity to 
hold public office and to influence the outcome of political 
decisions.21
If, as I have been arguing, socio-economic inequalities in liberal 
democratic societies are readily translated into wide disparities in 
political effectiveness then this condition should have very far-reaching 
effects. This point has not been lost on a number of critics.22 If the 
political liberties are to be given fair value then it is difficult to see how 
other basic liberties, such as freedom of speech, would not also have to 
be given fair value. Unequal effectiveness with regard to freedom of 
speech has serious inegalitarian effects on the value of the political 
liberties, even if the subject matter is not overtly political. Newspapers 
can have important political effects without reporting on the political 
process in a direct way. It might even be suggested that in some cases 
the less they report on politics the greater their effect in undermining the 
fair value of the political liberties.
Furthermore, if fair value is to be secured for the political liberties 
then the difference principle would not play such a significant role. In 
fact it may not be necessary at all given the stringent egalitarian measures 
that might be required to guarantee the priority of the first principle. In 
order for the rights of equal citizenship to be exercised effectively we 
must inevitably bring the distributive arrangements of many spheres of 
social life into question. This obviously does not tell us how these
20 A Theory o f Justice, 221-234.
21 "The Basic Liberties and their Priority", 42.
22 Daniels "Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty", 279-280, Buchanan Marx
and Justice, 152, Baynes The Normative Grounds o f Social Criticism, 159-160.
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spheres are to be separated but it does points us in the direction of, what 
we might call, a more complex social map of justice. The fact that Rawls 
continues to maintain this division between the domain of the first 
principle and that of the second, the political and the socio-economic, 
suggests that he does not envisage the kind of wide effects involved in 
securing the fair value of the political liberties that would appear to be 
necessary to preserve equal rights of citizenship.23
What is most important here is that the priority of liberty, as 
expressed in the priority Rawls gives to his first principle over his 
second, does not seem to be tenable. Since the fair value of basic 
liberties cannot be secured without far-reaching, stringent and rigorous 
regulation of socio-economic aspects of the basic structure, the second 
principle of justice seems to be redundant. What we are left with is a 
principle of equal citizenship that guarantees effectiveness in the exercise 
of basic liberties and equal rights of citizenship for all. As it stands this 
principle is rather vague and may even appear to be trivial. It might also 
be considered to be too general to be of any use in real concrete disputes 
about justice. The crucial questions about substantive justice still remain 
to be asked. If we wish to secure the rights of equal citizenship, how are 
we best to bring into question the social arrangements in other spheres, 
not political in the narrow sense? How are we to work out in more detail 
the demands of justice in specific contexts?
It is on this matter that Walzer's contribution to theorising justice is at 
its most original, and illuminating. According to him the problem with 
Rawls's principles is that they are derived through a process that requires 
abstraction from cultural particularity. This abstraction allows Rawls to
23 "The Basic Liberties and their Priority", 44-45.
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consider only the distribution of what he calls primary goods such as 
’’rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth."24 
These are the goods that are supposedly wanted by all individuals 
whatever else they want.23 In other words the primary goods are not 
dependent on any one thick conception of the good. Furthermore the 
logic of distribution from the standpoint of the original position is of 
course the same with regard to all the primary goods. It is assumed that 
the parties "would prefer more primary goods rather than less."26 This 
then is the only logic of distribution that enters into Rawls’s 
considerations as to how best to guarantee the rights of equal citizenship.
Walzer rejects both the notion of a primary good, one that can be 
conceived of independently of a thick conception of the good, and also 
the reductive logic of distribution that such an idea entails. A primary 
good is necessarily too abstract to be of any use in working out particular 
just distributions. Even goods that are valued as necessities in almost all 
particular contexts have different social meanings from one culture to 
another.27 Distributive principles are intrinsic to the meaning of the social 
goods that are to be distributed. In other words just social arrangements 
demand that goods get distributed for different reasons, depending on 
what reasons are relevant to the social meaning of a particular good in a
24 A Theory o f Justice, 92.
25 A Theory o f Justice, 433.
26 A Theory o f Justice, 142.
27 Spheres o f Justice, 8. Walzer's example here is bread, which he maintains can be
given different "primary'1 meanings depending on the context ("the staff of life, 
the body of Christ, the symbol of the Sabbath, the means of hospitality and so 
on"). If this is a problem with bread as a social good then it will surely be even 
more so when we come to consider social goods such as liberties, powers, 
wealth etc.
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particular cultural context. The details of what is involved in any dispute 
about justice will require empirical investigation since there is "no merely 
intuitive or speculative procedure for seizing upon relevant reasons."28
The most significant feature of Walzer’s approach is that it 
encourages us to think about substantive principles as being internal to a 
variety of spheres of justice. Each sphere has its own logic of 
distribution and each society has its own complex map of distributive 
spheres.29 We can see how this enables Walzer to take us much further 
than Rawls could in elaborating what is involved in securing the rights of 
equal citizenship. Walzer’s conception of citizenship conceives of 
politics as "only one (though it is probably the most important) among 
many spheres of social activity."30 This pluralist conception demands that 
social goods be distributed not according to one reductive logic, but for 
reasons internal to their social meaning.31 Citizenship is therefore not to 
be conceived of as a political notion in a narrow sense but rather more 
broadly as membership of a community where the task of justice is to be 
thought of as a matter of allowing each social good to be distributed 
according to the logic intrinsic to its own sphere.32
28 Spheres o f Justice, 10.
29 I am not going to endorse fiilly the claim, implicit in the idea of complex equality,
that there is a neat fit of spheres and principles in any given community. It seems 
to me that the demands of justice are even more complex than that. We will see 
why in the third chapter when I discuss the justification and the application of 
norms from the perspective of Habermas's discourse ethics. In this section I am 
merely underlining the contextual appeal of complex equality and its advantages 
over Rawls's principles in this regard.
30 Spheres o f Justice, 231.
31 For a discussion of the pluralism of Walzer's view of citizenship see Emily R. Gill
"Walzer's Complex Equality: Constraints and the Right to be Wrong" Polity, 20 
(1987), 32-56, here at 37-43.
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From Simple to Complex Equality
In Spheres o f Justice Walzer contrasts complex equality, which he 
advocates as the form that any particular substantive account of justice 
should take, with simple equality. Simple equality requires that the 
dominant good of a society be shared equally, or at least very widely, so 
that it cannot be monopolised, or nearly monopolised by one social 
group.33 A dominant good is a good that can readily be converted into 
other social goods. It seems pretty clear that material wealth is the 
dominant good in contemporary capitalist societies. Material wealth can 
of course take the form of money and in this form it becomes a means to 
many other goods. Money enables those who have a lot of it to acquire 
goods such as political influence, social power, clean work with good 
conditions, a good education, better health care, free time, status and sex. 
All of these goods can be bought directly or indirectly as commodities. 
Money, as moveable wealth, is dominant in that it can be converted 
systematically into most, but not all, goods in Western capitalist 
societies.
A regime of simple equality where the dominant good is shared 
widely would certainly demand radical redistribution of wealth in these
32 In a recent article Walzer suggests that in Spheres o f Justice he had
underestimated the role of the state, the political sphere in a narrow sense, as an 
agent of just distribution, "Exclusion, Injustice and the Democratic State" 
Dissent, (Winter 1993), 55-64. This does not alter the fact that Walzer’s central 
idea of the plurality of spheres of justice provides a more promising and 
contextually sensitive way of working out substantive principles of justice in 
concrete disputes than does Rawls’s notion of primary goods. These substantive 
principles, each one from a different sphere of justice, can be taken together as a 
map of complex equality that are, I suggest, best understood as an elaboration of 
the requirements o f equal citizenship.
33 Spheres o f Justice, 13-17.
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societies. It would be a society where everybody had roughly the same 
amount of money. But it seems unavoidable that under such conditions 
new goods, perhaps intelligence or certain natural talents, of which one 
group has a near monopoly, will begin to dominate. The only 
conceivable way of neutralising any monopoly, or preventing any single 
good from becoming dominant, is to have political power itself as the 
dominant good. A strong highly interventionist state would be needed to 
constantly redistribute goods so as to constrain monopolies.34
34 Walzer's point here, Spheres o f Justice, 14-17, echoes a certain aspect of Nozick's 
critique of Rawls. Nozick's claim is that liberty necessarily upsets patterns of 
distribution, Anarchy, State and Utopia, 160-164. While Walzer agrees that the 
application of the difference principle would require an excessively strong state 
he does not follow Nozick to his libertarian conclusions. Nozick ends up 
endorsing a rampant free market economy and so fails to question money's 
standing as a dominant good. Walzer on the other hand, as we will see, is 
primarily focussed on challenging this dominance. See for example the list of 
blocked exchanges, what money can't legitimately buy, in Spheres o f Justice, 
100-103. Nozick's point is reiterated in a slightly different way by Iris Young in 
Justice and the Politics o f Difference, 15-38 here at 28. Young argues that end- 
state approaches are locked into a distributive paradigm which overlooks many 
important aspects o f social justice. She maintains that theories o f justice should 
be focussed more on the historical and social process and the structural 
constraints that lead to the reproduction of distributive patterns over time. My 
emphasis on proceduralism endorses this view. It seems to me that Walzer's 
critique of simple equality reveals that he too is interested in shifting the 
emphasis of a theory o f justice away from end-state approaches in much the 
same way that Young is encouraging us to do. It is for this reason that Walzer 
can illuminate the task of working out what the rights of equal citizenship 
demand in a way that Rawls's principles could not. See also Walzer "Liberalism 
and the Art of Separation" Political Theory, 12 (1984), 315-330. Young 
appreciates the appeal of complex equality but we might note that she does 
criticise Walzer, rightly in my view, for continuing to use "the language of 
distribution to discuss social justice, in sometimes reifying and strange ways" 
Justice and the Politics o f Difference, 18. It certainly is strange to discuss 
distributions of love, recognition or power in the way that Walzer does. For the 
purpose of clear exposition, in what follows, I will continue to use the language 
of distribution as Walzer does. I simply note here that Young is right to point 
out that the overextension of the distributive paradigm is misleading when the 
issue of justice at stake is better thought of in terms of structural relationships or 
social and cultural processes.
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But of course one of the dangers of an excessively strong state is that 
political power can be monopolised by bureaucrats. This also brings with 
it the probability of rampant corruption. We could say that political 
office, and the party privileges that went with it, constituted the dominant 
good in the formerly existing socialist societies of Eastern Europe. In its 
turn this danger, of a repressive bureaucracy, can only avoided if political 
power is shared very widely. But once this happens it becomes difficult 
to secure its dominance as the democratic process will tend to reflect 
prevailing distributions of social goods, with their particular privileges 
and monopolies. We seem to be caught in a dilemma where we must 
either tolerate inequalities caused by monopolies that would seem to 
emerge naturally or we must run the risk of institutionalising a strong 
state where political power could be monopolised by bureaucrats who are 
committed to the repression of anything that disrupts the regime of simple 
equality. This analysis seems to lead to the conclusion that there are no 
other options but the capitalism of the Western powers or the statism of 
the former Eastern regimes.
Walzer maintains that we do not have to give up the aspiration to 
egalitarianism in the face of the notorious difficulties involved in 
institutionalising a regime of simple equality. These difficulties come 
about if we treat "monopoly and not dominance as the central issue in 
distributive justice."35 Complex equality involves the critique of the 
dominance of any one social good. As we have already seen justice for 
Walzer is a matter of protecting separate spheres of social goods from the 
imposition of principles that are not intrinsic to the meaning of those
35 Spheres o f Justice, 16.
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goods. This concern leads him to formulate an open-ended distributive 
principle:
No social good x  should be distributed to men and women who
possess some other good y  merely because they possess y  and
without regard to the meaning of x ,36
This principle reflects pluralism in two ways. First, each particular 
community will have its own map of substantive justice that will reflect 
its distinctive, culturally created social meanings. Second, there will be 
an indeterminate number of distributive principles in any given society, 
each of them being appropriate to a particular sphere of justice. Each 
distributive norm must operate with relative autonomy within its own 
sphere but it should have no direct bearing on the distributions in other 
spheres.
Complex equality is concerned with blocking exchanges between 
goods if the exchanges violate the social meaning of the goods involved. 
Thus if I hold political office I should not be able to convert that good 
into better health care than that available to other citizens. That would be 
to violate the social meaning of health care, at least in Western liberal 
societies. The meaning of health care in that context is that it is 
something which is provided to those in the community who are ill, and 
so its logic of distribution must be the criterion of need.37 But this does 
not mean that I should not have certain political privileges. If I have been 
fairly elected to office then I have been entrusted with a certain amount 
of power because my constituents find me to be a capable representative 
of their political views. So while it is just for me to speak in parliament
36 Spheres o f Justice, 20.
37 Spheres o f Justice, 86.
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say, it is certainly not just that I receive better health care on the basis of 
my success at being elected for political office.
It follows that while we may receive unequal shares within a 
particular sphere no group can convert this to their own advantage across 
all the spheres. The separation of spheres allows citizens to enjoy their 
own accomplishments without the threat of any one group constituting a 
ruling class.38 In this way complex equality is concerned to challenge the 
dominance of any one good rather than a monopoly or a wide inequality 
within one sphere. In fact since just distribution depends on the social 
meaning of goods, inequality can be expected to be quite appropriate, in 
most spheres. Those who are gravely ill should get more health care than 
those who complain of a minor ailment. A willing and capable elected 
political representative is given greater access to speak on political 
matters than other citizens. A just community maintains the autonomy of 
the spheres of justice by protecting them from one another. "Good fences 
make just societies.”39
Justice is critical then in that the social meaning of goods informs us 
as to how they are to be distributed. This provides us with a criterion of 
what is a just and what is an unjust distribution. Health care is justly 
distributed on the basis of need, unjustly on the basis of political office, 
or money, or intelligence. When one good dominates, it violates the
38 I cannot go into detail here about the full account of substantive justice that 
Walzer presents in Spheres o f Justice. Throughout the book he draws on 
numerous historical illustrations to argue his case for an interpretation of a 
certain map of complex equality that best reflects the demands of justice in a 
Western democratic pluralist society. On his views of the substance of justice in 
this context see also "Liberalism and the Art of Separation" and "Justice Here 
and Now" in Justice and Equality Here and Now, Frank S. Lucash (ed.), Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1986, 136-150.
89 Spheres o f Justice, 319.
social meanings of the other goods and hence allows for the disregard of 
the shared understandings of the community’s members. The invasion of 
other spheres of justice by criteria internal to a dominant good is what 
Walzer calls tyranny.40 In contemporary capitalist societies we are 
tyrannised by the dominance of money.41 To the extent that money can 
buy goods which have social meanings that demand different criteria of 
distribution (health care, education, political office, status for example) 
then it is unjustly dominant.
The autonomy of the spheres allows us to think of the citizens as 
ruling themselves without binding them as individuals too tightly to the 
community. This is due to the broadening of the conception of 
citizenship that we find in the notion of complex equality. What it 
requires is
not that citizens rule and are ruled in turn, but that they rule in one 
sphere and are ruled in another - where ’’rule’’ means not that they 
exercise power but that/enjoy a greater share than other people of 
whatever good is being distributed.42
Walzer can claim to be an egalitarian in so far as complex equality can 
"spread the satisfaction of ruling more widely" thus ensuring the 
"compatibility of being ruled and respecting oneself."43
His conception of a political community therefore does not depend on 
the active participation of all citizens in the narrowly defined political
40 Spheres o f Justice, 17-20.
41 Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift Liberals and Communitarians, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1992, 147. The chapter on Walzer in this book, 127-156, offers a 
clearly written introduction to his thought in the context of the communitarian 
critique of Rawls.
42 Spheres o f Justice, 321.
43 Spheres o f Justice, 321.
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domain. It does however depend on citizens being active in one sphere 
of justice or another.44 This involves a rejection of a strongly holist, 
Aristotelian or Rousseauean, conception of community. The limitation of 
the political to one dimension of citizenship and one sphere of justice is 
also implicitly a more liberal holism than the holism of Aristotle or 
Rousseau.45 It is a decentred holism that does not tie the citizen too 
closely to the narrowly defined political aspects of community life. 
Rawls’s vision of community as a social union of social unions has much 
in common with Walzer's view.46 I am arguing here that this vision is 
better served by justice as complex equality than by the principles Rawls 
defends.
Complex equality is, for example, not vulnerable to the charge that 
has been made against the difference principle, that in treating natural 
talents as common assets it undermines Rawls's commitment to the 
distinctness of individuals.47 From Walzer's point of view there is no 
need to ensure that all inequalities are to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged in any one sphere of justice. He therefore avoids advocating 
the type of state intervention that leads the attempt to maintain a regime
44 For an early essay that points in the direction of this pluralist conception of
citizenship see "A Day in the Life of a Socialist Citizen" in Walzer Radical 
Principles: Reflections of an Unreconstructed Democrat, New York: Basic 
Books, 1980, 128-138. See also Gill "Walzer's Complex Equality", 43.
45 For a critique of Rousseau from a liberal holist perspective see Charles Taylor's
Multiculturalism and "The Politics o f Recognition", Amy Gutmann (ed.), 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, here at 44-51 and note Walzer's 
general endorsement of Taylor's position in his "Comment" on Taylor's essay, 
99-103.
46 See/4 Theory of Justice,563-565.
47 A Theory o f Justice, 101. This criticism is made from two very different
perspectives by Nozick Anarchy, State and Utopia, 189-197 and Sandel 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 66-103.
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of simple equality into the type of dilemma discussed earlier. Once the 
autonomy of the spheres is protected there is good reason to believe that 
each citizen will be able to benefit from whatever individual talent they 
happen to have. If we get the map of complex equality right then nobody 
will be excluded or marginalised.48 Complexity is our best defence 
against tyranny.
The move away from state intervention as a means of achieving 
justice obviously sits more easily with the critics of Rawls's work who 
draw attention to the fact that he fails to theorise adequately the idea of a 
public sphere or a realm of civil society. We might think of autonomous 
associations as groups of citizens who are actively concerned with the 
regulation of spheres of justice that are not political in a narrow sense.
By defending the boundary of the sphere, they act as a check on the 
danger of state tyranny.49 Walzer, unlike Rawls, does not treat 
intermediate, voluntary associations as marginal to the subject of 
justice.50 Rather than depending on the active intervention of the welfare- 
state into civil society, the other spheres of justice play a vital role in 
defending us against tyranny. Since each of us could "rule'' in one sphere 
or another, we can all participate in the achievement of just institutions 
without all of us being actively involved in the more narrowly defined 
institutional domain of politics. A complex map of justice allows for the 
political domain to be integrated with, rather than isolated from, the other
48 Walzer argues against the idea that there might be a class of people without any
talent in "Exclusion, Injustice and the Democratic State", 61-62.
49 See the discussion in section 1.2 above, also Mouffe "Rawls: Political Philosophy
without Politics", 230 and Baynes The Normative Grounds o f Social Criticism, 
161-2.
50 "Exclusion, Injustice and the Democratic State", 59-61 and "The Communitarian
Critique of Liberalism" Political Theory, 18 (1990), 6-23.
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spheres of social activity. Furthermore this better facilitates resistance to 
the macrostrategy of bio-power that we discussed in the last chapter.
This macrostrategy is exemplified in a bureaucratic welfare-state that 
administers and controls those who depend on it.31
It would appear then that Walzer’s open-ended approach to 
substantive principles of justice overcomes some of the problems that 
Rawls encounters with his monologically derived principles. Rawls’s 
principles are insensitive to the particular meanings of various social 
goods in particular contexts. He does not allow for the kind of complex 
map of justice that Walzer advocates. Before we go on to consider the 
philosophical implications of Walzer’s rejection of proceduralism, I 
should indicate the ways that the advantages of Walzer's approach to 
substantive justice, over that of Rawls, would appeal to communitarians, 
post-structuralists and feminists.
Communitarians will appreciate the conception of social goods as 
being conceived of and created in particular cultural contexts.32 This
61 See the discussion of Foucault's work in section 1.3 above. For a detailed look at 
the ways in which the theorisation of civil society presents a challenge to 
traditional politics see Claus Offe "Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional 
Politics: Social Movements since the 1960s" in Changing Boundaries o f the 
Political, Charles S. Maier (ed.), Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1987, 63-105 and his "Bindings, Shackles, Brakes: On Self-Limitation 
Strategies" in Cultural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of 
Enlightenment, Axel Honneth et al. (eds.), Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1992, 63-94, also in this latter collection Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato "Politics 
and the Reconstruction of the Concept of Civil Society", 121-142 and their much 
more comprehensive Civil Society and Political Theory, Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 1992. Walzer himself relates his own concern for a pluralistic 
conception of citizenship to the theorisation of civil society in "The Civil Society 
Argument" in Dimensions o f Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, 
Community, Chantal Mouffe (ed.), London: Verso, 1992, 89-107.
52 On Walzer as a communitarian see the chapter on him in Mulhall and Swift 
Liberals and Communitarians.
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conception of a social good tends to bring out more clearly the notion of 
citizen self-rule as an important source of the dignity of citizenship thus 
reflecting better the fact that the defence of just institutions must be 
conceived of holistically, as a communal project. Post-structuralists will 
welcome the shift away from a bureaucratic, administrative welfare-state 
towards the empowerment of diverse and localised associations who can 
autonomously regulate particular spheres of justice.53 This represents a 
greater sensitivity to the danger of exclusion and marginalisation. 
Furthermore, justice is more concerned on this account with the 
recognition of difference, both between and within communities, rather 
than building on the assumption that everybody will reason in the same 
way regarding the choice of principles.54 From a feminist point of view 
Walzer can, and does, include the family as a sphere of justice.55 His 
particularist focus also indicates the significant role that solidarity with 
concrete others has to play in our reflections on justice. We must now 
focus our attention on the contextual form of justification that, from 
Walzer’s anti-procedural perspective, is the only legitimate grounding that 
substantive principles of justice can be given.
53 As I indicated earlier Walzer's critique of the welfare-state is totally different from
the libertarian critique of a theorist like Nozick. Walzer does not want to 
minimise state resources but he would want to see political power used, not to 
prop up bureaucratic state authorities that administer welfare, but rather to 
redistribute resources in a way that will empower associations to more 
effectively represent themselves. The idea of this decentralising empowerment is 
to allow those at the margins to develop their talents in their own way, to give 
them the opportunity to "rule" in one sphere or another.
54 See chapter 7 of White Political Theory and Postmodernism.
65 Spheres o f Justice, 227-242. Okin Justice, Gender and the Family, 111-117 
acknowledges Walzer's contribution on this point although she does not agree 
fully with his interpretation of what justice in that sphere might require. My 
main point however is to show that complex equality facilitates very easily our 
consideration of the internal justice of the family.
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2.2 HERMENEUTICS AND JUSTICE
Substantive principles of justice are obviously important as legitimate 
tools of social criticism. According to Walzer, these principles do not 
depend for their justification on any procedural conception of an impartial 
point of view. In order to engage legitimately in the practice of social 
criticism we must, he suggests, resist the philosophical urge to abstract 
from the particular commitments of the political community with which 
we identify. Critics do not stand outside of, but rather within, though a 
little to the side of the community. For Walzer, "critical distance is 
measured in inches."1 The critic remains connected to the community 
and to the commonly created social meanings of its goods.
It seems to me that the explicitly interpretive, contextualist approach 
that Walzer takes regarding the derivation of substantive principles of 
justice, is superior to Rawls's monological proceduralism in at least one 
significant respect. I have already argued that a substantive account of 
justice can never be justified within the philosophical construction of one 
theorist but rather it must be the product of on-going public deliberation 
within actual historical contexts. By stressing the fact that the derivation 
of substantive principles is necessarily a common task, Walzer therefore 
avoids some of the problems associated with Rawls’s monological 
abstraction that we discussed in the first chapter.
The stress that Walzer's interpretive approach puts on the active 
participation of citizens in the derivation of legitimate principles also 
makes a much clearer link between standards of justice and the particular 
identity of a political community. In other words, the holist view that the 
maintenance of just institutions and practices is constitutive of the
1 Interpretation and Social Criticism, 61.
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identity of individual citizens comes to the fore. The link between 
standards of justice and the shared identity of the members of a 
community reveals quite clearly why it is that citizens should care about 
the maintenance of just institutions. The extent to which our community 
has just institutions tells us, in one important respect, what kind of a 
community we are.
There are however a number of criticisms of Walzer's approach that 
must be considered. If legitimate substantive principles could not be 
worked out from an abstract procedure such as the original position, is 
social criticism in any meaningful sense possible at all? How can 
principles of justice derived within one tradition be used to criticise the 
institutions and practices of that same tradition? In this section I will 
defend Walzer's approach from these critical questions by indicating how 
we might understand the interpretation of substantive principles within 
particular traditions as a legitimate way of engaging in the practice of 
social criticism. The type of ethical reflection on the identity of the 
community that this type of social criticism requires, can indeed allow for 
self-criticism in highly significant ways.
On the other hand, it does seem that as a theory of justice, Walzer's 
interpretive social criticism is seriously flawed in at least one crucial 
respect. One of the main arguments of this thesis is that in a modem 
context some procedural conception of an impartial point of view is 
indispensable to an adequate understanding of how substantive principles 
of justice are to be justified. There is no alternative to such a procedure 
if we are to distinguish adequately between legitimate and illegitimate 
accounts of justice. I will not pursue this issue in the present section 
because the main aim here is to highlight the important ways in which 
hermeneutics can facilitate social criticism of a certain type. But it is 
important to point out at this stage that the type of criticism that is
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facilitated is dangerously partial. For this reason it must be thought of as 
an important and necessary aspect of, and not an adequate substitute for, 
a philosophical conception of an impartial point of view. I can only begin 
to develop this argument in the next section of this chapter, when I 
present a critique of hermeneutics by exposing the weaknesses in 
Walzer’s work. The argument will not be complete however until we 
consider Habermas's procedural conception of an impartial point of view 
in the following chapter.
In the analysis of hermeneutics as a form of social criticism in this 
section, I will first of all explain why Walzer, mistakenly as we will see 
later, rejects the Kantian project of philosophically justifying an impartial 
point of view. We will then examine his alternative notion of connected 
criticism. This will allow us to go on to explore the key role of 
interpretation in Walzer's understanding of the substance of justice by 
returning once again to consider arguments that could be offered in 
defence of complex equality. Having clarified what is involved in a 
hermeneutic interpretation of substantive principles of justice we can then 
place Rawls's recent work in this context. Finally we can see how further 
support can be added to the view that hermeneutics has critical potential 
by outlining some of the central ideas in the philosophical work of Hans- 
Georg Gadamer.
Justice without Procedures
For some time before he had developed fully his views on complex 
equality, Walzer was convinced that, in working out what justice 
demands, any quest for objectivity will be insufficiently sensitive to 
cultural differences between the creations of various communities.2 To
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that extent this quest has tendencies that run counter to the ideals of 
democracy. Justice must reflect the social meanings of the community 
even if this does not accord with the reflections of a philosopher who 
withdraws from the community, so as to be more objective. The 
democratic will has priority over the conclusions that a philosopher might 
come to with reference to a monological conception of an impartial point 
of view that is intended to inform us as to what is right.
For Walzer, justice depends not on philosophical knowledge but on 
political knowledge.3 While philosophical knowledge, as Walzer 
characterises it, comes from the outside as an attempt to articulate 
universal truth, political knowledge comes from within, from the shared 
historical experience of "negotiation, intrigue and struggle" that in an 
important sense constitutes a group of people as a political community.4 
To impose philosophical knowledge on a community’s choice of 
substantive principles would involve a failure to respect their own shared 
experience and their democratic will. Democracy is therefore prior to 
philosophy.5
2 See "Philosophy and Democracy" which was published two years before Spheres
o f Justice.
3 "Philosophy and Democracy", 393.
4 "Philosophy and Democracy", 395. Walzer1 s characterisation of philosophy is
actually more of a caricature. It is both controversial and crude. To think of 
philosophy as a straightforward matter of articulating universal truth reveals an 
ignorance of the current state of philosophy as a discipline. This raises many 
highly contentious issue about which there is no agreement among philosophers 
themselves. For samples of the work of some important voices in the 
conversation see After Philosophy: End or Transformation?, Kenneth Baynes et 
al. (eds.), Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987. A brief consideration of the 
work of Gadamer, for example, should make it clear that philosophical 
hermeneutics gives a subtle and convincing critique of the quest for universal 
truth in a way that supports Walzer much more effectively than he manages to 
do himself.
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Any historical community whose members shape their own 
institutions and laws will necessarily produce a particular and not a 
universal way of life. That particularity can be overcome only from 
the outside and only by repressing internal political processes.6
The philosopher attempts to see beyond the particular, to leave the cave 
with its shadow images of reality, so as to see in the light of the sun.
This Platonist vision of philosophy involves a claim to the superior status 
of philosophical knowledge to the mere opinion of the citizens. If we are 
to respect the shared creations of political communities and the social 
meanings that constitute their common life then it is the opinion of the 
citizens and not the knowledge of the philosopher that matters.7
Walzer has since offered a more explicit rejection of proceduralism 
as idealised philosophical conversation.8 Procedures that claim to test the 
legitimacy of an account of justice are designed to represent a kind of
5 See also Richard Rorty's essay on Rawls "The Priority of Democracy to
Philosophy" in Reading Rorty, Alan Malachowski (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1990, 279-302.
6 "Philosophy and Democracy", 395.
7 Spheres o f Justice, 320 and Mulhall and Swift Liberals and Communitarians, 134-
139. Whether or not anybody theorising about justice nowadays actually 
defends the strong Platonism that Walzer criticises here is pretty dubious. The 
strong Platonist looks like a straw man in the context of the contemporary 
debates that I am considering in this thesis.
8 "A Critique of Philosophical Conversation." In "Philosophy and Democracy", 389,
Walzer is implicitly critical of proceduralists, including both Rawls and 
Habermas. In the more recent essay he mentions Rawls and Habermas explicitly, 
as well as Bruce Ackerman, as theorists who are guilty of philosophising in a 
way that is dangerous to democracy. I will show that at least in the cases of 
Rawls (later in this section) and Habermas (in the next chapter), Walzer is guilty 
of seriously misrepresenting both their understanding of proceduralism and their 
views on justice. These distorted readings are not excused by his 
acknowledgement early in the essay, 185, that his references "will not do justice 
to the complexity and sophistication of the theories involved." See Georgia 
Wamke "Rawls, Habermas and Real Talk: A Reply to Walzer" in Hermeneutics 
and Critical Theory in Ethics and Politics, Michael Kelly (ed.), 197-203.
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hypothetical conversation "whose protagonists are protected against both 
bad agreements and bad disagreements."9 These hypothetical 
conversations press the protagonists towards a "preordained harmony"10 
which has already been determined in the design of the conditions under 
which the imagined encounter takes place. In other words the agreement 
that is generated in these conversations merely articulates the views of 
the philosopher who designed them. "Once one has a conversational 
design, it is hardly necessary to have a conversation."11
In contrast, Walzer suggests that critical assessments of our 
institutions should be based not on hypothetical conversations, but rather 
on what he refers to as "real talk." We can expect real talk in a modem 
pluralist society to reach democratic conclusions that are unpredictable 
and inconclusive. They will have no definitive full stop. This is because 
real conclusions must reflect the indeterminacy of any non-ideal 
conversation and these conversations have no moment of special 
philosophical authority.12 Real talk then is our only protection from bad 
agreements. It is this that forms the "conscious and critical part of the 
processes that generate our received ideas and reigning theories -
9 "A Critique of Philosophical Conversation", 184.
10 MA Critique of Philosophical Conversation", 186.
11 "A Critique of Philosophical Conversation", 184. While I do not propose to
examine the fairness of this criticism in any depth at this point, it does seem that 
Ackerman’s work is particularly vulnerable here. This is because he relies heavily 
on external conversational constraints that are designed to exclude from the 
discussion subjects about which agreement does not seem possible. Ackerman 
Social Justice in the Liberal State, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980 and 
also his "What's Neutral about Neutrality?" Ethicst 93 (1983), 372-390. For an 
entertaining critique of his work that has much in common with Walzer's see 
Benjamin R. Barber "Unconstrained Conversations: A Play on Words, Neutral 
and Otherwise" Ethicsy 93 (1983), 330-347.
12 "A Critique of Philosophical Conversation", especially 189 and 194.
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reflection become articulate."13 Its only constraints are those of everyday 
life, of time and circumstance, that demand some provisional and 
temporary conclusions if our institutional framework is to allow us to get 
on with the business of living anything close to an ordinary life in the 
modem world. But it has no constraints of a philosophical design.
It is clear that Walzer’s rejection of the Kantian project is related to 
his own self-understanding as a committed democrat. As I have already 
indicated this rejection is a mistake, one that rests to a large extent on a 
misunderstanding of the proceduralist project. Rather than dwelling on 
this just now, I want to assess the merits of Walzer's alternative. We 
must examine in more detail how real talk relates to justice and the 
practice of social criticism.
One obvious problem with Walzer’s interpretive approach to justice is 
whether or not he is simply uncritically affirming the beliefs and values 
that happen to dominate in a particular community at a given time. Is 
there any scope, inside the cave, for criticism of opinion as ideology? 
Walzer's response to this attack has been to emphasise the extent to 
which we, as members of one community, already inhabit a moral world 
that has its own critical standards. We can be more or less successful in 
our attempts to live up to these standards. Each other community also 
inhabits its own moral world that gives it internal standards.
It seems that from Walzer's point of view, any philosopher who is 
tempted to seek to discover or to invent moral principles from some 
external perspective is in danger of making two mistakes.14 First, this
13 "A Critique of Philosophical Conversation”, 194-195.
14 The first chapter of Interpretation and Social Criticism, 3-32, is a defence of the
path of interpretation over those of discovery and invention in moral philosophy. 
Walzer mentions divine revelation as the paradigmatic example of the path of
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project does not adequately recognise the extent to which our morality, 
and our principles of justice, are constituted by the thick social meanings 
that reflect our self-understanding as a particular historical community. 
Criticism is a matter not of abstracting from this moral world but of 
interpreting those social meanings from within it. Second, moralities that 
are discovered or invented turn out to be "remarkably similar to the 
morality we already have."15 In other words this project fails to recognise 
the historical and cultural presuppositions that always frame its 
supposedly objective constructions, inventions and discoveries.16
Our shared moral world is authoritative for us as the only source that 
can inform our substantive account of justice. In engaging in real talk we 
argue about the meaning of this moral world, how it is best to be 
interpreted. A good interpretation can affirm, but it can also challenge, 
the institutions and practices of our community. Just as the best 
interpretation of a poem is the one that "illuminates" its meaning in the 
most "powerful and persuasive way,"17 so the social critic aims to 
articulate as authentically as possible the meaning of a shared moral 
world. A bad interpretation articulates poorly the critical standards that
discovery though he also considers the work o f one contemporary liberal, 
Thomas Nagel, as well as Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian notion of felicific calculus 
in this context, Interpretation and Social Criticism , 3-8. With regard to the path 
of invention, Rawls is once more understood to offer the "best known and most 
elegant" solution, Interpretation and Social Criticism , 11. Again Walzer fails to 
deal adequately with the interpretive dimensions o f Rawls's work. See Brian 
Barry "Social Criticism and Political Philosophy" in his Liberty and Justice: 
Essay in Political Theory, 2, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, 9-22, here at 16.
15 Interpretation and Social Criticism, 21.
16 These points are made by Georgia Wamke in Justice and Interpretation,
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992, 2-5. They reflect the most recent Hegelian 
response to Kantianism in ethics.
17 Interpretation and Social Criticism, 30.
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are constitutive of us as a moral community. These bad interpretations 
might actually be embodied in our current institutions and practices.
To give an account of justice should be thought of, according to this 
interpretive approach, as the articulation of a central aspect of the identity 
of a community.18 For Walzer it would seem that the identity of the 
community is constituted by its particular shared social meanings. The 
social meanings we share with regard to justice are important aspects of 
our identity. We argue about them because it matters to us in clarifying 
who we are as a community. It matters if we have managed to live up to 
our own standards of justice or not because that says something 
significant about the type of human community we are. The social critic 
challenges us to live up to our deepest shared convictions, to be true to 
the moral commitments that, in part at least, constitutes our common life. 
Of course, each member of the community can take on the role of the 
social critic.
We can see more clearly now why reflection on the substance of 
justice must be, for Walzer, a common task, a project for the community 
as a whole. Since the identity of the community itself is at stake the lone 
philosopher can never be invited to take on the task of articulating for the
18 Charles Tayloris account of the identity of the self offers important insights on this 
subject. "To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in 
which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what 
not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary" 
Sources o f the Self 28. We might consider deliberation about substantive justice 
as an attempt to answer, in one important respect at least, the question of our 
common identity. The articulation of our principles of justice defines our 
identity to the extent that it provides orientation for us when we are confronted 
by certain inescapable questions. In any modem collective form o f human life, 
the question of what justice demands is not one that just happens to be asked.
On the contrary it is a precondition of such a collective form of life. See more 
generally chapters 1-4 of Sources o f the Self and also "Legitimation Crisis?" in 
Taylor's Philosophical Papers, //, 248-288.
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community even very basic features of its own account of justice.19 Wide 
participation in the democratic process is central to this task and it is this 
that Walzer is clearly most concerned about in his suspicion of 
philosophy.
Furthermore, the task of working out the substance of justice, since it 
involves a question of identity, must not be thought of in a static manner 
but rather as an on-going matter of clarification and communal self­
interpretation. In this sense, Walzer is right to insist that there can never 
be a definitive full stop at the end of such an account.20 The substance of 
justice can only be interpreted dialogically, in a discursive encounter, and 
not monologically, in isolated reflection.21 The social critic makes a 
contribution to this on-going democratic task by attempting to convince 
fellow citizens of a particular interpretation of their shared social 
meanings that actually conflicts with current social practice.22 This 
interpretation may illuminate the community’s self-understanding in 
radically new ways that not only conflict with current practice but that 
also challenge and undermine certain dominant beliefs.
19 In the first chapter I discussed this problem in detail in relation to Rawls's
proceduralism.
20 "A Critique o f Philosophical Conversation", 194.
21 One of the central arguments of this work is to defend the view that the fact that
Habermas's proceduralism accommodates this insight, while Rawls's does not, is 
of crucial significance in favouring the test of discourse ethics over that of the 
original position.
22 Walzer often takes the reading of a canonical text as an analogy for social
criticism. Certain world religions often base their moral disputes on the 
interpretation of such texts, for example Judaism, Christianity, Islam. The social 
critic reads in our social meanings the moral principles that give us orientation in 
matters of justice. For the clearest example o f the analogy see Interpretation 
and Social Criticism , 67-94.
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Interpretation and Connected Criticism
Walzer illustrates how connected criticism operates with reference to 
Antonio Gramsci’s critique of bourgeois morality.23 According to 
Walzer’s reconstruction of this critique, Gramsci offers a radical 
reinterpretation of values such as liberty and equality. Although these 
values are attached to the idea of citizenship in bourgeois conceptions of 
law, they are given an interpretation that serves to justify economic 
arrangements satisfying the interests of the bourgeoisie at the expense of 
the proletariat. These ideas of freedom and equality did however have a 
real attraction for the proletariat at that time since they reflected 
important aspects of the moral world they inhabited. They captured, for 
example, what was of significance in the rejection of aristocratic 
privilege.
What Gramsci sought to do was to argue that liberty and equality 
ought to be embodied differently in the economic and social structure 
than they had been up to that point. He interpreted these values to 
require substantive material egalitarianism and not simply formal equality 
before the law. This reinterpretation justified his rejection of the market 
relations of a capitalist economy. On Walzer's reading we should take 
Gramsci's argument to imply that capitalist market relations make it 
impossible for the democratic community with which he identifies to live 
up to the most coherent account of the moral standards by which it 
understands itself. This critique comes from within the particular moral 
world of the people to whom it is addressed and not from some 
supposedly objective, external standpoint.24
23 See especially Interpretation and Social Criticism, 43-44 and more generally for 
Walzer’s view of Gramsci as a critic The Company o f Critics, 80-100.
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For Walzer, criticism articulates a common complaint in the ordinary 
language of the people.25 Abstract theoretical language tends to alienate 
critics from the sentiments of their fellow citizens. We must recall that 
according to Walzer, it is not the search for philosophical knowledge or 
objective truth that motivates criticism but rather the political knowledge 
of citizens articulated through the democratic process. It is the failure of 
the community to be whatever it aspires to be, its failure to live up to its 
deepest convictions that generates the disappointment that drives 
criticism. In this way the critic can never be in total opposition to the 
community that is criticised.26 Loyalty, though not blind loyalty to the 
status quo, is the prerequisite of connected criticism.
The issue at stake might be put in the form of a question; why should 
people take a critic seriously if that critic is not committed in any way to 
the good of the criticised community's form of life? Such an external 
voice has no standing in the community. It is the voice of a stranger, an 
enemy, a coloniser. The connected critic is, in contrast, committed not 
primarily to a philosophical theory but rather to a community and its own 
particular form of life. It is the moral sensitivity of a critic who cares 
about the good of the community who can inspire solidarity and resolve
24 Of course at this point Walzer has to distance himself from Gramsci's own self-
understanding. While his account of hegemonic struggle allows us to understand 
criticism democratically as a rearrangement of ideas that are already dominant, 
his own belief in objective and absolute knowledge leads him into contradiction 
as a "victim ... o f Marxist teleology", The Company o f Critics, 99. We might 
think of Walzer's Gramsci as offering not an objective, uniquely correct 
interpretation of the values of liberty and equality, but a reinterpretation that 
opens up the meaning of these values in new and liberating ways.
25 The Company o f Critics, 9-12. He argues that Herbert Marcuse's rejection of
ordinary language leads him into an antidemocratic understanding of social 
criticism, The Company o f Critics, 184-187.
26 The Company o f Critics, 233-238.
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in the people to live up to their deepest convictions. This allows for a 
sensible flexibility towards theoretical commitments that can be revised 
in the light of historical events. Such revision is not an occasion for 
despair as it can invigorate rather than undermine the potential for 
connected criticism.27 What matters is not so much theoretical 
correctness but the identification with a form of life that lives up to its 
own moral commitments.
Walzer invokes the image of a critic holding a mirror up to fellow 
citizens.28 A look in the mirror can shatter any illusions as to the success 
with which the community has lived up to these commitments. While 
these can never be fully articulated, the critic’s mirror is intended to help 
citizens to face up to the disparity between what the community is and 
what it aspires to be at any given time. The tasks of the critic are ”to 
question relentlessly the platitudes and myths of his society and to 
express the aspirations of his people.”29 The critic also reminds the 
community of the particularity of both its aspirations and its failures. 
Each community has its own mirror telling its own story. Each mirror 
tells the story of one community’s moral world, not the story of the entire 
world or of humanity as such.30
27 The Company o f Critics, 229. It is according to criteria such as this that Walzer
assess the lives of the eleven twentieth century critics he considers in this work. 
He uses biographical sketches of these eleven so as to illustrate his preferred 
model of the connected critic.
28 The Company o f Critics, 229-233.
29 The Company o f Critics, 229.
30 Walzer maintains that this is not inconsistent with a certain universalist moral
code. Whether or not this is persuasive will be discussed in the text section.
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Criticism facilitates the justification of our institutions and practices 
to each other. We engage in this critical activity as we seek recognition 
from each other. We understand our personal identity, at least in part, in 
relation to the political community with which we identify. In this sense 
it matters to each of us whether or not we can be whatever we aspire to 
be together. Our aspirations give us direction and a critical standard by 
which we can critically assess the historical reality of our common life. 
Walzer's work on connected criticism is intended to support the argument 
he makes in favour of complex equality. Our disputes about substantive 
justice are to be thought of as an aspect of the common task of 
articulating as fully as possible the social meanings that constitute us as a 
community.
Rival Interpretations
We noted at the end of the last section how the social pluralism involved 
in Walzer's work might appeal to both communitarians and post­
structuralists. He recognises the culturally particular social meanings of 
goods and at the same time defends heterogeneity and the plurality of 
narratives of substantive justice from the repression of a forced 
metanarrative unity.31 We must respect both the boundaries that separate 
the spheres of justice within our own community and also the boundaries 
which separate our community from communities of others.
But a post-structuralist might worry, and with good reason, that 
Walzer tends to assume too much unity. While he may be sensitive to 
differences between communities, perhaps he forces a unity of
31 For a critique of metanarrative unity see Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984. See also White Political Theory and Postmodernism, 118-119.
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interpretation on to the citizens of one community. In other words while 
the external other is recognised there may be a blindness to the internal 
other.32 Of course one need not be a post-structuralist to share this 
concern. Many liberals argue that Walzer's assumption that justice must 
be based on shared understandings is simply inappropriate in the context 
of a modem democratic society.33 The reality of pluralism seems to 
suggest that we simply do not share understandings of the meanings of 
social goods. For a liberal, we are not a moral community in the way that 
Walzer presupposes in his approach to substantive accounts of justice 
and in his understanding of social criticism.
Does Walzer's moral community dissolve if it is fractured by 
dissensus over shared meanings?34 As we saw in the first chapter, 
Kantian liberalism is a response to the fact that in Western democratic 
societies we do not share comprehensive conceptions of the good. It is 
for this reason that we must settle for an agreement on some procedural 
framework of justice.35 We are not one moral community but rather a 
fractured, multicultural, political community that needs justice in order to 
regulate fair terms of co-operation for mutual advantage. This view
32 Richard Bernstein gives a useful overview of the common concerns of Anglo-
American and Continental philosophers with regard to the question of otherness, 
"Incommensurability and Otherness Revisited" in The New Constellation, 57-78.
33 In the final section of the next chapter I will discuss the extent to which Walzer's
approach to issues of justice could serve any critical purpose in the context of a 
society where pluralism is a deeply divisive problem. I will take the example of 
Northern Ireland where it would appear that there are two historical 
communities uneasily co-existing in the territory of one political entity.
34 See Nancy Rosenblum "Moral Membership in a Post-Liberal State" World
Politics, 36 (1984), 581-596, here at 586-590.
35 This is Rawls's project but for this criticism of Walzer see William Galston
"Community, Democracy, Philosophy: The Political Thought of Michael Walzer" 
Political Theory, 17 (1989), 119-130, here at 120-122.
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stresses plurality and difference within rather than between 
communities.36
Ronald Dworkin argues that the notion that justice is based on shared 
understandings represents a serious flaw in Walzer’s defence of complex 
equality.37 Let us take, for example, his interpretation of the meaning of 
health care in Western culture. As I indicated earlier Walzer argues that 
health and longevity are socially recognised needs and that in order to 
meet those needs we have provided a public health care system. 
Communal provision for needs in part constitutes and also sustains 
communities. The social meaning of health care then is that it is a good 
which should be distributed according to need. We should each receive 
it as citizens in proportion to our ill-health. The crucial claim of an 
account of complex equality is that this good should therefore not be 
distributed according to wealth, occupation, education or any other
36 I have argued already, in section 1.3, that despite this intention, Rawls's own
procedure is vulnerable to the post-structuralist charge that it is insufficiently 
sensitive to difference.
37 "To Each His Own" New York Review of Books, 30, 6 (April 14, 1983), 4-6. A
similar argument is made by Joshua Cohen "Review of Spheres o f Justice" 
Journal o f Philosophy, 83 (1986), 457-468. For the ensuing debate between 
Walzer and Dworkin see "Spheres of Justice: An Exchange" New York Review of 
Books, 30, 12 (July 21, 1983), 44-46. Interestingly enough while Dworkin's 
political philosophy contrasts with Walzer's because of its stress on abstract and 
general principles of equality, his legal theory is distinctively hermeneutic in 
orientation. See the three essays in "Law and Interpretation", part 2 of A Matter 
o f Principle, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 117-177. This collection also 
contains "To Each His Own" but under the title "What Justice Isn't", 214-220. 
More generally for Dworkin's view of legal theory see Law’s Empire,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986. The tension between the 
hermeneutic language of his approach to law and the appeal to abstract 
principles of justice is explored by Georgia Wamke Justice and Interpretation, 
77-80.
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criterion which is unrelated to the social meaning of health care as a 
need.38
Of course this interpretation of health care does conflict with current 
practice in most Western democracies. Wealth is in fact often a criterion 
which can determine the quality of health care that is provided. 
Presumably some people are willing to argue in defence of this situation 
and so it would appear that Dworkin is right about the fact that not 
everyone is in agreement with Walzer about the social meaning of health 
care. Does this mean that we lack the shared meanings that are 
constitutive of a moral community? A liberal conclusion might be that 
we simply cannot find internal solutions to our disagreements about 
justice and we must therefore appeal to some general moral principle.
But as our study of Rawls should confirm the problems involved in 
justifying such general substantive principles of justice are indeed 
onerous. Rather than abstracting from the particularity of social 
meanings, hermeneutics seeks to avoid these problems by digging more 
deeply into those meanings.39
Walzer could be defended from Dworkin's critique if we bear in mind 
the fact that we could not even have a disagreement unless we shared 
common terms of reference, a common vocabulaiy.40 The sharing is at a 
deeper level than the conflicting opinions about specific disputes about 
justice. In a moral disagreement about the merits of private medicine we
38 Spheres o f Justice, 86-91.
39 For the best defence of Walzer in this debate see Georgia Wamke "Social
Interpretation and Political Theory: Walzer and his Critics" in Hermeneutics and 
Critical Theory in Ethics and Politics, Michael Kelly (ed.), 204-226. More 
generally see Charles Taylor "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man" in his 
Philosophical Papers, II, 15-57.
40 Note Walzer's comments in "A Critique of Philosophical Conversation", 191-192.
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must draw on the resources made available to us in our shared moral 
vocabulary. We will use concepts such as needs, rights, welfare and so 
on which are for us shared meanings. While we may not be able to reach 
an explicit agreement we must assume that we all know what we are 
talking about or else the debate would be pointless. But these moral 
concepts do not just facilitate understanding between us. They are 
concepts that themselves express the shared moral commitments that are 
constitutive of our common way of life. These terms of reference that 
make up this common vocabulary are not primarily derived from explicit 
agreements among individuals. They are part of our tradition and they 
reflect moral assumptions which underlie our social practices and the 
language we use about them.
For example, the existence of a National Health Service of some 
description does in itself indicate a certain shared meaning of health care, 
no matter how much we might disagree about how it should be organised. 
This shared meaning involves a moral commitment. Even those who are 
completely opposed to the idea of such a service, as a waste of resources 
or whatever, cannot but debate within the context of a form of life where 
health care is now understood as a need for which communal provision 
has been made. The language used in current debates about health care, 
terms such as ’neglect1, 'understaffing', ’unacceptably long-waiting lists', 
reflect deep common assumptions that direct the dispute in a particular 
way. Shared understandings are contextualised within a tradition and 
they certainly do not preclude intense disagreement among individuals. 
Social meaning is not "a matter of individual opinion but of the nexus of 
social values, norms and practices about which individuals have 
opinions."41 Despite the views of some of Walzer’s critics, a debate such
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as that about just health care will not be resolved by appealing externally 
to a general substantive principle of justice, but rather with reference to 
the moral resources that are constitutive of the community's shared way 
of life.
What Walzer does in Spheres o f Justice is to present, as a connected 
critic, his interpretation of our shared understandings in relation to the 
various spheres of justice. He believes that we can mark off "deep and 
inclusive accounts of our social life from shallow and partisan 
accounts."42 The deeper accounts give a fuller and richer interpretation of 
the standards to which we aspire as a community. Walzer is not, unlike 
those in search of general principles, claiming to offer the one and only 
objectively right account of justice for us. If we understand his work in 
this way then we can see that the fact of moral disagreement does not 
imply that his emphasis on shared meaning is misguided. We can 
evaluate his interpretations of the social meaning of justice and test them 
against other interpretations. It is the attempt to offer the interpretation 
that best illuminates the moral commitments we already share that 
engages the connected critic.
This gives us an alternative view of what is at stake in the different 
substantive accounts of justice we find in the work of Rawls and Walzer. 
In the first chapter I mentioned that Rawls now presents his theory in a 
more hermeneutic way. His proceduralism is not driven by a 
philosophical urge for truth but rather by the practical purpose of 
constructing a workable conception of political justice. For this reason it 
draws upon "basic intuitive ideas that are embedded in the political 
institutions of a constitutional democratic regime and the public traditions
41 Wamke "Social Interpretation and Political Theory", 209.
42 "Spheres of Justice: An Exchange", 43.
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of their interpretation."43 Furthermore, the original position itself is 
intended as a model for "what we regard as fair conditions under which 
the representatives of free and equal persons are to specify the terms of 
social co-operation."44 The principles he believes the parties would adopt 
are intended to identify "the conception we regard -here and now- as fair 
and supported by the best reasons."45
It would appear that Rawls too is seeking to provide a "deep and 
inclusive" account of justice that best illuminates the moral commitments 
that we already share, at least from a political point of view.46 But this 
does not dissolve the differences between the two accounts. In the first 
place Rawls is concerned to construct his account in terms of an 
overlapping consensus since for him the fact of pluralism implies that we 
do not actually have very much shared meaning to work with.47 This 
explains a number of features of his construction; first, the centrality of 
the notion of impartiality in his interpretation; second, the need to
43 "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", 225.
44 "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", 237-238.
45 "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", 238. I think this quotation
supports the point I made earlier, that Walzer's critique o f Rawls is based, to
some extent at least, on a misinterpretation of his project.
46 Since Rawls is concerned to defend certain substantive principles this hermeneutic
turn was unavoidable. Habermas in contrast defends only a procedure. In the 
next chapter we will examine the extent to which this move allows him to resist 
the dangers of contextualism.
47 It is for this reason that Rawls, unlike Walzer, believes it to be necessary to
construct a substantive account of justice through an abstract monological 
conception of an impartial point of view. See Political Liberalism, 42-44. I 
have argued that we do need a conception of an impartial point of view but not 
Rawls's abstract monological one.
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represent this through the abstraction of the original position; and third, 
the generality of the principles that are derived there.
In contrast, Walzer argues for a much more detailed account of the 
substantive principles that he identifies in a wide variety of spheres of 
justice. He is enabled to do this by the fact that he resists monological 
abstraction. But since he fails to see that we need not conceive of an 
impartial point of view in terms of monological abstraction, Walzer 
refuses to place the notion of impartiality at the centre of his interpretive 
account of our shared meaning. These aspects of Walzer's work will be 
assessed critically in the next section.
The question that must be answered now however is how a 
hermeneutic approach can deal adequately with rival interpretations of 
shared meaning. This is a matter of seeing how each interpretation 
coheres with a community's values, its self-understanding and its 
aspirations. Substantive justice in any society is always the subject of an 
on-going public debate. Such debate does strive to reach some 
conclusions, bearing in mind that these will be temporary and provisional, 
without any definitive full stop. In order to see how a hermeneutic 
approach might help us to see how these debates could be brought to a 
temporary but legitimate conclusion, I will follow the lead of Georgia 
Wamke in turning to the philosophical work of Hans-Georg Gadamer.48
A Dialogical Understanding of Substantive Justice
Hermeneutics developed as a method for interpreting the meaning of 
authoritative texts, so as to apply that meaning in a new context.49 It is
48 Wamke "Walzer, Rawls and Gadamer: Hermeneutics and Political Theory" in 
Festivals o f Interpretation: Essays on Hans-Georg Gadamer's Work, Kathleen 
Wright (ed.), Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990, 136-160.
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not surprising that this field of study emerged in the context of theological 
and legal controversies about how to interpret texts correctly, to draw the 
proper normative conclusions for effective adherence to the authority of 
the text. If we want to understand a particular part of the Bible, or an 
aspect of the law, then we have to begin with an initial projection of its 
meaning that we derive from our interpretation of the whole of the 
scripture or our overall understanding of the law. Interpreting the part in 
question will require that we alter and revise in turn our understanding of 
the whole. Early hermeneutical theorists were concerned with the 
objective interpretation of meaning.50 They thought of hermeneutics as a 
method or a skilful technique whereby the interplay within the 
hermeneutical circle between part and whole, could allow the interpreter 
eventually to master the meaning of the text by arriving at an objective 
and definitive interpretation of its meaning.
Gadamer argues that the idea of an objectivist hermeneutics is 
fundamentally misconceived.51 We can never give an objective
49 For an introduction to early heremeneutic theories see Josef Bleicher
Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and 
Critique, London: Routledge and KeganPaul, 1980, especially 1-26.
50 These early theorists included F.D.E. Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey but for
an example of the work of a more recent exponent of objectivist hermeneutics 
see Emilio Betti "Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the 
Geisteswissenschaften" reprinted in Bleicher’s Contemporary Hermeneutics, 51- 
94.
51 The classical statement of Gadamer's position is Truth and Method. His
development of philosophical hermeneutics in this direction away from the quest 
for objectivity owes much to Heidegger's analysis of the forestructure of 
understanding in Being and Time, New York: Harper and Row, 1962. See 
Truth and Method, 265-271 and 291-300 and Bleicher Contemporary 
Hermeneutics, 97-127. For a good introduction to Gadamer's hermeneutics, 
Richard J. Bernstein Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1983, 34-44 and 109-169 and for a recent collection of essays dealing 
with critical encounters between Gadamer's work and a variety of contemporary
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interpretation of any text, or any account of the substance of justice, 
because we always remain in a particular context of interpretation. This 
context is limited and constrained by the historically situated perspective 
that we might consider, following Gadamer, as the interpreter’s horizon of 
understanding.52 There is no method that could possibly take us beyond 
the limited horizon of our own historicity. In this way the meaning of a 
text can never be tied to the notion of authorial intention. In the light of 
new circumstances and from the vantage point of a future reader who can 
interpret it in a wider perspective, the text may come to mean something 
that the author never intended.53 Similarly there is no definitive and fixed 
meaning of substantive justice we are always moving within a limited 
horizon of understanding.
The quest for objectivity places the interpreter in the role of an 
observer who claims to understand the moral commitments of a 
community from a neutral standpoint. Gadamer insists that understanding 
is not a matter of neutral observation but rather one of participative 
interpretation. We always understand from the perspective of a tradition. 
I suggested earlier that even if we disagree about what just health care 
requires of us as a community, we already presuppose a deep common 
commitment to a particular form of life. This common commitment to 
that form of life is an aspect of the forestructure of our understanding, 
something presupposed by the very disagreement. It is what Gadamer 
refers to as a prejudice.
philosophical perspectives Gadamer and Hermeneutics, Hugh Silverman (ed.), 
London: Routledge, 1991.
52 Truth and Method, 302-307.
53 For a discussion of Gadamer's critique of the idea that meaning is tied to authorial
intention see Georgia Wamke Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason, 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1987, 42-72.
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Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified or erroneous, so that they 
inevitably distort the truth. In fact the historicity of our existence 
entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the 
initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are 
biases of our openness to the world. They are simply conditions 
whereby we experience something - whereby what we encounter says 
something to us.54
In the context of a disagreement about substantive principles of justice 
within Western democratic societies we can think of these prejudices as 
the weight of our tradition. This is a particular tradition that has, through 
the struggles of its history, come to place values like equality, liberty and 
citizenship at the centre of its deliberations about justice. These 
prejudices give us an initial direction in our attempts to work out what 
justice demands of us here and now.
Our awareness of the prejudices of our own tradition constitutes our 
historically effected consciousness.55 This concept allows us to 
understand more clearly why the project of objectivist hermeneutics is 
misconceived. Take for example the way in which the law is applied by 
the Supreme Court in the USA. The judges interpret the Constitution 
with the historically effected consciousness of precedent.56 The history
54 Gadamer "The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem" in his Philosophical
Hermeneutics, 3-17, here at 9. This essay is also reprinted in Bleicher 
Contemporary Hermeneutics, 128-140.
55 This notion is closely related to the idea of a horizon of understanding. Gadamer
introduces it in Truth and Method, 300-307 but goes on to develop an 
explanation of what is involved at length, 341-379. This includes a highly 
illuminating analysis of the priority of the question in human understanding 
where Gadamer takes the Platonic dialogues as his model.
56 See David Couzens Hoy "Legal Hermeneutics: Recent Debates" in Festivals o f
Interpretation, Kathleen Wright (ed.), 111-135. Hoy discusses the notion of 
historically effected consciousness in relation to debates surrounding Dworkin's 
legal hermeneutics. See also Gadamer on "The Exemplary Significance of Legal 
Hermeneutics" in Truth and Method, 324-341.
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of previous interpretations of the Constitution as it was applied in various 
cases is the history of the Constitution itself. The requirements of the law 
in a new case cannot be tied to the original intention of the founding 
fathers but nor can they be understood as merely subjective 
interpretations on the part of the judges. What is expected of the judges 
is that they engage in a dialogical encounter whereby they can 
incorporate the context of the new case into their understanding of the 
law. They carry forward the tradition by testing its prejudices in new 
historical circumstances.
Georgia Wamke suggests that we understand the differences between 
the substantive accounts of justice offered by Rawls and Walzer as two 
interpretive accounts of our political tradition.57 Neither of them can 
capture fully the meaning of that tradition and each of them stresses 
different aspects of it but we can take both to be making significant 
contributions to a public understanding of what justice requires of us. In 
so far as it seems clear that there are disagreements about the substance 
of justice, we must engage in a dialogical encounter whereby we test the 
various prejudices of our tradition in our attempts to come to terms with 
new circumstances.58 This can take the form of a hermeneutic dialogue 
where each of us can test our differing interpretations of justice in an 
encounter where we seek to deepen our views by learning from one 
another. We are seeking a fusion of horizons with each other as partners 
in dialogue.59
57 "Walzer, Rawls and Gadamer", 152-153.
58 New circumstances challenge the reasonableness of a tradition's prejudices. When
a community attempts to come to terms with new circumstances in an openly 
dialogical way then the prejudices of the community's tradition may be to revised 
or even repudiated. I will return to this in the next section.
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In this interpretive dialogue our prejudices are tested by the encounter 
with the other. If the partners to this dialogue really listen to each other 
then they will not simply remain entrenched in the position they were in 
before the dialogue took place at all. A public dialogue about justice 
which is genuinely open will involve a process of self-transformation for 
each of the participants and also for the identity of the community as a 
whole. If we have listened then we will have taken the differences 
between us into account and while it is possible that none of us will 
change our minds to a significant degree, all of us will have benefited in 
terms of a deeper understanding of our own views on justice and a more 
adequately articulated account of the issues of justice that matter to us 
communally.60
The interpretive accounts of substantive justice offered by theorists 
such as Walzer and Rawls draw very heavily on traditions that could be 
thought of as the dominant strands of modem Western political culture. 
These are the traditions of liberalism, socialism and republicanism. But 
there are other traditions within modem democratic societies that are 
rooted in minority cultures, such as immigrant cultures or perhaps new 
cultures that have developed through the progress of social movements, 
such as that of the gay and lesbian community. We have already 
considered, in our discussion of Foucault’s work in the first chapter, how 
such minority cultures are in danger of being marginalised or even 
excluded from our deliberations about justice. On this dialogical account,
59 On the fusion of horizons as a self-transformative moment see Truth and Method,
379. Gadamer thinks of this as an achievement of language, something which in 
part led to his debate with Habermas, as we will see in the next section.
60 Wamke's recent book Justice and Interpretation provides the clearest available
account of how hermeneutics relates to matters of justice. I will have certain 
criticisms to make of her argument when I discuss contextualist critics of 
Habermas in the next chapter.
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these minority cultures must be included in these interpretive encounters 
that seek to carry forward the political tradition as a whole. The onus is 
on those who draw most heavily on dominant traditions to listen to the 
voices of these minority cultures.61 As members of our democratic 
community they can make important contributions to our self- 
understanding. The horizon of a minority culture is not simply 
incorporated into that of a dominant culture leaving the latter unchanged. 
Rather we can expect both cultures to be transformed in the fusion of 
their horizons.
This will not be the case only within one democratic community but 
communities can learn from one another. "We British" can learn 
something from "you Germans", and vice versa, if we really take 
seriously our cultural encounter as a potentially edifying and educational 
experience. We will deepen our understanding not only of the Germans, 
but of ourselves as well. In this way, as our self-interpretation changes, 
so we change ourselves. We can think of the cultural aspects of closer 
European co-operation as an attempt to engage various European cultures 
in a mutually enriching and self-transformative dialogue. Nor need this 
experience be limited to Western cultures learning from each other. In
61 See Charles Taylor's comments on the Rushdie affair in Multiculturalism and 
"The Politics o f Recognition", 62-63. Taylor defends a version of liberal holism 
in this essay that, as he mentions here, avoids the distinction between political 
and comprehensive moralities that makes it so difficult for Rawls's proceduralism 
to deal with politico-cultural controversies such as that sparked by the Rushdie 
affair. I made a similar argument in section 1.2. The hermeneutic account I am 
outlining here advocates a dialogue between the dominant liberal tradition and 
minority groups o f citizens such as Moslem fundamentalist groups. While we 
must presume that these minorities can enrich our interpretive account of justice, 
there is no guarantee that this will lead to a significant shift in the moral 
standards that constitute in part our self-understanding as a democratic 
community. What we can expect is that through the encounter we will have 
deepened our interpretive account of justice by clarifying what it is that we 
cannot accept in the demands such minorities might make.
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fact we might expect to learn more, on condition that we put in the more 
demanding efforts of listening required, from an encounter with non- 
Westem cultures that aims at a genuine understanding, or a fusion of 
horizons.62
In seeking to give the best interpretation of what the substance of 
justice is for us, through our own internal debates as well as external 
encounters, we are therefore enriching our own tradition. As each 
participant in these encounters seeks to incorporate the better insights of 
the other they are collectively striving to give the most adequate account 
of justice for them. This of course is always open to future revision and 
so is never given a definitive full stop. The fusion of horizons that we 
seek will enrich and develop our communal articulation of what justice 
demands of us. While this will not resolve all of our disagreements the 
encounter itself will constitute a vibrant public culture where a passionate 
concern for justice can be expressed collectively.
A hermeneutic understanding of justice requires of each of us that we 
be open to our deepest shared moral convictions. To engage in a serious 
attempt to answer the question "What is justice for us?" inevitably 
involves us in the common project of facing up to the questions; "WTio 
are we?" and "What do we aspire to be?"63 Our account of justice in part
62 T aylor Multiculturalism and "The Politics o f Recognition", 65-73. He actually
invokes Gadamer's idea of a "fusion of horizons", 67.
63 As well as the work of Gadamer and Taylor, especially Sources o f the Self
Alasdair MacIntyre gives a comprehensive defence of the centrality of tradition 
in moral reflection in Three Rival Versions o f Moral Inquiry, London: 
Duckworth, 1990. On the other hand, Richard Rorty, unlike any of these 
hermeneuticists, does not allow for any significant degree of communal rational 
self-criticism since he tends to endorse whatever self-understanding a community 
just happens to have. This amounts to the conflation o f the questions "Who are 
we?" and "Who do we aspire to be?" If Rorty were right, then our deliberations 
about justice would not only lack direction but they would also be devoid of any
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defines our identity as a community. In so far as we share a form of life 
at all, and this is surely not an option, these questions are inescapable.
A dialogical understanding of substantive justice can claim to have 
important advantages over an account of justice derived through a 
procedure of monological abstraction. It does not deny the significance 
of historical and cultural traditions and so it can respect the particularity 
of different communities. It also reflects better the communal aspect of 
democratic deliberation that is essential to the derivation of legitimate 
substantive principles of justice. This provides strong motivation for a 
common striving for the articulation of and adherence to such principles.
I have argued in this section that hermeneutics does not undermine the 
possibility of social criticism. Hermeneutic critique is grounded on the 
fact that we can be more or less true to our deepest moral convictions.
This defence of the critical potential of Walzer’s stress on 
interpretation adds to our understanding of the holist aspects of an 
adequate liberal holist approach to justice. We will recall that in the 
discussion of the communitarian critique of Rawls, I suggested that while 
Rawls is a liberal holist, his monological procedure that demands the 
isolation of the political sits rather uneasily with that commitment. In the 
last section I maintained that Walzer has a more contextually sensitive
internal critical standards. Nor can Rort/s "neo-pragmatism" accommodate very 
easily differing interpretations of what our shared moral commitments require. 
For Rort/s view on matters of justice see Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989, "The Priority of Democracy 
to Philosophy" and also "Solidarity or Objectivity?" and "Postmodernist 
Bourgeois Liberalism" both collected in his Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: 
Philosophical Papers, Volume I, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1991. For a contrast between Gadamer and Rorty, Wamke Gadamer: 
Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason, 139-166 and for a sample of the numerous 
general criticisms of Rort/s political views, Richard Bernstein The New 
Constellation, 230-292 and Nancy Fraser "Solidarity or Singularity?: Richard 
Rorty between Romanticism and Technocracy" in Reading Rorty, Alan 
Malachowski (ed.), 303-321.
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approach to substantive accounts of justice than Rawls and that this is 
due to his pluralist conception of citizenship. However I have maintained 
throughout that the attempt to provide a philosophical conception of an 
impartial point of view is indispensable to a theory of justice. In fact 
impartiality is a crucial aspect of the self-understanding of any pluralist 
political community that aspires to a just social reality. This should 
become clear now as we turn to the most serious weaknesses in Walzer's 
work. In the following section I will argue that his rejection of the 
Kantian project is seriously misguided. Walzer is left with a hermeneutic 
approach to justice that is dangerously partial in that it obscures what 
must be the key feature of a theory of justice that is to serve its critical 
task in a modern context.
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2.3 THE LIMITS OF WALZER'S IMMANENT CRITIQUE
In the last section I argued that Walzer's defence of connected criticism 
should not be dismissed as an apology for the status quo. Our deepest 
moral commitments can be articulated in ways that conflict with current 
social and political practices. In this section I will look at the other side 
of the story by presenting a critique of Walzer’s work. I will argue that 
despite the critical potential of a hermeneutic approach, the form of 
immanent critique that Walzer actually advocates represents at best one 
aspect of what is required of us with respect to our reflections on justice.1 
Its potential for social criticism is seriously undermined by Walzer’s 
refusal to endorse the Kantian project. Without some philosophical 
articulation of an impartial point of view we are left without an adequate 
means of distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate principles of 
justice. I will be suggesting that in a modem context the justification of 
legitimate principles of justice must presuppose some conception of an 
impartial point of view. Hermeneutics could never on its own act as a 
substitute for such a conception.
In the first part of this section I will question whether or not 
hermeneutics is sufficiently sensitive to the way that social power 
operates. Marxists will wonder how interpretation is expected to 
penetrate the ideological beliefs that serve to justify the power structure 
of capitalism’s relations of production. Foucauldians will wonder how an 
interpretive account of justice can do anything but affirm, ever more 
deeply, the regime of truth that constitutes the configuration of power
1 We will see precisely what aspect o f our reflections on justice is involved here 
when I discuss the relation between moral and ethical employments of practical 
reason in the third section of the next chapter.
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relations in any given modem society.2 Can Walzer’s hermeneutics 
adequately identify, explain and overcome the effects of power in 
democratic deliberation as it is currently carried out? In order to begin to 
find an answer to these questions we will first of return briefly to 
Walzer's rejection of Marxism, or indeed any critical theory, for the sake 
of what he takes to be a sufficiently connected approach to social 
criticism. I will argue that this betrays a naivete on Walzer’s part with 
regard to the possibilities of ideological distortion in actual processes of 
democratic deliberation.
In order to develop this issue further we will then consider, in the 
second part, Jurgen Habermas’s critique of Gadamer’s hermeneutics and 
his defence of a version ideology critique based on the model of 
psychoanalysis. This debate can be related quite straightforwardly to 
some of the problems associated with Walzer’s defence of immanent 
critique. Even if the psychoanalytic model depends on certain untenable 
assumptions, there is no good reason to abandon the search for a 
theoretically grounded model of critique. This will take us beyond 
Walzer’s anti-theoretical stance. Critical theory does not in itself offend 
our democratic sentiments, as Walzer seems to suggest. In fact only a 
critical theory of society, that is sensitive to democratic concerns while at 
the same time facilitating a critique of ideology, could actually be 
effective in the defence of legitimate and just institutions and practices.
2 Thomas McCarthy gives a useful summary of the similarities and differences 
between the work of Foucault and the tradition of Marxian critical theory 
especially in relation to their reaction to hermeneutics. See "The Critique of 
Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School" Political Theory, 18 (1990), 
437-469, here at 439 and 441-442. The essay is included in McCarthy's Ideals 
and Illusions t 43-75.
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In the third part I will turn to the relationship between universalist 
moral principles, ones that are justified independently of any one context 
or tradition, and substantive accounts of justice that are particular to one 
context or tradition. In order to theorise adequately the relationship 
between a minimal universalist moral code, that Walzer does affirm, and 
the substantive accounts of justice that constitute in part particular forms 
of life, again we need to look beyond Walzer’s preferred form of 
immanent critique. The discussion will seek to provide further evidence 
in support of the view that philosophical theory plays an indispensable 
role in the legitimation of substantive principles of justice. This is related 
to the fact that if the practice of social criticism is not to be undermined, 
we will obviously need a clear moral-theoretical understanding of what is 
to count as rational deliberation about justice in a modem pluralist 
context. This is something that Walzer's hermeneutics does not provide.
Furthermore, as well as clarifying both the relation between the 
universal and the particular and the demands of rational deliberation, this 
alternative moral theory should also show, more convincingly that Walzer 
manages to, that individual rights and the democratic will are necessary 
and complementary aspects of a theory of justice. Walzer’s hermeneutics 
tends to submerge the individual by stressing the common will in a way 
that is inappropriate in a modem context. It is inappropriate in that it 
does not reflect adequately the variety of perspectives that we could 
expect individuals to bring to disputes about justice in a modem pluralist 
society. In this way, despite its stress on real talk and on the importance 
of open democratic deliberation about the substance of justice, Walzer's 
approach is actually insufficiently dialogical.
Walzer’s work is seriously flawed then for a number of reasons.
First, he is unable to confront the possibilities of ideological distortion or 
the effects of power in democratic deliberation. Second, he does not
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provide an adequate understanding of the relation between universalist 
and particularist aspects of the substance of justice. Third, he does not 
clarify the demands of rational democratic deliberation. Fourth, nor does 
he show convincingly how individual rights and the democratic will are 
to complement one another. I believe that all of these flaws point us back 
towards the Kantian project. We must be careful however to pursue this 
project in a way that avoids the problems of Rawls’s monological 
procedure. This will lead us to our extensive discussion of Habermas's 
moral theory in the third chapter. I will be suggesting that by presenting 
us with a dialogical conception of an impartial point of view, discourse 
ethics manages to bring the best insights of hermeneutics into the 
concerns of the Kantian project.
Immanent Critique and Ideology
Marxism tends to be antagonistic towards hermeneutics since its stress on 
shared social meanings seems to obscure class conflict within capitalist 
societies. The locus of shared understandings for the Marxist is the 
social class and not the political community. The bourgeoisie of one 
political community share social meanings with the bourgeoisie of other 
communities and not with their own local proletariat and the same goes 
for the international proletarian movement. This is because social 
meaning will be determined by economic relations and interests. In fact 
it is the ideological claim that meanings are shared across a community 
that serves to institutionalise the rule of the dominant class. The task for 
the proletariat is to overcome their own false consciousness and to 
penetrate bourgeois prejudices by becoming aware of their own interests, 
which will inevitably conflict with the interests of their local bourgeoisie.
In the last section we saw that Walzer used Antonio Gramsci’s 
critique of bourgeois ideology as an example of connected criticism.
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This is controversial since we might expect a Marxist like Gramsci to 
deny that a political community could actually share social meanings 
across classes. As we saw, Walzer maintains that we should understand 
Gramsci’s critique as a reinterpretation of the shared values of liberty and 
equality. The deeper interpretation he gives deprives the bourgeoisie of 
their privileges by showing that these values could only be 
institutionalised by destroying the capitalist economic system. The 
internal contradictions of bourgeois ideology provide the critical foothold 
for this challenge to bourgeois hegemony.3 In this way ideas that are 
used to establish class rule always provide grounds for resistance to that 
rule.4 This is the danger of using ideas that have a broad enough appeal 
to operate successfully as an ideology in the first place. Walzer 
maintains that Gramsci's social criticism presupposes the fact that 
political communities share social meanings, but that those meanings can 
be interpreted well or badly.
The next issue of course is how we distinguish between good and bad 
interpretations. I argued in the last section that a good interpretation will 
be one that gives a deep and inclusive account of the community's self- 
understanding. But what about the possibility of a false consciousness or 
ideological distortions in democratic deliberation, caused by the power 
relations which for a Marxist are always grounded in the economic base
3 Interpretation and Social Criticism, 41-43. Here Walzer also mentions Ignazio
Silone, like Gramsci, a one-time member of the Italian Communist party. See 
also the chapter on Silone in The Company o f Critics, 101-116. Silone is one of 
Walzer's favoured critics to a large extent because o f his rejection of Communist 
party orthodoxy. Walzer characterises with approval Silone's later views, here at 
115. "He is seized by a fear of abstractions; he is in retreat from world history; 
he is content to begin and end his narratives with the peasants of the Abruzzi... 
Silone, we might say, is committed to his dialect, the party to its dialectics."
4 See also the footnote at Spheres of Justice, 9.
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of the society? Is it not possible that power will distort our reflections on 
justice and more generally on our self-understanding in ways that the 
participants will not even be aware of? What if Gramsci’s radical 
reinterpretation of bourgeois values is rejected by most workers? It 
might be possible, as Walzer puts it, that "the greater number of workers 
believe that the equality realized in capitalist society is genuine equality 
or equality enough.”5
Unlike Gramsci, Walzer refuses to claim that workers could 
misinterpret their own objective interests, that they could be wrong about 
what would constitute "equality enough."6 In this way he seems to be 
giving the workers the last word on what counts as a good interpretation 
of the demands of justice. He does not consider it likely that any theory 
could provide a cogent explanation as to why the conditions of 
democratic deliberation involve structural biases that distort decision­
making processes by repressing the interests of the workers. While he 
accepts that workers could be mistaken because of a lack of information, 
he seems to deny that they could be mistaken in interpreting their own 
moral standards.
5 Interpretation and Social Criticism, 44.
6 Note Walzer’s critique of Gramsci's Marxism which I mentioned in a note in the
last section. In fact Walzer's own interpretation of the demands of justice in 
modem complex societies suggests that workers would be wrong to believe that 
capitalism could realise "equality enough." He argues for a "decentralised 
democratic socialism", Spheres o f Justice, 318 and he goes to some lengths to 
defend industrial democracy from the dangers of private government, Spheres o f 
Justice, 291-303, "Justice Here and Now", 146-148 and "Liberalism and the Art 
of Separation", 328, where he notes that liberalism "passes definitively into 
democratic socialism when the map of society is socially determined." As we 
have seen his interpretation is not presented as a uniquely correct one but rather 
as the one that best discloses to us the moral commitments that constitute in part 
our common identity.
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The workers can indeed be wrong about the facts of their case, such 
as the actual extent of income differentials or the real chances of 
upward mobility. But how can they be wrong about the value and 
significance of equality in their own lives? Here criticism depends 
less on true (or false) statements about the world than on evocative 
(or unevocative) renderings of a common idea. The argument is 
about meaning and experience; its terms are set by its cultural as well 
as its socio-economic setting.7
It seems clear therefore that Walzer's hermeneutics involves the rejection 
of any form of Marxian objectivism.8 If we must choose between our 
theory and our connectedness to the community we criticise, it is obvious 
which choice Walzer would see as the better one. This is not to say, as 
we have already seen, that the connected critic must be blindly loyal to 
current practices. Connectedness is humanising in that it ensures that the 
critic's theory continues to address the issues that really matter to fellow 
citizens.9
But the choice is not so straightforward if we do not follow Walzer in 
giving the last word on what counts as a good interpretation to the 
participants in democratic deliberation itself. He simply has not said
7 Interpretation and Social Criticism, 44.
8 Georgia Wamke notes that this rejection of Marxism implies that Walzer cannot
but offer a subjectivist interpretation of principles of justice, Justice and 
Interpretation, 36. As noted in the last section, she sees Gadamer's stress on 
tradition as a means of defusing this problem of subjectivism, "Walzer, Rawls 
and Gadamer", 151-157 and Justice and Interpretation, especially 128-134.
9 Marxist-Leninism is clearly Walzer's main target here. There certainly would seem
to be good grounds for believing Leninists to be guilty on this score but, as we 
have seen Walzer also finds non-Leninist Marxists, such as Gramsci and also 
Sartre and Marcuse, wanting here. Nor does he see this failing as one that is 
exclusive to Marxists, as is obvious from his discussion of Foucault. See 
Interpretation and Social Criticism, 62-64 on Lenin, 57-59 on Sartre, and the 
The Company o f Critics, 170-190 on Marcuse and 191-209 on Foucault's 
"lonely politics."
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enough about the ways in which structural biases can distort such 
deliberation and how critical theories might identify and explain such 
distortion. If a critic is convinced that such distortion is possible then the 
fact that a radical reinterpretation of shared meanings is rejected by most 
fellow citizens does not necessarily imply that the critic's views should be 
revised. Social criticism can lead to isolation despite the best intentions 
of a critic to remain connected. If this occurs then it is theoretical 
conviction, and perhaps the support of a few significant others, that for 
the most part sustains the lonely critic.10 Social critics often face a real 
dilemma where their theoretical convictions force them to sacrifice much 
of their sense of connectedness to their political community.
On the other hand, Walzer does seem to accept that the majority of 
citizens "might well misunderstand the logic of their own institutions or 
fail to apply consistently the principles they professed to hold."11 This 
must allow for the possibility that the critic is right and the majority of 
citizens wrong. It is not clear however, from what Walzer has to say 
about this possibility, how the critic's claim might be legitimately 
justified. How we are to distinguish between an ideological and a non- 
ideological decision, a genuine and a pseudo-consensus, a fair and a 
warped conclusion, an impartial and a biased principle of justice, this 
remains something of a mystery.12 While Leninist elitism is rejected by 
Walzer, and with good reason, he tends to assume that every critical
10 This point is made by Kerry Whiteside in "Review of The Company o f Critics"
Political Theory, 17 (1989), 689-692.
11 Spheres o f Justice, 99.
12 Many of Walzer’s critics make this point. For a fairly typical example see
Alessandro Ferrara "Universalisms: Procedural, Contextualist and Prudential" in 
Universalism vs. Communitarianismy David Rasmussen (ed.), 11-37, here at 23.
179
theory of society must involve anti-democratic implications. This leaves 
him ill-equipped to offer a sound test of legitimacy for democratically 
worked out norms of justice. I believe that only some more sophisticated 
account of power, integrated with a philosophical conception of an 
impartial point of view, could possibly enable him to deal with these 
challenges.13
The effects of power might be considered as the exclusion from the 
democratic process of those whose real interests could not be satisfied 
within its particular structure.14 This view of power allows us to think of
13 See White Political Theory and Postmodernism, 120-121 where Walzer’s
limitations in respect to the theorisation of power are effectively exposed. White 
shows how Walzer's approach to matters of justice is undermined by his failure 
to grapple with specifically modem forms of power with anything like the 
sophistication of Foucault or Habermas. We have already considered Foucault's 
work in the first chapter and we will begin to explore the work of Habermas later 
in this section. Walzer shows some awareness of this problem in "Exclusion, 
Injustice and the Democratic State", 56, where he acknowledges that "the 
convertibility of social goods and the dominance it makes possible take 
increasingly subtle and indirect forms in modem societies." His response is to 
argue that the state should play a more significant role in facilitating the 
"associations of civil society", 61, in trying to ensure that no social group is 
marginalised or excluded from social life as an underclass of second class 
citizens. While this greater sensitivity to the real dangers of social 
marginalisation is welcome, it does not seem to recognise the need to take 
theoretical steps beyond Walzer's preferred anti-philosophical, story-telling 
approach to social criticism. Furthermore, encouraging the state to greater 
intervention in civil society would seem to undermine some of the advantages of 
Walzer's pluralistic conception of citizenship through the variety of spheres of 
justice as against the overburdened welfare-state which Rawls's well-ordered 
society must presuppose. At best Walzer has moved in the direction of an 
interesting and original proposal that takes as the object of inquiry for a 
hermeneutic ethics, not the interpretation of the meaning of social goods, but 
rather of evil. See also Adi Ophir "Beyond Good - Evil: A Plea for a 
Hermeneutic Ethics" in Hermeneutics and Critical Theory in Ethics and 
Politics, Michael Kelly (ed.), 94-121. White also recommends a similar shift of 
focus, towards phenomena of injustice, Political Theory and Postmodernism, 
122-126. I will not explore this shift here since, despite its more direct 
confrontation with power (as a source of injustice), it does not seem to move in 
any significant sense beyond the limits of Walzer’s form of immanent critique.
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the preferences and values of at least some of the participants, as they are 
expressed and acted upon in a democratic context, as products of a 
system which, behind their backs as it were, obscures their own real 
interests. Were they to experience a less repressive system they might 
well come to realise how their real interests had previously been 
obscured. This insight would therefore give them good reasons for acting 
differently. It seems to me that this would constitute a genuine 
achievement for them as it would give them a better self-understanding 
by enabling them to overcome illusions with regard to their own deepest 
aspirations.15
But if the people concerned were not to experience a less repressive 
system, thus leaving them blind to the ways that their interests are 
obscured, this does not make the critic’s interpretation wrong. We might 
consider the claim Walzer makes in relation to the internal justness of a 
caste society.16 Such a society is just, according to him, if the social 
meaning of ritual purity is integrated with that of many other social goods 
and if those meanings are genuinely shared. But it is possible for an 
internal, connected critic to argue that these meanings are shared 
precisely because the interests of the lower caste members have been 
obscured. The critic might go on to point out that deliberation about the 
caste system has therefore been distorted and biased. Even if the
14 See Steven Lukes Power: A Radical View, London: Macmillan, 1974, especially
21-25.
15 While it seems that Walzer's anti-theoretical stance would make it difficult for him
to endorse this view, hermeneutic criticism is, as suggested in the last section, 
generally concerned with deepening self-understanding. There is no reason why 
this should not be thought of in terms of overcoming illusions. See for example 
Taylor’s essay "What's Wrong with Negative Liberty?" in Philosophical Papers, 
77,211-229.
16 Spheres o f Justicey 313-315.
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majority are not convinced, the critic might support this claim empirically 
by indicating, for example, the level of conversions to other religions 
among lower caste members.17
Susan Okin argues that Walzer's defence of the internal justness of a 
caste society shows up the dangers involved in an approach which 
"depends heavily upon what people are persuaded of."18 She then argues 
that the gender system is in some sense analogous to a caste system. In 
both cases "an inborn characteristic determines dominant or subordinate 
status in relation to social goods over a whole range of spheres."19 It 
certainly seems to make good sense to consider the ways in which 
women have been expected traditionally to perform domestic duties, 
leaving political matters for men, as ideological distortions that led to the 
interests of women being systematically obscured. The gains that have 
been achieved by the feminist movement must be thought of as examples 
of an overcoming of the effects of power. It has been a matter of 
dispelling patriarchal illusions that repressed and constrained women's 
self-understanding. The fact that women of earlier generations, and many 
women today, fail to see the injustice of patriarchy must be explained 
with reference to certain structural features of society of which they 
themselves are not sufficiently aware.
What is at issue here is whether or not we can give theoretical 
justifications for critical interpretations of a community's principles of
17 Lukes Power: A Radical View, 49-50. The work of John Gaventa is mentioned by
Lukes, 57 as offering a good example of an empirically based analysis of power
in this respect, see Gaventa's Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and 
Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980.
18 Justice, Gender and the Family, 65.
19 Justice, Gender and the Family, 65.
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justice even if that interpretation is rejected by a majority of citizens. 
Walzer’s version of immanent critique is not helpful in this respect. I 
have been suggesting that one way of justifying this type of critical 
interpretation would be to provide a convincing explanation for the 
majority’s rejection of the critic’s interpretation. The explanation would 
attempt to reveal that rejection to be a mistake caused by some factor or 
other that the majority had failed to recognise at the time. In other words 
the justification of the critic’s interpretation would depend on a successful 
explanation of an ideological distortion. This issue might be brought into 
a clearer focus if we consider Habermas’s critique of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics.
Hermeneutics and Critical Theory
While Habermas accepted many of the insights of the philosophical 
hermeneutics elaborated by Gadamer, particularly regarding the 
impossibility of transcending completely an historically effected 
consciousness, he was alarmed by what he saw as a tendency to 
absolutise the authority of tradition. It is the proper balance between the 
authority of one’s tradition and the capacity for critical reflection on the 
prejudices of that tradition that is at issue in the debate between 
hermeneutics and critical theory.20 From Habermas’s point of view, if we
20 For Habermas's initial response to Truth and Method, see his On the Logic o f the 
Social Sciences, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1988, 151-170, especially at 168- 
170. Some of the better commentaries on the controversy between Gadamer 
and Habermas include Bleicher's Contemporary Hermeneutics, 153-158, Paul 
Ricouer "Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology" in his Hermeneutics and 
the Human Sciences, John B. Thompson (ed.), Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981, 63-100, Georgia Wamke Gadamer: Hermeneutics, 
Tradition and Reason, 107-138, Thomas McCarthy The Critical Theory o f 
Jurgen Habermas, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1984, 169-193, Robert C. 
Holub Jurgen Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere, London: Routledge,
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are to be capable of critical reflection at all, then we must appropriate our 
tradition selectively, which means that we will repudiate or reject certain 
aspects of it. Habermas seeks to undermine the authority of tradition in 
an attempt to avoid the possible conservative implications of Gadamer's 
critique of the Enlightenment's "prejudice against prejudices."21
Of course while we can acknowledge that some particular horizon of 
understanding is inescapable we must also recognise that all known 
historical traditions are repressive as well as enabling. Habermas stresses 
the power of critical reflection, our capacity to challenge what has been 
handed down through tradition and to replace dogmatism with rational 
insight. But how could critical reflection be grounded in a system of 
reference which is not context-dependent? Can any social theory 
guarantee a critical distance that facilitates a selective, and liberating, 
appropriation of tradition without taking certain unquestioned 
assumptions, or prejudices, for granted? If these assumptions actually 
underwrite repressive social practices then must we not accept that the 
promise of such a critical theory is in fact an illusory one?
The theoretical project that Habermas set for himself, against the 
claims of hermeneutics, was to detect and overcome systematic 
distortions in self-interpretations. For Gadamer all understanding is
1991, 49-77, Graeme Nicholson "Answers to Critical Theory" and Dieter 
Misgeld "Modernity and Hermeneutics: A Critical-Theoretical Rejoinder" both in 
Gadamer and Hermeneutics, Hugh Silverman (ed.), 151-162 and 163-177 and 
for a special journal issue on the dispute and its relation to methods in the social 
sciences, including a contribution from Gadamer, Cultural Hermeneutics, 2, 4 
(February, 1975), David Rasmussen (ed.), 305-390. For an assessment of the 
implications of this dispute in relation to ethics, Michael Kelly "The Gadamer- 
Habermas Debate Revisited: The Question of Ethics" in Universalism vs. 
Communitarianism, David Rasmussen (ed.), 139-159.
21 Truth and Method, 271-277. This phrase is used at 272.
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linguistic.22 Our language discloses to us the truth of our world and of 
ourselves. Language is the horizon that enables us to ask questions and 
to participate in a dialogical encounter with another (text, person, culture) 
that we previously had not been capable of comprehending. As we saw 
in the last section if we are to have any hope of understanding something 
unfamiliar we must be genuinely open in anticipating a fusion of 
horizons. This fusion enriches our language and discloses to us new 
aspects of the world, and of ourselves. But if, as Habermas claimed, 
language can be systematically distorted by power then it may represent 
not only the resources for an ever enriching self-understanding but also a 
force of domination and mystification. But what exactly had Habermas 
in mind when he spoke of systematically distorted communication?
A particular aspect of a tradition is systematically distorted if it is, in 
part, the result of non-dialogical factors, notably social processes of 
labour and domination.23 In other words the language of our self- 
understanding, in modem Western capitalist societies, is not simply the 
result of an open dialogue, a series of fusions bringing us to our present 
horizon. Other factors, such as the innovative technological exploitation 
of external nature and consequent changes in the system of labour, have 
shaped our language in a non-dialogical manner.24 Relations of power
22 This is the subject of part ID of Truth and Method, 381-491. See for example 474
where he maintains that "being that can be understood is language." See also 
"The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem", 15-17 and "To What Extent 
"t/J Does Language Perform Thought?", included as "Supplement II" to Truth and 
Method, 542-549. I’his piece constitutes in part a response to Habermas's 
critique.
23 On the Logic o f the Social Sciences, 172-174.
24 See also Habermas "Technology and Science as Ideology" in Toward a Rational
Society: Student Protest, Science and Politics, London: Heinemann, 1971, 81- 
122.
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and authority have framed our dialogical encounters of understanding,
without themselves being legitimated in an open dialogue where all
participants are equally free to question the normative assumptions of
those relations. In this way language serves as a medium in which
organised force is legitimated.
Insofar as the legitimations do not articulate the power relationship 
whose institutionalization they make possible, insofar as that 
relationship is merely manifested in the legitimations, language is also 
ideological.25
Gadamer’s hermeneutics is, according to Habermas, insufficiently aware 
of the need for a critique of ideology. The intention of such a critique is 
to distinguish between aspects of our language that emerge from open 
dialogue and aspects that are distorted by the effects of systems of 
domination.
For Habermas, hermeneutics pays insufficient attention to the 
objective context, constituted by labour and domination as well as open 
dialogue, in which all social action takes place. It therefore makes a false 
claim to universality.26 But the crucial question remains: how can we get 
beyond hermeneutics to a critical standpoint that is not context-bound?
In response to Gadamer’s work Habermas initially turned to 
psychoanalysis as an analogy for the critique of ideology. Psychoanalysis 
and the critique of ideology both deal with systematically distorted 
communication in a way which can be understood in terms of the general 
conditions of communication.27 In both cases subjects fail to recognise
25 On the Logic o f the Social Sciences, 172.
26 See Habermas "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality" in Bleicher
Contemporary Hermeneutics, 181-211.
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the intentions that are actually guiding their expressive activity. This 
constitutes a distorted form of communication, one that cannot be fully 
comprehended by a purely hermeneutic inquiry since genuine 
understanding can only occur in these cases if the cause of the distortion 
is explained.28
Habermas invokes Alfred Lorenzer's use of Freudian psychoanalysis 
in explaining neuroses or specifically incomprehensible symptomatic 
expressions.29 The analyst tries to reconstruct an original scene from the 
patient's early childhood which might account for the particular neurosis. 
A certain form of interaction that occurred at that formative early stage 
may have given rise to such intolerable conflict that it was unconsciously 
repressed. This led to it being split off from its corresponding linguistic 
symbol. The rejected form of interaction may however continue to 
motivate action at a subconscious level. This, Lorenzer suggests, can be 
the cause of neurotic compulsive reactions to certain stimuli which it may 
eventually become impossible to conceal with public rationalisations.
The analyst’s aim is to reintroduce the repressed form of interaction into 
public language and thereby to resymbolise it. Subjects overcome their 
neuroses if they can accept the analyst's theoretically guided
27 In Knowledge and Human Interests, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1987, 214-
300, Habermas discusses psychoanalysis in relation to a programme of critical 
social science that is to serve a human interest in emancipation, but his attempt 
to use it as a means of transcending the limits of Gadamer's hermeneutics is more 
explicitly dealt with in "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality" and also "On 
Systematically Distorted Communication" Inquiry, 13 (1970), 205-218.
28 The intention is to offer a model for how we might explain the acquiescence of
those whose real interests are systematically obscured and repressed while at the 
same time dispelling the ideological illusions that act as pseudo-justifications for 
the continued repression. We might think of examples such as those discussed in 
the previous section; patriarchy and the caste system.
29 "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality", 192-195 and "On Systematically
Distorted Communication", 207-209.
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interpretation by coming to recognise the original unconscious 
repression.30
In so far as this type of scenic understanding is guided by theoretical 
assumptions, it succeeds, at least from Habermas's perspective, in going 
beyond hermeneutics. The meaning of the systematically distorted use of 
language must be explained before it can be understood.31 In the case of 
scenic understanding, this occurs under experimental conditions and the 
analyst’s pre-understanding is directed at a specific set of possible 
meanings regarding early childhood. The analyst's interpretation is not 
however imposed but rather it must be accepted by the subject as an 
enlightening account of previously incomprehensible aspects of her own 
behaviour. We could then say that the analyst's theory led to the 
emancipation of the subject from some or other force of repression.
But there are some obvious problems with the model of 
psychoanalysis when it comes to the practice of social criticism in terms 
of the legitimation of substantive principles of justice. Firstly as 
Gadamer, in his response to Habermas, points out, the social critic is not 
a doctor dealing with patients who need therapy but rather a partner in 
dialogue, just another member of a social community.32 The critic can 
claim no privileged vantage point in seeking to justify an interpretation of 
justice that is critical of current practice, perhaps against the view of the
80 See Bleicher Contemporary Hermeneutics, 167.
31 Habermas rejects certain scientistic assumptions in Freud's understanding of his
own metapsychology, especially with regard to the relationship between 
causality and freedom, Knowledge and Human Interests, 246-273. See Jeffrey 
A. Abramson's comments on this issue in Liberation and Its Limits, Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1984, 114-119
32 "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection", in his Philosophical
Hermeneutics, 18-44, here at 41-42.
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majority of citizens. Unlike the relation between the analyst and the 
neurotic in need of therapy, the social critic is on an equal footing with 
every other citizen.
Secondly, if we rely too heavily on our theory we may begin to suffer 
under the illusion that we no longer depend on the authority of any 
tradition at all, that we see beyond all horizons. We may even begin to 
believe that our own theoretical analysis convincingly demonstrates that 
all who disagree with us hold such distorted self-understandings that they 
are incapable of recognising themselves in our (uniquely correct) 
explanatory account of the cause of their delusions. Of course this 
conflicts not only with any commitment to genuine democratic 
deliberation but with the most basic insight of hermeneutics, that we 
could not even engage in a dispute about justice if we did not do so in the 
context of some tradition or other, however broadly defined. The danger 
of showing contempt for fellow citizens is indeed a real one. It is this, as 
we have seen, that grounds Walzer's concern for connectedness and his 
suspicion of philosophy.33
Thirdly, in the case of psychoanalysis, a precondition of successful 
therapy is that a patient has the desire and the determination to overcome 
and recover from whatever suffering the neurosis has caused. The patient 
must have a "passion for critique."34 In a social context it seems that the 
analogy breaks down if a supposedly pathological social group are not 
sufficiently aware of their own suffering that has been caused by
33 Walzer explicitly rejects Freudian models of social criticism in Interpretation and
Social Criticism, 65. He maintains there that criticism is "less the practical 
offspring of scientific knowledge than the educated cousin of common 
complaint."
34 Knowledge and Human Interests, 234
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systematically distorted communication. Since it is behind their 
consciousness they may have no desire for any treatment and therefore it 
would appear that successful therapy is impossible.
Fourthly, resistance to therapy and a struggle to work through 
insights is to be expected of a willing and cooperative patient who both 
accepts the authority of the analyst’s theory and displays a resolute 
’’passion for critique." If this is so, then we can be certain then that the 
resistance that members of a political community, perhaps the majority, 
will offer to a social critic will be incomparably greater. This will be 
even more evident if the interpretation of justice that the critic rejects, as 
an effect of systematically distorted communication, is actually bolstered 
by institutional authority. In such a case we might imagine that the 
critic's interpretation is more likely to be dismissed by the majority as the 
result of a distorted personal self-understanding than to be embraced by 
them as a liberating explanatory account of their own collective 
pathology.35
Finally, Gadamer maintained that neither the system of labour nor 
relations of power are themselves outside of language, as Habermas 
seemed to suggest, but they too can be objects of hermeneutic reflection. 
Indeed if we are to understand them at all we must do so linguistically. 
For this reason it is "absurd to regard the concrete factors of work and 
politics as outside the scope of hermeneutics."36 If we are crudely to 
dismiss the authority of tradition, as always taking the form of dogmatic 
power, we will obviously be blind to the critical potential of 
hermeneutics. In this case, if we engage in social criticism at all, it must
35 McCarthy The Critical Theory o f Jurgen Habermas, 211-212.
36 Gadamer "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection". 31 and "To
What Extent Does Language Perform Thought?", 546.
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be on the basis of an unsustainable conception of critical reason that 
assumes falsely that it has freed itself from the authority of all tradition. 
Reason and tradition must not be opposed in this vulgar fashion but 
rather we should think of critical reflection as the selective appropriation 
of tradition.37
Now while many of these counterarguments do not do justice to 
Habermas's intentions, they do serve as salutary indications of the 
dangers involved in using psychoanalysis as a model for social criticism. 
But where has this discussion brought us? It may seem that we are back 
at our point of departure in our assessment of the dispute between 
Gadamer and Habermas. It is now clear that both of them are concerned 
with critical reflection as the selective appropriation of tradition. While 
Gadamer initially seemed to Habermas to overemphasise appropriation to 
the detriment of necessary critical selectivity, Habermas's use of 
psychoanalysis seemed to Gadamer to overemphasise selectivity to the 
detriment of inescapable appropriation. This still does not provide much 
in the way of a theoretical guide as to how we might engage, as social 
critics, in this selective appropriation, distinguishing as we must between 
legitimate and illegitimate aspects of our tradition.
If democratic deliberation can be distorted by the effects of power, 
and it would seem ridiculous to deny this, then the theoretical project in 
which Habermas was engaged in his initial response to Gadamer is one 
that is of crucial importance to an adequate understanding of what counts 
as a legitimate principle of justice. This raises questions which have 
simply never been at the centre of Gadamer's concerns.38 Although there
37 See "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection", 32-35.
38 Dieter Misgeld gives a good summary of how the concerns o f recent critical
theory have been shaped in part by the encounter between Habermas and
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are obvious problems with a straightforward application of the model of 
psychoanalysis, the need for some alternative theoretical basis for 
grounding criteria of legitimacy that can test substantive principles of 
justice has never been greater. What is clear is that such an alternative 
must take greater care in ensuring that it does not undermine a 
commitment to democratic deliberation. In his work since the debate 
with Gadamer, Habermas has set about constructing a critical social 
theory that is grounded in a theory of communication that is not so 
dependent on the analogy of analyst and patient.39 This theory of 
communication allows him to integrate that critical theory with a moral- 
theoretical conception of an impartial point of view. The discourse ethics 
which emerged from this work will be the subject of the next chapter.
Critical theorists must certainly remain connected to the community 
that is criticised in some, not insignificant, sense, since they cannot 
expect to be taken seriously unless it matters to them personally that the 
community lives up to its own deepest moral convictions. But there can 
be sound theoretical reasons for doubting the views of most of our fellow
Gadamer. See "Modernity and Hermeneutics: A Critical-Theoretical Rejoinder", 
175-177. We might suggest that while Gadamer would share many of 
Habermas's concerns he is not primarily interested in the grounds of a critical 
social theory but rather in the ontological preconditions of all forms of human 
understanding.
39 The continuity between the notion of a critique of ideology and the theory of 
communicative action that is at the centre of Habermas's later work is effectively 
established by James F. Bohman in "Formal Pragmatics and Social Criticism: The 
Philosophy of Language and the Critique of Ideology in Habermas's Theory of 
Communicative Action" Philosophy and Social Criticism, 11 (1985), 331-353 
and in his "Participating in Enlightenment: Habermas's Cognitivist Interpretation 
of Democracy" in Knowledge and Politics, Marcelo Dascal and Ora Gruengard 
(eds.), Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, 264-289, especially at 281-287. For an 
interesting view of the way in which Habermas's views on communication and 
the public sphere correct and improve on Marx's critique of certain ideological 
tendencies within liberal discourses, Mark Warren "Liberal Constitutionalism as 
Ideology: Marx and Habermas" Political Theory, 17 (1989), 511-534.
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citizens. If those doubts are to be justified they will need to be supported 
by an explanation as to how these views are the result of the distorting 
effects of power on the self-understanding of democratic actors.
Within the context of a modem pluralist society the effects of power 
can be much more subtle and pervasive than the type of immanent 
critique that we find in Walzer’s interpretation of Gramsci’s social 
criticism could possibly confront.40 This should be clear from our earlier 
discussion of Foucault and also from the examples of caste societies and 
patriarchy used above.41 Since Walzer is a theorist of justice, he cannot 
be satisfied, as Gadamer is, to treat the development of a philosophically 
grounded critical social theory as somebody else's agenda. Nor should he 
reject the project out of hand as a return to Leninist vanguardism and an 
inevitable danger to democracy.
Walzer’s anti-theoretical stance leaves him incapable of distinguishing 
adequately between legitimate and illegitimate principles of justice. He
40 Habermas maintains that the traditional ideologies, such as religious ones, that
were criticised by Marx, no longer even appear convincing. This may well also 
be the case for the bourgeois interpretations of the values of liberty and equality 
that were the object of Gramsci’s critique. The effects of power now are to be 
thought of more in terms o f a "fragmentation of consciousness" in the way that 
various aspects of everyday life are separated from each other and "colonised" by 
different expert cultures. This fragmentation is now the "functional equivalent" 
of an ideology and it must be exposed and criticised as a block to rational 
deliberation about the legitimacy of norms and principles that currently regulate 
the institutional life of modem societies. See Habermas The Theory o f 
Communicative Action, Volume 2, 354-356 and Steven White The Recent Work 
o f Jurgen Habermas: Reason, Justice and Modernity, Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988, 116-118. But see the last footnote for 
references to work that stresses the fundamental continuity between the critique 
of ideology and Habermas's most recent social theory.
41 In the final section of the next chapter I will develop this criticism of Walzer by
exposing the limits of his approach in the context of a deeply divided society. I 
will argue that Habermas's recent work allows us more effectively to adopt a 
critical stance with regard to the effects of power in the political dispute at the 
centre of the Northern Ireland conflict.
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has not dealt in sufficient depth with the real danger of democratic 
deliberation being systematically distorted by power. If we are to be in a 
position to test currently dominant interpretations as potentially arising 
from the effects of power, we would be wise not to be so dismissive of 
philosophical theory. If it is possible that victims of injustice can 
acquiesce in their own suffering by failing to recognise the effects of 
power, then our need for critical theory seems to be beyond argument. A 
philosophical conception of impartiality would be a vital complement to 
such critical theory. This would act as a test to see whether or not some 
particular norm or institutional arrangement is biased in favour of some 
people’s interests over those of some others. Before we return to assess 
Habermas’s contribution on this point there are a number of other 
weaknesses in Walzer's approach that we must analyse.
Extending the Universalist Moral Code
While the stress in Walzer's work has been on defending the particularity
of substantive principles relative to the shared understandings of
historical communities, his conviction, that we must be tolerant of the
cultural creativity of other communities, is supported by a universalist
meta-ethical principle. Each community is to respect the internal norms
of all other communities. The point has been made with admirable clarity
by William Galston.
His [Walzer's] entire theory of justice is presented as a 
transcontextual metatheory, structurally valid for all communities 
(though substantively different for each). And the nerve of his 
relativism - the assertion that it is not possible to rank-order social 
worlds - is itself put forward, not as an interpretation of our 
experiences but as a universal truth.42
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So there is, after all, within Walzer's scheme, a way of objectively rank- 
ordering communities. We can do so by assessing the extent to which 
they allow other communities to be true to their own deepest convictions, 
and refrain from imposing their moral standards as cultural imperialists.43 
Even though Walzer does not consider this rank-ordering to be of great 
relevance to a theory of substantive justice we might bear in mind that, in 
modem pluralist societies, minorities are often culturally oppressed by a 
self-glorifying majority.44 This rank ordering might therefore be of great 
significance as a defence of the cultural rights of minorities, a point we 
will consider in the next chapter.
This meta-ethical principle of cultural toleration is not however the 
only universalist principle that Walzer recognises. He accepts that there 
is a minimal moral code that can be considered to be universal valid since 
it seems to be adhered to in almost all known cultures. The content of 
the code must be, for him, an empirical matter, but it would appear that 
moral principles respecting the life and autonomy of human persons are 
to be included.45 There are a number of important claims that Walzer
42 Galston Liberal Purposes, 46. See also Spheres of Justice, 312-316.
43 Walzer develops this rank-ordering in his two lectures given under the title
"Nation and Universe" in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, XI, Grethe B. 
Peterson (ed.), Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990, 507-556. I will 
discuss this in more detail in the discussion of Northern Ireland towards the end 
of the next chapter.
44 As we will see this is relevant in a case like that of Northern Ireland. It is also a
common experience of immigrant cultures, especially in countries that were 
formerly colonial powers, where cultural imperialism almost always survives the 
end of colonial rule. Similar forms of cultural oppression occur in relation to 
minorities such as the disabled, lesbians and gays, the elderly etc. See Young 
Justice and the Politics o f Difference, 58-61.
45 In Spheres o f Justice, xv, Walzer argues that the (human) rights to life and liberty
are central to a theory of just war but they do not get us very far in determining 
the substance of distributive justice for a particular society. See his Just and
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makes however, that seem to indicate that the moral code he considers to 
be universal in scope is not as minimal as he tends to suggest. Indeed 
within the context of modem pluralist societies, if we were to give a full 
account of all the aspects of social life that Walzer appears to treat as 
universally essential features of any just society, we may not have very 
much to add in determining the structural requirements of justice for any 
one community.
What I am suggesting is that all modem pluralist societies work out 
what the substance of justice is for them by interpreting the same (or at 
least a very similar) code of universalist moral principles. Their 
interpretations will differ in the details and in various stresses and 
nuances, given the particularity of each society's history and culture. 
There may of course also be some substantive principles of justice that 
are unique to one society, because they have some problem or other that, 
for whatever reason, is not shared by other communities, but which rather 
reflects an idiosyncratic characteristic of that society's history. 
Nonetheless it does seem to be the case that Walzer assumes that 
legitimate accounts of justice of all modem societies share certain 
fundamental structural features.
But what are the claims that suggest that Walzer is, despite his own 
self-understanding, committed to this more extensive moral universalism? 
First of all, we might note that Walzer assumes that every just society 
defends rights and liberties for its members that go far beyond a respect 
for life and a commitment to individual freedom. In fact he must
Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, Second Edition, 
New York: Basic Books, 1992. On the minimal code see Interpretation and 
Social Criticism , 24-25, 45 and on the prophet Jonah as a "minimalist critic", 76- 
78 and 89-90, The Company o f Critics, 226-227. It is rather odd to treat the 
question of human rights as an empirical matter since the rights that Walzer 
includes in his minimal code are clearly not respected universally.
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presuppose the inclusion within the universalist moral code, of liberties of 
conscience, critical thought and expression, and rights of participation in 
the democratic process of deliberating about the substantive principles of 
justice that are to regulate the life of the community. These must be 
included since all just societies are politically egalitarian for Walzer, in 
that it will be a necessary feature of them that "no one possesses or 
controls the means of domination."46 This commitment to a universalist 
political egalitarianism, is grounded in his conception of human beings as 
culture-producing creatures who seek to justify to each other their 
interpretations of the principles of justice for their shared way of life.47
Furthermore, in any society where social meanings of goods are 
distinct, and for Walzer that includes any modem society, "there is no 
alternative to democracy in the political sphere."48 Democratic 
government depends on the outcome of deliberation among citizens and 
no social good (money, rank, status) that is irrelevant to the idea of 
deliberation is to have any influence within it.49 We have already seen 
that Walzer's resistance to the use of philosophical theory for social 
criticism leads him into a position from which he seems ill-equipped to 
deal with the distorting effects of power on democratic deliberation. Yet 
it is clear from his discussion of democracy as the political sphere of
46 Spheres o f Justice, xiii.
47 Spheres o f Justice, 314 and Interpretation and Social Criticism, 46-48 where he
draws on Thomas Scanlon's important ideas on justification, as argued in 
"Contractualism and Utilitarianism" in Utilitarianism and Beyond\ Amartya Sen 
and Bernard Williams (eds.), 103-128.
48 Spheres o f Justice, 303.
49 Spheres o f Justice, 303-311.
197
justice that he is committed to an ideal of distortion-free deliberation 
himself.
What counts is argument among the citizens. Democracy puts a 
premium on speech, persuasion, rhetorical skill. Ideally the citizen 
who makes the most persuasive argument - that is the argument that 
actually persuades the largest number of citizens - gets his way. But 
he can't use force, or pull rank, or distribute money; he must talk 
about the issues at hand. And all the other citizens must talk, too, or 
at least have a chance to talk. It is not only the inclusiveness, 
however, that makes for democratic government. Equally important 
is what we might call the rule of reasons. Citizens come into the 
forum with nothing but their arguments. All non-political goods have 
to be deposited outside: weapons and wallets, titles and degrees.50
While it is very obvious what Walzer considers to be the requirements of 
justice in the political sphere, he seems unwilling to offer the kind of 
theoretical support that this vision demands.
On the one hand, these two ideas, of human beings as culture- 
producers and a deliberative democratic form of government, do support 
Walzer's contention that morality is always potentially subversive of 
power.51 Any citizen can argue that our current institutions and practices 
are failing to do justice to our deeper aspirations as a particular 
community. On the other hand however, the structural features of 
democratic government are assumed by Walzer to have a universalist 
egalitarian thrust. This seems to demand a shift of focus from the 
particularity of substantive accounts of justice to the universality of the 
structural requirements of democracy for any modem society.
50 Spheres o f Justice, 304.
51 Interpretation and Social Criticism, 22.
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If Walzer's work does reveal a commitment to a much more extensive 
universalist moral code than he is happy to admit to, and I think that it 
clearly does, then there is a serious tension between this implicit 
commitment and his explicit stress on interpretive accounts of justice as 
local narratives.52 Hermeneutics simply does not have the theoretical 
resources that are necessary to ground this more extensive universalist 
moral code. The important point here is that some of the main features of 
Walzer's own interpretation of the substance of justice for a modem 
democratic society appear to be grounded independently of the particular 
historical traditions of any one modem society. These are features of a 
universalist moral code that is far from minimalist, but rather is the 
articulation of the most significant aspects of an adequate substantive 
account of justice for any modem society. These features include; 
respect for human life and individual autonomy, liberties of thought and 
expression, rights of democratic participation for all as an expression of 
their human creativity, a politically egalitarian conception of deliberative 
democracy. We might also include toleration of the different cultural 
creations of other traditions on condition that those traditions include 
these other features in their accounts of justice. These features taken 
together represent the structural characteristics of all possible legitimate 
accounts of justice in a modem context.
While this suggests that Walzer's stress on local narratives is 
inappropriate, it does not imply that a social critic who invokes this moral
52 Walzer tends towards Rorty’s position here in his apparent scepticism towards any 
substantive principles that could legitimately claim universal scope, except for a 
few empirical examples that just happen to be shared almost universally. See 
Rorty’s "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism" and Walzer Interpretation and 
Social Criticism, 24. See also Will Kymlicka's critique of Walzer and Rorty in 
"Liberalism and Communitarianism" Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 18 
(1988), 181-203, here at 197-203.
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code is disconnected from the community to which the criticism is 
addressed. There should still be genuine loyalty and commitment to the 
members of that community. More importantly the criticism is not 
derived from a totally abstract, ahistorical perspective, but rather from an 
open articulation of the demands of justice that must apply in any modem 
community. The criticism is situated in the context of any society that 
has shared the historical experience of an ever more expansive 
globalisation in terms of both economic markets and administrative 
bureaucracies. An appeal to this universalist moral code represents 
"situated criticism for a global community that does not shy away from 
knocking down the 'parish walls’."53
To be situated as a social critic within a modem context will at times 
demand an appeal to moral principles that represent structural features of 
all modem societies that could claim to be just. At other times it will 
demand an appeal to a local narrative that speaks directly and uniquely to 
the historical traditions of a particular modem community. I will 
conclude this section by briefly illustrating four implications of this, each 
of them involving a criticism of Walzer's defence of immanent critique.
First, the practice of effective social criticism requires, as we have 
seen, an approach to justice that is connected to a social-theoretical 
understanding of the effects of power. But it also requires a moral- 
theoretical understanding of the way in which political communities are 
made up of widely divergent social groups all of whom are entitled to 
have their voice heard in any deliberation about the demands of justice. 
This means that we need a philosophical conception of an impartial point 
of view, something which Walzer's anti-theoretical stance rules out. This
53 Seyla Benhabib Situating the Self,\ 228.
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conception would be provide us with a way of working out in a particular 
dispute, which account of the demands of justice is right. Every modem 
society, in so far they share conditions of pluralism, also share this task. 
The task is to combine social-theoretical contributions and moral- 
theoretical insights in a way that gives us a critical understanding of the 
effects of power in a modem context.
Second, it seems quite likely that within the context of a modem 
pluralist society, a clash could emerge between the demands of the 
universalist moral code and the principles of justice that are legitimately 
accepted as, in part, constitutive of that particular form of life.54 For 
example a Dutch social critic may argue that the Dutch people, and all 
citizens of other relatively wealthy countries, treat those who suffer and 
die because of famine, say in Somalia, unjustly. In other words she 
appeals to the fact that the failure to relieve famine when they have more 
than enough, violates for the Dutch people the universalist moral code 
they have come to respect. But others might object that if they were to 
relieve famine, by themselves or in alliance with other wealthy countries, 
their carefully worked out arrangements for the distribution of wealth 
among their own citizens would have to be disregarded.55
54 The following example is a version of one that is mentioned in Charles Taylor's
discussion of this issue, see "The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice" in 
Justice and Equality Here and Now, Frank S. Lucash (ed.), 34-67, here at 49.
55 Of course this is a case of justice in an international context conflicting with
national arrangements. It might also be the case that some aspect of the 
universalist code clashes internally with the traditions of a particular community. 
In fact this occurs whenever the traditions of a community fail to respect some 
or other human right that would be included as a structural feature of any 
legitimate account of justice. Again, Walzer’s stress on local narratives, which 
obscures the extensiveness of the universalist code, explains the fact that he does 
not say enough to justify the claim that the human right should take precedence 
over the particular traditions of the community. We will see later how 
Habermas's moral theory deals much more effectively with this problem.
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In practice of course those who object almost always win out. In fact 
it would appear that nothing short of a strongly coercive state could 
actually succeed in ensuring the redistribution of wealth from North to 
South that could prevent famine. Is that too high a price to pay? The 
dilemma is a very real one. We might acknowledge everybody's right to 
life without feeling that it would be right to sacrifice the advantages of a 
less coercive state than would be necessary to protect that right. The 
point is that some local principles of justice do clash with the universalist 
thrust of other principles. Again Walzer, by leaving the universalist code 
on the margins of his concern, does not say near enough about this 
possibility.56
Third, the defence of the rule of reasons in the sphere of democratic 
politics is something that requires far greater attention than Walzer has 
given to it. Why should reason be privileged over other means of 
persuasion in the political sphere? Perhaps the rule of reasons is simply 
another regime of power/knowledge, as Foucault seems to indicate. It 
might even be suggested that to privilege reason is to endorse the 
repression and marginalisation of the "other" of reason, the emotional, the 
sexual, the irrational, or the zany.57 Walzer does not say in detail what it
56 See however Interpretation and Social Criticism, 45. The example used there 
relates to missionary activity and not to the kind of dilemma that most citizens of 
modem societies encounter with distressing regularity, as for example, whenever 
they are shocked by the fact that many human beings are in danger of starving to 
death.
67 See the earlier discussion of the post-structuralist challenge to Rawls. I will not 
repeat the defence of reason I made at the end of that section. It is important to 
note however, that the privilege of reason in politics has, for better or worse, 
become a hotly contested issue. For some indication as to why this is so and for 
a useful critical discussion of the ideas involved see Richard Bernstein’s essay 
"The Rage against Reason" in The New Constellation, 31-56. My point here is 
simply that Walzer says very little about this, nor does he justify any procedural 
rules of rational argumentation.
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is that is required of us if we are to argue in a rational way. Nor does he 
mount a defence of the rule of reasons. We would surely want to know 
what constraints or procedural rules are to be adopted if the rule of 
reasons is to preside over the political sphere. More importantly we 
would want to know why these constraints are justified. This is, in part, 
the task of a moral theory that defends an impartial point of view.
Finally, I have already outlined how Walzer’s stress on inclusivity 
ensures that nobody is prevented from participating in the democratic 
process. Indeed everybody is encouraged as a culture-producer to make 
their own unique contribution to the enrichment of the common life.58
/  Despite this however his failurey endorse a theoretical conception of an 
impartial point of view is a cause for concern with regard to the rights of 
an individual who disagrees with the views of the majority on some 
fundamental principle of justice. What theoretical guarantee does Walzer 
provide that the process of democratic deliberation can afford to give that 
dissenting individual’s say its due weight?59
One problem that Walzer has here is the fact that there may be some 
serious tension between majority rule and the rule of reasons. Even if no 
coercion is used in democratic deliberation, it is far from self-evident that 
these will amount to the same thing. Again we would need to know
58 For an account of the centrality of the notion of inclusivity to Walzer's social
criticism see Robert B. Thigpen and Lyle A. Downing "Beyond Shared 
Understandings" Political Theory, 14 (1986), 451-472.
59 Serious doubts are expressed on this score by William R  Lund in "Communitarian
Politics, the Supreme Court and Privacy: The Continuing Need for Liberal 
Boundaries" Social Theory and Practice, 16 (1990), 191-215, on Walzer at 199- 
206. While Emily Gill shows how Walzer's defence of both non-discrimination 
and participative rights defuse the dangers involved here, it is still the case that 
the dissenting individual is not that central to Walzer's concerns. See Gill's 
"Walzer's Complex Equality: Constraints and the Right to be Wrong", here at 
44-51.
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much more about the procedural constraints involved if we were to 
accept that this is in fact so. Another problem is that there is a danger 
that the democratic authority will constantly interfere in the regulation of 
our lives to such an extent that the private space, sacred to the tradition of 
liberalism, will be so shrunken as to leave each of us uncomfortably 
exposed in our chosen way of life. We will begin to feel morally quite 
vulnerable to the will of the majority.60
Of course Walzer might respond by arguing that these fears fail to 
take into account the fact that the political sphere is only one sphere 
among many. While politics is of crucial significance, it does not define 
the shared meanings within each sphere, but only regulates the 
boundaries. Democratic authority is decisive "at but not within the 
boundaries.”61 This was the most important advantage of complex 
equality over simple equality. But what guarantees a limitation on the 
right of majority of citizens to decide that the political sphere is to include 
ever more aspects of social life?62 The rights of the individual seem to be 
insufficiently grounded in Walzer’s work. This includes both rights in the 
negative sense, guaranteeing freedom from state interference, and in the 
positive sense, ensuring that each individual has a proper and fair 
political hearing. Again, some moral-theoretical account of the rules of 
democratic deliberation, incorporating a conception of an impartial point 
of view, would seem to offer the only effective route around these 
problems.
60 Nancy Rosenblum "Moral Membership in a Post-Liberal State", 593.
61 Spheres o f Justice, note at 15. See also his discussion of the blocked uses of
political power in Spheres o f Justice, 282-284.
62 Thomas Morawetz expresses some related concerns in "Tension in the 'Art of
Separation'" Political Theory, 13 (1985), 599-606.
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If we are to draw out the implications of the more extensive 
universalist moral code that Walzer seems to presuppose, then a number 
of problems in Walzer's approach to justice and social criticism rise to 
the surface. In the first place this code is not an empirical matter of 
certain rights that all political communities just happen to recognise but 
rather it outlines the structural features of any legitimate account of 
justice, at least under the conditions of modem pluralism. While Walzer 
assumes these features, he does not do near enough to justify them. As I 
have stressed throughout such a justification seems to point us back in the 
direction of a detailed philosophical defence of some procedure of 
legitimation that is to act as a test for our substantive principles of justice. 
It is the search for such a philosophical defence that will lead us to a 
more detailed consideration of Habermas’s work.
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2.4 CONCLUSION
In the three sections of this chapter we have examined various aspects of 
the work of Michael Walzer. Our purpose has been to assess the 
prospects of a theory of justice that abandons the attempt to justify a 
philosophical conception of an impartial point of view. Walzer maintains 
that substantive principles of justice are embedded in a community’s 
shared understandings of the meaning of social goods in their own 
particular context. By stressing the fact that no lone theorist can 
articulate philosophically the substantive demands of justice, Walzer 
rejects the type of monological procedure of legitimation that Rawls 
advocates. From his perspective, that procedure violates the self- 
understandings of particular communities. Substantive principles of 
justice are necessarily justified in an open public encounters that respect 
historical particularity. Accounts of justice are presented as 
interpretations of shared meanings that are constitutive of the 
community's way of life.
As the argument of the first chapter would suggest, Walzer is right to 
reject monological proceduralism. However he fails to see that this 
rejection does not force us to abandon altogether the attempt to ground a 
philosophical conception of an impartial point of view. I hope to make it 
clear in the next chapter that the dialogical conception of impartiality that 
is at the core of Habermas’s discourse ethics points us towards a theory 
of justice that transcends the weaknesses of both Rawls's monological 
proceduralism and Walzer’s contextualist anti-proceduralism.
In the first section of this chapter, we saw how Walzer's avoidance of 
monological abstraction enabled him to present complex equality as an 
open-ended, indeterminate, flexible approach to substantive accounts of 
justice. The actual demands of a right to equal citizenship are to be
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determined in particular historical contexts according to shared meanings 
of local communities and not according to general principles such as 
those that are derived from Rawls’s original position. The pluralist 
conception of citizenship that is implied in the idea that politics is just 
one among an indeterminate number of spheres of justice, adds weight to 
the case against Rawls’s principles as it would appear to present a 
decentred vision of a just modem society that would lighten somewhat 
the burden of an overextended welfare state.
In the second section we saw that Walzer's connected criticism need 
not amount to a conservative affirmation of current practices. The stress 
that his hermeneutic approach to social criticism places on shared 
meanings builds on the holist claim that just institutions are in part 
constitutive of the identity of individual citizens. Hermeneutic criticism 
highlights the community's failure to live up to its own deepest moral 
convictions. These convictions can be challenged and revised as the 
prejudices of tradition are carried forward into new historical 
circumstances. The identity of the community depends in part on these 
critical standards that it sets for itself and that define the type of 
community it wants to be. These critical standards can change and 
develop in dialogical encounters with other forms of life and so ethical 
reflection on identities can form an important aspect of any public 
deliberation about justice.
However, in the third section I argued that hermeneutics cannot by 
itself give us an adequate philosophical understanding of why it is that 
such an openness to other forms of life is a requirement of justice. This 
is better thought of in terms of a universalist moral code. There is an 
extensive universalist moral code at work in Walzer’s approach to justice, 
despite his attempts to obscure it with an excessive and unwarranted 
stress on cultural particularity. The moral principles of justice that are to
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be included in this universalist code cannot be justified in terms of the 
traditions of one particular form of life. In a modem context any 
community that is just must allow ethical reflection on its identity to be 
shaped and directed by the moral demands of this universalist code. 
Otherwise hermeneutically grounded social criticism will be dangerously 
partial. It is for this reason that I suggested that hermeneutics could 
never act as a substitute for the project of justifying a philosophical 
conception of an impartial point of view.
There are other good reasons for rejecting Walzer's hermeneutic 
approach to justice. It is ill-equipped to act as a challenge to the unjust 
effects of power in modem societies. It does not justify its apparent 
commitment to rational deliberation. Its stress on the common will leaves 
the individual with a vulnerable moral status that should cause serious 
concern. Philosophical theory is necessary to, and not as Walzer implies, 
a danger to our understanding of democratic deliberation. This theory 
must inform us as to how the legitimacy of substantive principles of 
justice is to be tested. It seems to me that Habermas's dialogical 
conception of impartiality provides the most fertile theoretical ground 
available for such a legitimacy test. We can now, finally, turn to an 
exploration of that fertile ground.
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3 DISCOURSE ETHICS AS DIALOGICAL 
IMPARTIALITY
Jurgen Habermas has produced a highly impressive and comprehensive 
approach to philosophy and social theory. Few, if indeed any other 
contemporary theorists, have studied so thoroughly, with such diligence 
and imagination, the problems associated with the justification of social 
criticism in a modem context. From his earliest reformulations of critical 
theory through numerous wide-ranging and far-reaching scholarly 
disputes and political controversies, to his most recent contributions to 
contemporary thought, Habermas has worked through a systematic 
critical defence of the Enlightenment and its hope for emancipation based 
on human reason.1 In this chapter I hope to show that in Habermas's 
work we find the most fruitful theoretical resource available to us in
1 Knowledge and Human Interests represented Habermas's first attempt at a 
systematic reformulation of a critical social theory. The project reaches its 
culmination with the two volumes of The Theory o f Communicative Action, 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1984 and 1987 and The Philosophical Discourse 
o f Modernity, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1987. In his work since then 
Habermas has focussed on the elaboration of discourse ethics, which can be 
thought of as an account of justice grounded in his critical understanding of  
modernity. Most recently he has drawn out the implications of his discourse 
theory for an understanding of the law and the constitutional principles of a 
democratic state, see Faktizitat und Geltung: Beitrdge zur Diskurstheorie des 
Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1992. In this chapter I will be focusing on discourse ethics as a 
dialogical conception of an impartial point of view. Robert Holub's Jurgen 
Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere gives an excellent overview of the 
debates, disputes and controversies that have characterised Habermas's career. 
The best introduction to his thought remains Thomas McCarthy's The Critical 
Theory o f Jurgen Habermas but his work since the early eighties is considered in 
Stephen K. White's The Recent Work o f Jurgen Habermas and in David M. 
Rasmussen's Reading Habermas, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
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dealing with the problems of justification that are central to our concerns 
in this thesis.
Habermas’s discourse ethics represents a procedure of legitimation 
for substantive principles of justice that is built on a conception of 
dialogical impartiality. While Habermas shares with Rawls the Kantian 
project of justifying an impartial procedure that can act as a test for 
competing principles of justice, he rejects the monological character of 
the original position. This means that, for Habermas, norms are not valid 
unless they could be accepted by all affected by them as participants in a 
real discourse.2 The discursive test must be thought of as a co-operative 
venture among the members of a community who are practically engaged 
in deliberation. Valid norms are grounded in a shared conviction that is 
collectively achieved and so these norms express a common will. They 
cannot therefore be justified by an aggregate of solitary individuals 
choosing principles in isolation from one another under theoretically 
designed conditions.
This enables Habermas to avoid the problems that Rawls encounters 
in insisting that we isolate political aspects of our morality from our more 
comprehensive moral commitments before we can consider impartial 
moral reflection to be even possible. More significantly, it allows for the 
participants in discourse to assess critically and if necessary to revise 
their moral intuitions in the light of the encounter with others. Within this 
procedure of legitimation the participants really do differ from one 
another, and the critical flexibility required of them ensures that there is a 
real possibility that they will experience the discourse as a moment of 
uncoerced self-transformation.
2 See for example Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 67.
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Habermas insists that it is not for the philosopher to derive or to 
justify substantive principles of justice.3 This must be left to the 
participants in real moral discourses. The principles and norms that are 
to be tested are thrown up in the context of the real disputes that arise in 
any shared form of life. By keeping the philosophical task of justifying 
an impartial point of view strictly separate from the political task of 
justifying substantive principles of justice, Habermas can address 
Walzer's concern that the democratic will should not be overridden by 
philosophical theoiy. The procedure that discourse ethics defends does 
not violate the self-understandings of historically particular communities. 
Habermas is every bit as concerned as Walzer is, that the justification of 
substantive principles of justice be characterised by a public encounter of 
co-operative deliberation. But what Habermas does provide, and Walzer 
does not, is a justification for specific rules of argumentation that act as 
procedural constraints on that deliberation. In this way he takes us far 
beyond Walzer in detecting the more subtle distorting effects of power on 
democratic deliberation.
The first task of this chapter will be to present an overview of 
Habermas's critical defence of the Enlightenment. With this in mind, I 
will explain how the theory of communicative action is to be understood, 
at least in part, as Habermas's response to the debate with Gadamer.
This theory provides a basis for critique that makes it abundantly clear, in 
ways that the psychoanalytic model could not, that Habermas is not 
interested in any vanguardist form of elitism that is hostile to genuine 
democracy. Habermas now grounds his criteria of legitimacy for
8 See his critical comments in relation to Rawls's attempt to justify his two principles 
in Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jurgen Habermas, Revised Edition, 
Peter Dews (ed.), London: Verso, 1992, 200-201.
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principles of justice in a theory of language and in the claim that 
communicative action has priority over strategic action. In the first 
section, we will see why this claim is fundamental to Habermas’s defence 
of reason, modernity and Enlightenment and how it relates to the 
paradigm shift from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of 
intersubjective understanding.4 This claim, of the priority of 
communicative action, grounds both Habermas’s critical social theory, 
which will be considered very briefly in this first section, and his 
discourse ethics. The discussion of this section should therefore enable 
us to place discourse ethics in its proper context.
In the second section we will focus directly on the distinctive features 
of discourse ethics. Habermas presents this as a cognitivist ethic, in that 
the norms or principles of justice that are justified as valid according to 
its procedural test, have a status analogous to truth. This claim is 
defended against sceptics in a complex argument that I hope to clarify.
In doing so I intend to show how, in conceiving of an impartial point of 
view dialogically, Habermas can make a much more convincing case for 
the Kantian project than Rawls could. Having stressed the advantages of 
this dialogical approach, it should then become clear that discourse ethics 
incorporates the better insights of communitarianism, post-structuralism 
and feminism without making Walzer’s mistake of rejecting altogether the 
task of providing a philosophical justification for a procedural test of 
impartiality.
Habermas's encounter with contextualists will be dealt with more 
explicitly in the third section. While discourse ethics makes significant 
concessions to the concerns of a variety of contextualists, Habermas
4 On this paradigm shift see especially The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, 
294-326.
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never succumbs to the temptation of abandoning his strong universalist 
moral claims. I will defend the universalist thrust of Habermas's 
discourse ethics by considering his moral theory in relation to three 
recent contributions to the on-going debate about universalism and 
contextualism. This critical analysis should throw further light on the 
ways in which discourse ethics is to function as a procedural test for 
substantive principles of justice in the context of a modem society.
Finally, in the fourth section, I will highlight the advantages of 
discourse ethics as a conception of dialogical impartiality, over the anti­
procedural contextualism of Walzer, by looking in some detail at a 
particular dispute about justice. I will apply both Walzer’s and 
Habermas's theory of justice to the question of the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland. This case both exposes the limitations of Walzer's 
approach and also indicates how discourse ethics can take us much 
further in clarifying what justice demands in that particular situation.
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3.1 THE PRIORITY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
Habermas's work is best situated in the tradition of critical social theory
that aspires to ground our hopes for an emancipated future on a real
basis. That people want to be emancipated from whatever unnecessarily
causes them to suffer is, for Habermas, not just a contingent fact. It is
rather, as he puts it,
so profoundly ingrained in the structure of human societies - the 
calling into question, and deep-seated wish to throw off, relations 
which repress you without necessity - so intimately built into the 
reproduction of human life that I don’t think it can be regarded as just 
a subjective attitude which may or may not guide this or that piece of 
scientific research.1
While the idea of an emancipatory cognitive interest does not feature 
explicitly in his most recent substantive social theory, there can be no 
doubting that this critical attitude continues to constitute the dominant 
characteristic of his self-understanding as a theorist.2 Habermas now 
grounds our emancipatory hope in a theory of communicative action. 
More specifically, his recent work suggests that the claim that 
communicative action is the original mode of language use provides us 
with a theoretical basis for social criticism that can help to sustain our 
hope in a better future.
Both Habermas’s social theoretical diagnosis of modem society and 
his discourse ethics, are built on the theory of communicative action. 
While his social theory aims to identify and explain the repressive
1 Autonomy and Solidarity, 194.
2 The best account of this shift of emphasis in Habermas's work, from cognitive
interests in Knowledge and Human Interests to communicative action, is given 
by Richard Bernstein in his "Introduction" to Habermas and Modernity, Richard 
J. Bernstein (ed.), Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1985, 1-32.
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features of advanced capitalist societies by revealing the ways in which 
our communication can be distorted by power, his moral theory, or 
discourse ethics, articulates the criteria by which we can distinguish 
between valid and invalid moral norms or legitimate and illegitimate 
principles of justice. Discourse ethics facilitates constructive social 
criticism by articulating standards of legitimacy, while critical social 
theory helps us to realise the conditions of fulfilment for a legitimate 
social order.
In this section I will present a broad outline of Habermas’s overall 
project so that we can then place discourse ethics in its proper context. 
The main aim of Habermas’s project is to present a critical defence of 
reason, modernity and the Enlightenment. In this outline I will focus on 
Habermas's crucial claim that communicative action is the original mode 
of language usage. But first of all we will see why his theory of 
communicative action can be thought of as, in part at least, a response to 
the insufficiently critical stance of hermeneutics. This requires a brief 
discussion to introduce the idea of a reconstructive science.
Philosophy and Rational Reconstruction
In his social theory, Habermas accepts much of the hermeneutic critique 
of the unwarranted objectivist claims of positivist social science. 
However, in building a framework for a critical theory, he is concerned to 
avoid the implied relativism of radical hermeneutics.3 While the role of
8 Gadamer's Truth and Method, in opposing "truth" to "method", offers the most 
thoroughgoing hermeneuticist critique of positivist social science. However, the 
implied relativism that Habermas is keen to avoid, from a social-theoretical 
perspective, is more clearly exemplified in the work of the neo-Wittgensteinian, 
Peter Winch The Idea of a Social Science, Second Edition, London: Routledge, 
1990, and the neo-pragmatist, Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
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the social theorist must indeed be thought of as that of a participative 
interpreter rather than that of neutral observer, the conclusion that we 
must therefore give up on the idea of objectivity altogether does not 
necessarily follow. We can certainly give up our privileged observer 
status and our pretensions to context-independence. We can also extend 
our inquiries beyond claims of propositional truth to include non- 
descriptive claims of normative rightness and sincere self-expression.
But we can still derive objective standards of social criticism by drawing 
out and theoretically reconstructing the rational assumptions implicit in 
all possible interpretations of social actions and phenomena.4 What is at 
issue here is the possibility of making explicit the conditions of validity 
for expressions and actions which intuitively guide all social actors in 
distinguishing the valid from the invalid. It is an attempt to give a 
theoretical account of the intuitive know-how that we all take for granted 
in everyday communication.
Habermas seeks to support his theory of communicative action by 
turning to what he calls reconstructive scientific research. Reconstructive 
scientific procedures are distinguished from empirical-analytical 
procedures by the fact that they attempt to "systematically reconstruct the 
intuitive knowledge of competent subjects" rather than seeking to 
"develop nomological hypotheses about domains of observable events."5
4 Habermas "Interpretive Social Science Vs. Hermeneuticism" in Social Science as
Moral Inquiry, Norma Haan et al. (eds.), New York: Columbia University Press, 
1983, 251-269, especially 256-261. This article is reprinted as "Reconstruction 
and Interpretation in the Social Sciences" in Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action, 21-42.
5 Habermas "What is Universal Pragmatics?" in Communication and the Evolution
of Society, London: Heinemann, 1979, 1-68, here at 9. The differences between 
reconstructive and empirical-analytical scientific methods are discussed in this 
essay, 15-20.
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The rational reconstruction of communicative action is concerned with 
the deep structure of the symbolically structured reality of the social 
world.6 It seeks to render explicit the practical, pre-theoretical know­
how of all communicatively competent subjects. The deep structure that 
it reconstructs is the implicit rule consciousness that underlies the 
possibility of competent subjects generating meaningful expressions 
within the context of the surface structure of a language. For the 
reconstructive scientist
the object of understanding is no longer the content of a symbolic 
expression or what specific authors meant by it in specific situations 
but the intuitive rule consciousness that a competent speaker has of 
his own language.7
What this type of analysis aims to uncover are the presumably universal 
standards of rationality that can be thought of as conditions for the 
validity of meaningful expressions.8
In this way rational reconstruction goes beyond the concerns of a 
heremeneutic approach that limits itself to the attempt to understand the 
content of expressions within the context of the surface structure of a 
language. In contrast Habermas is interested in defending a general
6 For a useful discussion of the idea of a reconstructive science see McCarthy The
Critical Theory o f Jurgen Habermas, 276-279. On Habermas’s own views see 
"What is Universal Pragmatics?", 8-25 and "Interpretive Social Science Vs. 
Hermeneuticism", 258-261. For an exceptionally clear account of the relation 
between rational reconstruction and Habermas's critical social theory, Kenneth 
Baynes "Rational Reconstruction and Social Criticism: Habermas’s Model of 
Interpretive Social Science" in Hermeneutics and Critical Theory in Ethics and 
Politics, Michael Kelly (ed.), 122-145.
7 "What is Universal Pragmatics?", 12.
8 "Interpretive Social Science Vs. Hermeneuticism", 260. See also "A Reply to my
Critics" in Habermas: Critical Debates, John B. Thompson and David Held 
(eds.), London: The Macmillan Press, 1982, 219-283, here at 234.
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theory, in so far as the know-how that is reconstructed expresses a 
universal capability or a ’’species competence."9 In clarifying the general 
conditions of the validity of a symbolic expression, Habermas hopes that 
his theory of communicative action will secure a critical foothold with 
regard to particular invalid expressions.
The theory maintains that making a statement which can be 
understood necessarily involves participation in processes of 
communication where all participants (speakers, hearers and observers) 
adopt a performative attitude. This attitude, as opposed to an 
objectivating attitude, enables "a mutual orientation toward validity 
claims ... designed for critical assessment so that an intersubjective 
recognition of a particular claim can serve as the basis for a rationally 
motivated consensus."10 Before examining this idea of communicative 
action in more detail we should note that Habermas sees rational 
reconstruction as a key feature of his critical defence of the 
Enlightenment.
Habermas argues that in the light of the prevalent critiques of 
foundationalism, philosophy must find a new role.11 It must humbly
9 "What is Universal Pragmatics?”, 14.
10 "Interpretive Social Science Vs. Hermeneuticism", 255.
11 While many broad philosophical currents, including hermeneutics and post-
structuralism as well as recent approaches to the history o f science, are engaged 
in the critique o f philosophical foundationalism, Rorty’s Philosophy and the 
Mirror o f Nature constitutes one of the most trenchant attacks on the idea that 
there could be any ultimate grounds for a philosophical justification of reason, 
independent of the contingencies of history and culture. Anti-foundationalism 
rejects in particular the autonomous rational subject that characterises the 
philosophy of consciousness in the work of Descartes and Kant. Subjects do not 
so much constitute the world but rather they are embodied within the context of 
a particular linguistic world. Habermas also rejects foundationalism and along 
with it any possibility o f a pure conception of reason; "There is no pure reason 
that might don linguistic clothing only in the second place. Reason is by its very 
nature incarnated in contexts of communicative action and in structures of the
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accept that it can no longer play the authoritative role which Kant had 
hoped for it, that of clarifying "the foundations of the sciences for once 
and for all, defining the limits of what can and what cannot be 
experienced."12 This attempt by philosophy to usher the sciences to their 
proper place is, Habermas admits, unacceptable.13 The same can be said 
for philosophy's self-appointed role as judge of all cultural matters such 
as the differentiation of value spheres (science, morality, art), with its 
implicit claim to confer legitimacy on these spheres within their own 
limits. This represents a task which philosophy cannot achieve. The 
reason for this is because these structures of rationality do not need to be 
grounded or justified in a modem context, since the fact of their cultural 
generation is what characterises modernity itself. The task of giving 
these differentiated value spheres a philosophical justification is simply 
redundant.14
So even though philosophy can no longer claim the roles of usher and 
judge, it can still, despite the ironic laughter of its contemporary 
gravediggers, claim to function as the "guardian of rationality."15 If it is 
to do so, it must steer a course between the discredited tradition of
lifeworld." The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, 322. Habermas 
however, by defending a situated reason, does not endorse Rorty's outright 
rejection of the philosophical project.
12 "Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter" in Moral Consciousness and
Communicative Action, 1-20, here at 2.
13 This is, in part, why he moved away from the epistemological project of
Knowledge and Human Interests that set about establishing critical theory in 
terms of cognitive interests. He now admits that this does not take sufficient 
account of historical change and the socially constituted nature of theoretical- 
paradigms. See Autonomy and Solidarity, 192-3.
14 "Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter", 17.
15 "Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter", 3.
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foundationalism on the one hand, and the flight to irrationality of a 
totalizing critique of reason on the other.16 This is where Habermas sees 
the importance of reconstructive science. Philosophy can enter into a 
cooperative relationship with certain research projects in the human 
sciences by playing the role of "stand-in” for "empirical theories with 
strong universalistic claims."17 In other words philosophy can furnish 
reconstructive hypotheses that are to be used in empirical settings. In 
turn the empirical research may offer indirect confirmation of the 
reconstructive hypothesis.
Philosophy then continues to make universalist claims, but ones that 
are fallibilistic in orientation. They are offered without any pretence to 
support them with a foundational grounding. Nor is there any attempt to 
provide ultimate justifications for these hypotheses independently of any 
empirical corroboration. The hypotheses involved would be used in 
empirical research that might, for example, seek to explain, from the 
intuitive knowledge of competent subjects, "the presumably universal 
bases of rational experience and judgement, as well as of action and 
linguistic communication."18 Habermas's own philosophical work is to be 
thought of in the context of this co-operation with the reconstructive 
human sciences.19
16 The whole argument of The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity can be thought
of in these terms. For Habermas the paradigm of a philosophy of intersubjective 
understanding offers us a way out of this dilemma.
17 "Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter", 15. See also Postmetaphysical
Thinking: Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992, 38.
18 "Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter", 16.
19 We will see in the next section how Habermas sees Kohlberg's empirical work in
the field of moral developmental psychology in this cooperative relationship with 
his own philosophical defence of discourse ethics as a cognitivist moral theory.
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Similarly, while philosophy can no longer set itself up as judge, 
above and beyond the value spheres of culture, it can take on the more 
modest task of helping us to find a balance between these separated 
moments of reason in communicative everyday life.20 Philosophy can be 
the mediating interpreter between the spheres of science, morals and art 
so that, while the regional rationality of each sphere is respected, they are 
no longer isolated from each other. These spheres are conceptually 
distinct but yet they are constantly interpenetrating and overlapping. It is 
for this reason that Habermas sees a necessity for a general theory of 
communicative action that can thematise validity claims in each of these 
spheres, while at the same time fulfilling this role of interpreter on behalf 
of the lifeworld. As mediating interpreter, philosophy can help us to 
identify and to challenge the dominance of one of these spheres over the 
others.21
Habermas understands these new roles for philosophy as being 
characteristic of a paradigm shift from the philosophy of consciousness to 
the philosophy of intersubjective understanding. The philosophy of 
consciousness sought to secure its foundations in the lone, isolated, 
autonomous subject standing apart, rationally disengaged and 
disembodied, independent of all historical and social contingency.22 Even
20 "Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter", 19.
21 As we will see below, Habermas is most concerned here with the ways in which
the sphere of science and technology can encroach on the domains of morality 
and art. This has been a constant theme in his work from "Technology and 
Science as Ideology" in Toward a Rational Society through to the critique of 
functionalist reason in The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2.
22 While Habermas gives his most comprehensive account of this paradigm shift in
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, the same theme is present in his 
early work, see "Labour and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena Philosophy of 
M ind ' in Theory and Practice, London: Heinemann, 1974, 142-169.
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though these foundations would seem to have crumbled under our feet,
we need not be paralysed philosophically by accepting the contingency of
our situatedness in real historical and cultural contexts. We can be
rescued from the fate of such a paralysis by refusing to see reason as
necessarily pure and disembodied, but rather by seeing reason as
historically situated in the communicative practice of everyday life.
Habermas's philosophical project is the task of clarifying, with a
fallibilistic consciousness, the pragmatic presuppositions of rationality in
everyday processes of reaching understanding, presuppositions that he
presumes to be universal in so far as they are unavoidable. He seeks
confirmation for his hypothesis in a cooperative venture with empirical
theories of universal competences. Within the contours of this project
neither paralysing anxiety, nor ecstatic celebration, are appropriate
responses to the demise of the ultimate foundations of a philosophy of
consciousness. Philosophy as guardian of rationality has not ended but
rather it has been transformed
so as to enable it to cope with the entire spectrum of aspects of 
rationality - and with the historical fate of a reason that has been 
arrested again and again, ideologically misused and distorted, but that 
also stubbornly raises its voice in every inconspicuous act of 
successful communication.23
In the next section I hope to show how discourse ethics develops out of 
this paradigm shift to a philosophy of intersubjective understanding. In 
this way it can provide us with a dialogical conception of impartiality that 
constitutes, or so I will argue, the best guide available to us in seeking 
criteria of justification for legitimate principles of justice. But first we
28 "Questions and Counterquestions" in Habermas and Modernity, Richard J. 
Bernstein (ed.), 192-216, here at 197.
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need to examine more closely some of the main features of Habermas's 
theory of communicative action.
Communicative and Strategic Action
The theory of communicative action gives us an account of the pre- 
theoretic knowledge and the intuitive command of "rule systems by 
means of which competent subjects generate and evaluate valid 
expressions and performance."24 What distinguishes Habermas's 
approach from the hermeneutics of Gadamer is the claim that whenever 
we seek to reach an understanding we must implicitly appeal to universal 
standards of rationality. He is not concerned only with the interpretation 
and explication of meaning but rather also with the rules of language use 
which are intuitively known to all communicatively competent subjects. 
The identification of universal conditions of validity which is the object 
of a process of rational reconstruction produces theoretical knowledge of 
the general structures of communication that transcends the limiting 
horizon of a particular tradition.
In communicative action validity claims, that are in principle 
criticisable, are raised. There are, according to Habermas, three separate 
validity claims that correspond to three different relations to the world; a 
claim to truth relates to an existing state of affairs in the objective world; 
a claim to normative rightness relates to the regulation of interpersonal 
relationships in the social world; a claim to truthfulness relates to the 
speakers lived experience in the subjective world.25 Every speech act
24 "Interpretive Social Science Vs. Hermeneuticism", 260.
25 See for example "What is Universal Pragmatics?", 50-59, Moral Consciousness
and Communicative Action, 59, 136-137, The Theory o f Communicative Action, 
Volume 7, 305-319 and Postmetaphysical Thinking, 75-78. I cannot go into 
detail here about Habermas's argument in support of this separation of three, and
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could therefore be criticised from three different perspectives, even 
though "only one of the three validity claims can be thematically 
emphasised in any explicit speech act."26
What is distinctive about communicative action is the performative 
attitude that is adopted in any attempt to reach an understanding with 
somebody else about something in the world. The formal-pragmatic 
features of this attitude can be analysed in terms of speech acts, where 
one participant says something to which the other participant takes a yes 
or no position. This is the simplest form of communicative action but this 
attitude is not unique to speech acts and it can also characterise many 
forms of non-verbal action in everyday communicative practice.27 This 
includes action that can easily be given a linguistic form, such as that 
involved in a game of charades, and action that cannot be given a verbal 
form at all, like certain gestures that an orator might use to emphasise a 
point. If we are to analyse what is involved in the process of two or more 
subjects reaching a mutual understanding however, then we must refer to
only three validity claims. Our main concern in this section is to lay the ground 
for an analysis of discourse ethics, which thematises the claim to normative 
rightness. For an illuminating critical exchange on the question as to whether or 
not Habermas can defend a procedural unity of reason in his notion of 
communicative action, while also maintaining this three way differentiation of 
validity claims and the corresponding separation of the specialist areas of 
science, morality and art, see Martin Seel "The Two Meanings of 
'Communicative' Rationality: Remarks on Habermas's Critique of a Plural 
Concept of Reason" in Communicative Action: Essays on Jurgen Habermas’s 
”The Theory o f Communicative Action", Axel Honneth and Hans Joas (eds.), 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991, 36-48 and in the same collection Habermas's 
"A Reply", 214-264, here at 222-229. See also the essay "The Unity of Reason 
in the Diversity of Its Voices" in Postmetaphysical Thinking, 115-148.
26 Postmetaphysical Thinking, 77.
27 The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 7, 287-288. See also "A Reply to
my Critics", 270.
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the model of speech. Habermas therefore reconstructs the formal- 
pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action through an analysis 
of speech acts.
When we engage in communicative action there are certain necessary 
and unavoidable presuppositions involved in our speech acts. If in 
communicating with you my attitude is solely oriented to reaching an 
understanding with you about something then I have to presuppose that 
you will be motivated to accept the validity claims I raise by nothing but 
the force of reason. In other words I presuppose that the understanding 
we seek will be rationally motivated. This can be contrasted with a mere 
de facto accord since any communicatively achieved agreement must be 
accepted or presupposed by the participants and not just imposed.28
A de facto accord can be imposed by whichever participant is in a 
stronger bargaining position. We can differentiate between a 
communicatively achieved agreement and an imposed accord, as 
illustrated in the following examples. It seems clear that somebody 
looking for work in Britain today is, in normal circumstances, in a weaker 
position than is a prospective employer. In any negotiations which might 
arise in this context the person seeking employment might be inclined to 
come to an agreement or even to sign a contract not because of the force 
of reason alone but rather because it may represent the best offer 
available at the time. Getting off the dole is sufficient motivation for the 
employee not to question the normative claims entailed in the contract. 
While an employer may act benevolently the basic inequality in 
bargaining positions is not altered since the employer has the power to 
decide whether to be benevolent or not.
28 This distinction is introduced in The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 7, 
287.
225
A rather different example which demonstrates that a mere de facto 
accord is not the same as a communicatively achieved agreement might 
arise on an occasion where I am having a quiet drink in a pub with one 
friend and a large and boisterous group wrongly accuse me of having 
spilt one of their drinks. I am not likely to engage in communicative 
action in order to come to a rationally motivated agreement with them 
about whether or not I did spill the drink. It seems much more likely that 
I would cut my losses and accept that buying them a drink is the best 
offer available to me at the time. The advantages of avoiding violence, 
which may implicitly or explicitly be threatened in the encounter, would 
prevent me from questioning their truth claim.
Habermas is clearly not claiming that all linguistically mediated 
interaction is communicative action. He is primarily concerned with 
distinguishing between communicative action and what he refers to as 
strategic action.29 These represent two types of interaction that might be 
used in coordinating plans of action. It is of course true that we often 
engage in social action with an attitude which is not oriented to reaching 
understanding but rather with an objectivating attitude that is oriented to 
consequences, to the success of our private goals. For Habermas the 
latter constitutes strategic action. Linguistically mediated strategic action 
involves the use of speech acts to instrumentalise our fellow participants 
as we seek to succeed in our own individual goals.
It must be noted that communicative action often serves to link 
individual participants’ teleologically structured instrumental plans of 
action. However a distinctive feature of communicative action, as a form
29 See The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 7, 286-296, "A Reply to my 
Critics”, 264-267, and for a more recent overview Postmetaphysical Thinking, 
78-84.
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of coordinating interaction, is that it cannot be reduced to teleological
action which could only be analysed by reference to the intentions and
aims of the individual actors. Of course action oriented to reaching
understanding does have a goal but it would be a mistake to think that
this necessarily means that the distinction between the two models of
action must breakdown. This is because the "medium of language and
the telos of reaching understanding intrinsic to it reciprocally constitute
one another. The relation between these is not one of means and ends."30
While strategic action aims to intervene causally in the world, the aims of
communicative action are situated at a different level. That level is the
linguistically constituted lifeworld.
The telos of reaching understanding, inherent in linguistic structures, 
compels the communicative actors to alter their perspective; this finds 
expression in the necessity of going from the objectivating attitude of 
success-oriented action, which seeks to effect something in the world, 
over to the performative attitude of a speaker who seeks to reach an 
understanding with a second person about something.31
Communicatively achieved agreement always proceeds co-operatively 
"within the dimension of world-disclosing language itself' and is 
therefore never "at the disposal of an individual party to interaction."32 
The end of communicative action is so interwoven with the 
intersubjective form of life which makes all linguistically mediated
30 "A Reply", 241.
31 Postmetaphysical Thinking, 81.
32 "A Reply", 241. See also Habermas "Remarks on the Discussion" Theory,
Culture and Society, 7 (1990), 127-132, here at 131.
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interaction possible that it cannot be treated as a contingent end but
rather, it is an end that cannot be bypassed.33
Communicative action must therefore be analysed independently of
the intentions and the purposive-activity of individual actors. Since in
communicative action our speech acts are oriented to reaching
understanding it must be possible to "clarify the structure of linguistic
communication without reference to structures of purposive activity."34
Of course, for Habermas, this is a central feature of the paradigm shift
from a philosophy of consciousness to a philosophy of intersubjective
understanding. In attempting to derive the general pragmatic
presuppositions of communicative action from the structure of processes
of reaching understanding, Habermas is hoping to provide a
reconstructive theoretical account of the
pretheoretical knowledge of competent speakers, who can themselves 
distinguish situations in which they are causally exerting an influence 
upon others from those in which they are coming to an understanding 
with them, and who know when their attempts have failed.35
While there are numerous important issues that would have to be 
addressed in any serious consideration of the notion of communicative 
action, it would take us too far from the central focus of this thesis to 
pursue many of them here.36 For our purposes we need only address one 
question that bears directly on the justification of discourse ethics. Since
33 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 94-95. This point will be
developed below.
34 The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume l t 293.
35 The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume / ,  286.
36 See for example the collection of essays Communicative Action, Axel Honneth
and Hans Joas (eds.).
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Habermas admits that linguistically mediated interaction could be 
communicative or strategic (as he defines them), then why is it that he 
takes speech acts to be a model for communicative and not strategic 
action? In other words, why should communicative action have priority 
over strategic action as a mode of language use? Habermas needs to 
justify this priority if the presuppositions of communicative action are to 
provide the basis for both his moral theory and his critical social theory. 
What is so special about the use of language with this orientation to 
reaching understanding?
Illocutions, Perlocutions and Communicative Action's Priority
At one point in his attempt to justify the priority of communicative action 
over strategic action as a mode of language usage, he puts the matter 
quite straightforwardly; "the use of language with an orientation to 
reaching understanding is the original mode of language use, upon which 
... the instrumental use of language in general, [is] parasitic."37 After 
making this strong claim he immediately goes on to assert that Austin's 
distinction between illocutions and perlocutions shows us that this is 
indeed so.
For Austin, to say something that expresses a state of affairs is a 
locutionary act, to perform an action in saying something is an 
illocutionary act, to bring about an effect on the hearer through saying 
something is a perlocutionary act. When we pursue only illocutionary 
aims in our speech acts then it can be considered to be self-sufficient in 
the sense that "the communicative intent of the speaker and the 
illocutionary aim he is pursuing follow from the manifest meaning of
37 The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume I, 288.
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what is said.”38 On the other hand perlocutionaiy effects can result 
’’whenever a speaker acts with an orientation to success and thereby 
instrumentalises speech acts for purposes that are only contingently 
related to the meaning of what is said.’’39 We can only describe these 
effects in ”a context of teleological action that goes beyond the speech 
act."40 Furthermore while illocutionary aims have to be openly expressed 
to succeed, the opposite is true of perlocutionary aims which must be 
kept concealed in order to be successful.41
I might say to a student; ’’that essay is particularly difficult.” I am 
pursuing the illocutionary aim of warning the student of problems which 
would lie ahead if she were to choose to write that essay. I may have no 
other aim except that of reaching an understanding with the student. 
However, in another case, I may say exactly the same thing but with the 
hope of putting the student off doing the essay because it would be more 
difficult for me to assess it than any of the other alternative essays. This 
desire to save myself work would represent a necessarily concealed 
perlocutionary aim that is obviously related to the meaning of what is said 
in a contingent and not a necessary sense. Success of the perlocutionary 
aim depends on the success of the illocutionary one. What this means in 
this case is that if I am successfully to save myself work then the student 
must understand the meaning of my speech act.
38 The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 7, 289.
39 The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 1, 289.
40 The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 7, 291.
41 The case of imperatives adds a serious complication here, one which will be
considered below.
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How does Austin’s distinction help to justify Habermas's claim that
strategic action is parasitic upon communicative action, and that the latter
is the original mode of language usage? As in the example just given we
could only use speech acts to pursue perlocutionary aims if they could
achieve illocutionary aims.
If the hearer failed to understand what the speaker was saying, a 
strategically acting speaker would not be able to bring the hearer, by 
means of communicative acts to behave in the desired way. To this 
extent... ’the use of language with an orientation to consequences' is 
not an original use of language but the subsumption of speech acts 
that serve illocutionary aims under conditions of action oriented to 
success.42
What communicative action amounts to then is any linguistically 
mediated interaction where all participants pursue only illocutionary 
aims.
Austin's distinction does not give as neat a result as Habermas would 
have hoped for in making his claim for the originaiy nature of 
communicative action. He recognised himself that a simple imperative is 
a case where the speaker pursues unreservedly illocutionary aims and yet 
acts with an orientation to success rather than understanding. If I say 
"shut the door!" I do not conceal the perlocutionary aim involved, to get 
somebody else to close the door simply because I want it closed. In 
order to take imperatives into account Habermas argued that it is only 
illocutionary acts which raise criticisable validity claims that should be 
considered as constitutive of communicative action.43
42 The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 1, 293.
43 The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 7,305.
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It would appear therefore that since the distinction between 
illocutions and perlocutions is not the same as the distinction between 
communicative action and strategic action, then demonstrating the 
dependence of perlocutions on illocutions will not provide Habermas 
with the conclusion that communicative action is originary as a mode of 
language use while strategic action is parasitic. Astute critics have not 
been slow to point that out.44 More recently however Habermas has 
modified his view on this point so as to defend his central claim that 
communicative action has priority over strategic action. He now argues 
that simple imperatives are also parasitic on the use of language with an 
orientation to understanding, in that they must refer to potential sanctions. 
This makes up for a deficit in illocutionary force but again this could not 
be understood if the hearer did not know what the demand would mean in 
a normatively authorised context. The validity claim to normative 
rightness is replaced by a power claim of threatened sanctions or perhaps 
violence.45
Furthermore Habermas realises that, since the distinction between 
illocutions and perlocutions is not the same as that between 
communicative and strategic action, he will have to differentiate between 
perlocutionary effects that are strategically intended and those that are 
not. While strategically intended perlocutionaiy effects are undeclared, 
non-strategically intended effects arise in the context of an interactive 
success. The acceptance of a validity claim may well lead the hearer to 
’’take on obligations which are relevant to the further sequence of
44 See for example Jonathan Culler "Communicative Competence and Normative
Force" New German Critique, 35 (1985), 133-144.
45 "A Reply", 239, Postmetaphysical Thinking, 83-84.
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interaction.”46 An interactive success therefore goes beyond the narrow 
sense of an illocutionary success which simply involves the hearer 
understanding the speaker’s utterance. It also involves a success in the 
more far-reaching sense of achieving a consensus on a validity claim that 
can effect co-ordination of action. Such an effect would be a non- 
strategically intended perlocutionary effect of successful communicative 
interaction.
It should be noted that these revisions do not in any sense undermine
the distinction between communicative action and strategic action itself.
As we will recall, these types of interaction are to be distinguished in
terms of their structural characteristics.
In communicative action the structure of language usage oriented 
toward reaching understanding is superimposed on the underlying 
teleological structure of the action, and subjects the actors to 
precisely such constraints as compel them to adopt a performative 
attitude that is more laden with presuppositions than the objectivating 
stance of the strategic actor. Interaction mediated through acts of 
reaching understanding exhibits a both richer and more strictly 
limiting structure than does strategic action.47
Austin's work undoubtedly provides Habermas with useful tools for a 
formal-pragmatic analysis of speech acts that allows him to study the 
structure of processes of reaching understanding without reference to 
purposive activity. We have seen however that it does not in itself justify 
the priority of communicative action. But just because Austin's 
distinction between illocutions and perlocutions does not ground this 
priority, it does not follow that it cannot be grounded.
46 MA Reply", 240.
47 "A Reply", 242.
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Habermas might, for example, draw explicitly in this context on
Wittgenstein’s analysis of the concept of following a rule. He discusses
this in his account of Mead’s work on symbolic interaction. The basic
point is that we can only learn to use language if we develop a rule-
consciousness. As Wittgenstein noted, it is not possible to obey a rule
privately. Rather he
emphasised the internal connection that holds between the 
competence to follow rules and the ability to respond with a 'yes’ or 
'no' to the question whether a symbol has been used correctly, that is, 
according to the rules. The two competences are equally constitutive 
for rule-consciousness.48
If this is true of learning a language then the original mode of language 
use must have an orientation to intersubjective understanding among 
those who together become conscious of rules genetically. Before a 
language can be used with an orientation to success, rule-consciousness 
must already have been developed among its speaking subjects and this 
could only occur through action oriented to reaching understanding. It 
seems that communicative action could in this way be shown to be 
originary and strategic action parasitic as uses of language.49
If we are to appreciate fully the strength of Habermas’s case for the 
priority of communicative action however, we must shift our focus away 
from the formal-pragmatic analysis of speech acts so as to take into
48 The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 2, 22. See also On the Logic o f
the Social Sciences, 134-135 where Habermas discusses this point in the context 
of a critical analysis o f Winch's linguistic approach to social studies. If 
communicative action were not the original mode of language use this would 
raise important questions about the possibility of learning a new language or 
translating from one language into another.
49 See Nick Smith "Modernity, Crisis and Critique: An Examination of Rival
Philosophical Conceptions in the Work of Jurgen Habermas and Charles Taylor", 
PhD Dissertation, Glasgow University, 1992, chapter 4.
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account the fact that communicative action always takes place in the 
context of a concrete form of life, or a lifeworld.
The Reproduction of the Lifeworld and Critical Social Theory
The lifeworld is a background resource that represents a "culturally 
transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns.”50 
This stock of interpretive patterns is the horizon within which 
communicative actors are always already moving. It represents the taken 
for granted background assumptions that shape the contexts of all 
processes of reaching understanding. The conception of the lifeworld, as 
the shared background knowledge of participants in everyday practices of 
communication, helps to explain how successful interaction is possible at 
all. In every act of communication the participants depend on the 
resources of a pre-reflexively known form of life over which they have no 
control. They always find themselves within a shared interpretive 
horizon that is taken for granted. Interactive success is therefore 
achieved autonomously in a rather superficial sense.51
Processes of reaching understanding in turn maintain and reproduce 
the symbolic structures of the lifeworld. As a resource the lifeworld is 
not merely "routed through" communicative action but it is "saddled on" 
the interpretive accomplishments of the actors.52 As Habermas puts it;
50 The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 2, 124. Habermas's most complete
account o f the lifeworld is given here at 119-152.
51 "A Reply", 244-245 and The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 2, ISO-
135.
62 The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, 342, The Theory o f Communicative 
Action, Volume 2, 145 and Baynes "Rational Reconstruction and Social 
Criticism", 135. This makes it clear that we are not simply products of the 
lifeworld, but rather the lifeworld is reproduced by the interactive achievements 
of concrete individuals and groups.
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"the network of communicative actions is nourished by resources of the
lifeworld and is at the same time the medium by which concrete forms of
life are reproduced."53 The concepts of communicative action and the
lifeworld are therefore complementary. Habermas supplements his
analysis of action oriented toward reaching understanding with his
analysis of the lifeworld. In communicative action participants stand in a
cultural tradition that they simultaneously use and renew. The symbolic
structures of the lifeworld are reproduced through the practices of
communicative action.
Under the functional aspect of mutual understanding, communicative 
action serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge; under the 
aspect of coordinating action, it serves social integration and the 
establishment of solidarity; finally under the aspect of socialization, 
communicative action serves the formation of personal identities.54
The processes of cultural reproduction, social integration and 
socialisation constitute the reproduction of the symbolic structures of the 
lifeworld and communicative action is the medium through which this 
reproduction takes place.
This two-way relation between the lifeworld and communicative 
action provides Habermas with the basis for an alternative justification 
for the priority of communicative action. In fact he develops this 
argument in response to the claim that it might be possible to avoid the 
performative attitude oriented to reaching understanding altogether by 
consistently adopting the objectivating attitude of the strategic actor.55
53 The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, 316.
54 The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 2, 137.
55 This is a suggestion of Agnes Heller, "Habermas and Marxism" in Habermas:
Critical Debates, John B. Thompson and David Held (eds.), 21-41.
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Habermas claims that this would require the disengagement of the 
individual from the lifeworld.56 As we have seen, the lifeworld can only 
be reproduced through the medium of communicative action and not in 
accord with the rational purposive activity of isolated individuals. The 
individual can only form her personal identity in the context of a web of 
mutual recognition and intersubjective understanding that is provided by 
the lifeworld.57
Insofar as the actor’s personal identity depends on the structures of 
the lifeworld then the option of consistent strategic action is only 
available in the abstract, in individual cases, and not as a long term 
disengagement from contexts of communicative action. Habermas 
maintains that
opting for a long-run withdrawal from contexts of action oriented to 
reaching understanding, and thus from communicatively structured 
spheres of life, means retreating into the monadic isolation of 
strategic action; in the long-run this is self-destructive.58
Strategic action presupposes an identity of a self whose formation is 
dependent on the symbolic structures of the lifeworld. There is therefore 
no substitute for communicative action from the perspective of the 
lifeworld to which the individual belongs and on which her identity 
depends. There is a high price to be paid by the individual for long term 
withdrawal from this context, be it the self-destructive monadic isolation
56 Habermas's thinking on personal identity is very much shaped by his reading of the
work of Mead. See The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 2, 96-106 
and especially the essay "Individuation through Socialization: On George 
Herbert Mead's Theory of Subjectivity" in Postmetaphysical Thinking, 149-204. 
The conception o f the self implicit in Habermas's work has much in common 
with the holist view I defended earlier.
57 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 199.
68 "A Reply to My Critics", 227.
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of the compulsive strategic actor, schizophrenia or suicide.59 This 
conception of the lifeworld shows how the claim that communicative 
action is prior to strategic action is directly connected to the paradigm 
shift from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of 
intersubjective understanding.
But it is still not clear how the priority of communicative action 
relates to the realm of politics. While we might accept, for example, that 
since our personal identity depends on the symbolic structures of the 
lifeworld and these are reproduced in a necessarily communicative way, 
communicative action certainly does have priority in the sphere of 
intimate relations, but what about matters of political and social policy? 
Why is strategic action not adequate as a medium of coordinating action 
in these realms?
We have already seen that the reproduction of the lifeworld is 
constituted not only by the socialisation of individuals but also by the 
transmission and renewal of cultural knowledge and processes of social 
integration and the establishment of forms of solidarity. The co­
ordination of action through social and political institutions, no less than 
the socialisation of the individual, is anchored in the lifeworld. While 
strategic action may well play an ineliminable role in political and social 
life, our political and social institutions must also act in the service of 
social integration and solidarity formation. To this extent these 
institutions cannot be detached from communicatively structured domains 
of action. If the symbolic structures of the lifeworld are to survive the 
atomising effects of pervasive strategic action and its instrumental
59 M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 101-102.
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rationality, then communicative action must also have priority in the 
realm of politics.60
It should now be clear how Habermas's theory of communicative 
action can be thought of as a reformulation of critical social theory. It is 
intended to facilitate both the explanation and the critical assessment of 
the institutional patterns of late capitalist societies. It is not strategic 
action as such, but rather the functionalist reason of social systems that 
promote it, that constitutes the greatest threat to the communicative 
structures of the lifeworld. In complex modem societies the material 
reproduction of the lifeworld becomes systematically organised through 
the development of economic markets and state bureaucracies. These 
systems and their corresponding non-linguistic steering media, money 
and power, have encroached into domains of the symbolic reproduction 
of the lifeworld. Functionalist reason, in the form of systemic 
mechanisms, has suppressed communicative reason, in the form of social 
integration.61
60 For a similar argument see Tony Smith The Role o f Ethics in Social Theory:
Essays from a Habermasian Perspectivey New York: State University of New 
York Press, 1991, 190-192. For an interesting attempt to show how an 
examination of rational choice theory can strengthen the claim that strategic 
action cannot adequately sustain political interaction, see James Johnson "Is Talk 
Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation between Critical Theory and Rational 
Choice” American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 74-86.
61 Autonomy and Solidarity, 112-113. For a fuller account o f this aspect of
modernisation and for his use of the systems theory of Talcott Parsons in this 
respect see The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 2, 153-197 and 199- 
299. Sympathetic commentators have criticised Habermas on the grounds that 
his appropriation o f Parsonian systems theory undermines the emancipatory 
potential of his critical theory. See Thomas McCarthy "Complexity and 
Democracy, or the Seducements of Systems Theory" and Dieter Misgeld 
"Critical Hermeneutics Versus Neoparsonianism?" New German Critique, 35 
(1985), 27-53 and 55-82 respectively, also David Rasmussen Reading 
Habermas, 37-55.
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One of the effects of this one-sided process of rationalisation has 
been to promote rational purposive strategic action and its objectivating 
attitude in domains of social life where this type of interaction cannot 
perform the task required of it, that of the reproduction of the lifeworld.62 
With his theory of communicative action, Habermas hopes to explain 
’’why modem societies cannot be held together exclusively or even 
primarily through money and power."63 Put slightly differently, it shows 
that "money and power can neither buy nor compel solidarity and 
meaning."64 The suppression of communicative action constitutes a 
crisis, or a pathology for the lifeworld, one that can be diagnosed in terms 
of the colonisation of the lifeworld by systems.65
Habermas's colonisation thesis recasts the notion of reification. His 
critical social theory is concerned to articulate the necessary conditions
62 Habermas draws heavily on Max Weber in his understanding of modernity and
processes of rationalisation. Unlike Weber, Habermas sees the "iron cage" as a 
product, not of rationalisation as such, but of one-sided (instrumental) 
rationalisation. The idea of a communicatively rationalised lifeworld is offered as 
a corrective to the pessimism of Weber and the early critical theorists. See The 
Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 7, 143-271 and 339-399. More 
recently Habermas's own work has become increasingly pessimistic, for example 
"The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of 
Utopian Energies" Philosophy and Social Criticism, 11 (1986), 1-18.
63 Autonomy and Solidarity, 227.
64 The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, 363.
65 For an earlier formulation of Habermas's conception of crisis, see Legitimation
Crisis, London: Heinemann, 1976. The colonisation thesis is developed in The 
Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 2, 301-403. For a highly instructive 
critique of the distinction between system and lifeworld from a feminist 
perspective, Nancy Fraser "What's Critical about Critical Theory? The Case of  
Habermas and Gender" New German Critique, 35 (1985), 97-131 but see James 
Bohman's defence of Habermas's distinction "'System' and 'Lifeworld': Habermas 
and the Problem of Holism" Philosophy and Social Criticism, 15 (1989), 381- 
401.
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for a communicatively rationalised society. It suggests that we need to 
reclaim for the public sphere those aspects of our politics that have been 
colonised by systemic imperatives.66 The priority of communicative 
action both grounds a critical social theory and offers us a normative 
guide for political protest and resistance to the domination of the current 
configuration of power.67 It is with the justification of his discourse 
ethics that Habermas makes the normative aspects of this theory explicit.
We have seen how the argument for the priority of communicative 
action is related to the task of rational reconstruction, the concept of the 
lifeworld and the elaboration of a critical social theory.68 These are the
66 Concern about the public sphere has been constant in Habermas's work. Although
it has only recently been translated into English, his first major book was written 
on this subject, in 1962, Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere, 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1989. For a recent collection o f essays on this 
theme, Craig Calhoun (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere, Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 1992. Habermas updates his own views here in "Further 
Reflections on the Public Sphere", 421-461. Habermas has been an important 
influence on recent theorists o f civil society and the role of new social 
movements in protest politics, Jean Cohen "Discourse Ethics and Civil Society" 
in Universalism Vs. Communitarianism, David Rasmussen (ed.), 83-105, Cohen 
and Arato Civil Society and Political Theory. On new potentials for protest,
The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 2, 391-396. Baynes The 
Normative Grounds o f Social Criticism, 172-181, and White The Recent Work 
o f Jurgen Habermas, 107-127 also develop this theme.
67 Habermas does not suffer from the deficit of normative insights that we
encountered in the work of Foucault in section 1.3. This will become clearer 
later on in the discussion of discourse ethics but McCarthy's "The Critique of 
Impure Reason" makes the case more than adequately. Both Nancy Love 
"Foucault and Habermas on Discourse and Democracy" Polity, 22 (1989), 269- 
293 and Lois McNay Foucault and Feminism: Power, Gender and the Self, 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992, while reluctant to side decisively with 
Habermas against Foucault, are obliged to accept this basic point.
68 We might note that neither Rawls nor Walzer develops a critical social theory in
conjunction with their normative theories. The fact that Habermas's work on 
justice forms a coherent whole with one of the most impressive contemporary 
social theories can only strengthen the claim that discourse ethics overcomes the 
inadequacies of these alternative theories of justice.
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key features of the paradigm shift that Habermas claims his work to 
represent, from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of 
intersubjective understanding. My intention in this section has been to 
lay the ground for my argument that Habermas's work enables us to 
theorise justice in a way that can overcome the weaknesses of both 
Rawls's monological proceduralism and Walzer's anti-procedural 
contextualism. It is to the elaboration of discourse ethics as a dialogical 
conception of impartiality that we must now turn.
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3.2 DISCOURSE AND IMPARTIALITY
Habermas's contribution to current debates in moral theory constitutes the 
most compelling case for resisting the conclusion that the insights of 
communitarians, post-structuralists and feminists have, for once and for 
all, undermined the attempt to discover or construct a context- 
independent, impartial point of view. In defending a discourse ethics that 
claims to be valid universally, Habermas is swimming against the tide, 
stubbornly refusing to be carried away in the contemporary drift towards 
relativism.
Habermas sets about reconstructing an impartial point of view with 
two principal concerns in mind. First, he wants to refute the views of 
sceptics and relativists by using his theory of communicative action to 
argue that advocates of such views are inevitably enmseshed in a 
performative contradiction.1 Second, he hopes to defend a modified 
version of Kant's categorical imperative from the contextualist criticisms 
that have dogged Kantian moral theory since Hegel's celebrated critique.2 
While discourse ethics follows Kant in its most significant features, 
Habermas draws on Hegel's distinction between morality (Moralitdt) and 
ethical life (,Sittlichkeit) in his characterisation of moral discourse as a 
reflective form of everyday communicative action.3 Although morality is 
always embedded in ethical life, "the unrelenting moralizing gaze of the
1 See for example Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 88-89.
2 See especially the essay "Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant
Apply to Discourse Ethics?" in Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Actiony 195-215.
3 M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 201.
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participant in discourse" weakens the power of norms that had previously 
enjoyed a naive social acceptance.4
Habermas’s encounter with contextualism will be the subject of the 
next section but the aim here is to outline the way in which discourse 
ethics elaborates a dialogical conception of impartiality. Our concern is 
with the Kantian project of justifying an impartial procedure that can act 
as a test for competing substantive principles of justice. It is with regard 
to the question of democratic legitimacy, rather than moral theory in a 
wider sense, that we will evaluate Habermas’s discourse ethics.5 First of 
all, we need to account for the distinctive features of discourse ethics. 
Secondly we will analyse, in some detail, Habermas's justification for the 
impartial procedure implicit in this approach to moral theory. Finally, I 
hope to make clear the advantages of a dialogical conception of 
impartiality over Rawls's monological view by showing how discourse 
ethics is not vulnerable to the criticisms, outlined in the first chapter, that 
undermine Rawls’s project.
4 M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 108.
5 For criticisms of the view that discourse ethics can serve not merely as a test of
democratic legitimacy but also as a procedure that could guide an individual's 
moral judgement and action, see Albrecht Wellmer "Ethics and Dialogue: 
Elements of Moral Judgement in Kant and Discourse Ethics" in The Persistence 
o f Modernity, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991, Jean Cohen "Discourse Ethics 
and Civil Society", here at 86-91 and Grace Clement "Is the Moral Point of View 
Monological or Dialogical? The Kantian Background of Habermas' Discourse 
Ethics" Philosophy Today, 34 (1989), 159-173, here at 169-172. Seyla 
Benhabib rejects the view that discourse ethics should be limited to a model of 
political legitimacy, although her interpretation of discourse ethics differs in 
important ways from Habermas's, as we will see in the next section. See the first 
chapter of Benhabib Situating the Self My only concern is with discourse ethics 
as a model of political legitimacy so when I speak of a morally valid norm, this 
can be taken to indicate a legitimate principle of justice. See also David Ingram 
"The Limits and Possibilities o f Communicative Ethics for Democratic Theory" 
Political Theory, 21 (1993), 294-321, here at 298-300.
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Discourse as Reflective Communicative Action
Discourse ethics is Kantian in the sense that it shares the following 
attributes with Kant's moral theory.6 Firstly, it is deontological, 
concerning itself with the validity of norms, which in providing a 
legitimate ordering for the satisfaction of interests, can act as a basis for 
the justification of our actions. It therefore limits itself to questions of 
moral rightness, rather than dealing with full conceptions of a good life. 
Habermas, like Rawls, affirms the priority of right but, as we will see, in 
a significantly different way. Secondly, it is cognitivist in that it treats 
normative rightness as a claim to validity that is analogous to a truth 
claim. Thirdly, it is formalist in that it defends a procedure of moral 
argumentation rather than any substantive moral principles. This 
procedure embodies a moral point of view that explains how competing 
substantive principles can be judged impartially, or in a way that 
expresses a common interest. The rules of argumentation that Habermas 
elaborates represent a dialogical procedure that can be contrasted with 
the monological procedures of Kant and Rawls. Furthermore Habermas, 
unlike Rawls, leaves the justification of substantive principles of justice 
to the participants in a real discourse. Finally, discourse ethics is 
universalist, in that it claims to justify its procedure of moral 
argumentation independently of the prejudices or biases of any particular 
tradition or culture.
Habermas grounds discourse ethics in his analysis of communicative 
action, or action oriented toward reaching understanding. As we saw in 
the last section, this involves at least two participants who seek to
6 For what follows, see Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 196-198.
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harmonise their individual plans of action on the basis of a 
communicatively achieved agreement that is rationally motivated. An 
agreement is generated if all participants can affirm, at least implicitly, 
some criticisable validity claim that has been raised.7 The actors share as 
a background a lifeworld that forms the context for communication while 
at the same time providing the resources that the actors need to engage in 
this process.
In the context of a modem lifeworld, according to Habermas’s 
reconstruction, all competent communicative actors can differentiate 
between three different relations to the world and three corresponding 
validity claims. As we will recall these are first, the objective world 
(existing states of affairs) and a claim to truth, second, the social world 
(regulation of interpersonal relationships) and a claim to normative 
rightness and third, the subjective world (the speaker’s lived experience) 
and a claim to truthfulness.8 We can also differentiate between the 
unquestioned intersubjectively shared certitudes of the lifeworld and the 
content on which participants in communicative action reach agreement. 
Participants reach agreement about something in a world (objective,
7 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 134.
8 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 59, 136-138. More generally
see The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 1, 233-242, 305-319. 
According to Habermas we can further differentiate between three basic 
attitudes, each of which entails a different perspective on the world; an 
objectivating attitude (that concentrates on claims to truth), a norm- 
conformative attitude (that concentrates on claims to normative rightness, or 
justice) and an expressive attitude (that concentrates on claims to truthfulness, or 
personal taste). We can confront any of the three worlds with any of these three 
basic attitudes. Since our focus is on claims to normative rightness that relate to 
the regulation of interpersonal relations in the social world, we need not concern 
ourselves with the complex interplay between these differentiated relations to the 
world, claims to validity and basic attitudes. It is however important to note that 
this differentiation, according to Habermas, is itself characteristic of the process 
of rationalisation in a modem lifeworld.
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social or subjective). This content has become detached from the diffuse 
background of the lifeworld and has taken on "the character of 
knowledge linked with a potential for reasoning, knowledge that claims 
validity and can be criticized, that is, knowledge that can be argued about 
on the basis of reasons."9 Our capacity to make these differentiations 
constitutes for Habermas a decentred understanding of the world.
With this decentred understanding of the world the lifeworld is put at 
a distance as the objective, social and subjective worlds are 
problematised.10 For example, the objective world is theorised in that 
propositions that had been unquestioned may now be true or false. 
Similarly, the social world is moralised in that norms that were previously 
taken for granted can now be valid or invalid. This means that the 
normativity of existing institutions becomes open to question. A 
hypothetical attitude has been introduced to the domain of social 
interaction that allows for a move to discourse, a more reflective form of 
communicative action.11 These validity claims, to truth and to normative 
rightness, must be redeemed discursively, that is with the support of 
reasons, if the participants are to continue to orient themselves towards 
reaching mutual understanding.12 If they do not resort to strategic action 
or to brute force, they will become involved in a discourse that 
anticipates a rationally motivated consensus. The participants will then
9 M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 138.
10 M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 107.
11 M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 156.
12 The claim to truthfulness is not redeemed discursively, that is by giving reasons in
support of the claim, but rather through consistent behaviour on the part of the 
speaker who raises the claim, M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 
59.
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be engaged in a procedure of argumentation that tests a disputed validity
claim's worthiness to be recognised.
The rationality proper to the communicative practice of everyday life 
points to the practice of argumentation as a court of appeal that 
makes it possible to continue communicative action with other means 
when disagreements can no longer be repaired with everyday routines 
and yet are not to be settled by the direct or strategic use of force.13
Discourse ethics relates specifically to the moralisation of the social 
world that occurs when the normativity of existing institutions is brought 
into question. These can no longer enjoy a naive social acceptance but 
are potential subjects of a practical discourse.
If a normative validity claim is called into question then the 
background consensus that plays an important action-coordinating 
function in everyday communicative practice is broken. Practical 
discourse is a procedure of moral argumentation in which "participants 
continue their communicative action in a reflexive attitude with the aim of 
restoring a consensus that has been disrupted."14 Agreement is produced 
if the participants collectively become convinced of something. This 
might involve the restoration of the intersubjective recognition of the old 
norm that had become controversial or its substitution with another claim 
that is newly recognised as valid.
Habermas's insistence that discourse ethics is cognitivist amounts to 
the claim that it represents a procedure of argumentation that satisfies the 
conditions for making impartial moral judgements. In other words, it 
maintains that norms can be given a rational justification. This is what it 
means to say that a claim to normative rightness is analogous to a claim
18 The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 7, 17-18.
14 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 67.
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to truth. However this does not require us to deny the important
differences between the two claims.15 While both can be redeemed
discursively, there are no moral facts as such. Normative validity claims
do not therefore reflect a moral "truth" in the same way that assertoric
validity claims reflect propositional truth. We might also note that while
the reality of nature does not depend on validity claims to truth, the social
reality of an intersubjectively regulated form of life is dependent on the
recognition of validity claims to normative rightness.
This asymmetry between claims to truth and normative rightness is
highlighted if we contrast between the unequivocal relation between an
existing states of affairs in the objective world and true propositions
about them, and the relation between socially accepted norms and the
question of their validity.
We must distinguish between the social fact that a norm is 
intersubjectively recognised and its worthiness to be recognised. 
There may be good reasons to consider the validity claim raised in a 
socially accepted norm to be unjustified. Conversely, a norm whose 
claim to validity is in fact redeemable does not necessarily meet with 
actual recognition or approval.16
The validity of a norm does not depend on its social currency but rather 
on the fact that it could rationally be justified in a practical discourse.
Finally, the differences between the validity claims to truth and to 
normative rightness reflect the fact that while both empirical knowledge 
of the objective world and moral knowledge of the social world are
15 M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 59-62, Autonomy and
Solidarity, 256 and Thomas McCarthy Ideals and Illusions, 187-188. For an 
earlier formulation of the sense in which practical questions admit o f truth, 
Legitimation Crisis, 102-110.
16 M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 61.
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fallible, in that they acknowledge the ’’critical potential of superior future 
knowledge,” our moral knowledge is provisional in a more far reaching 
sense.17 This is because of the intrinsic historicity of the social world. 
Social reality throws up unforeseen situations that then become objects of 
our moral knowledge. Unlike the objective world, the social world is 
constituted by historical and cultural processes that shape the 
interpretations we give to morally valid norms.18
By grounding discourse ethics in the theory of communicative action 
Habermas wants to make it clear that an impartial assessment of claims 
can only proceed dialogically, in terms of a real argumentation where the 
individuals concerned reach an agreement cooperatively. Norms are not 
justified through a rational procedure that an isolated individual could 
undertake in solitary reflection. It is not a matter of what an individual 
moral agent could will, without self-contradiction, to be a universal 
maxim. Nor is it a matter of representative parties in an original position 
choosing rationally principles of justice in isolation from each other 
behind a veil of ignorance. For Habermas, unlike Kant and Rawls, the 
justification of norms is necessarily a matter of whether or not a disputed 
norm is acceptable to the participants in a practical discourse that is 
actually carried out.
Real argumentation is required not only because it equalises power 
among the participants, though as we will see it does that, but because it 
is the only way in which a genuinely common will, generated by moral 
insight, could be expressed.19 In discourse we do not simply seek a fair
17 Justification and Application, 39.
18 We will return to this point in the next section when we discuss the relation
between the justification of norms and their application.
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compromise between participants, though we may often have to settle for 
a fair compromise if no norm that expresses a common will can be 
affirmed. What is highlighted in the shift from a monological to a 
dialogical moral point of view is the fact that the aim of a practical 
discourse goes well beyond the task of accommodating the initial moral 
intuitions of the participants. The aim is rather to clarify a common 
interest. Each of us involved in this real process of argumentation is 
called on to adopt the perspective of all the other participants.20
To adopt an impartial point of view requires that we engage critically 
in a process of interpreting our individual needs and interests so as co­
operatively to reach an agreement on norms that satisfy shared interests. 
Needs and interests are always interpreted in the light of cultural values 
and so this can only be undertaken dialogically, in an intersubjective, 
public encounter.21 This may well involve a moment of moral 
transformation for some, or perhaps all, of the participants, since the 
dialogical encounter engages them in a self-critical revision of their own 
need interpretations.22 Indeed such a moral transformation might also be 
necessary even if, while no norm is accepted as being in the common 
interest, the participants are to agree on a fair compromise. We can now
19 See especially Habermas’s critique of Ernst Tugendhat in Moral Consciousness
and Communicative Action, 68-76.
20 See Habermas's comments on Mead in The Theory o f Communicative Action,
Volume 2,94-96.
21 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 68.
22 Seyla Benhabib Critique, Norm and Utopia: A Study o f the Foundations o f
Critical Theory, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, 313-316. For an 
interesting analysis of the political significance of need interpretation, Nancy 
Fraser "Women, Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation" and "Struggle 
over Needs: Outline of a Socialist-Feminist Critical Theory of Late Capitalist 
Political Culture", chapters 7 and 8 of her Unruly Practices.
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see how the dialogical conception of impartiality in discourse ethics 
draws out the moral-theoretical implications of the paradigm shift from a 
philosophy of consciousness to a philosophy of intersubjective 
understanding. What we now need to assess is the argument that 
Habermas offers as a justification for this view of impartiality.
Justification of a Cognitivist Ethic
The justification of Habermas’s procedure of moral argumentation as a 
universally valid impartial point of view takes as its starting point the 
unavoidable presuppositions of communicative action. In raising a 
validity claim a speaker takes on the obligation to support that claim with 
reasons if called on to do so.23 By entering into a discourse about a 
disputed norm the participants must also presuppose rules of 
argumentation which guarantee that the only motivation driving the 
discourse is the rational force of the better argument.24 Habermas 
suggests that the normative content of these rules ensures that no subject 
capable of speech and action is excluded from the discourse, that all 
participants are allowed to question any assertion, to introduce any 
assertion and to express their attitudes, desires and needs, and that the 
exercise of these rights is not to be prevented by coercion, whether
23 This aspect o f rational accountability is to be understood as an obligation that is
immanent to speech acts. It is a distinguishing feature o f communicative action. 
See "What is Universal Pragmatics?”, especially at 59-65 and for useful 
comments, McCarthy The Critical Theory o f Jurgen Habermas, 282-291 and 
White The Recent Work o f Jurgen Habermas, 50-55. We have already 
discussed the structure of communicative action in the previous section.
24 "A Reply to my Critics”, 254-258 and Moral Consciousness and Communicative
Action, 76-98, White The Recent Work o f Jurgen Habermas, 55-58 and for a 
distinctive interpretation of these rules Benhabib Situating the Self 29.
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internal or external.25 These presuppositions, expressed as rules,
represent the general conditions of a co-operative search for a rationally
motivated agreement.
These presuppositions have been characterised in terms of an "ideal
speech situation."26 It is more appropriate to speak of the idealising
presuppositions that must be made by participants if they are
communicatively to restore a disrupted normative consensus. They must
assume that nothing but the force of the better argument is going to
influence the outcome of the discourse.27 This is how Habermas derives
the rules of argumentation outlined above.
Every speaker knows intuitively that an alleged argument is not a 
serious one if the appropriate conditions are violated - for example if 
certain individuals are not allowed to participate, issues or
25 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 89.
26 For a good discussion of this much misunderstood idea, McCarthy The Critical
Theory o f Jurgen Habermas, 306-310. Habermas now believes that the term 
"ideal speech situation" is misleading in that it seems to imply an ideal that we 
must realise in all discourses that are actually carried out. In fact the term was 
intended to describe the conditions under which claims to truth and normative 
rightness can be discursively redeemed, that is the general, unavoidable, 
idealising, communicative presuppositions that all participants must make if they 
are to engage in argumentation at all. See "A Reply to my Critics", 235-236,
The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, 322-323, Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action, 201-203, Autonomy and Solidarity, 160-161, 171 and 
note especially the tone of regret here at 260. For recent comments that provide 
a clear and detailed account of the role of these idealising presuppositions, 
Justification and Application, 54-60. For a typical misreading of Habermas on 
this issue see Walzer "A Critique of Philosophical Conversation." Steven Lukes 
gives a more incisive critical analysis in "Of Gods and Demons: Habermas and 
Practical Reason" in Habermas: Critical Debates, John B. Thompson and David 
Held (eds.), 134-148 but for Habermas's response, "A Reply to my Critics", 250- 
263 and Justification and Application, 57-58.
27 Habermas had earlier discussed some of the implications of this approach for
social criticism in terms of the suppression of generalisable interests, 
Legitimation Crisis, 111-117.
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contributions are suppressed, agreement or disagreement is 
manipulated by insinuations or by threat of sanctions and the like.28
Now, of course, when we actually engage in communicative action our 
idealising assumptions may not always be objectively correct. Indeed 
they may never be correct in a strict sense.29 The point is that if we do 
not assume that the conditions under which we engage in argumentation 
at least approximate to a sufficient degree ideal conditions, that is 
conditions where these rules of argumentation are adhered to, then we 
could not be participating in a discourse at all. These presuppositions 
therefore make possible "the practice that participants understand as 
argumentation."30 In cases where something other than the force of the 
better argument is actually in play, we will be acting under a 
counterfactual presupposition.31
28 Justification and Application, 56. See also the discussion in Moral
Consciousness and Communicative Action, 89-92.
29 Habermas makes the point eloquently; "As little as we can do without the
supposition of a purified discourse, we have equally to make do with ’unpurified' 
discourse", The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, 323. On this tension 
between the actual and the ideal see also "A Reply to my Critics", 221, 
"Questions and Counterquestions", 197 and Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action, 203 where Habermas argues that the "factual force of 
counterfactual presuppositions" offers a bridge that Kant could not provide, 
between the realms of the intelligible and the empirical.
80 Justification and Application, 31.
31 Habermas is not guilty of presupposing the possibility of a fully transparent, 
rationalistic, homogenised society. In fact he assumes that much of the 
background taken-for-grantedness of any intersubjectively shared lifeworld will 
remain opaque. He also assumes that modem societies will continue to be 
characterised by a plurality of interest positions (and indeed conceptions of the 
good in Rawls's sense). Discourse ethics is a response to pluralism and not an 
attempt to eradicate it. Our need for the justification of norms to regulate our 
social world actually increases with an ever greater diversity of lifestyles. This 
need "must be satisfied at higher and higher levels of abstraction. For this reason 
the consensual norms and principles become ever more general", Autonomy and
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Rational discourses exist like ’’islands in the sea of everyday 
practice,” serving as they do important social functions, not least of 
which is the legitimation of principles of justice.32 We must 
institutionalise such discourses in accordance with rules that regulate our 
public deliberations "with the goal of ensuring the probability of adequate 
fulfilment of demanding communicative presuppositions under temporal, 
social and practical limitations."33 The institutionalisation of such
Solidarity, 171. We will discuss the implications of this increasing generality in 
the next section. See also McCarthy Ideals and Illusions, 188-190 and for an 
interesting discussion of this point, Brian Walker "Habermas and Pluralist 
Political Theory", Philosophy and Social Criticism, 18 (1992), 81-102.
Habermas is also keen to point out that idealisation itself "leaves the identity of 
the participants and sources of conflict originating in the lifeworld untouched" so 
that "worldviews are not effaced but are given foil play in discourse." This does 
not however preclude the possibility of moral transformation, discussed above, 
taking place in the course of a procedure of moral argumentation. The 
acceptance of the moral demands of justice will sometimes lead to ethical 
reflection that could transform collective identities. This point will be developed 
in section 3.4 when we will examine the case of Northern Ireland. Finally, we 
might also note here that, just as Habermas is not guilty of seeking to eradicate 
pluralism, neither is he guilty of assuming that any discourse could ever be 
completely free from the effects of power. The reconstruction of the pragmatic 
presuppositions of communicative action is intended to enable us to identify the 
use and abuse of power in discourse. We may come to realise how a discourse 
that had at the time seemed to approximate sufficiently ideal conditions, was in 
fact distorted by some subtle form of manipulation that had gone unnoticed. It is 
the reconstruction of the rules of argumentation that in this way enables us to be 
critical of the outcome of such a discourse. This is a condition of the possibility 
of distinguishing between more or less reasonable processes of deliberation. If 
this is not possible, and as I argued in section 1.3 above it does not seem to be 
possible within a Foucauldian perspective, then the whole project of legitimating 
principles of justice is fatally undermined.
32 Justification and Application, 56, also "A Reply to my Critics", 235.
33 Justification and Application, 57. This is a matter for a discourse theory of law
and politics which has been the subject of Habermas's most recent work. See 
especially Faktizit&t und Geltung, but for a brief statement of some of the themes 
of that major work "Three Normative Models of Democracy" Constellations, 1 
(1994). An earlier work on this theme is "Law and Morality" in The Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values, VIII, Sterling M. McMurrin (ed.), Salt Lake City: 
University of Utah Press, 1988, 217-279. For a useful account of Habermas's
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discourses, in the form of legal norms, is intended to facilitate an 
approximation to ideal conditions. Such an approximation would seem to 
be impossible, for reasons of the motivational and cognitive burdens 
involved, if argumentation were thought of simply in terms of the 
spontaneous outbursts of participants engaging in everyday 
communicative practice. It is the rule of law that allows the conditions of 
rational collective will-formation to take on a concrete institutional 
form.34
In the next stage of the argument Habermas derives from these
presuppositions, or rules of argumentation, a principle of universalization
(U). This is to act as a bridging moral principle that will allow us to
clarify the condition of normative validity.35 Whether or not a norm could
be discursively redeemed will depend on the satisfaction of (U), that
all affected can freely accept the consequences and the side effects 
that the general observance of a controversial norm can be expected 
to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each individual,36
The justification of (U) as part of the logic of practical discourses is 
intended to refute the sceptic who maintains that norms cannot be 
rationally justified. This allows Habermas to introduce the principle of 
discourse ethics itself (D).
work on law prior to Faktizitat und Geltung, Robert Shelly "Habermas and the 
Normative Foundations o f a Radical Politics" Thesis Eleven, 35 (1993), 62-83.
54 Justification and Application, 16.
35 For a detailed reconstruction of this argument, William Rehg "Discourse and the
Moral Point of View: Deriving a Dialogical Principle of Universalization" 
Inquiry, 34 (1991), 27-48.
36 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 93.
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Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) 
with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a 
practical discourse.37
This is the test of justification that discourse ethics demands of any 
substantive principle of justice that is raised as a normative validity claim 
within the context of a particular form of life. So there are four layers 
here; first, there are the unavoidable presuppositions of argumentation 
expressed as rules; second, the moral principle (U) that is grounded in 
those presuppositions; third, the principle of discourse ethics (D); and 
fourth, substantive principles that are the subject matter of argumentation.
One important question that must be addressed is whether or not 
there are any substantive norms, or principles of justice, that could pass 
the universalizability test involved in discourse ethics. Perhaps there are 
no norms at all that would be equally good for all.38 This has been the
87 M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 93.
38 In fact norms that can be equally good for all in a strict sense are not the only ones 
that could rationally be justified in a practical discourse. Such a norm (and "do 
not kill another human being" is an obvious candidate) is acceptable to all and 
would also seem to be equally good for all, but another norm that might be 
acceptable to all may be better for some than for others. For example the norm 
"everybody should receive from the state a basic income" may be acceptable to 
some, because it seems fair or the crime rate will go down or whatever, even 
though they will be worse off financially because they will have to pay higher 
taxes. On the other hand, this norm is acceptable to others in a more 
straightforward sense as they may not have to weigh the gain of the general 
observance o f this norm against any significant loss. Now this norm, were it to 
be acceptable to all participants in a real practical discourse, may be said to 
articulate a shared interest without being equally good for all in a strict sense.
See Maeve Cooke "Habermas and Consensus" European Journal o f Philosophy, 
1 (1993), 247-267, also McCarthy Ideals and Illusions, 189-190. This gives 
support to the criticism I made of Iris Young at the end of section 1.3. There I 
argued against Young, that impartiality may well require us to assert the 
differences between social groups, see Justice and the Politics o f Difference, 96- 
121. This point also hopefully makes it clear that Habermas's concept of a 
generalisable (or shared) interest is more fluid and flexible than Rawls's list of 
primary goods. For brief but suggestive comments on how these two concepts
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basis for much of the contextualist criticism that has been directed against 
Habermas, and we will confront it more directly in the next section. It is 
important to note here that Habermas differentiates between moral 
questions, which can in principle be decided rationally in terms of justice 
(which for him concerns the universalizability of interests), and 
evaluative questions, which are accessible to rational discussion only 
within the context of a concrete historical form of life, or a prior 
commitment to a particular conception of the good.39 While evaluative, 
or ethical, questions, call for a distinctive use of practical reason, 
Habermas restricts the moral domain to matters of justice, or the 
generalisability of interests.40
Our central concern here is whether or not Habermas has successfully 
defended a conception of impartiality that grounds a universally valid 
cognitivist ethic. Is his moral theory really built on inescapable 
presuppositions of argumentation or does it merely reflect his own view 
of an ideal form of communication? If this challenge, typical of the 
claims of contemporary sceptics, is convincingly to be deflected, much 
will depend on the arguments that have already been discussed. These
might be related, Baynes The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism, 151 and 
for a more extensive discussion Carol C. Gould "On the Conception of the 
Common Interest: Between Procedure and Substance" in Hermeneutics and 
Critical Theory in Ethics and Politics, Michael Kelly (ed.), 253-273. We might 
also note that a norm that is rationally justified from a dialogically impartial point 
of view may demand that some social groups give up certain privileges that they 
have come to recognise as being unjustifiable. This would also seem to suggest 
that an impartial norm is not necessarily equally good for all. The fact that 
justice benefits some social groups more that others should come as no surprise 
since it rectifies injustices that have clearly had consequences that have been to 
the advantage of some groups while causing others to suffer unnecessarily.
89 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 178, Autonomy and Solidarity, 
248-249.
40 See the essay "On the Pragmatic, the Ethical and the Moral Employments of 
Practical Reason" in Justification and Application, 1-18.
258
include Habermas's claim about the priority of communicative action and 
his reconstruction of the idealising presuppositions of communication as 
rules of argumentation that are intrinsic to the structure of language itself. 
But in defending his position against sceptical objections Habermas has 
also drawn on an argument first used by his colleague Karl-Otto Apel. If 
sceptics are to put forward their views as arguments, then they cannot 
avoid the pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action and these 
contradict, as a matter of fact, the content of their arguments.41
In order to convince, and not merely to cajole, manipulate or demand 
assent, the sceptic cannot escape the normative presuppositions of the 
practice of argumentation itself. Sceptics must presume that the position 
they defend is supported with the force of reason. This means that they 
will not convince their interlocutors by excluding certain people from the 
discussion, or by preventing certain claims from being discussed, or by 
using threats or sanctions to ensure that the discussion proceeds in the 
manner that they would favour. If the use of power is to be avoided, and 
it must be when we are considering matters of conviction, then the 
idealising presuppositions that Habermas reconstructs do indeed seem to 
be inescapable as rules of argumentation. The objections of sceptics 
therefore involve performative contradictions.42
Habermas disagrees with Apel however with regard to the status of 
the transcendental-pragmatic argument they both use against sceptical
41 M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 79-82, 89-91.
42 The argument about performative contradiction runs through Habermas's critique
of the philosophical heroes of contemporary critics of reason, especially in The 
Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity. See Martin Jay "The Debate over 
Performative Contradiction: Habermas versus the Poststructuralists" in 
Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project o f Enlightenment, Axel 
Honneth et al. (eds.), Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992, 261-279.
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objections. For Apel it counts as an ultimate justification 
(Letztbegriindung) that is absolutely secure. For Habermas, however, the 
argument is fallible. According to him the identification of the 
inescapable pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation relies on a 
maieutic method that seeks to explicate the pre-theoretical intuitive 
know-how that the sceptic relies on even when denying it. What is 
required, as we have already noted, is a hypothetical reconstruction of 
presumably universal intuitions and competences.43 This reconstruction, 
as opposed to the intuitive know-how itself, is fallible in the sense that 
we cannot dismiss a priori the possibility that the human life-form, within 
which the practice of argumentation is interwoven, will undergo future 
changes.44 The reconstruction is also dependent on maieutic 
confirmation, that is on subjects coming to explicate their own pre- 
theoretical intuitive know-how for themselves. Within the paradigm of 
the philosophy of intersubjective understanding, an ultimate philosophical 
justification is neither warranted nor necessary. Habermas's moral theory 
is rather to be thought of as a reconstructive science that is susceptible to 
indirect corroboration.
In the last section we saw how reconstructive scientific research 
projects engage philosophy and the empirical sciences in a co-operative 
venture.45 Empirical theories can use falhble philosophical 
reconstructions, of presumably universal bases of rational experience, in 
particular contexts of research. The success of the empirical theory can
45 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 95-98. For a more extended 
discussion of his differences with Apel, Justification and Application, 76-88.
44 This is, however, an empty possibility, Justification and Application, 83-84.
45 M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 15-16,39, 116-119.
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then safeguard the validity of the philosophical reconstruction. It is 
Lawrence Kohlberg's work on moral development that Habermas sees as 
the principal source of empirical corroboration for discourse ethics.46
On the basis of his empirical research, Kohlberg claims to identify 
certain universal forms of moral reasoning which can be understood as a 
six stage sequence in the development of the individual’s capacity for 
moral judgement.47 The first two stages are at what Kohlberg calls the 
pre-conventional level, the next two at the conventional level and the two 
highest stages are at the post-conventional level. The moral judgement of 
a child at the pre-conventional level is oriented only to immediate 
consequences of action. At the first stage this is simply a matter of 
avoiding punishment while at the second stage it extends to a 
straightforwardly instrumentalist view of all human relations. An 
identification with others, such as family, social groups, the political 
community, takes priority over immediate consequences at the 
conventional level. At the third stage this is a matter of making 
judgements on the basis of what others approve of while at the fourth 
stage it is more particularly oriented towards the maintenance of the 
social order.
There is a shift in moral judgement at the post-conventional level 
towards moral principles that do not depend for their validity on the
46 See "Moral Development and Ego Identity" in Communication and the Evolution
o f Society, 69-94, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 33-41, 
119-133, 171-188. Habermas outlines the differences between Kohlberg's 
moral-philosophical theory and discourse ethics in "Justice and Solidarity: On the 
Discussion Concerning 'Stage 6'" in Hermeneutics and Critical Theory in Ethics 
and Politics, Michael Kelly (ed.), 32-52.
47 What follows, in this and the next paragraph, is an exceptionally brief sketch. A
somewhat more detailed summary of the stage sequence is provided by Stephen 
White in The Recent Work o f Jurgen Habermas, 66-68.
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individual’s identification with particular social groups. At the fifth stage 
this is a matter of adhering to a legal system that facilitates each 
individual's pursuit of their own personal values. At the highest stage, 
moral judgement is guided not so much by concrete legal norms but 
rather by universal principles of justice that affirm the equal rights of 
each individual. Legal norms would be judged in accordance with the 
demands of these universal principles. This can be thought of in terms of 
a procedural test of the legitimacy of substantive principles from an 
impartial point of view.
In constructing this account of moral development in terms of six 
successive stages, Kohlberg is guided by moral-theoretical assumptions 
as to the superior moral adequacy of a higher stage. For example a 
higher stage should be more adequate in taking the claims of others into 
account. But his empirical research provides indirect confirmation for 
those philosophical assumptions, since these assumptions would be 
called into question if they did not fit with the psychological facts of the 
moral development of the subjects of his empirical investigations. This is 
a good example, according to Habermas, of the way in which philosophy 
and empirical research can complement each other, since it shows us one 
way in which a reconstructive science can be indirectly corroborated 
through such a coherence test.48
Habermas also believes that the theory of communicative action can 
add support to Kohlberg's theory by grounding his moral stages in a logic 
of development. Conceiving of discourse as a more reflexive 
continuation of communicative action involves reconstructing stages of 
interaction in terms of perspective structures. It is with the moralisation
48 Moral Consciousness cmd Communicative Action, 37-39, 116-119.
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of the social world that norms of action are subordinated to principles and 
eventually, at the highest stage of moral development, to procedures for 
testing substantive principles. This requires of the participants the 
higher-level cognitive structures involved in adopting a hypothetical 
attitude to socially accepted norms.49 Such a progressively decentred 
understanding of the world accounts for the learning process involved in 
the shift from conventional to post-conventional levels in Kohlberg’s 
theory.50 At the post-conventional level socially current norms and 
expectations are brought into question and assessed from an impartial 
point of view. In this sense morality at the post-conventional level 
becomes autonomous from ethical life.
What if a sceptic were to refuse to engage in argumentation at all, 
anticipating the performative contradiction trap that Habermas has laid 
for all who are foolish enough to enter into his language game? I have 
already argued that Habermas quite convincingly maintains that the 
sceptic cannot withdraw entirely from the communicative practice of 
everyday life, at least not without embarking on a path of self- 
destruction.51 But while communicative action cannot be bypassed, is
49 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 168.
60 Habermas maintains that the development o f higher-level cognitive structures 
characterises the process of tradition becoming reflexive in general and should 
not be thought of in terms of the historical development of one particular 
tradition. If the members of any culture begin to take a hypothetical stance 
towards their own traditions, then the processes of learning and adaption 
required of them involve the same logic o f development as they would in any 
other culture, Autonomy and Solidarity, 254. Habermas's arguments in relation 
to social evolution are developed in great detail in Communication and the 
Evolution o f Society and especially in The Theory o f Communicative Action, 
Volume I.
51 This point was made in the discussion of the lifeworld towards the end of the last 
section. See especially Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 99- 
102.
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there any reason why the sceptic must move beyond the certitudes of 
ethical life? Why shift from conventional moral reasoning to accept the 
abstract formalism of post-conventional morality?52
It must be noted that it is only those norms that are called into 
question that become subjects of moral argumentation. This leaves many 
other aspects of our ethical life as taken for granted certitudes of the 
lifeworld. We need not, indeed we cannot, question all norms at once. 
Nonetheless any norm can be problematised, including Habermas's 
reconstruction of the normative content of the pragmatic presuppositions 
of argumentation. When a norm is questioned it would seem that the 
shift to discourse is inevitable. The refusal to adopt a hypothetical 
attitude towards such a norm (take any norm that discriminates on the 
basis of race or gender) endorses a conservative attachment to a 
discredited tradition that can no longer serve as a basis for rational 
agreement.53 In so far as we seek to restore the background normative
52 An interesting exchange on this matter took place within the context of a
symposium on Charles Taylor's Sources o f the Self in Inquiry, 34 (1991). See 
Martin Low-Beer "Living a Life and the Problem of Existential Impossibility", 
217-236 and Taylor's response "Comments and Replies", 237-254, here at 251- 
253. Low-Beer argues that since a principle of equal respect is a presupposition 
of communication, discourse ethics can explain why it is impossible to avoid a 
moral, or an impartial, point of view. Taylor, on the other hand, maintains that it 
is not the presuppositions of communicative action but rather the 
acknowledgement of a crucial human good ("the way in which human identity is 
formed through dialogue and recognition", 252) that makes the moral point of 
view inescapable. It seems to me that these arguments collapse into each other 
(as Taylor seems to suggest, 253) if we bear in mind that the socialisation of the 
individual depends on the reproduction of the lifeworld through the 
communicative achievements of its participants. The procedure for testing 
norms that discourse ethics justifies can also, as we will see, affirm certain 
structural features of any good life. The good that Taylor sees as crucial in this 
context would, it seems to me, have to be included as one of these structural 
features.
63 See Benhabib's similar point, that inegalitarianism is either irrational or unjust, 
Situating the Self 33.
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consensus within a modem lifeworld, there is no alternative to post- 
conventional moral reasoning over disputed norms.
Justice and the Advantages of Dialogical Impartiality
I have been suggesting that it is the fact that discourse ethics conceives of 
an impartial point of view dialogically rather than monologically that 
supports the central argument of this thesis. Discourse ethics provides 
the most adequate moral philosophical basis available to us for the 
necessary task of justifying a procedural test for the legitimacy of 
substantive principles of justice in a modem society. On the basis of the 
paradigm shift from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of 
intersubjective understanding, Habermas’s version of the Kantian project 
is more successful than Rawls’s in achieving its end.54 Here I would like 
briefly to summarise the main reasons for favouring Habermas’s approach 
over that of Rawls, as the best theoretical articulation of the demands of 
post-conventional moral reasoning.55
Discourse ethics represents an attempt to redeem Hegel’s aspiration 
to overcome both the abstract individualism of Kant's moral universalism 
and the concrete particularism of Aristotelian moral contextualism.56
54 The best available discussion of the work of Habermas and Rawls is Baynes The
Normative Grounds o f Social Criticism.
55 Habermas makes the case for the superiority of discourse ethics as against Rawls's
theory most explicitly in "Justice and Solidarity" but see also Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action, 66-61, 198, Autonomy and 
Solidarity, 158, 199-202, 271, Justification and Application, 25-30, 48-54, 92- 
96. In contrast with Habermas's encounter with scepticism, the contest between 
competing post-conventional moral theories cannot be based on arguments about 
a logic of development, but rather it must be decided on the basis of 
philosophical argument, "Justice and Solidarity", 32-35.
56 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 201.
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Habermas achieves this to the extent that morality is grounded in the 
intersubjective understanding of participants in moral argumentation.
This allows him to link justice with solidarity and concern for the 
common good by elaborating certain structural features of the good life. 
These are the social bonds of an intersubjectively shared web of mutual 
recognition that constitute the well-being of any community. The 
protection of these social bonds is a necessary condition of respect for 
the dignity of each individual.57 As well as grounding the individual's 
equal right to respond freely to the offer of a normative validity claim, 
discourse ethics at the same time requires that each participant overcome 
an egocentric perspective by adopting the perspective of all the others. 
Solidarity and empathetic sensitivity among all participants is thereby 
built into an impartial point of view. One implication of this is that 
autonomy is reformulated in intersubjectivist terms since according to this 
account "the free actualization of the personality of one individual 
depends on the actualization of freedom of all.”58
By grounding his procedure in everyday communicative practices, 
Habermas sees no need to introduce a veil of ignorance into the 
description of an impartial point of view. The idealising presuppositions
57 It is for this reason that the arguments of Taylor and Low-Beer, as noted above, 
collapse into each other.
68 M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 207. On the role of morality in 
protecting the vulnerable individual through the protection of the web of 
intersubjective recognition on which the individual's identity depends see also 
Justification and Application, 109. This should make clear the superiority of 
discourse ethics on this point as against Walzer's hermeneutics. Walzer’s 
weakness in this regard was discussed at the end of section 2.3 above. An 
incisive discussion o f Habermas's notion of autonomy, and how it can, with some 
modification, be defended from Foucauldian criticism, is given by Maeve Cooke 
"Habermas, Autonomy and the Identity of the Self" Philosophy and Social 
Criticism , 18 (1992), 269-292.
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that participants actually do make already require them to adopt a 
hypothetical stance towards their own interpretations of their needs and 
interests. In argumentation, characterised as a real encounter with others, 
we adopt the perspective of all participants, or as Habermas puts it, we 
engage in the practice of ideal role taking.59 The notion of an original 
position is therefore redundant.60 The lifting of the veil of ignorance 
means that nothing is excluded as a potential subject of discourse. It also 
means that the participants can bring to the encounter knowledge of 
everything that particularises them.
Participants in argumentation do not choose principles of justice in 
isolation from each other by asking themselves what they would find 
acceptable if they did not know the position they were to occupy in 
society. Habermas's explanation of a moral point of view involves a 
much more radical break from an egocentric perspective than is achieved 
by the parties to Rawls’s original position. Those parties choose 
principles on the basis of a calculation of private interests.61 In contrast,
69 Habermas's discussion of ideal role taking draws on the work of Mead, although 
"practical discourse transforms what Mead viewed as individual, privately 
enacted role taking into a public affair, practiced intersubjectively by all 
involved", Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 198. See also 
"Justice and Solidarity", 38-41.
60 I suggested at the end of section 1.4 that the original position can at best act as a
test to clarify whether or not our public discourse has brought us to a rationally 
justified consensus on a principle of justice. Even though Okin's interpretation of 
the original position shows us that the parties must care about each other as 
much as they do about themselves, this does not address the real issue of how 
the participants are enabled to do this. By explaining an impartial point of view 
in terms of a real discourse, we can see how an encounter with collective 
concrete others facilitates and makes possible shared moral insight.
61 In "Contractualism and Utilitarianism", Thomas Scanlon maintains that in
choosing principles of justice, the parties to a contract are moved by "the desire 
to be able to justify one's actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably 
reject", 116, and that this requires that they adopt the perspectives of other
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a participant in discourse can only make a moral judgement socially, in a 
co-operative venture with all the others concerned. An impartial point of 
view must therefore be thought of as a reflective form of communicative 
action, where the presuppositions of argumentation constrain all the 
participants to ideal role taking.62
It is clear in Rawls's most recent work that he understands the 
rationality of the choosing parties to be framed by the reasonableness of 
the conditions of choice that constitute the original position. These 
conditions are themselves justified in relation to a model conception of 
the citizen. This model conception of the citizen is however based on the 
deeply embedded convictions of a particular political tradition. It cannot 
therefore provide the grounds for a procedure of rational justification as 
such. Rawls’s constructivism is rooted in a particular context in a way 
that Habermas's procedure of rational justification, being grounded in the
parties, 122. But the ideal role taking that Scanlon discusses is, according to 
Habermas, something that is always already taking place once we engage in 
discourse. Since this involves the unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions of 
communication it takes us beyond the perspective of contractualism altogether. 
See "Justice and Solidarity", 37-41 and Wamke Justice and Interpretation, 92- 
94. Kenneth Baynes points out that, unlike Habermas, Scanlon fails to 
distinguish adequately between social norms that regulate behaviour from the 
general rules for reaching agreement, or, in the terms that I have been using, 
substantive principles from procedures of justification, The Normative Grounds 
o f Social Criticism, 117-118. It seems to me that this is linked to Scanlon's 
defence of a contractualist position, in that he begins with individuals who come 
together to find norms that will regulate their social world. Habermas of course 
takes as his starting point the necessary conditions for the communicative 
reproduction of the lifeworld. If we also consider the fact that in Scanlon's 
approach real argumentation does not necessarily have to take place, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that Scanlon's account of a moral, or an impartial, point of 
view only partially overcomes the problems associated with Rawls's monological 
procedure.
62 "Justice and Solidarity", 40.
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rational reconstruction of the idealising presuppositions of 
communication as such, is not.63
The context-dependence of Rawls’s procedure is related to the fact 
that Rawls is not only clarifying the demands of impartiality, but he also 
wants to advocate particular substantive principles of justice. It should 
come as no surprise that substantive principles will be shaped by the 
deeply held convictions of particular traditions. But, as we have already 
seen, Habermas maintains that this task of advocating substantive 
principles must be kept strictly separate from the philosophical task of 
clarifying an impartial point of view. The latter task provides us with a 
procedure of rational justification that can test the legitimacy of 
substantive principles but it leaves the generation and the testing of those 
principles up to participants in particular contexts. Habermas could 
therefore agree with Walzer's critique of Rawls’s substantive principles, 
that they are insufficiently sensitive to particular contexts. But he would 
add another criticism that Walzer could not endorse, that Rawls's 
procedure of justification is insufficiently independent of particular 
contexts.
Discourse ethics theorises impartiality in a way which can overcome 
the difficulties that Rawls’s project encounters when faced with the 
challenges of communitarianism, post-structuralism and feminism. If we 
recall, in the first chapter I argued that Rawls's attempt to isolate political 
aspects of our morality from our more comprehensive moral views prior 
to reflection on principles of justice is untenable. Rawls is forced into 
this attempted isolation of the political because his monological 
understanding of an impartial point of view is designed to avoid moral
63 Justification and Application, 28. See also Ingram "The Limits and Possibilities 
of Communicative Ethics for Democratic Theory", 305-306.
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controversy. It seeks to do so by accommodating the moral intuitions of 
all parties to the overlapping consensus.
Rawls’s strategy of avoidance implies that we must exclude from our 
public deliberations anything about which it is presumed that we will not 
agree. This precludes the possibility of a transformation of the initial 
moral intuitions of the parties and offers us a rather static model of the 
demands of impartiality. It also precludes the possibility of any genuinely 
collective insight in our public deliberations about justice. Without such 
collective insight it is difficult to see how any progress can be made in 
our attempts to provide a normative justification for principles of justice 
that are to regulate the institutions and practices of our society. Rawls's 
invitation to the citizens of a democratic society to enter the original 
position would certainly not lead to any significant political achievements 
without some such collective insight. Despite this, his own account of an 
impartial point of view does little to enlighten us as to how the real moral 
differences between us are fairly to be dealt with. As we saw in the first 
chapter, these differences may well lead us to question the conditions of 
choice as laid down in Rawls's description of the original position. If this 
is so then we will have at least one good reason for not taking up his 
invitation.
In the face of the communitarian challenge to the Kantian project, 
Habermas can affirm the priority of right by reconstructing the rules of 
moral argumentation. But this in no way restricts the potential subject 
matter of a discourse. There is no need to isolate in advance political 
aspects of morality and to attempt (in vain) to avoid moral controversy. 
We can only separate moral questions, that admit of a rational consensus 
in terms of common interests, from ethical questions through the
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clarification of an actually carried out public discourse.64 It is through 
on-going deliberation within a vibrant public sphere that we will be 
enabled to test and to reflect on each others' moral intuitions in a way that 
protects the social bonds of an intersubjective web of mutual recognition 
while respecting the dignity of each individual.65
In response to the post-structuralist challenge, Habermas accepts that 
the lone theorist cannot clarify in isolation what is involved in adopting 
an impartial point of view. Rawls's model conception of the citizen 
would itself have to be subjected to the moralising gaze of all participants 
in a discourse about justice in a democratic society. Indeed Habermas's 
own reconstruction of the pragmatic presuppositions of moral 
argumentation is held to be fallible and to be susceptible to indirect 
empirical corroboration. With the demise of the philosophy of 
consciousness, the possibility of an ultimate philosophical justification 
must be rejected. The potential biases of the moral theorist therefore 
have nowhere left to hide as impartiality is reconceptualised in terms of a 
public dialogue.
With regard to the feminist challenge, there is no good reason for not 
considering the internal justice of the family to be a subject of discourse. 
Furthermore by stressing the intrinsic link between justice and solidarity, 
Habermas reiterates the need for actual discourses to take place if we are 
to achieve shared moral insights. These insights could not be generated 
by accommodating initial moral intuitions but only by putting those 
intuitions to the test in a real encounter with collective concrete others. 
Since discourse demands that we adopt a hypothetical stance towards our
64 Baynes "The Liberal/Communitarian Controversy and Communicative Ethics", 74.
65 Walker "Habermas and Pluralist Political Theory", 84-86.
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interpretations of our needs and interests, each participant engages in 
argumentation in foil awareness of the fact that the encounter itself could 
represent a moment of moral transformation.
It would appear then that there are a number of good reasons for 
taking discourse ethics to represent the most adequate articulation of the 
demands of post-conventional moral reasoning. With regard to questions 
of democratic legitimacy, it has clear advantages over Rawls's theory of 
justice. The extent to which it can incorporate the better insights of a 
variety of contextualist criticisms of the Kantian project gives sufficient 
evidence for that. But there a number of other contextualist criticisms 
that could be aimed more directly at Habermas's work. It is to a 
consideration of these remaining criticisms that we must now turn.
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3.3 MORALITY AND ETHICAL LIFE
As we have noted, Habermas insists that discourse ethics is valid 
universally. Contextualists, from a variety of perspectives, argue that any 
attempt to defend moral universalism not only fails to fulfil its promise to 
provide impartial standards or a critical foothold beyond all particular 
perspectives, but that it conceals from itself its own cultural prejudices, 
totalising tendencies and male biases. In our current cultural climate the 
recognition of difference is undoubtedly a matter of real concern. We 
have already considered, in the first chapter, the ways in which this 
concern is articulated theoretically in the work of communitarians, post­
structuralists and feminists. In such a climate, universalist moral claims 
appear so controversially strong that they carry with them a dauntingly 
onerous burden of proof. Habermas does not flinch from the challenge of 
carrying this burden, despite the perilous state of the theoretical terrain 
that must be traversed. His response is to ground discourse ethics in the 
pragmatic presuppositions of everyday practices of communication. I 
have argued that this grounding does justify an impartial point of view 
that can transcend the ethnocentric prejudices of a male, liberal, white, 
Western bourgeois worldview.
Habermas is able to overcome the contextualist challenge more 
effectively than Rawls because of the way in which he incorporates 
Hegelian insights into Kantian moral theory, most notably in his 
characterisation of moral discourse as a reflective form of communicative 
action. But since, according to Habermas, morality is indeed embedded 
in ethical life, this means that we must make a crucial distinction, one that 
I referred to briefly in the last section. This is the distinction between a 
moral employment of practical reason, one which deals with questions 
that can in principle be decided rationally in terms the universalisability
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of interests, and an ethical employment of practical reason, one which 
deals with evaluative questions that are accessible to rational discussion 
only within the context of a concrete historical form of life or a particular 
conception of the good.1 Habermas restricts the scope of the moral 
domain by limiting it to questions concerning the universalisability of 
interests.
In this section I will focus directly on some of the issues at stake in 
the debate between Habermas and contemporary contextualists, an 
encounter that updates the agenda set by Hegel’s critique of Kant.2 In 
order to do so I will consider Habermas's distinction between the moral 
and the ethical employments of practical reason in relation to the 
arguments of three recent contributions to this debate. These arguments 
raise important questions for discourse ethics as a procedure that claims
1 M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 178, also Autonomy and
Solidarity, 266-268 and especially "On the Pragmatic, the Ethical and the Moral 
Employments of Practical Reason" in Justification and Application, 1-17. I will 
leave aside the pragmatic employment of practical reason. While this is certainly 
of some significance in the network of communicative processes which 
constitute the type of deliberative politics that Habermas advocates, it is not of 
direct relevance to our concerns here. For some of Habermas's recent reflections 
on that communicative network see "Three Normative Models of Democracy."
2 The most impressive recent alternatives to Kantian moral theory have come from
contemporary neo-Hegelian and neo-Aristotelian critics of proceduralism such as 
Charles Taylor Sources o f the Self and The Ethics o f Authenticity, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1992, Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue, Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions o f Moral Inquiry and 
Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy, London: Fontana, 1985. 
Habermas provides excellent critical commentary on these three alternatives in 
Justification and Application, on Williams, 21-25, on Taylor, 69-76, and on 
MacIntyre, 96-105. I will discuss an aspect of Taylors work below but I have 
chosen to focus, in the earlier parts of this section, on the work of two theorists 
who do not claim to present strongly contextualist alternatives to Habermas's 
approach, but who rather make explicit attempts to mediate between the 
universalist and contextualist positions.
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to test, in an impartial manner, the legitimacy of substantive principles of 
justice.
Seyla Benhabib advocates a ’’post-conventional Sittlichkeit", a vision 
of ethical life thought of from the standpoint of a universalist morality. 
This involves a rejection of Habermas's strict separation of moral and 
evaluative questions.3 Georgia Wamke advocates a hermeneutic 
conception of political philosophy, where an interpretive pluralism about 
appropriate principles of justice in any given society is thought to be 
inevitable. No procedure therefore, discourse ethics included, could 
possibly guarantee a consensus on any given principle.4 Charles Taylor 
advocates a "politics of recognition", where the importance of the cultural 
survival of certain, particular, collective goals can, at times, legitimately 
outweigh the importance of the state's uniform treatment of all its 
citizens. Taylor argues that Kantian proceduralism, in contrast to his own 
view, is insufficiently hospitable to cultural difference.5 We need to
3 See Situating the Self generally. The reference to a "post-conventional Sittlichkeit
is here at 11. Benhabib seeks to incorporate contextualist insights into a 
universalist position.
4 See Justice and Interpretation generally. On the inevitability of interpretive
pluralism, see 11-12. Wamke, in contrast to Benhabib, can be thought of as a 
contextualist who seeks to incorporate universalist insights into that position.
5 See Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", 25-13, especially 60-61.
This essay represents an attempt by Taylor to draw out the implications of his 
own philosophical hermeneutics for political questions of cultural difference.
That philosophical position is developed in Philosophical Papers, I: Human 
Agency and Language, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 
Philosophical Papers, II, Sources o f the Self md. The Ethics o f Authenticity.
For a more direct challenge to Kantian proceduralism see his "The Motivation 
behind a Procedural Ethics" in Kant and Political Philosophy: The 
Contemporary Legacy, Ronald Beiner and William James Booth (eds.), New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993, 337-359. Two other essays in which Taylor 
explicitly distinguishes his philosophical position from that of Habermas are 
"Language and Society" in Communicative Action, Axel Honneth and Hans Joas 
(eds.), 23-35 and "Inwardness and the Culture of Modernity" in Philosophical
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assess the extent to which these rival positions undermine the claim that 
Habermas's discourse ethics offers the best available theoretical resource 
for the necessary task of justifying substantive principles of justice in 
modem societies.
It would appear then, that despite the paradigm shift from the 
philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of intersubjective 
understanding, many of Habermas's critics maintain that his universalist 
moral theory has not gone far enough in incorporating Hegelian insights 
into the Kantian project. There are at least two remaining sets of 
Hegelian objections that we must consider. The first set concerns the 
formalism of Kantian moral theory. Given its exclusive stress on 
proceduralism, is discourse ethics devoid of moral content? If it is to 
avoid this emptiness, must it make some substantive moral claims that are 
inconsistent with formalism? I will deal with these objections in relation 
to Benhabib's work. The second set, which I will consider in relation to 
Wamke's work, concerns the idealising abstraction from ethical life that 
is involved in moral discourse. Does this render it insensitive to the real 
context of particular moral disputes? Can discourse be practically 
effective given its separation of rationally motivated insight from 
empirical attitudes? Finally, in relation to Taylor's work, I will discuss 
the ways in which the moral and ethical employments of practical reason 
are best to complement each other in relation to the legitimacy of 
substantive principles of justice.
Interventions in the Unfinished Project o f  Enlightenment, Axel Honneth et al. 
(eds.), 88-110,
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The Scope of the Moral Domain
The moral theory Seyla Benhabib develops in Situating the Self is a form 
of interactive universalism that draws heavily on Habermas’s work. 
Despite this, I think it will prove to be instructive to highlight the 
significance of the ways in which her version of discourse (or 
communicative) ethics differs from that of Habermas. Benhabib’s project 
is a post-Enlightenment reconstruction of the modem ideals of moral and 
political universalism through a dialectical engagement with the sceptical 
concerns of communitarians, feminists and postmodernists.6
Benhabib interprets the objection to Kantian formalism as the claim 
that any procedural moral theory faces an unavoidable choice between 
triviality and inconsistency. She argues that as a testing procedure for 
moral norms communicative ethics can evade this dilemma.7 As we will 
recall, Habermas himself notes that norms are generated not by 
philosophy but by real life.8 He is however insistent that moral 
philosophy can explain and ground a procedure of moral argumentation 
that could allow us to test the intersubjective validity of disputed norms 
that are thrown at us in everyday communicative practice. According to 
Benhabib what this procedure achieves is the placing of substantive 
limitations on our moral intuitions. It yields standards of what is morally 
permissible or impermissible, without telling us what is the most morally 
meritorious norm of action in any given context.
Benhabib argues that Habermas unnecessarily relies on the idea of 
consensus as a guarantee of the validity of a norm. According to her
6 Situating the Self 2.
7 Situating the Self 34.
8 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 204.
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version of discourse ethics, the moral principle (U) is redundant. Its 
consequentialist formulation renders it too indeterminate to be of use 
even as an adequate universalizability test for negative duties. For 
example, given the existence of masochists, the principle ”Do not inflict 
unnecessary suffering" could not be justified as a morally valid norm.
She maintains that we could overcome such counter-intuitive outcomes if 
(U) were abandoned along with its guarantee of consensus. The norms of 
universal respect and egalitarian reciprocity, which can be established as 
the normative content of the rules governing discourse, along with the 
principle (D), are adequate in themselves as a moral test. The infliction 
of unnecessary suffering would then have to be ruled out if the procedure 
of moral argumentation is not to be undermined itself. This shifts the 
emphasis from consensus as an outcome of discourse to the moral 
relationships that could sustain the practice of reaching reasoned 
agreement as a way of life.
It is on this basis that Benhabib calls for a "post-conventional 
Sittlichkeit." One implication of this is that Habermas’s distinction 
between a moral and an ethical use of practical reason can no longer be 
maintained. There is no longer the possibility of distinguishing between a 
moral norm that expresses a generalisable interest and an agreement that 
is premised on a prior commitment to the good of a shared way of life. In 
Benhabib's version of communicative ethics the scope of the moral 
domain is extended to include practical reasoning concerning particular 
conceptions of the good. While accepting that a universal, rational 
consensus is unattainable on such issues, we can, Benhabib maintains, 
allow for intersubjective moral debate and reflection on evaluative 
questions.9
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The restriction of the moral domain to questions of justice in 
Habermas's sense, that is questions that admit of a rational consensus, is, 
from Benhabib's perspective, untenable. Unfortunately this overlooks an 
important and distinctive feature of valid moral claims. For Habermas 
these moral claims can be given a strong cognitive justification. They are 
not validated simply with regard to the procedure of argumentation but 
rather because of the fact that they express a common will. This reflects 
a communicatively achieved moral insight into a generalisable interest as 
all participants come to this conviction together. We know that any norm 
that passes (U)’s test is right because the grounds that support it are 
rationally justified. Benhabib claims to defend ethical cognitivism in that 
valid norms must be supported with reasons, but this claim is weakened 
since these norms need not express a common will.10 She must accept 
this consequence as the price to be paid for such an extensive moral 
domain.11
Benhabib also suggests that her concern to distance herself from 
strictly formalist Kantianism leaves her less vulnerable than Habermas to 
the sting of contextualist criticism. Her weak deontological moral theory 
commits her to certain substantive presuppositions. She maintains that 
such a commitment is unavoidable.12 Communicative ethics is justified as 
an "historically self-conscious universalism" that establishes the 
principles of universal respect and egalitarian reciprocity as "our 
philosophical clarification of the constituents of the moral point of view
9 Situating the Self, 75.
10 On ethical cognitivism see Situating the Self, 49-50.
11 See also Maeve Cooke's critique of Benhabib in her "Habermas and Consensus".
12 Situating the Self, 74.
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from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity.”13 She 
presents this as an alternative to Habermas’s strategy of reconstructing 
presumably universal competences of all communicative actors in the 
context of a modem lifeworld.
But in fact Benhabib's position is hardly distinguishable at all from 
Habermas's own views on this matter. Benhabib's defence of post- 
conventional morality and the conception of modernity that informs it 
depend very much on Habermas’s reconstruction.14 While she maintains 
that other interpretations of the requirements of post-conventional moral 
competence cannot be mled out in principle, this has also been conceded 
by Habermas. It was precisely this point that he was making in 
presenting his reconstruction as fallible while rejecting Apel's notion of 
an ultimate justification. Furthermore he has stressed the fact that his 
defence of discourse ethics as against other post-conventional moral 
theories, such as those of Rawls and Scanlon, is based on philosophical 
arguments that are "fuelled by historical experience" and not with 
reference to empirical science.15 As we have seen, these arguments turn 
on the shift from a monological to a dialogical conception of an impartial 
point of view. We will recall that if the individual's dignity is to be 
respected then the social bonds of the intersubjectively shared web of 
mutual recognition on which that individual’s identity is dependent must 
also be protected.16 This elaboration of the structural features of a good
13 Situating the Self \ 30.
14 Habermas's reconstruction is elaborated in the two volumes of The Theory of
Communicative Action. For evidence of Benhabib's dependence on, what we 
might call this critical Weberian account of modernity, Situating the Self 32-33, 
40-42, 80-82, 86-87, 225-228.
15 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 175.
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life that Habermas includes in his deontological conception of justice can 
be thought of as the articulation of substantive presuppositions that take 
him, with Benhabib, beyond the strict formalism of Kant.
There is another important matter at issue between Benhabib and 
Habermas regarding the scope of the moral domain. This relates to the 
sensitivity of discourse ethics to particular moral contexts and to morally 
relevant differences between individual actors. According to Benhabib, 
Habermas's conception of an impartial point of view is too rationalistic 
and not situated enough in the context of gender and community.17 We 
saw in the first chapter how Benhabib, in presenting her criticisms of 
Rawls, draws on Carol Gilligan's feminist critique of moral theories that 
privilege justice and rights over care and concern for particular concrete 
others.18 Habermas is also accused of relegating care to the margins of a 
moral domain that is centred on issues of justice.19 The conception of 
moral maturity implied depends on a male bias that emphasises "our 
dignity and worth as moral subjects at the cost of forgetting and 
repressing our vulnerability and dependency as bodily selves."20 While 
not wishing to underestimate the importance of our moral concern for 
justice in political and socio-economic arrangements, Benhabib maintains 
that the moral disputes most likely to preoccupy us relate to personal
16 "Justice and Solidarity", Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 200
and Justification and Application, 67-69.
17 Situating the Self \ 8.
18 A revised version of the essay "The Generalized and the Concrete Other" in
included in Situating the Self \ 148-177.
19 Situating the Self,\ 183.
20 Situating the Self \ 189.
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decisions demanded of us in relationships, at work, in the social 
interaction of our everyday lives.21
I have already outlined the way in which justice and solidarity are 
considered to be two sides of the one coin in Habermas’s defence of 
discourse ethics. Our concern with both individual rights and the care of 
the other have the same root, the protection of the social bonds that 
constitute a web of inter subjective recognition. Moral reflection is 
impossible without empathetic sensitivity among the participants.22 
Strangely enough Benhabib admits, quite rightly, that Habermas has 
incorporated this concern for the other into his conception of an impartial 
point of view, but without withdrawing her criticisms.23 I suspect that her 
continuing unease is due to Habermas's restriction of the moral domain to 
questions that admit of rational justification in terms of generalisable 
interests. Benhabib could, I believe, relieve herself of this unease by 
considering the fact that, in Habermas's recent work, evaluative questions 
do admit of a rational solution although this will be arrived at through an 
ethical, and not a moral, employment of practical reason.
Evaluative questions do not yield an answer that is valid for 
everyone. In seeking rationally to answer the question "what is right for 
me?" or "what is right for us as a particular group sharing certain ideals?"
21 Situating the Self, 184-185.
22 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 199-203. Habermas insists
that this is simply a requirement of rational justification itself. It is not therefore 
to be thought of as a task of working out a proper balance for the roles of reason 
and emotion in moral discourse, "Justice and Solidarity", 40-41.
23 Situating the Self \ 189-190. Benhabib's criticisms of Rawls's monological
proceduralism, which I upheld in section 1.4, remain valid. The criticism cannot 
however be pressed, even in a diluted form, against Habermas's dialogical 
conception of impartiality.
282
we must appeal to standards of authenticity. This involves a critical task 
of hermeneutic self-clarification. What is at stake is a matter of identity 
that depends on a prior commitment to a particular consciously pursued 
way of life. Moral questions on the other hand are not resolved in 
relation to any particular form of life but they are concerned with the 
justification of principles that could be acceptable to all.24 We can only 
work out whether a question is moral or evaluative after we have engaged 
in argumentation.
Take for example the issue of abortion. Despite the fact that this has 
been a subject of public debate for some time, it would appear that there 
is no prospect of reasonable agreement with regard to the rights involved 
in this debate. The question therefore demands an ethical employment of 
practical reason in so far as different answers are given depending on the 
different ethical contexts in which it might be asked. There is however a 
moral question involved, but it is on a different level. It is the issue as to 
how the forms of life that give different solutions to the question; "is 
abortion right for me / for us?" can co-exist under conditions of equal 
rights.25 It is through our failure to resolve the dispute about abortion as a 
moral question in itself that leads us to accept first, that it actually 
requires an ethical solution and second, that this in turn gives rise to a 
new moral issue.26 Of course many of the personal decisions that 
Benhabib is concerned to bring in from the margins of traditional moral
24 See especially Justification and Application, 4-8.
25 Habermas Justification and Application, 59-60.
26 We might note that this requires the kind of open public debate that Rawls's
strategy of avoidance seemed to preclude. Through argumentation we can work 
out whether a dispute admits of a moral or an ethical solution without deciding 
what is and what is not a matter of political morality in advance.
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theory will admit of a rational solution, but often this solution would have 
an ethical, and not a moral, character.
It would appear then that Habermas and Benhabib agree that ethical 
questions, which by Habermas's definition do not admit of a normative 
consensus, can nonetheless be answered rationally. Furthermore, even 
though they define the moral in different ways, they also agree on the 
deontological point that moral norms constrain reasonable conceptions of 
the good.27 Given this, it is not clear that Benhabib gains anything by 
abandoning the distinction between the moral and the ethical, nor indeed 
does it appear to be necessary. What remains to be seen however is 
whether or not Habermas gains very much by holding on to the 
distinction. We will return to this matter later in this section when we 
attempt to explore the ways in which the moral and the ethical are related 
to each other with respect to questions of democratic legitimacy. What is 
clear here is that Habermas, no less than Benhabib, has incorporated 
many of the better insights of contextualists into his account of discourse 
ethics. In doing so he has shown his moral theory to be premised on a 
more situated, and less pure, conception of reason than many critics 
suppose.
Hermeneutics and Discourse
In Justice and Interpretation Georgia Wamke stresses the self- 
interpretive dimension of mutually educational conversations about 
justice within the context of a particular tradition. Warnke traces the 
impulse for the recent interpretive turn in moral and political theory to a 
dissatisfaction with the abstract formalism of Kantianism.28 She
27 Situating the Self, 187.
284
maintains that while political philosophy can encourage these self- 
interpretive conversations in a democratic society, a certain interpretive 
pluralism about the principles of justice that would be appropriate to that 
particular society is unavoidable. This rules out the possibility of a 
consensus on any moral principle. Despite this apparent subordination of 
morality to ethical life, Wamke is aware of the possible dangers involved 
in the implied relativism of her position. She seeks to defuse these 
dangers by insisting that hermeneutic conversations presuppose 
conditions of fairness.29 It seem to me that this cannot be done without a 
more explicit appeal to Kantianism than Wamke seems willing to make.
The interpretive understanding of principles of justice that has 
followed from this hermeneutic turn in recent political philosophy reflects 
a shift from Kant towards Hegel in its conception of a theory of justice as 
an "attempt to uncover and articulate the principles already embedded in 
or implied by a community’s practices, institutions and norms of action.”30 
From the perspective of hermeneutics, morality and justice do not have to 
be constructed or discovered independently of particular cultures since 
they themselves are embedded within the ethical context of historical 
communities. Moral principles must therefore be interpreted rather than 
derived from any abstract idealising procedure. We have already 
considered this position, and exposed its serious weaknesses, in our 
discussion of Walzer’s work in the second chapter.
Wamke is concerned to provide theoretical resources that would 
defend the hermeneutic approach to matters of justice from the charge 
that it must inevitably yield either a conventionalist or a subjectivist
28 Justice and Interpretation, 3-4.
29 Justice and Interpretation, 157.
30 Justice and Interpretation, 5.
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reading of our ethical life. A conventionalist reading would lead to an 
uncritical, conservative attachment to tradition with the consequence that 
the moral protection of minority rights and individual autonomy become 
dangerously inadequate. A subjectivist reading would reflect the 
personal biases and preferences of an individual interpreter thus 
undermining any claim to justify moral principles for the whole 
community.31
Wamke considers whether or not there are rational standards of 
interpretation that might enable hermeneutics to escape from the shadows 
of conservative conventionalism and partisan subjectivism. Discourse 
ethics, with its claim to provide a context-independent procedural test for 
substantive norms, is an obvious starting point in the quest for such 
critical standards. Wamke shares Benhabib’s doubts about the ideal of 
consensus that is so crucial to Habermas’s procedure of justification for 
moral norms. She wonders whether (U)’s test is simply too strict for any
81 In the first half of the book Wamke works through a careful analysis of the
contributions of Walzer, Rawls and Dworkin without managing to relieve herself 
of worries about conventionalism and subjectivism. As we have already seen, 
Walzer believes that hermeneutic interpretations of the shared understandings of 
a particular community can allow for an immanent critique of practices that 
deviate from that understanding. Wamke rightly points out that it is not clear 
how one critic's interpretation can guarantee agreement and so Walzer's account 
of the substance of justice for his own society remains a subjectivist one, Justice 
and Interpretation, 30. She also points out that Rawls's appeal to an 
overlapping consensus fails to resolve this problem since the model conceptions 
of moral personality and a well-ordered society on which it depends build on 
what Rawls's critics take to be a selective reading of our public political culture, 
Justice and Interpretation, 54-58. Dworkin's account of legal interpretation, see 
especially A Matter o f Principle and Law's Empire, tends to deviate from its 
own hermeneutic implications, Justice and Interpretation, 78-80. Despite this 
however, it allows us to think of constrained legal judgement as an educational 
process of self-development where we learn something about ourselves in trying 
to understand the law in the context of a test case. But the value of such an 
education might be put in question if the constraints involved cannot in principle 
rule out even sexist or racist interpretations of the law, Justice and 
Interpretation, 88.
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norm to pass or indeed whether there are any generalisable interests at 
all.32 Wamke notes Habermas's acceptance that under conditions of 
pluralism, and an ever greater diversity of lifestyles, morally justified 
norms become ever more general and abstract and that, furthermore, 
many disputes will turn out to reflect particular and not generalisable 
interests.33 In such a case what is called for is a fair compromise and not 
a consensus, though this does of course require morally justified 
procedures for compromising.
Wamke responds to this by claiming that it is unlikely that we would 
even agree on what would constitute fair conditions of compromise. 
However it must be noted that, according to Habermas, moral theory 
itself can never guarantee a consensus, either on a norm or on a 
procedure of compromise. It can tell us what a morally justified 
procedure of justification involves but it does not inform us as to the 
content of that procedure nor, as we will see, could it ever ensure that the 
participants will act morally.34 Wamke's criticism is not altogether 
convincing for another reason. In the case of reasonable yet conflicting 
particular interests, it seems plausible to argue that a fair compromise 
would constitute a generalisable interest, in protecting the conditions for 
a democratic form of life for example, on which a rational consensus 
could certainly not be ruled out in principle. This helps us to understand 
the nature of the moral question that is raised in the dispute about 
abortion.
32 Justice and Interpretation, 96-97.
33 See for example, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 205 and
Justification and Application, 91.
34 See for example "Lawrence Kohlberg and Neo-Aristotelianism" in Justification
and Application, 113-132, here at 127-128.
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With regard to Habermas's view, that moral norms become more 
abstract and general in modem societies, Wamke maintains that this 
occurs to such an extent that, if these norms are not to become entirely 
irrelevant, the concrete disputes in which they are brought to bear will 
enmesh us once again in the interpretive problems from which discourse 
ethics promised an escape. Habermas does however insist on a 
distinction between the justification of a moral norm and its application.35 
The application of a norm requires a hermeneutic effort to undo the 
decontextualisation that was necessary to give it a rationally grounded 
justification.
While justification does not depend on any particular ethical context, 
impartial application proceeds interpretively in the light of all information 
relevant to the context of the actual dispute. Nonetheless application, no 
less than justification, requires the use of practical reason and must be 
carried out from a moral point of view. The idea of impartiality 
expressed in justificatory discourses as a principle of universalization 
appears in a discourse of application as a principle of appropriateness.36 
The cognitive operation involved in applying the appropriate valid norm 
in a given case is integrated with empathetic concern for those affected in 
the particular circumstances of the situation. This further strengthens 
Habermas's claim to have given care for the concrete other its due in his 
interpretation of the moral point of view.
85 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 181-182, Justification and
Application, 36-39. See also Klaus Gunther "Impartial Application of Moral and 
Legal Norms: A Contribution to Discourse Ethics" in Universalism Vs.
Com muni tarianism, David Rasmussen (ed.), 199-206.
86 Justification and Application, 37.
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But what norms could possibly be justified independently of any 
concrete context? What Habermas seems to have in mind here is a set of 
moral norms, the validity of which has been established in advance, that 
we must choose between in seeking to apply the appropriate norm in a 
concrete context. He mentions human rights as examples of such norms 
since they clearly embody generalisable interests.37 These can, he 
maintains, be given a strong cognitive grounding, one that Benhabib has, 
perhaps inadvertently, given up on. For example, murder is wrong 
because the norm "do not kill" expresses a common will in protecting a 
generalisable interest in life. The justification of this norm is in no way 
dependent on a particular conception of a good life.38 This is all that it 
means to say that justification is not context dependent.
Habermas assumes that there are a number of moral norms, for 
example those expressing negative duties such as "do not deceive" or 
positive duties such as "keep your promises", that have prima facie 
validity since they appear to represent norms that all could will. We 
might also include "do not inflict unnecessary suffering," to return to one 
of Benhabib's objections that Wamke endorses, and another norm "do not 
interfere in the sexual practices of consenting adults."39 Now the 
existence of masochists no longer seems to invalidate the former norm, 
since in a discourse of application it might be decided that the latter and 
not the former is appropriate in a concrete case, say of a particular type
37 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 205.
38 Justification and Application, 62.
39 Justice and Interpretation, 97.
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of sado-masochistic sex. The former norm retains its validity even if it is 
deemed to be inappropriate in this particular instance.40
The fact that moral justification must be supplemented with a 
contextually-sensitive discourse of application further emphasises the 
fallibilism of Habermas's account. In acknowledging the critical potential 
of superior future knowledge Habermas admits that our interpretations of 
morally valid norms must be provisional as they can change in the light of 
new circumstances. This awareness of the historical nature of the social 
world reveals the extent to which Habermas has appropriated the insights 
of hermeneutics.41
We must return to the Hegelian objection that discourse ethics is 
practically ineffective because its abstraction from ethical life leaves it 
with a serious motivational deficit. Rationally motivated insight is 
separated from empirical attitudes. I already pointed out that Habermas 
limits moral theory to the justification of valid norms and so freely admits 
that it could never guarantee that participants will act morally.42 It must 
be borne in mind however that if it is successful in the former task then it 
will have achieved much. While his self-limiting conception of moral 
theory may be disappointing to some, the expectation that philosophy 
could provide sufficient motivation for moral action on its own would
40 I think that this relationship between the justification and the application of moral
norms allows for greater flexibility and complexity than does Walzer's approach 
to substantive principles of justice. The assumption that is fundamental to 
complex equality is that there will be a neat fit between spheres of justice and the 
principles that are intrinsic to each particular sphere. As I suggested in the 
second chapter, this is simply not complex enough.
41 Justification and Application, 39.
42 Justification and Application, 12-17, 33*3 5, 127-128.
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seem to overburden philosophy with a task that, given the demise of 
metaphysical worldviews, it can no longer accomplish.43
Habermas accepts that moral insight is compatible with a weakness 
of will and so its only motivating power is that an actor will have no good 
reason to act otherwise.44 The gap between moral judgement and moral 
action must be compensated for with the anchoring of moral insight in the 
participants' internalisation of the authority of the abstract principles 
embodied in discourse ethics. Ultimately the internalisation of the 
authority of principles will depend on processes of socialisation that are 
constitutive of a form of life that can meet discourse ethics halfway.
There must be a "modicum of congruence" between morality and 
practices of socialisation that could promote this internalisation as well as 
socio-political institutions that will embody to some extent post- 
conventional ideas about law and morality.45
48 Justification and Application, 74-76.
44 Justification and Application, 33.
45 Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 207-208. It is this theme that
has occupied Habermas in his most recent writings, especially in Faktizit&t und 
Geltung. This point may give us some idea as to how discourse ethics might 
guide us with regard to the possible clash between certain human rights and local 
arrangements regarding principles of distributive justice. In section 2.3 above I 
mentioned the example of a controversy that might arise among citizens of a 
relatively wealthy country who realise that they will have to change their own 
patterns of distribution if they are to take sufficiently seriously the rights of 
people who are starving as a result of famine. If such a basic human right as the 
right not to die of starvation is to be taken seriously, we must seek to create 
global institutions that would have some legal right to draw on the resources of 
countries that can afford to make a contribution to the setting up a long-term 
project that could overcome effectively the causes of the suffering that people 
caught in such disasterous circumstances have to endure. The creation of such 
institutions will depend very much on the outcome of a political struggle that is 
barely under way. Of course ultimately these considerations point us in the 
direction of a world state but I cannot pursue any possible justifications for such 
an arrangement here.
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These achievements are the result of an historical social struggle. It 
would be absurd to think that they were the tasks of the moral 
philosopher or the theorist of justice alone. This is the reason why 
Habermas refrains from advocating particular substantive principles of 
justice. Such concrete decisions must be left up to the participants in a 
particular form of life. The ethical use of practical reason can guide the 
action of those who seek to ensure that their particular form of life better 
supports a universalist morality. As we will see below, moral and ethical 
reflection are complementary and very often we will be required to use 
both in the context of a particular dispute about justice.
This discussion of the work of Benhabib, with her concern for 
personal decision making, and of Wamke, with her focus on the 
interpretation of substantive principles of justice in particular contexts, 
makes it clear that the ethical employment of practical reason is of great 
significance. Until recently Habermas had stressed moral discourse to 
such an extent in his work that the significance of ethical matters seemed 
to have been overlooked.46 Both Wamke and Benhabib have however, in 
different ways, abandoned the distinction between moral and ethical 
questions. I have argued that they are unwise to do so. The relevance 
for modem ethical life of the distinctive form of moral discourse 
elaborated in Habermas's work has certainly not yet been exhausted.
It seems to me that the shortcomings of Wamke’s proposal for a 
hermeneutic conversation can be drawn on to illustrate this point. Such a 
conversation foregoes the aspiration to a normative consensus but aims 
rather at an ongoing dialogue, one which does not attempt to overcome
46 It is only with the essays collected in Justification and Application that Habermas 
began to turn his attention towards the ethical employment of practical reason in 
relation to questions of public discourse. His concern with ethico-political 
discourses is central to the arguments of Faktizittit und Geltung.
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interpretive pluralism. This dialogue will be mutually educational if we 
are to be genuinely open to other interpretations of the principles of 
justice that are to regulate our social interaction. Wamke is explicit in 
maintaining the need for some constraints on interpretation so that the 
conditions of the conversation are fair.47 She turns to Habermas in 
elaborating the procedural rules of discourse ethics and also in pointing 
towards his social theory as a way of identifying and overcoming 
distortions in such conversations. She even invokes the idea of a 
reconstructive science as an empirical support for such a theory.48 What 
she fails to recognise however is the extent to which this brings her away 
from Hegel back towards Kant. She stops short of accepting fully 
Habermas's conception of moral discourse, but it seems to me that if we 
are concerned to protect the conditions for a democratic form of life, then 
nothing less than this can finally save us from the dangers of 
conventionalism and subjectivism. While no substantive principles of 
justice are offered, discourse ethics retains its critical function as a 
fallible, yet universally valid, procedure of moral argumentation.
Recognition and Ethical Patterning
In his essay "The Politics of Recognition" Taylor raises the question of 
Kantian moral theory's sensitivity to cultural particularity. He begins with 
a clear and convincing holist account of personal identity. According to 
this account, the identity of an individual is constituted, at least in part, by 
relations with others.49 We come to a self understanding dialogically,
47 Justice and Interpretation, 155.
48 Justice and Interpretation, 148.
293
dependent as we are on a web of intersubjective recognition. Modern 
politics is characterised by the fact that individual citizens demand equal 
recognition from the state. This demand has come to be articulated 
theoretically in at least two different ways. A politics of equal dignity, 
inspired by Kant, demands equal rights for all citizens by virtue of their 
all having the potential to live an autonomous life. On the other hand a 
politics of difference, inspired by post-structuralism, demands that we 
acknowledge the particular identity of an individual, group or culture. In 
its strongest versions this implies that we must acknowledge the equal 
value not just of each citizen's potential for autonomy but "the equal 
value of what they have made of this potential in fact."50
Advocates of the politics of difference charge defenders of the 
politics of equal dignity with insensitivity to cultural particularity, a 
charge that Taylor supports. He finds Kantian moral theory, with its 
stress on equal individual rights, to be ill-equipped for the important task 
of safeguarding collective identities. Taylor gives two reasons for this. 
First, Kantianism tends to advocate a procedure of impartiality as a set of 
rules for defining individual rights. It insists that these rules must be 
applied in a uniform manner across all cultures. Second, this kind of 
proceduralism asserts a priority of right that is suspicious of collective 
goals.51 He presents an alternative "politics of recognition" that respects 
basic rights while also allowing for a liberal state to espouse a strong
49 Multiculturalism and "The Politics o f Recognition", 32. It is this kind of account
that I defended in section 1.2 above. It should be clear by now that Habermas 
also considers the identity o f the self to be dialogically constituted.
50 Multiculturalism and "The Politics o f Recognition", 42-43.
51 Multiculturalism and "The Politics o f Recognition", 60.
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collective goal, such as the survival of its own distinctive cultural 
tradition.52
But Taylor also seeks to maintain a scathingly critical distance from 
the "subjectivist, half-baked neo-Nietzschean" judgement that all cultures 
are of equal worth.53 He finds this strong post-structuralist claim, that all 
cultures are of equal value not only in potential but in fact, to be 
somewhat ridiculous. He argues that we certainly must be open to the 
potential value of learning something new from a dialogical encounter 
with a different culture. We must respect other cultures by approaching 
them with an initial presumption of equal worth.54 Indeed, in this way we 
actually acquire an enriched self understanding. However we must also 
accept that we do in fact learn more from some cultures than from others. 
What could be more homogenising than to demand that we must find all 
cultures to be of equal worth?55 It is surely absurd to expect that 
encounters with each other culture would be equally significant in 
enriching our own self-understanding? Taylor suggests that if our
52 In Multiculturalism and "The Politics o f Recognition", 51-61, Taylor reaches his
conclusion, that this alternative to Kantianism is necessary, from an examination 
of the argument made by some Quebeckers, that the state's legislation should 
reflect the fact that it is a "distinct society." He is keen to point out however that 
so long as diversity is respected and fundamental rights protected, this is still a 
liberal model of politics. It is, however, a model that is organised not around a 
procedure of impartiality, but rather a definition of the good life. The work of 
Axel Honneth presents a interesting alternative attempt to ground morality on 
the concept of recognition "Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception 
of Morality Based on a Theory of Recognition" Political Theory, 20 (1992), 
187-201 and for a much more extensive discussion The Struggle for  
Recognition: The Moral Grammar o f Social Conflicts, Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 1994.
53 Multiculturalism and ”The Politics of Recognition", 70.
54 Multiculturalism and "The Politics o f Recognition", 66-73.
55 Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", 71.
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recognition of other cultures and collective identities were granted so 
cheaply, it could hardly count as the authentic expression of respect that 
is sought by groups and cultures who wish to have the particularity of 
their identities acknowledged.
There are a number of difficulties with Taylor’s approach. He neither 
establishes the claim that Kantian moral theory is insensitive to cultural 
particularity nor can the alternative he presents successfully avoid facing 
some serious objections. While his criticisms of Kantianism may carry 
some weight with regard to the proposals of those liberals who conceive 
of impartiality in a monological way, they are not at all convincing when 
levelled at discourse ethics.
As we have seen, Taylor suggests that the safeguarding of collective 
identities competes with the uniform treatment of citizens in relation to 
equal individual rights. Certain basic rights, though not the most 
fundamental liberties, can be trumped for the sake of ensuring that a 
distinctive cultural form of life will be carried forward by future 
generations. This might for example legitimately restrict citizens to the 
use of a particular language in business or in relation to their children's 
education.56
In response to Taylor, Habermas argues that collective rights could
only be thought to be in competition with equal individual rights if the
internal relation between private and civic autonomy were overlooked.
According to him
private legal persons cannot even gain equal individual liberties 
unless they themselves, by jointly exercising their autonomy as 
citizens, arrive at a clear understanding of the legitimate interests and 
standards involved and reach agreement on those aspects and criteria
56 These are the kinds of example that Taylor mentions in relation to the Quebec 
case, Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", 55.
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according to which equal things should be treated equally and
unequal things unequally.57
Any and every legitimate system of rights must be implemented by 
democratic means. Legal subjects have an intersubjectively constituted 
identity so any system of rights must protect both individual liberties and 
"the integrity of the individual in his or her identity forming life 
context."58 For this reason cultural and social differences must be taken 
into account if rights are to be implemented democratically. This 
presupposes that the particular needs of distinctive cultures and social 
groups are articulated and justified in an open public discourse.59 The 
democratic implementation of a system of rights must be sensitive to the 
different life contexts in which the identities of individual legal subjects 
are secured. Taylor is therefore wrong to claim that Kantian moral theory 
must ignore cultural and social differences in implementing equal 
individual rights. He is also mistaken in his implication that there is no 
internal relation between collective rights and the protection of individual 
liberties.60
57 "Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States" European Journal of
Philosophy, 1 (1993), 128-155, here at 131.
58 "Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States", 132.
59 In this regard Habermas discusses the ways in which differences in the experiences
of women and men must be taken into account in any attempt to guarantee equal 
opportunities to exercise equal individual liberties, "Struggles for Recognition in 
Constitutional States", 132-134 and for a detailed discussion Faktizitat und 
Geltung, 493-515. Again this stress on the public articulation of particular needs 
enables him to evade the problems Rawls encounters in the face of the challenges 
of post-structuralism and feminism.
60 Habermas "Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States", 136-137 but see
also Will Kymlicka Liberalism, Community and Culture, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1991.
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Taylor also suggests, in presenting his alternative, that policies which 
aim at the survival of a distinctive culture should not be seen as "just 
providing a facility to already existing people."61 These policies seek to 
ensure that the collective identity of that particular culture be carried 
forward in the future and so they are designed to actually create new 
members of a community. It is not enough to guarantee the protection of 
the life contexts in which the particular identities of existing persons are 
secured, but rather we must ensure that the distinctive culture survives 
through "indefinite future generations."62
But why should this be so? Certainly there is a sense in which the 
protection of the life context in which the identities of existing persons 
are secured might involve the support of their attempts to impart to the 
next generation the value of keeping their distinctive culture alive. But it 
might be the case that the next generation do not share the same passion 
for maintaining that distinctiveness. In other words, the earlier generation 
might fail in its attempt to instil in its children the conviction that their 
distinctness should be cherished. In this case the particular culture may 
indeed fail to survive but surely this cannot be avoided. The protection 
of identity-forming life contexts is not to be thought of as "an 
administrative preservation of cultural species."63
One further problem with Taylor's approach is that the right which 
each of us has to equal respect in our identity-forming context seems to 
depend, in his account, on the initial presumption that our distinctive
61 Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition"y 59.
62 Note Taylor's criticism of Kymlicka, Multiculturalism and "The Politics of
Recognition", 40-41, n. 16.
63 Habermas "Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States", 142.
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culture is of equal worth with other cultures. It is presumed to be of 
equal worth in relation to its having "something important to say to all 
human beings."64 Why should the recognition and respect of our 
distinctive collective identity have anything to do with such a 
contribution? Again Taylor's difficulty here seems to be connected to his 
overlooking the way in which individual rights and the respect of 
collective identities are internally related. It is not because a particular 
culture might have something of value to say to all other cultures that the 
individuals who identify themselves with that culture should be treated 
equally by the state. It is simply because that culture represents the 
identity-forming life context of those individuals that we must recognise 
and respect the distinctiveness of that culture as a necessary requirement 
of the equal treatment of all citizens.65 While his critique of post­
structuralism is undoubtedly cogent, Taylor himself unwisely departs 
from Kantianism, at least of the kind espoused in discourse ethics, on this 
matter. The appeal to an initial presumption of equal worth is simply 
unnecessary to justify the recognition and protection of collective 
identities in modem constitutional states.66
This issue of the recognition of collective identities clears up a 
number of questions regarding moral and ethical employments of 
practical reason in relation to democratic legitimacy. Habermas has now 
made it clear that he does not consider it possible for any constitutional
64 Multiculturalism and "The Politics o f Recognition", 66.
65 Habermas "Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States", 141-142 and
Susan Wolf "Comment" in Multiculturalism and "The Politics o f Recognition", 
75-85, here at 78-81.
66 This protection is of course subject to the particular culture's capacity to affirm 
the demands of justice.
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state to be ethically neutral. The on-going democratic implementation of
any system of rights depends on the incorporation of political goals
"including those goals which are articulated in collective struggles for
recognition."67 In other words, the particular collective identities that are
represented in any one state give a certain ethical shape to the political
culture of that state. Legal norms always apply in a particular political
form of life, to the citizens of a specific republic, within a certain
geographically delimited territory. They must therefore depend on a
particular society's networks of interaction.
Habermas argues that we can continue to maintain that impartiality is
the core of justice, that ethical considerations are subordinate to moral
questions, and that the right has priority over the good, while at the same
time accepting that in the medium of law
setting normative rules for modes of behaviour is receptive to the 
goals set by the political will of a particular society. For this reason, 
every legal system is also the expression of a particular form of life 
and not merely a reflection of the universalist features of basic 
rights.68
From this it seems clear that for Habermas ethico-political discourse, in 
the form of hermeneutical self-interpretive reflection, does play an 
important role in procedures of democratic legitimation. The citizens of 
any specific republic must clarify for themselves their own ethical self- 
understanding. Of course this will involve an on-going struggle for 
recognition of those groups that have been marginalised in the past. 
Immigrant cultures challenge the majority culture to broaden their horizon
67 "Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States", 138.
68 "Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States", 138. See also Habermas's
"Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe" 
Praxis International, 12 (1992), 1-19, especially at 12.
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of self-understanding.69 Gay activists challenge citizens to see
themselves not just as a collectivity of heterosexuals. National minorities
challenge majorities to reinterpret their identities so as to allow for the
equal treatment of all the state’s citizens.70
So while collective identities must be allowed to flourish in their
particularity, the challenge to the citizens of any specific constitutional
state is to engage in a critical process of hermeneutic self-clarification so
as to achieve an integrated political culture.
This political integration of the citizens ensures loyalty to a shared 
political culture. The latter is rooted in an interpretation of the 
constitutional principles from the perspective of a nation’s historical 
experience; thus, the interpretation cannot be ethically neutral.71
The self-understanding of a political community is disputed within a
common horizon of interpretation, but according to Habermas, such
disputes, in any particular constitutional state will
revolve around the best interpretation of the same basic rights and 
principles. These then provide the fixed point of reference for any 
constitutional patriotism which situates the system of rights in the 
historical context of a polity. The cognitive grasp of rights and 
principles must be linked to the citizens' motives and sentiments; for 
without such a motivational base, they cannot become the driving 
force for the project - understood here in a dynamic sense - of 
establishing an association of free and equal subjects. For this
69 Habermas has discussed at length the implications of immigration in this regard,
especially in the particularly volatile context that is of special interest to him, in 
post-Unification Germany, "Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States", 
145-153, "Citizenship and National Identity", 13-18 and see also his most recent 
biting critique of contemporary right-wing German nationalism in "The Second 
Life-Fiction of the Federal Republic: We Have Become Normal' Again" New 
Left Review, 197 (1993), 58-66.
70 We will examine the case of Northern Ireland in detail in the next section.
71 "Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States", 144.
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reason, the common political culture in which the citizens identify 
themselves as members of their community is ethically patterned12
Habermas is advocating a form of constitutional patriotism which 
involves a commitment to the implementation in a particular political 
culture of universally valid norms that are justified through moral 
discourse. The ethical pattern of such a patriotism must be compatible 
with a consensus among diverse cultures on a procedure of democratic 
legitimation.73
We have already explored in detail the way in which Habermas 
grounds the procedure of moral discourse in the pragmatic 
presuppositions of communicative action. Ethico-political discourse 
complements such a procedure by allowing legal principles that express 
generalisable interests and universally valid moral norms to be embedded 
in the context of a particular form of life. We can now, at last, see how 
Habermas’s work presents us with that more adequate version of liberal 
holism that was anticipated in the discussion of the communitarian 
critique of Rawls. While moral discourse grounds the liberal concern 
with just institutions that guarantee individual rights, ethico-political 
discourse reflects the holist nature of a commitment to the historical 
embodiment of particular just institutions.74 Ethico-political discourse
72 "Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States", 144.
73 This is not of course based on the isolation of the political domain that is required
in the construction of Rawls's overlapping consensus. See also Kenneth Baynes 
"Liberal Neutrality, Pluralism and Deliberative Politics" Praxis International, 12 
(1992), 50-69.
74 This discussion should also justify the claim that I made in chapter 2, that
hermeneutics is at best an important aspect of, but never an adequate substitute 
for, a philosophical conception of an impartial point o f view. Hermeneutic self- 
clarification in the form of ethico-political discourse comes into play once moral 
norms, that make up the universalist code discussed in section 2.3, are 
institutionalised in historical contexts.
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also takes into account the fact that deliberative democracy requires both 
the critical assessment of political identity and the articulation of 
particular needs that the post-structuralist and the feminist challenges to 
Rawls's procedure demanded.
Hermeneutic theories of justice are partial in that they limit 
themselves to reflecting on justice in purely ethical terms. I believe that 
the alternative discussed in this chapter effectively overcomes the 
weaknesses of such an approach. This is because Habermas's dialogical 
conception of impartiality presents moral and ethical reflection as 
complementary employments of practical reason in our attempts to 
resolve disputes about justice. Finally, I now want to show how 
discourse ethics is superior to Walzer's hermeneutics in helping us to 
clarify the demands of justice in the context of one particular deeply 
divided society; Northern Ireland.
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3.4 THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND
We have now seen how Habermas's theory of communicative action 
involves a paradigm shift to a philosophy of intersubjective understanding 
that enables him to ground and justify a dialogical conception of 
impartiality. We have looked in some detail at this justification and in the 
last section I argued that, for all its ambition, discourse ethics can draw 
on such a wealth of argumentative resources in its own defence that it is 
sufficiently well fortified to withstand the challenges of some of its most 
astute contextualist critics. In this final section I will examine a concrete 
dispute about justice in one particular Western society. This concrete 
issue is one that dominates the public agenda in that society. The 
discussion will, I hope, support my claim that Habermas's theory of 
justice has important advantages over the contextualist alternative that we 
have considered in most depth in this thesis, that of Walzer. The 
concrete issue I refer to is the question of the legitimacy of the 
constitutional status of Northern Ireland.
If we wish to tie justice to the traditions of particular communities, as 
Walzer does, then a divided society like Northern Ireland should prove a 
challenging test case. This is of course partly because the notion of 
community is particularly problematic in such a context. By trying to 
apply Walzer's hermeneutics to this case I want to highlight the limits of 
that approach as an interpretive guide in assessing actual demands for 
justice in Northern Ireland. The real test here is whether or not the 
theory enables us to clarify the conditions that must be satisfied if a 
normatively justified solution to the particular conflict being analysed is 
to be achieved. It seems to me that Habermas's discourse theory attains a 
considerably higher degree of success than Walzer in relation to this test. 
My claim is that an analysis of this particular dispute about justice
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reveals that Habermas’s discourse theory can both incorporate the best 
insights of Walzer's hermeneutics and also give some indication as to 
how its limits might be transcended.
While I will be emphasising the strengths and weaknesses of the 
theoretical contributions of Walzer and Habermas, I also hope to say 
something constructive about Northern Ireland. I will offer a critique of 
one argument for the maintenance of the Union which at first glance 
appears to have much in common with Habermas's approach. What 
emerges from this critique is the suggestion that the problem of justice in 
Northern Ireland can adequately be resolved only through the 
engagement of the members of each community in a critically-reflexive, 
self-transformative process of reinterpreting their identities. While this 
conclusion certainly promises no easy road ahead, it may provide some 
reasons for cautious optimism.
Justice and Pluralism in Northern Ireland
While liberalism has always stressed the plurality of individual plans of 
life, Walzer, as we will recall, draws our attention to the social 
dimensions of pluralism. It is the social meaning of goods which 
determines their just distribution. This meaning cannot be grasped 
outside of the concrete context of a particular historical tradition. There 
is, he argues, no ahistorical idealised perspective from which we could 
derive general substantive principles of justice. It is the plurality of 
communities in the present and through history that is central to Walzer's 
concerns. He is critical both of atomistic individualism and of the 
cultural imperialism involved in the claim to universal validity for 
substantive standards of justice which have been derived from particular 
perspectives. Both liberalism and Marxism have been guilty of 
generalising universally from assumptions that have a limited cultural
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relevance.1 For Walzer of course ’’every substantive account of 
distributive justice is a local account.”2 Standards of justice are 
embedded within the shared understandings of particular historical 
communities. Individuals still choose to pursue certain goods in their life 
plans but the meaning of those goods and the norms of distribution 
appropriate to them can only be interpreted and understood within the 
concrete social context in which the individual is embedded. From 
Walzer’s perspective, demands for justice make no sense except within 
the context of a particular community which is constituted by the shared 
understandings of its members about the meaning of social goods.
We noted earlier that the merit of Walzer's pluralism, from the 
perspective of both hermeneutics and post-structuralism is its openness to 
otherness, its refusal to succumb to the temptation of seeking a closed 
and totalising system or a reductionist and abstract unifying principle of 
justice. Walzer respects the particularity of local communities and is 
hermeneutically sensitive to the context of other traditions and their moral 
worlds. He does not see pluralism as an unfortunate modem dilemma 
which we must learn to tolerate but rather as a cause for celebration as 
we contemplate the infinite multiplicity of possible cultures and possible 
human lives.3 This celebration of the plurality of cultures, each with their 
own norms of justice, makes us more sensitive to otherness and to the 
need for us to limit our own conception of what justice demands to its 
finite and limited context. We must respect both the boundaries which
1 See for example "Philosophy and Democracy" and "A Critique of Philosophical
Conversation."
2 Spheres o f Justice, 314.
3 Spheres o f Justice, 313.
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separate the spheres of justice within our own community and also the 
boundaries which separate our community from communities of others.
We also noted earlier how this particular form of respect for 
otherness leads Walzer into some serious difficulties. The idea of 
community which his theory of justice depends on is based on the notion 
of shared understandings of the meaning of social goods. This is a 
conception of a moral or an historical community bound together by 
shared cultural traditions and practices. The argument of Spheres of 
Justice however is set in the context of the political community.4 This 
raises problems wherever historical and political communities do not 
coincide. It is questionable whether or not Walzer's approach to issues of 
justice has much to say, for example, in a political setting where two or 
more distinct historical communities are intermingled. It is for this reason 
that it seems worthwhile to return to Walzer at this stage so as to assess 
in more detail the merits of his theory in the context of the Northern 
Ireland conflict.
Northern Ireland is a divided society in the sense that it is constituted 
by two fairly distinct historical traditions. In cases like this what is often 
at stake is not an interpretation of just distributive norms within a 
political community but rather the very legitimacy of the boundaries of 
that political community. If we think for a moment of the turbulent 
regions in the contemporary world of international politics we will realise 
that this is not an altogether unusual phenomenon. In the political entity 
of Northern Ireland there is no agreement on what the constitutional 
status should be, even indeed if it should constitute a separated political 
entity at all.5 While the Unionist majority defend the legitimacy of the
4 Spheres of Justice, 28.
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link with Britain, the Irish Nationalist minority aspire to a United Ireland. 
It seems clear that there is not one historical community, nor is there one 
sense of national identity, nor one cultural tradition within Northern 
Ireland. There are two historical communities sharing the territory of one 
political entity.6 An added difficulty is the fact that the two communities 
do not live in neatly separable geographical regions. If they did then it 
might be possible for one community to secede leaving two separated 
culturally homogenous political communities. Given the intermingling of 
the population in Northern Ireland it is highly questionable that partition 
(or, in this case, re-partition) would be a desirable option.
So to what extent can Walzer's theory of justice be applied to a 
political entity like Northern Ireland where the very legitimacy of the 
entity is itself in question? One of the features of the conflict has to do 
with the fact that Nationalists do not feel themselves to be recognised as 
full members of the political community. They are denied equal rights to 
express their collective identity. They do not feel themselves to be 
British and yet they are subject to the rule of the British state. For them it 
is as if they were subject to the state institutions of another community. 
Unionists on the other hand, in so far as they think of themselves as 
British, consider the state institutions to be a legitimate political structure
5 See John Whyte Interpreting Northern Ireland’ Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
Whyte gives a comprehensive survey of the intensive social scientific research on 
Northern Ireland. His survey will be my main source of empirical evidence to 
support my own interpretation of the problem.
6 This claim is a matter o f some dispute. While I have crudely simplified the issue
here, I do wish to defend the view that the conflict is primarily one between two 
separate historical communities. See Whyte Interpreting Northern Ireland,, 14- 
18, 101-110, 194-201. It does not follow that the roles of either Britain or the 
Irish Republic should be excluded from an analysis o f the conflict. See Joseph 
Ruane and Jennifer Todd "Diversity, Division and the Middle Ground in 
Northern Ireland" Irish Political Studies, 1 (1992), 73-98.
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for their community. Does Walzer’s contextualism deprive the minority 
of any plausible moral argument for equal rights to express their national 
identity and for this to be reflected in the political constitution and the 
institutions of the state? Can they make any claim to be unjustly denied 
those rights or are they dependent on the unlikely possibility of these 
political rights of national self-expression being granted willingly by the 
majority?7
Walzer does have some things to say about deeply divided societies 
in Spheres o f Justice. He suggests that where political and historical 
communities do not coincide then decisions about distributive justice 
would have to be made in smaller more homogenous units rather than in 
the state as such.8 Of course a decision about what these smaller units 
should look like would have to be worked out politically, at state level. 
This then is not very useful in a society where the legitimacy of the state 
itself is in question and where the majority would be in a strong position 
to secure advantages for themselves in any decentralisation of power. 
Furthermore there would be serious geo-political difficulties involved in 
finding units of cultural homogeneity within Northern Ireland which 
would be of an appropriate size to offer a plausible forum for debate over 
issues of distributive justice. Walzer also asserts that in a community 
that ”is so radically divided that a single citizenship is impossible then its 
territory must be divided."9 Again we have already seen that this is not a 
very attractive proposition in this case.
7 For an argument that Walzer's communitarian sensitivities ironically weaken the
case for minority cultural rights see Kymlicka Liberalism, Community and 
Culture, 220-236.
8 Spheres o f Justice, 29.
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In general it seems that when Walzer deals with political problems 
arising from a plurality of historical communities he is thinking of 
American society. It seems reasonable that an American political theorist 
who is committed to a contextualist theory of justice would focus his 
attention on pluralism in a highly diverse political culture such as his 
own.10 Walzer's vision is of a state that promotes pluralism by supporting 
intermediate associations such as labour unions, churches, neighbourhood 
groups and so on. These groups foster communal ties in an otherwise 
atomised, fragmented society. They allow for a decentralised state to 
encourage participative citizens to take control of local affairs. The state 
acts as a "republic of republics."11
This might well be a thought provoking response to problems of 
pluralism in the United States but it could be argued that in Northern 
Ireland the problem is not one of individual atomisation but rather that the 
two historical communities provide such strong communal ties that they 
make the division more difficult to bridge politically. Nor does this 
vision of a "republic of republics" have much chance of getting off the 
ground in a situation where the members of one community feel no
9 Spheres o f Justice, 62. It is worth noting that Walzer's views on partition are most
probably influenced by his liberal Jewish perspective on the Israel/Palestine 
question. See his Exodus and Revolution, New York: Basic Books, 1985 and 
for a sharp review from a Palestinian perspective, Edward W. Said "Michael 
Walzer's Exodus and Revolution: A Canaanite Reading" in Blaming the Victims: 
Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question, Edward Said and 
Christopher Hitchens (eds.), London: Verso, 1988, 161-178.
10 See for example "Pluralism in Political Perspective" in Michael Walzer et al. The
Politics o f Ethnicity, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1982, 1-28.
11 See "The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism" and also Walzer's "Comment" in
T aylor Multiculturalism and "The Politics o f Recognition", 99-103, where he 
argues that, given the peculiarity of its political culture, citizens of an immigrant 
society, like the United States, might well choose to have a liberal neutral state, 
not for its own sake, but as the best political expression of its own distinctive 
collective goals.
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loyalty to what they see as an illegitimate state. Perhaps we are 
expecting too much from Walzer here? We must recall however that 
there is, despite his emphasis on pluralism, an affirmation of a 
universalist code in his work. As we noted in section 2.3, the claim that 
all communities have their own norms of justice involves some minimal 
form of moral universalism . How might this relate to the veiy basic 
matter of justice that is at issue in Northern Ireland, the justness of the 
state boundary?
There is a hint of something more promising in Walzer’s discussion
about quota systems or the reservation of offices for members of
particular groups within society. He claims that
this sort of thing might be acceptable in a bi-national state, where the 
members of the two nations stand, in fact, as foreigners to one 
another. What is required between them is mutual accommodation, 
not justice in any positive sense; and accommodation may best be 
achieved in a federal system where both groups have some 
guaranteed representation. 12
This would be a case of politics acting ”as a substitute for justice.”13 It 
amounts to a proposal for a form of consociational democracy.14 This 
system is based on the idea of an executive government formed as a 
grand coalition of political leaders from the different communities. It is 
supported by a number of other structural features such as a mutual veto, 
proportionality in key positions (perhaps even in all occupations 
throughout the society) and segmental autonomy for each community.
12 Spheres o f Justice, 149.
13 He uses this formulation in his encounter with Dworkin, "Spheres of Justice: An
Exchange", 44.
14 See Arend Lijphardt Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration,
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
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These features combine to give an internal federalist system of 
government. Some of the features of consociational democracy have 
helped to provide a high degree of stable government in certain plural 
societies. Countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium or regions such 
as the Italian South Tyrol have all been successful in their efforts to find 
such political solutions to the problems of cultural pluralism. The idea of 
a "balanced ticket" for elections in some of the more culturally 
heterogeneous states in the USA is a case where the general idea has also 
been beneficial in more loosely pluralist societies.
Unfortunately Northern Ireland does not enjoy many of the 
favourable conditions for such a political solution to its problem of 
cultural plurality. The most crucial ingredient in working such a system 
is that both communities are willing to compromise. It is the attitudes of 
the members of the divided communities rather than the institutions 
themselves which make the system workable. The reluctance of the 
Unionist community to enter power sharing arrangements, up to the 
present at least, undermines any hope for a straightforward consociational 
solution.15 Not only is there no tradition of accommodation among the 
leaders of the communities but it is not all that clear, given for example 
the vehemence of Unionist resistance to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, that 
they are committed to the idea of a plural democracy at all. Furthermore 
the relative absence of cross-cutting cleavages or overarching loyalties 
exacerbate the divisions.
The consociational model does not offer much hope because of the 
relative size and strength of the communities. An analysis of the history 
of the origins of the Northern Ireland state and the way in which its
15 See Whyte Interpreting Northern Ireland’ 224-225.
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politics were conducted in the first fifty years of its existence reveals that 
the members of the Unionist community in general have not perceived it 
to be in their interests to engage openly with the claims of Nationalists 
regarding the question of the constitutional status.16 The fact that they are 
the majority community and their relative strength, based on the 
guarantees of successive British governments, have acted as obstacles, 
though not necessarily the only ones, to the emergence of any significant 
degree of flexibility among political actors on the fundamental issue of 
Northern Irish politics.
It would appear that what is needed in terms of a theory of justice 
adequate to the problems of a political entity like Northern Ireland is 
some standard which will enable us to move beyond pluralism. We want 
to do this without falling back into the difficulties involved in deriving 
substantive universalist principles of justice. These difficulties have 
already been considered at length in earlier sections of this thesis. It is 
clear however that the main weakness of Walzer’s theory of justice with 
respect to Northern Ireland is that it seems to assume that each 
community has an equal and legitimate right to cultural and political self- 
expression. Is this assumption warranted? It seems to me that it is not.
It leaves us bereft of any universalist standard by which we might 
evaluate, in a critical manner, opposed traditions or identities. How are 
we otherwise to assess the extent to which the claims of either 
community are legitimate? Without some such standard we cannot even 
explain why it is that consociational democracy, or indeed any looser 
form of pluralism, does not seem to work in Northern Ireland.
16 Whyte Interpreting Northern Ireland, 163-169 and Jennifer Todd "Unionist 
Political Thought" in A History o f Irish Political Thought, R. Eccleshall, V. 
Geoghegan, G. Boyce (eds.), London: Routledge, 1993, 190-211.
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From Communitarianism to Constitutional Patriotism
Since writing Spheres o f Justice, Walzer has gone much further in 
clarifying how some such standard might be justified. In two lectures 
given under the title "Nation and Universe" he argues for a minimal 
universalist rank ordering of nations.17 He focuses on the nation as the 
paradigm example of a moral community since he maintains that "it is 
probably true that the greatest evils in human history have occurred and 
continue to occur between nations."18 Although the evils of Northern 
Ireland may seem relatively insignificant in such a context, his choice of 
the nation is somewhat fortunate for our purposes here. What Walzer is 
seeking to do in these lectures is to justify a critical standard by which we 
can judge morally national communities in their relations with each other.
He begins by distinguishing between two kinds of moral 
universalism. Firstly, what he calls "covering-law universalism" assumes 
that a certain substantive morality, which is at present only adhered to by 
the select few, is the true morality for all peoples. Most monotheistic 
religions, various forms of revolutionary Marxism and any supposedly 
liberal form of imperialism that takes as its mission the task of 
"civilizing" other cultures, fall into this category. Secondly there is 
"reiterative universalism" which is the kind that Walzer is interested in 
defending. This is characterised, not surprisingly, by "its particularist 
focus and its pluralizing tendency." It accepts that each community has 
its own morality and should enjoy the tolerance and respect of other 
communities. At the same time it is rooted in particular historical
17 "Nation and Universe" in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, XI, Grethe B.
Peterson (ed.), Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990, 507-556.
18 "Nation and Universe", 536.
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experiences which lead to respect for the particularity of the experience 
of others and so is less likely to inspire confidence in any one substantive 
morality. This gives a positive foundation for tolerance of difference and 
respect for otherness.19 Essentially reiterative universalism demands that 
each nation respect the creativity and particularity of all other nations and 
with it their right to self-determination.20 Some nations do well according 
to this standard, others not so well.
The nations that do badly are those that tend to disregard other 
nations' "spontaneous and natural forms of self-expression". This 
disregard may come naturally to them. Covering-law universalist 
doctrines are most often invoked as justifications for such an attitude.21 
This denies the reiterative rights to creative self-determination of other 
nations. Furthermore such denial assumes a loss of agency on the part of 
the victim nationals and an implicit claim to inherent cultural 
superiority.22 Walzer notes that for any nation which is under threat, or 
perhaps in the case of a newly independent nation, there is often a 
tendency for a new imperialism to emerge which forces a crude 
uniformity on the self-consciousness of the dominant community. This 
will often be premised on a claim to cultural superiority and it will often
19 All of the brief quotations in this paragraph are from "Nation and Universe", 510-
515.
20 Presumably Walzer would maintain that this differs from conventional liberalism in
at least three ways. First, it rejects substantive universalist principles of justice. 
Second, the emphasis here is on cultural pluralism and not just a plurality of 
individual plans of life. Third, this approach involves a much more positive view 
o f the enriching effects of being open to cultural, and not just individual, 
otherness.
21 "Nation and Universe", 546-547.
22 "Nation and Universe", 543.
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result in the corollary of such a claim, the oppression of minorities. In 
this sense ’’the test of every nationalism is the ’nation’ that comes next.”23 
Walzer’s reiterative universalism can acknowledge the strength and 
meaning of nationalism while at the same time confronting this form of 
nationalist blindness. He also argues that it can help us to understand and 
to justify state boundaries, or intra-state boundaries (as in 
consociationalism). While admitting that there is no sure way of getting 
them right his claim is that boundaries should be drawn in such a way as 
to prevent the disregard and repression of cultural creativity.24
Does this attempt by Walzer to transcend pluralism in this minimalist 
way get us any further in an understanding of what justice might demand 
in Northern Ireland? There are clearly some ideas worth pursuing in 
terms of an interpretation of the relationship between the two 
communities. We might suggest that Unionist disregard for some 
’’spontaneous and natural forms” of (Irish nationalist) self-expression 
such as the Irish language, Gaelic sports, traditional Irish music and 
dancing, reveals an implicit sense of superiority in their own identity. 
Most importantly of course this disregard involves the oppression of the 
Nationalist minority by denying them, as human agents, their reiterative 
rights to creative political self-determination. This is often rationalised 
with a version of covering-law moral universalism that purports to be 
enlightened, progressive and liberal.25 We might be able to explain this
23 "Nation and Universe", 544.
24 "Nation and Universe", 554-555.
25 I will argue below that arguments for Unionism that invoke liberal principles are
often blind to the real grievances o f the Nationalist community. For two 
pertinent examples see Arthur Aughey Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement, Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1989 and R. L. 
McCartney Liberty and Authority in Ireland' Derry: Field Day Pamphlets, 1985.
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denial of Nationalist rights in relation to Unionist insecurities. The 
Unionist community occupies a rather precarious position. They are of 
course dependent on British guarantees while at the same time they feel 
under threat from the territorial claims of the Irish Republic as well as the 
violent campaign of the IRA. These insecurities might help to explain 
why there has been an apparently crude uniformity forced on Unionist 
self-consciousness since the formation of the Northern Irish state.26
Walzer’s reiterative universalist standard can then give us some 
interpretive guide as to why the Northern Irish problem of plurality has 
been so difficult to resolve. However it does not help us to move beyond 
this towards a view which could throw some light on the fundamental 
question of the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. The standard 
Walzer invokes appears to lead us fairly straightforwardly to the 
conclusion that the present boundary is unjustified since it permits the 
disregard and repression of (Irish nationalist) cultural creativity. This is 
all very well but it does nothing to address Unionist reiterative claims nor 
does it give us any indication as to how Unionists might accept that they 
have an inherent sense of cultural superiority and a tendency to dominate 
and disregard the self-expression of the Nationalist identity. I believe 
that a strong case can be made for the view that the main obstacle to 
progress towards a normatively justified solution to the Northern Ireland 
conflict is indeed a certain aspect of the Unionist identity that fails to 
respect the otherness of Irish Nationalists.27 This would allow us to
26 See Terence Brown The Whole Protestant Community: The Making o f a
Historical Myth, Derry: Field Day Pamphlets, 1985.
27 Jennifer Todd "Unionist Political Thought" and also "The Limits of Britishness"
The Irish Review, 5 (1989), 11-16. For further references that support this 
interpretation see Whyte Interpreting Northern Ireland, 162-169.
317
explain that the Unionist community's unwillingness to compromise is 
rooted in certain dominating tendencies that are partly constitutive of 
their very identity. As it stands however, the analysis does not offer us 
any real hope for a just pluralism in Northern Ireland.
In order to overcome their blindness to Nationalist reiterative rights 
Unionists would have to engage in a self-critical process of reinterpreting 
their own identity. A workable and justifiable solution will depend on 
any surviving vestiges of an imperialistic attitude being overcome and 
discarded. Unionists, in so far as they think of themselves as inherently 
the cultural superiors of Nationalists, must be expected to reinterpret both 
their own identity and their understanding to the identity of the other. In 
other words the Unionist identity would itself have to be transformed if it 
were to achieve the required openness to otherness that justice demands. 
We need some idea as to what would motivate such a radical 
reinterpretation. Walzer's pluralist approach to justice leaves us pretty 
much in the dark here. What is clear is that if a blindness to otherness in 
the Unionist identity is the main obstacle to progress towards a political 
solution to the Northern Ireland problem, then a simple appeal to the 
value of cultural pluralism is far from adequate.
It would appear then that, as a theoretical guide towards a 
normatively justified solution to the Northern Ireland conflict, Walzer's 
hermeneutic approach to justice does not get us very far. What is missing 
is any grounds for the belief that Unionist blindness to otherness might be 
overcome. It seems to me that we might be able to address this problem 
more effectively by turning to the less ambiguous version of moral 
universalism that is defended by Habermas. Since moral discourse is 
concerned with the search for generalisable interests it might help us to 
discover what could motivate Unionists to call the constitutional status 
quo into question. It seems to me that if they are genuinely to be open to
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alternative constitutional arrangements then Unionists must inevitably be 
drawn into the type of critical self-questioning that discourse requires. 
Engagement in this potentially self-transformative process of identity 
reinterpretation is a necessary prerequisite to any political discourse that 
could possibly unearth a constitutional arrangement which would satisfy 
a generalisable interest in this case. Nothing short of this could, I 
suggest, provide a stable basis for social unity, harmony and peace 
among all the people of Northern Ireland.
As we have already seen, Walzer does provide a general principle 
which protects pluralism. However this is simply too vague to yield any 
specific guidelines in a situation where two historical communities 
disagree about very basic norms, such as the dispute about the Irish 
border. The main problem with Walzer's account is that it cannot get 
beyond this disagreement, despite the fact that it can be critical of less 
tolerant, imperialistic cultures. Specifically in this case it cannot reveal 
what legitimate rights of cultural expression Unionists do have, nor could 
it persuade them to overcome and discard the aspects of their identity that 
are at the root of the political stalemate. Habermas’s procedural 
universalism endorses Walzer's rejection of substantive, determinate 
principles of justice which claim universal scope. At the same time he 
offers us a way of conceiving how a discourse about such disputes such 
as the one we are considering here might proceed in a normatively 
justified manner.
We will recall that the central claim of discourse ethics is that if we 
wish to come to a rational agreement with each other about the justness 
of a certain norm, then there are legitimate procedural constraints on the 
arguments that we can make.28 These constraints constitute rules of
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discourse that are universally valid since they are grounded in the 
intuitive knowledge of all communicatively competent individuals in 
modem societies. When we are engaged in communicative action we 
presuppose a certain reciprocal accountability, that we can justify the 
claims we make if called upon to do so. If a certain validity claim is 
called into question, then in order to continue the quest for understanding 
we must engage in a process of argumentation that has as its goal a 
rationally motivated agreement.
Within a modem context, when we participate in a discourse we 
make certain necessary and unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions. As 
we have seen, Habermas expresses these in terms of rules of 
argumentation. Insofar as we seek a rational agreement over a disputed 
norm we accept the following rules; that no subject capable of speech 
and action is excluded from the discourse, that all participants are 
allowed to question any assertion, to introduce any assertion or to 
express their attitudes, desires and needs, and that the exercise of these 
rights is not to be prevented by coercion, whether internal or external.29 
From these presuppositions Habermas grounds his universalist moral 
theory. What we must assess now is whether or not this particular 
defence of moral universalism throws more light on the problem of 
justice at hand, than our critical analysis examination of Walzer’s work 
managed to do?
Before developing the argument in this direction it is important to 
stress once more some implications of the fact that Habermas's moral- 
theoretical claims are based on the universally valid presuppositions of
28 We went into the details of Habermas’s justification for this claim in section 3.2
above.
29 Habermas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 89.
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argumentation rather than the particular context of a historical 
community. It would be wrong, for at least two reasons, to think of this 
theory as a version of covering-law universalism which fails to respect 
otherness. Firstly the principles of discourse ethics are formal and offer 
nothing more that a procedural test for substantive principles within 
concrete contexts. Secondly it does not have any on-going moral agenda 
as such itself but rather it only comes into play whenever a normative 
dispute arises in a particular context. Discourse ethics provides a 
procedure for normatively justified argumentation whenever that is 
needed. With regard to the case of Northern Ireland, discourse ethics 
does not claim to offer us the solution that has eluded everyone else. The 
point is that a moral theory cannot itself provide a substantive solution to 
a normative dispute. This is a matter for the relevant political actors. All 
a theory can do (and it should do it!) is to elaborate the procedural 
conditions under which a normatively justified solution could emerge.
Not surprisingly, Habermas brings a rather different perspective to 
bear on problems of national identity than that of Walzer’s contextualism. 
Habermas argues that in Western societies an unquestioning and naive 
identification with the traditions of a particular nation has been shattered, 
by the experiences of the threat of nuclear war, the shrinking of the world 
through mass communication, mass immigration, but primarily through 
our collective experience of the horrors of Auschwitz.30 A more abstract 
constitutional patriotism now sets limits to ’’the imperatives of the self-
30 Habermas developed his thinking in this regard in the context of the recent
German Historikerstreit (Historian's controversy) about the legacy of the Third 
Reich. See "A Kind of Settling of Damages" and "Historical Consciousness and 
Post-Traditional Identity: The Federal Republic's Orientation to the West" in the 
collection of Habermas's writing on this and related themes, The New 
Conservatism, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989, 207-248 and 249-267.
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assertion of national forms of life.”31 This involves a shift in the balance
between the two key elements of national consciousness, the universalist
value orientations of democracy and the particularism of a nation which
distinguishes itself from others.
The abstract idea of the universalization of democracy and human 
rights forms the hard substance through which the rays of national 
tradition - the language, literature and history of one’s own nation - 
are refracted.32
Becoming conscious of the ambivalence of our own tradition gives us a
more critically reflexive stance. This allows us some distance to take a
more flexible attitude in deciding which aspects of our traditions we want
to carry forward and which we want to discard.
Constitutional patriotism can set its own limits by listening to and
engaging with the claims of others. It is this precisely that characterises
for Habermas what moral universalism means today.
Relativizing one’s own form of existence to the legitimate claims of 
other forms of life, according equal rights to aliens and others ... not 
sticking doggedly to the universalization of one's own identity, not 
marginalizing that which deviates from one’s own identity.33
As we saw in the last section, Habermas allows for the fact that each 
constitutional state will have its own ethical pattern, one that expresses
31 The New Conservatism, 256. The notion of constitutional patriotism was
introduced briefly in the last section. Habermas has developed this idea at much 
greater length in Faktizitdt und Geltung, but see also "Citizenship and National 
Identity" and "Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States" for recent 
comments on this theme.
32 The New Conservatism, 262.
33 "Jurgen Habermas: An Interview on Ethics, Politics and History by Jean-Marc
Ferry" Universalism Vs. Communitarianism, David Rasmussen (ed.), 207-213, 
here at 210.
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its particular identity. Impartiality must however remain at the core of 
justice if the equal rights of all are to be guaranteed within the framework 
of a constitutional state. The ethical employment of practical reason will 
have an important role to play in the networks of communication around 
which a legitimate political discourse can be grounded. But it remains 
constrained and shaped by moral principles that are not justified in the 
context of a particular form of life but that rather claim to be valid 
universally.
Discursive Legitimation and Northern Ireland's Constitutional 
Status
The notion of constitutional patriotism captures appropriately the way in 
which Habermas’s relates his moral theory to questions of national 
identity. Is it legitimate however to expect actors engaged in a discourse 
about a disputed norm to adopt the sort of flexible attitude towards 
tradition that constitutional patriotism demands? There is a necessary 
link for Habermas between this attitude and the rationality of the actors 
involved. This demand is not imposed externally but rather it is 
presupposed internally in the rules of discourse. A rational defence of a 
given norm must seek to show that a justification of the norm could meet 
with the approval of all those affected by it. It must be underpinned by a 
generalisable interest. It should be clear from our earlier discussion of 
discourse ethics that this quest for generalisable interests is only possible 
if the actors involved adopt a critically flexible attitude towards their 
need interpretations and towards their own identities.
If there is no agreement on any particular norm, as has clearly been 
the case up to now in the politics of Northern Ireland, then the 
participants will have to resort to some compromise. We can distinguish 
between a legitimate compromise that is rationally-motivated, and which
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could be justified according to discursive conditions, and an illegitimate 
compromise that is a function of a power relationship, and so is only 
acceptable to the participants on prudential grounds under conditions of 
unequal bargaining. It has been argued that an acceptable compromise in 
Northern Ireland would be equal citizenship for all, integrated within a 
culturally heterogeneous British state.34 It seems plausible that this 
argument does not transgress, in any obvious way, Walzer's principle of 
cultural tolerance. Unionism it is claimed here does not seek to be the 
dominant nation or culture, since this compromise would be justified not 
in terms of nationalist self-determination but rather in terms of the liberal 
principles underpinning the modem constitutional democratic (and 
culturally plural) state. However, despite initial appearances, this 
particular appeal to modem constitutional principles fails the legitimacy 
test that discourse ethics offers. This compromise can, I believe, be 
shown to be premised on an assumption of initially unequal bargaining 
positions.
The existence of the Irish border is itself a structure of inequality in 
the context of the dispute about the constitutional status of Northern 
Ireland. It privileges the Unionist majority politically and allows them to 
express their national identity through the institutions of the state. I think 
it is clear that the interests of the Nationalist community have not been 
and cannot be satisfied if the assumption is unquestioningly made that 
Northern Ireland is legitimately British. Offering equal British citizenship 
to Nationalists suppresses the vital issue of whether or not the border 
itself can be justified, leaving it off the liberal Unionist agenda entirely. 
This clearly cannot satisfy one of the rules of argumentation, that each
34 See the first chapter of Aughey Under Siege.
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participant can call any norm into question. Nor does it address the fact 
that the structures of power under present arrangements prevent 
Nationalists from expressing their own national identity in any 
meaningful way. The compromise advocated by liberal Unionists is 
therefore, according to this standard, illegitimate. They naively assume 
that a British state could act as a neutral arbiter between the conflicting 
parties in the dispute. This view incredibly presupposes that the real 
source of conflict, whether Northern Ireland should be British or not, is 
not at issue at all. Historically of course since they have failed to provide 
Nationalists with a moral justification for the border, they have had to 
rely on coercion to uphold their unequal status. The Union with Britain 
has been defended not with reasons but with power.
This leaves us with the question as to what reasons we have for 
believing that Unionists would be motivated to enter into an open 
discourse about the legitimacy of the constitutional status quo. As we 
have seen, it is at this stage that Walzer's reiterative universalism runs out 
of steam entirely. The attitude of critical flexibility which is required in 
any sincere quest for generalisable interests involves the type of self- 
transformative reinterpretation of Unionist identity that I have argued is 
required if blindness to the claims of Irish Nationalism is to be overcome. 
Naturally any identity resists such radical questioning. However it must 
be kept in mind that discourse ethics does not bring the veiy identity of 
Unionism itself as a whole into question. It is only the aspects of the 
Unionist identity that act as an obstacle to the recognition of Nationalist 
rights that must be reinterpreted. This would be sufficient for the 
question of the constitutional status to become a subject of discourse.
It may well be argued that any political discourse on Northern Ireland 
would also require Nationalists to reinterpret aspects of their identity. 
This is certain to be the case should the question of the constitutional
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status actually become a subject of discourse. However, critical 
flexibility on the part of Unionists is of much greater immediate concern. 
This is because Nationalists are as things stand readily predisposed to 
adopt a critical attitude towards the current constitutional arrangements. 
Their interests remain unsatisfied in very obvious ways. In contrast, 
given the structure of power at present, the reinterpretation of aspects of 
the Unionist identity is more problematic. For one thing the Unionist 
community may not feel that it is necessary to engage in an open 
discourse in order to have what it takes to be its best interests satisfied. 
Furthermore the reinterpretation of the Unionist identity is a necessary 
prerequisite to any possible discourse about the constitutional status 
getting under way at all.
This is certainly not to suggest however that the political 
responsibility for the creation of conditions under which a real discourse 
could take place lies entirely with the Unionist community. On the 
contrary, that responsibility must be shared by the British government, 
the government of the Irish Republic and all strands of the Nationalist 
community in Northern Ireland, along with all strands of the Unionist 
community. It might even be shared more widely to include European 
and even UN institutions. Every political actor must be judged according 
to the extent to which they contribute to the creation of favourable 
conditions for real discourse. This will presumably involve building up 
an atmosphere of trust that will assure the Unionist community that their 
identity as a whole is not in question. The critical reflection on identities 
involved in discourse can only be achieved co-operatively and never by 
one of the parties in isolation from the other relevant actors. A spirit of 
co-operation can be either fostered or undermined by any political action. 
But while the creation of favourable conditions for discourse is a task that 
all parties share, the actual reinterpretation of the Unionist identity that
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would allow them to enter such a discourse can only be achieved by 
Unionists themselves. They can be helped or hindered by others but 
ultimately it is how they act that will determine whether or not they adopt 
the critical attitude that would allow a discourse about the constitutional 
status to take place.
I believe that motivation for such reinterpretation of the Unionist 
identity exists in the concrete context of Northern Ireland at present. We 
have already alluded to the particular insecurities of Unionist identity. 
First of all there is the relationship with Britain, which is at best uneasy. 
While Unionists depend on Britain to uphold their privileges they realise 
that public opinion in Britain (and beyond) does not look altogether 
favourably on their cause. For this reason alone the threat of a British 
withdrawal can never be discounted. Secondly, there is constant 
questioning of the status quo by Nationalists. This is supported by the 
claims of the Irish Republic and is publicised by the activities of the IRA. 
All of this uncertainty leads to self-questioning. These distressing 
circumstances might be described as disequilibrium-inducing phenomena 
for the Unionist identity.35 They loosen the particularist strand of the 
identity which distinguishes Unionism from others and point towards the 
kind of moral universalism (implicit in constitutional patriotism) which is 
open to the legitimate claims of other identities. In so far as the Unionist 
community seeks a normatively justified solution to the problem of 
pluralism in Northern Ireland, they must engage in a process of critically 
reinterpreting their needs, their interests and their own collective identity 
in ways which open them to the claims of Nationalists. Of course I have 
already indicated that they can be assisted in this by assurances from the
35 See White The Recent Work o f Jurgen Habermas, 77-83 for a relevant discussion.
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other relevant actors that neither their identity as such, nor their own 
legitimate reiterative rights, are under threat. Ultimately however they 
can only overcome their own insecurities when they can recognise the 
equal and legitimate rights of other forms of life.
As I have already argued discourse ethics offers us the basis for a 
critique of the liberal Unionist case for equal citizenship and full 
integration with the UK. It does not yield any alternative concrete norm 
as a solution to the problem. Rather it limits itself strictly to advocating a 
procedure which provides a test for competing norms. It might however 
allow us to project tentatively how a discourse might proceed. Such a 
projection would have no special claim to validity as norms can only be 
justified if they could be freely accepted by all those affected by them in 
a real (and not an idealised) discourse. At the same time it can make a 
contribution to a rethinking of the interests of the actors in relation to 
possible norms. I have suggested that the constitutional status quo is 
itself a structure of inequality which renders it normatively illegitimate 
under present conditions. Other possible solutions could be analysed in 
the context of discourse theory with the hope of stimulating critical 
reflection on the part of the relevant actors. It might also be possible to 
assess the extent to which each projected solution could satisfy 
substantive generalisable interests. I cannot hope to offer such an 
analysis of the various possible constitutional arrangements that have 
been proposed with regard to Northern Ireland.36 What I am proposing is 
that such assessments be made in the light of Habermas’s discourse 
theory as this provides the most adequate normative basis for the critical 
task involved. It must be stressed however that concrete questions as to
36 See Whyte Interpreting Northern Ireland, 209-243.
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how such political discourse should actually be brought about, and as to 
how it should proceed, must be left up to the actors themselves.
One thing we can say is that the upshot of a real discourse should 
have certain clear advantages over the status quo. It should more 
adequately satisfy generalisable interests. The legitimate claims of both 
communities would be recognised and this would necessarily involve a 
gain for Irish Nationalists in terms of the self-expression of their national 
identity. Both communities would gain in the new pluralist context by 
being better able to relativise their own form of existence by "not sticking 
doggedly to the universalization of [their] own identity". The emergence 
of this form of constitutional patriotism would bring further liberating 
gains. Nationalists would no longer suffer the indignity of oppression as 
a dominated minority. Unionists would overcome both their inability to 
come to terms with the disequilibrium-inducing phenomena that strain 
their identity under present circumstances and also their blindness to 
others which deprives them of a rational justification for the status quo. 
No Unionist denies that it is in their interest to have normatively justified 
political institutions. This fact alone can provide some hope that the 
present stalemate in the politics of Northern Ireland will not be 
interminable.
How these features of an alternative framework for the politics of 
Northern Ireland are best to be institutionalised would become a pressing 
matter for participants in a real discourse.37 I mention them here only to
37 While I have alluded to alternative arrangements, solutions and frameworks, I am 
not assuming that the entity of Northern Ireland would continue in some form or 
other after a real discourse. There are many other possibilities (repartition, a 
United Ireland, fuller integration with the UK, new European arrangements) 
which would alter the geo-political structure of the territory under consideration. 
Nothing is ruled out nor is anything guaranteed, least of all the boundaries, or 
indeed the existence, of the political entity of Northern Ireland.
briefly elaborate some necessary features of any concrete norm that could 
emerge from the type of procedure that I have been advocating. Whether 
or not anything approaching a real discourse will take place depends very 
much on the actors involved. There are obviously no guarantees. If a 
theory of justice can help at all in this respect, then it should be made to 
do so. As I have suggested above, all political action should be evaluated 
according to the extent to which it encourages the form of critical 
reflection on identities that real discourse requires. I believe that cautious 
optimism can be justified as it is clear that many interests of the actors 
involved (including the Unionist community) remain unsatisfied at 
present. An alternative framework, based on the principles of 
constitutional patriotism, promises greater satisfaction of generalisable 
interests, not least of which would be a constitutional arrangement that is 
both rationally motivated and normatively justified. If we are to give an 
adequate account of what justice demands in a deeply divided society, 
such as Northern Ireland, then Walzer's concern with pluralism must be 
supplemented with the sharper normative bite that discourse ethics 
provides.
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3.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have assessed the work of Jurgen Habermas in relation 
to the problem that has been the central focus of this thesis. In 
Habermas's work we find a procedural approach to the justification of 
substantive principles of justice in modem societies which avoids the 
most important weaknesses that we found in the work of both Rawls and 
Walzer. Rawls's procedural test for substantive principles is flawed 
because it represents a monological point of view which attempts to 
eliminate all that differentiates one person from another in its conception 
of impartiality. Furthermore, this conception of impartiality is built on an 
implausible claim that political morality can be treated in isolation from 
other comprehensive moral commitments. Walzer on the other hand, in 
giving up completely on the philosophical project of justifying an 
impartial point of view is left with an approach to justice that is 
dependent on the identities and traditions of particular communities. 
Within a modem context this hermeneutic conception of justice 
represents an insufficiently sharp critical tool for effective and legitimate 
social criticism. The dialogical conception of impartiality that is implicit 
in Habermas's discourse ethics enables us to move beyond the limits of 
both Rawls’s monological proceduralism and Walzer's contextualist anti- 
proceduralism.
In the first section we explored Habermas's broad philosophical 
project in terms of its concern with the defence of reason, modernity and 
the Enlightenment. Habermas advocates a shift from the philosophy of 
consciousness to the philosophy of intersubjective understanding. It is 
through a reconstructive analysis of the structure of everyday 
communication in human language as such that this defence of reason is 
to be elaborated. The priority of communicative action as the original
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mode of language use determines the fundamental contours of a critical 
social theory of advanced capitalist societies. It is the structures of 
communicative rationality that facilitate the reproduction of a lifeworld 
on which human identities depend. If these identities are not to be 
damaged then the lifeworld must not be colonised by the systemic 
imperatives of economic markets and administrative bureaucracies.
These same structures of communication are the grounds on which 
Habermas's justification of a philosophical conception of an impartial 
point of view is built. As we saw in the second section, the dialogical 
nature of the impartial procedure according to which moral principles are 
normatively justified reflects the pragmatic presuppositions that are 
necessary and unavoidable for all human actors who seek to reach a 
reasoned agreement with one another whenever a matter of justice is in 
dispute. There is no need for monological abstraction since these 
presuppositions are internal to everyday communication itself. Nor is 
there any need to eliminate differences in adopting an impartial point of 
view since this in itself requires the actors to take a hypothetical attitude 
towards their interpretations of their own needs, interests and identities. 
The procedure represents a genuinely intersubjective, open encounter 
between real participants, each of whom are entitled to speak in the 
discourse from their own particular point of view on condition that they 
are also willing to adopt the points of view of all other participants who 
are affected by the norm in question. A discourse can represent a self- 
transformative moment for any or all of the participants involved.
Moral norms or principles of justice do not depend, from this 
theoretical perspective, on the traditions of any one particular culture. 
They are rather justified in terms of their representing a generalisable 
interest. This dialogical view of impartiality reflects a learning process 
that is a necessary development for any culture that wants to deal in a
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communicatively rational way with the fact that norms which were once 
taken for granted have now been called into question. In this sense the 
practice of moral discourse is a necessary, and not a contingent, aspect of 
modernity. Discourse ethics is a cognitivist moral theory which regards 
claims to normative rightness to be analogous to claims to truth.
In a modem context the demands of morality constrain particular 
communities in their ethical reflections on their own collective identities. 
In the third section we saw how Habermas reformulates the Kantian 
claim that the right is prior to the good in terms of the distinction between 
a moral and an ethical employment of practical reason. While morality 
constrains hermeneutic reflection on identities, it remains embedded in 
ethical life to the extent that moral norms are always institutionalised in 
ways that are marked by the ethical patterns of particular traditions. 
Discourse ethics therefore represents a liberal holist approach to matters 
of justice in that the rights of the individual can only be respected if the 
intersubjective bonds of solidarity that constitute their identity-forming 
context are also protected. Its liberalism is reflected in its affirmation of 
the priority of right. At the same time, Habermas maintains that the 
ethical pattern of a constitutional state represents a holist commitment to 
the embodiment of just institutions in the context of a particular tradition. 
These institutions are in part constitutive of the identity of those 
individuals whose rights they guarantee.
Finally, in the fourth section, we examined one particular dispute 
about justice in order to show in detail how the demands of justice 
necessarily open particular traditions to the legitimate claims of other 
forms of life. Any possible moral discourse about a just constitutional 
solution in Northern Ireland will depend on the parties involved 
becoming engaged in ethical reflection on their own identities in ways 
that allow them to adopt the perspective of all other participants affected
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by the norm in dispute. I argued that this applies most particularly to the 
Unionist community. The discussion of this case again highlighted the 
partiality of Walzer's hermeneutics in that his minimalist universalism is 
insufficiently dialogical to provide us with a theoretical understanding as 
to how the participants are rationally to respond to the actual demands of 
justice in this context. The dialogical nature of Habermas’s procedure, 
built as it is on the rational structures of everyday communication, makes 
it clear that no generalisable interest could be satisfied in this case unless 
the parties involved were to adopt the hypothetical attitude towards their 
identities that a genuinely impartial point of view requires.
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CONCLUSION
Philosophers do not have any special qualification that would allow them 
to determine the content of a substantive account of justice for a modem 
society. They can however, and indeed they should, seek to ground 
rationally a philosophical conception of an impartial point of view. An 
impartial procedure that is justified philosophically can then act as a test 
for the legitimacy of substantive claims that are raised about justice in a 
modem political context. This legitimacy test is however not to be 
carried out by philosophers themselves but by all the members of the 
community who are to be affected by the norms and principles about 
which these claims are made.
Modernity is characterised by a proliferation of comprehensive moral 
commitments and reasonable conceptions of a good human life. Under 
these conditions, we have no option but to theorise justice in terms of a 
procedural framework that treats each individual person as a subject of 
justice in an impartial way. This is what I mean by endorsing the Kantian 
project. Habermas's procedure of impartiality is superior to that of Rawls 
because of its dialogical nature. The rules of argumentation that 
characterise an impartial point of view represent the pragmatic 
presuppositions that no communicatively competent participant can avoid 
if a genuine attempt is being made to achieve a rationally justified 
consensus on a disputed moral norm. Anything and everything can be 
brought into question in a moral discourse that is regulated according to 
these procedural rules. Participants can even call into question 
Habermas's fallible reconstruction of the rules themselves. This 
procedure, unlike the monological view from the original position, is 
dynamic rather than static. It facilitates the generation of collective
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insights since, in the encounter, all participants adopt a hypothetical 
attitude towards their own initial moral intuitions as well as their 
interpretations of needs, interests and identities.
Endorsing the Kantian project involves an affirmation of the priority 
of right. Walzer is justified in maintaining that a substantive account of 
justice will reflect, to some degree, the historical context and the cultural 
traditions of particular communities. He is also justified in indicating the 
fact that these substantive principles are constitutive, at least in part, of 
the identities of these communities and further, that this collective 
identity is constitutive, in part, of the identities of individual citizens. The 
priority of right is not incompatible with these holist views. However, 
Walzer's rejection of the Kantian project makes it impossible for him to 
show how his holism could allow for an adequate defence of the priority 
of right. This leads to serious problems in his approach to justice and 
social criticism in a modem context. Without a philosophically justified 
conception of an impartial point of view, Walzer gives us an insufficient 
basis for an effective defence of reason from the effects of power in 
processes of democratic deliberation about principles of justice.
By providing us with a dialogical conception of an impartial point of 
view, Habermas shows us how such a philosophically justified procedure 
is necessary for, and not in any way a threat to, democracy. At the same 
time, his distinction between morality and ethical life allows him to affirm 
the priority of right in a way that is compatible with the holist view that 
the substance of justice is constitutive of the identities of particular 
communities. Universalist moral norms and principles of justice are 
justified according to this discursive procedure which is not dependent on 
any one historical tradition. Under modem conditions these universalist 
principles penetrate into any form of ethical life that could claim to be 
just. In this way, Habermas overcomes the partiality of hermeneutics.
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But these universalist principles must be applied in particular contexts 
and so they will be ethically patterned. To this extent, Habermas 
presents us with a liberal holist approach to justice.
It is the intersubjective basis of Habermas’s procedure that sets it 
apart from Rawls’s, allowing for the shift from a monological to a 
dialogical conception of impartiality. Of course, Habermas also avoids 
the atomistic conception of the person that has been at the foundation of 
many traditional liberal attempts to ground an account of justice in certain 
(natural) individual rights. Nor does he rely on a strongly communitarian 
conception of democracy that ties individuals too tightly to the common 
will. This is one of the dangers involved in Walzer's rejection of the 
Kantian project. If we treat the community as a macro-subject in this 
way, then we do not allow the real differences between individuals and 
social groups of modem societies to be expressed in democratic 
deliberation. Neither atomistic liberalism nor a holism that is 
insufficiently liberal could account for a genuinely intersubjective basis 
for the generation of shared insights. Habermas's liberal holism is 
superior to other approaches to justice since it stresses the fact that 
justice and solidarity, which facilitates these shared insights, are two 
sides of the one coin. If the lifeworld is to be reproduced 
communicatively, as it must be, then this inextricable link between justice 
and solidarity must not be overlooked.
It is important to note that from Habermas's perspective, and in 
contrast to Walzer's. there are no moral communities as such in the 
modem world. While every modem community is ethically unique, 
morally the demands of justice, in terms of a universalist code, are the 
same for each of them. Justice demands that in modem societies this 
universalist code becomes embedded in the political culture of each 
ethically unique community. The universalist principles of justice
337
involved then become internal moral resources that can be drawn on in an 
attempt to resolve disputes about justice in each particular context.
While each community is challenged by the requirement that norms be 
justified in terms of a conception of an impartial point of view, each 
retains its ethical pattern in the application of norms. There will of 
course be certain disputes within each society that are peculiar to that 
society and these can be resolved ethically on the basis of an interpretive 
account of what it is that the community wants to strive towards. Despite 
their limited scope, even these ethico-political discourses, if they are to 
be legitimate, must follow the procedural rules of argumentation that are 
justified in Habermas’s discourse ethics.
It would appear then that much of the normative content of 
substantive accounts of justice in modem societies will be universal in 
scope. The principles involved will be justified in terms of generalisable 
interests and not in terms of the traditions of one particular form of life. 
The procedure of justification is of course internally grounded in the 
necessary and unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions of communicative 
action. These universalist principles of justice are constitutive of the 
identities of all just political communities. They reflect not a contingent 
historical development but the outcome of a rational process of 
modernisation. If the people of any society are to learn rightly how to 
deal with the facts of modem pluralism then they will have to 
institutionalise forms of discourse that reflect, at least in some 
approximate way, the philosophical conception of an impartial point of 
view that Habermas outlines. It is in this sense that discourse ethics is 
cognitivist, treating normative validity claims and truth claims in an 
analogous manner.
Ultimately this analysis may point us in the direction of a world state, 
or at least towards global political institutions that can implement
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effectively some normatively justified universalist code. Whether or not 
we take this direction will depend on the historical struggles that will be 
carried out within each unique modem ethical context.
The challenge that each modem political community certainly does 
now face is to institutionalise discursive procedures that will allow for 
invigorated public spheres to engage in a critical analysis of substantive 
principles of justice. These institutions must facilitate a complex network 
of interaction where moral, ethico-political, pragmatic and legal 
discourses can all flourish. This network of interaction is the only 
guarantee we have that substantive principles of justice will be 
legitimated both democratically and in an impartial manner. The content 
of a substantive account of justice must be the outcome of open and 
inclusive democratic encounters. Philosophers can participate, just like 
all other citizens, in these encounters. But the discursive practices 
involved must be guided and tested by a philosophically justified 
conception of an impartial point of view. Our hopes for a just future must 
be grounded in the successful institutionalisation of some such discursive 
practices.
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